^ 


RUSSIA 


'•^^■■u:-i-:'-i't^::-^n:iit::- 


AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 


j'Tiivi,.'.  '■:•■.■"■:-■■••' •!Vijift*i'''ttiii* 


GREGOR  ALEXIN  SKY 


V-'  .  .  1-1-.'  'iyvfimpm^^ 


^ 


0'    9 


/96* 


RUSSIA   AND   THE    GREAT   WAR 


RUSSIA    AND    THE 
GREAT   WAR 


BY 

GREGOR    ALEXINSKY 

Ex-Deputy  to  the  Duma 


Translated  by 

BERNARD    MIALL 


NEW    YORK 

CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

597-599    FIFTH    AVENUE 
1915 


(AH  rights  resen'ed) 


'KL 


"  Petrograd,  12  January. — At  Lcmberg  the  con- 
valescent Russian  soldiers,  blinded  by  vitriol,  which 
was  flung  in  their  faces  by  the  Germans,  offer  a  pitiful 
spectacle.  With  bandaged  features,  they  move  in 
Indian  file,  holding  on  to  a  cord,  and  led  by  a  guide  " 
(Telegram  published  in  the  journal  L Humanite, 
January  13,  1915). 

TO   THESE    RUSSIAN   SOLDIERS, 

AND   TO   OTHER   VICTIMS   OF   THE   WAR, 

WHICH    THE    RUSSIAN    PEOPLE   DID   NOT    DESIRE, 

I    RESPECTFULLY   DEDICATE   THE 

PHESENT    VOLUME 

THE  AUTHOR 


PREFACE 

The  success  obtained  with  the  British  public  by 
my  work  on  "  Modern  Russia,"  of  which  the 
second  edition  followed  the  first  in  the  space  of 
ten  months,  has  inspired  me  with  courage  once 
more  to  address  my  readers  in  a  book  devoted 
to  my  country. 

The  subject  of  this  new  book  is  "  Russia  and 
the  Great  War."  But  in  writing  it  I  wished 
not  merely  to  write  a  book  for  the  moment  ex- 
clusively, of  value  only  for  to-day,  and  of  no 
interest  to-morrow.  It  is  not  the  external  and 
dramatic  aspect  of  the  great  war  waged  by  Russia 
and  her  Allies  that  interests  me  the  most.  On 
the  contrary,  my  readers  will  find  in  my  pages 
neither  descriptions  of  battles  nor  tragic  or 
picturesque  narratives  of  the  incidents  of  battle. 
My  aim  has  been  something  quite  different  from 
this,  I  wish  to  inform  my  English  readers  con- 
cerning the  principal  phenomena  of  Russian  life 
before  the  war,  and  to  explain  the  relations  be- 
tween these  phenomena  and  the  war  itself. 


8  PREFACE 

What  were  the  events  of  international  poli- 
tics which  preceded  the  war,  and  what  causes 
forced  Russia  to  take  part  in  it?  What  was  the 
internal  situation  of  Russia  on  the  eve  of  the 
war?  Can  we  say  that  the  Russian  people,  or 
its  Government,  or  both  together,  desired  tnis 
war?  How  was  the  war  received  by  society, 
and  by  the  popular  masses  in  Russia,  and  what 
was  the  attitude  of  the  various  nationalities  and 
political  parties  of  my  country  toward  the  world- 
war  ?  Why  did  certain  of  the  Russian  "  revo- 
lutionaries ■■  and  Socialists  experience  a  strange 
dread  of  the  victor>-  of  Russia,  and  even  express 
a  desire  that  she  should  meet  with  defeat?  In 
what  manner  did  the  Governments  of  the  countries 
at  war  with  Russia  seek  to  exploit,  to  their  own 
proht,  the  hatred  of  the  Russian  revolutionaries 
for  Tsarism  ?  Why  does  the  Russian  soldier  fight 
better  when  opposed  to  the  Austrians.  Germans, 
and  Turks,  than  he  fought  during  the  war  with 
Japan?  What  prospects  will  lie  open  before 
Russia  at  the  end  of  the  war?  What  may  Europe 
expect  from  Russia,  and  Russia  trom  Europe, 
after  the  demolition  of  the  Prussian  militarism 
which  threatens  both  Russia  and  Europe  ? 

Here  are  the  numerous  questions  which  I  deal 
with  m   the   present   volimie,   and  which   I    seek 


PREFACE  9 

to  answer.  In  my  arguments  and  expositions 
I  have  sought  always  to  remain  objective  and 
impartial,  so  far  as  that  is  possible  in  the  phase 
of  the  human  tragedy  through  which  we  are 
passing.  Each  of  my  assertions  is  based  on  facts 
and  supported  by  documents.  I  do  not  wish 
to  trouble  the  minds  of  my  readers  by  clamorous 
indignation  ;  I  prefer  to  convince  their  minds 
by  an  objective  analysis.  For,  in  the  words  of 
a  Russian  writer — 

Words  and  illusions  perish  ;  facts  remain. 

G.  A. 

April  1915. 


CONTENTS 

PART   I 
BEFORE    THE    WAR 

CHAPTER   I 

PAGE 

I,  The  evolution  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Russian  Empire 
after  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  The  movement  towards 
the  Far  East  and  the  recoil  towards  the  West.  The 
economic  interests  of  Russia  in  the  Far  East  and  the  Near 
East. — II.  The  supporters  of  the  "  Asiatic  policy."  The 
confidential  memoir  of  a  Russian  diplomatist         .  .     19 

CHAPTER   II 

I.  Russia  in  the  Concert  of  the  Powers.  The  Franco-Russian 
Alliance.  Was  the  position  of  France  offensive  or  de- 
fensive ? — II.  The  Anglo-French  Alliance.  The  rivalry 
between  Germany  and  England.  The  Anglo-Franco- 
Russian  enitnte  and  its  political  character   .  .  •    Z^ 

CHAPTER  III 

I.  The  Balkan  War  and  the  Balkan  League. — II.  The  Turco- 
German  friendship. — III.  Austria  in  the  Balkans  and  her 
conflict  with  Serbia  and  Russia.  The  problem  of  Con- 
stantinople and  the  Dardanelles         .  .  .  -47 

11 


12  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   IV 

PAGE 

I.  The  economic  relations  between  Russia  and  Germany.  The 
commercial  exchange  between  these  two  countries.  The 
success  of  German  trade  in  the  Russian  market  facilitated 
by  the  anti-Semitic  policy  in  Russia. — II.  The  Customs 
Treaty  of  1904  and  the  problem  of  its  renewal.  The 
necessity  of  abolishing  the  Protectionist  system  in  Russia. 
Why  was  not  the  Russo-Gcrman  economic  entente 
realized  ?  .......     59 


CHAPTER  V 

I.  The  internal  life  of  Russia  before  the  war.  Economic 
progress  and  the  re-birth  of  the  popular  movement. — II. 
The  policy  of  the  Government.  Recent  success  of  the 
liberative  movement.  The  political  strike  and  the  popular 
demonstrations  of  July  1914  in  Petersburg     .  .  -74 


CHAPTER   VI 

I.  The  Russian  finances.  The  increase  in  the  Budget.  The 
revenues. — II.  The  expenditure — how  divided.  Military 
expenditure. — III.  The  reserves  available.  The  new  loan 
of  1914.     Its  strategical  and  military  destination       .  .     82 


CHAPTER   VII 

I.  The  evolution  of  the  Russian  Army  since  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century. — II.  Tiie  military  forces  of  Russia 
compared  with  those  of  Austria  and  Germany. — III.  The 
Russian  Navy     .  .  .  .  .  .  -95 


CHAPTER   VIII 

I.  Did  Russia  desire  the  war  ?  The  two  Russias,  popular  and 
governmental.  The  pacific  tendencies  of  the  Russian 
peasants    and    working-men. — II.  Official    Russia   and    its 


CONTENTS  13 

PAGE 

attitude  towards  the  Austro-German  coalition.  The  political, 
military,  and  ideological  recoil  of  the  Russian  Government 
from  the  Austro-German  expansion. — III.  The  war  and  the 
Revolution.     Tlie  Russian  reaction  and  the  Prussian  .  105 


PART   II 
IN    THE    BLOODY    FRAY 

CHAPTER    I 

I.  The  diplomatic  documents  and  the  political  reality.  The 
opinion  of  a  little  Chinese  scholar  and  a  great  European 
scientist. — II.  The  international  tension  in  July  1914  and 
the  question  of  responsibility.  The  Austro-German  aggres- 
sion and  the  part  played  by  Russia.  Could  Russia  have 
anticipated  the  war  ?     .  .  .  .  .  -123 

CHAPTER   II 

I.  The  Russian  Government  and  Russian  society  confronted 
with  an  unexpected  war. — II.  The  session  of  the  Duma. 
The  agreement  between  the  majority  of  the  parties  and 
representatives. — III.  Why  the  Extreme  Left  did  not  vote 
for  the  military  credits  .....   134 

CHAPTER    III 

I.  The  action  of  the  Government.  The  administrative  measures 
taken  in  relation  to  the  war. — II.  Financial  measures;  the 
new  taxes  and  loans.  The  prohibition  of  the  sale  of 
alcohol. — III.  The  domestic  policy  of  Tsarism  during  the 
war  .  .  ,  .  .  .  .  .155 


14  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   IV 

PAGE 

I.  The  nationalist  problem  and  the  war.  The  various  nation- 
alities of  the  Russian  Empire  before  the  international  war. 
— II.  The  Polish  problem.  Why  have  the  Russian  Poles 
become  Russophiles  ? — III.  The  Armenian  problem. — 
IV.  The  Ukraine.— V.  Finland.— VI.  The  position  of  the 
Jews.  Their  conflict  with  the  Poles. — VII.  The  nationalist 
problem  in  the  Baltic  Provinces        .  .  .  -179 

CHAPTER  V 

I.  The  dread  of  a  Russian  victory  among  the  revolutionaries 
and  Socialists  of  Russia.  The  workers  do  not  share  this 
dread.  The  declarations  of  Kropotkin  and  Plechanov. 
Why  is  the  propaganda  resulting  from  this  apprehension 
erroneous  and  harmful  ? — II.  The  German,  Austrian,  and 
Turkish  Government's  endeavour  to  corrupt  the  Russian 
revolutionaries.  The  noble  reply  of  certain  of  these  latter 
to  the  agents  of  the  Austro-Germans  and  the  Turks. 
Russian  revolutionaries  in   the  French  Army  .  .  229 

CHAPTER   VI 

I.  The  activities  of  public  institutions  and  private  initiative. 
The  "  Union  of  the  Zemstvos  "  and  the  "  Union  of  the  Cities." 
— II.  The  rural  communes  and  co-operative  associations 
in  the  campaign  against  the  misfortunes  produced  by  the 
war. — III.  The  intellectual  youth  of  Russia  and  the  war. — 
IV.  The  Press  in  Russia  during  the  war         .  .  .  258 

CHAPTER   VII 

I.  On  the  field  of  battle.  The  Russian  soldier  in  the  present 
war.  Mobilization.  The  prohibition  of  the  sale  of  alcohol 
and  its  effect  on  the  Army.  The  military  chiefs. — II.  Treason 
in  the  Executive. — III.  Why  the  Russian  soldier  is  fighting 
better  against  Germany,  Austria,  and  Turkey  than  he 
fought  against  Japan.     The  "  liberation  idea  "  and  the  war  .  277 


CONTENTS  15 

PART   III 
AFTER    THE   WAR 

CHAPTER   I 

PACK 

I.  The  possible  results  of  the  war.  Territorial  changes  and  the 
problem  of  an  enlargement  of  the  Russian  frontiers. — II. 
The  possession  of  the  Dardanelles  and  Constantinople. 
Are  they  necessary  to  Russia  ?  .  .  .  .  297 

CHAPTER   II 

I.  The  political  and  economic  results  of  a  German  defeat  and 
the  destruction  of  Prussian  Imperialism. — II.  The  defeat 
of  Germany  is  to  the  advantage  of  the  German  revolu- 
tionaries and  the  Socialists  of  Germany  and  of  all 
Europe  ........  306 

CHAPTER  III 

I.  Why  is  the  Anglo-Franco-Russian  alliance  preferable,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  Russian  liberty  and  democracy,  to 
the  alliance  of  Russia  with  the  German  and  Austrian 
monarchies? — II,  The  intrigues  of  the  Russian  reaction- 
aries during  the  war.  Their  propaganda  in  favour  of  a 
separate  peace  with  Germany.  The  necessity  of  an  alliance 
of  the  democratic  elements  of  the  Allied  countries  if  these 
intrigues  are  to  be  disarmed     .  .  .  .  -312 

CHAPTER   IV 

I.  The  future  evolution  of  Russia.  Various  opinions  held  in 
Russian  society  concerning  this  evolution. — II.  The  national 
question  after  the  war. — III.  The  role  of  the  French  and 
English  democracies  in  the  Russian  people's  struggle  for 
liberty. — IV.  What  has  Russia  to  give  to  the  world  ?        .  322 


16  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  V 

PAGE 

I.  Russia  and  England.  Their  economic  relations.  The  neces- 
sity of  a  system  of  Free  Trade  in  these  relations. — II.  The 
intellectual  relations  between  Russia  and  England.  Con- 
cerning certain  "deviations"  of  English  sympathies  .  343 


PART    I 
BEFORE    THE    WAR 


Russia  and  the  Great  War 


CHAPTER    I 

The  evolution  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Russian  Empire 
after  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  The  movement  towards  the 
Far  East  and  the  recoil  towards  the  West.  The  economic 
interests  of  Russia  in  the  Far  East  and  the  Near  East. 
— II.  The  supporters  of  the  "Asiatic  policy."  The  con- 
fidential memoir  of  a  Russian  diplomatist. 


The  war  with  little  Japan  marked  a  decisive 
moment  in  the  contemporary  history  of  the  ex- 
ternal policy  of  the  great  Russian  Empire.  To 
be  more  precise,  it  constituted  first  a  check  and 
then  a  change  in  the  direction  of  this  policy. 
Before  the  war  the  Russian  eagle  had  hovered 
in  full  liberty  above  the  Asiatic  Orient,  continu- 
ally extending  its  wings  over  new  territories,  until 
at  length  the  Pacific  Ocean  was  attained.  But 
the  Rising  Sun  of  the  young  Japanese  Empire 
was  to  scorch  its  pinions.  Its  flight  toward  the 
Far  East  was  suddenly  arrested,  and  as  early  as 
1906,  at  a  secret  meeting  of  the  leaders  of  the 
Russian  Government,  one  of  these  latter  declared 

19 


20  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

that  after  the  debacle  occasioned  by  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars  must  per- 
force renounce  the  old  aggressive  energy  of 
its  customary  external  policy,  in  order  to 
"  assume  a  more  prudent  and  more  conciliatory 
attitude." 

Thus  there  ensued  a  period  of  arrest  in  the 
march  of  Russia  toward  the  Far  East,  and  the 
Muscovite  bear  found  himself  at  the  parting  of 
the  v^ays,  like  the  hero  of  a  popular  Russian 
legend.  Which  was  the  road  to  follow  ?  Should 
he  continue  to  tread  the  ancient  track?  But  the 
yellow  sun  of  Japan  was  still  visible  on  the 
Eastern  horizon.  Or  would  it  be  better  to  return 
toward  the  West  ?  Behold  the  black  eagle  of 
Germany,  with  its  beak  of  steel,  and  always  on 
the  alert  ! 

Doubtless  the  best  and  simplest  policy  would 
have  been  to  remain  at  home,  to  seek  no  new 
adventures,  whether  to  East  or  to  West.  But 
unhappily  man  does  not  always  adhere  to  the 
best  or  the  simplest  solution.  And  the  historical 
past  had  left  Russia  a  heavy  burden  in  the  shape 
of  an  inheritance  of  military  and  diplomatic  ties^ 
and  alliances  and  counter-alliances,  whose  auto- 
matic action  might  well  result  in  dragging  Russia 
into  an  external  conflict,  or  in  forcing  her  to 
involve  both  friends  and  enemies  in  such  a  con- 
flict. Moreover,  there  were  forces  in  the  interior 
of  the   country   which   would  not   willingly   bow 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  21 

to  the  necessity  of  modifying  the  tone  of  the 
State's  external  policy.  There  were  several 
groups  among  the  higher  ranks  of  the  aristocracy 
and  the  Army  for  whom  the  lesson  of  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  passed  almost  unperceived,  and  who 
were  eager  to  take  their  revenge  upon  the  field 
of  battle— but  on  what  field  was  a  matter  of  in- 
difference. There  were  groups  of  capitalists, 
moreover,  who  would  not  be  content  with  a  patient 
and  peaceable  effort  to  regenerate  the  great  home 
market,  which  was  nevertheless  capable  of  yield- 
ing them  a  greater  revenue  than  all  the  Man- 
churias  and  Persias  of  the  world  together.  They 
hankered  after  foreign  markets,  which  were  to 
be  conquered  by  brute  force. 

"  The  East  China  railway  should  have  created 
new  markets  for  us,  and  have  connected  Europe 
and  the  East  by  a  trade  route.  The  Russo- 
Japanese  War  destroyed  these  hopes.  The  railway 
has  lost  700  versts  of  its  best  and  most  pro- 
ductive portion  ;  we  have  lost  the  port  of  Dalny 
(Talienwan),  which  was  equipped  to  perfection. 
We  cannot  hope  great  things  from  the  exporta- 
tion of  our  merchandise  to  Southern  Manchuria, 
where  the  Japanese  are  the  masters.  Our  trade 
with  Mongolia  is  equally  in  a  stagnant  condi- 
tion. .  .  .  Our  position  in  the  Far  East  being 
compromised  as  a  result  of  the  war,  the  eye 
naturally  returns  toward  the  West,  and  above  all 
to   the    Near   East.      A   series    of    Chambers    of 


22  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

Commerce  has  been  established— Anglo-Russian, 
Russo-Belgian,  and  so  forth.  At  the  same  time 
companies  have  been  formed  for  the  exporta- 
tion of  general  merchandise,  and  especially  for 
export  to  the  Balkans.  .  .  .  But,  notwithstand- 
ing the  simultaneous  efforts  of  the  Government, 
and  the  commercial  and  industrial  circles,  the 
exportation  of  manufactured  articles  is  increasing 
far  too  slowly.  Our  position  in  the  Near  East 
is  weak.  In  the  West  there  is  nothing  to  hope 
for.  '  Friendly  '  Germany  is  pushing  us  toward 
Asia,  but  in  Persia  our  affairs  are  in  a  bad  way, 
and  threaten  to  grow  still  worse  in  the  future- 
thanks  to  the  German  competition.  We  have 
lost  the  market  of  the  rich  southern  portion  of 
Manchuria,  and  the  market  offered  by  its  northern 
portion  is  poor  and  unstable.  Foreign  compe- 
tition is  successfully  driving  us  out  of  Mongolia. 
Hence  the  tendencies  which  are  now  apparent 
among  us,  which  demand  the  employment  of 
armed  force,  that  we  may  retain  possession  of 
these  markets  ;  so  that  we  find  ourselves  on  the 
eve  of  new  colonial  adventures.  ...  In  a 
word,  the  historical  phase  which  was  passed 
through  before  the  Revolution  is  about  to  be 
renewed." 

Such  is  the  description  of  the  political  situa- 
tion of  Russia  in  Eastern  Asia  after  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  in  respect  of  the  economical 
basis  of  that  policy,  as  it  appeared  to  a  worthy 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  23 

Russian  economist  whose  book  was  published  in 
191 1 .' 

But  while  a  few  small  political  and  economic 
circles  hoped  for  a  continuation  of  the  old  orien- 
tation of  the  foreign  politics  of  Russia— that  is, 
the  continuation  of  the  march  toward  the  Far 
East— there  were  others— and  among  them  were 
many  Liberals— who  insisted  that  Russia  should 
concentrate  her  attention  and  her  energies  on 
regions  less  remote,  notably  on  Asia  Minor,  the 
shores  of  the  Black  Sea,  and  the  Balkans.  It 
must  be  admitted  that  this  tendency  is  founded 
on  interests  and  considerations  of  an  important 
nature.  Russia  is  one  of  the  "  granaries  of  the 
world."  Her  foreign  trade  consists  above  all 
in  the  exportation  of  cereals. 

"  A  glance  at  the  statistics  of  our  cereal  exports 
will  show  that  their  centre  of  gravity  since  the 
year  1896  lies  in  the  ports  of  the  south.  During 
the  last  twelve  years  the  part  played  by  the 
regions  of  the  south,  south-east,  and  south-west 
in  the  foreign  trade  of  Russia  has  been  still 
further  enlarged.  In  1909,  76  per  cent,  of  all 
the  wheat,  91  per  cent,  of  all  the  barley,  53  per 
cent,  of  all  the  rye,  and  83  per  cent,  of  all  the 
maize  exported  from  Russia  was  exported  from 
the  ports  of  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Sea  of  Azov."  = 

'  See  the  great  economic  work  of  M.  A.  Finn-Yenotaevsky 
Sovremenno'ie  Khoziaistvo  Rossiyi  ("The  Modern   Economy  of 
Russia"),  Petersburg,  191 1,  pp.  408-12. 

^  Ibid.  pp.  425-6. 


24  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

Cereals  are  the  principal  article  of  Russia's 
foreign  trade.  The  ports  of  the  Black  Sea  are 
the  chief  outlets  for  the  foreign  export  of  Russian 
grain.  From  this  you  can  judge  the  importance 
of  the  Eastern  Question,  the  question  of  the 
Dardanelles,  etc.,  for  the  whole  of  Russia,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  her  economic  interests. 

Add  to  these  the  problem  of  the  commercial 
relations  existing  between  Russia  and  Germany, 
which  are  connected  by  a  highly  developed  com- 
mercial exchange,  the  nature  of  which  I  shall 
presently  explain.  Finally,  consider  the  position 
of  Germany  and  Russia  on  the  Baltic,  which  is 
the  second  great  route  of  the  foreign  trade  of 
Russia,  and  which  is  really  in  the  possession  of 
the  powerful  German  Nav^,  and  you  will  readily 
perceive  that  the  economic  interests  of  Russia 
in  the  West  are  far  greater  than  in  the  Far  East, 
and  that  Russia  cannot  completely  ignore  what 
is  passing  in  Asia  Minor,  in  the  Balkans,  and  on 
her  western  frontiers. 

II 

Certain  Russian  politicians  were  even  of 
opinion  that  Russia  ought  resolutely  to  abandon 
the  old  direction  of  her  military  and  diplomatic 
policy,  which  looked  toward  the  Asiatic  Orient, 
and  that  this  policy  should  confine  itself  to 
Europe  and  the  Balkans.  This  opinion  was  dis- 
puted  by   the   supporters   of  the   Asiatic   policy. 


BEFORE  THE   WAR  25 

One  of  these  latter,  Baron  Rosen,  who  had  been 
Russian  Ambassador  in  Belgrade,  Tokio,  and 
Washington,  and  who  was  a  colleague  of  M. 
Witte  at  the  time  of  the  negotiations  with  Japan 
which  took  place  at  Portsmouth,  published,  in 
1913,  a  very  interesting  confidential  memoir 
dealing  with  this  subject,  of  which  the  issue  was 
withdrawn  from  circulation — it  is  said  by  order 
of  the  Government.  I  believe  my  readers  will 
feel  grateful  to  me  for  quoting  the  essential  por- 
tion of  this  memoir.' 

"  After  the  check  occasioned  by  the  last  war," 
writes  M.  Rosen,  "  and  the  defeat  of  our  entire 
policy  in  the  Far  East— a  policy  qualified  as  a 
mere  adventure  by  people  who  did  not  realize 
the  vast  importance  to  Russia  of  her  interests  in 
those  regions,  a  policy  which  deserved  that 
epithet  only  because  it  was  not  in  time  supported 
by  all  the  forces  of  the  State— the  idea  seems 
firmly  to  have  rooted  itself  in  the  mind  of  the 
public  that  Russia  should  once  more  seek  the 
centre  of  her  political  interests  in  Europe." 

M.  Rosen  does  not  share  this  opinion.  He 
does  not  believe  that  Russia  has  any  historic 
mission  in  the  Near  East ;  he  does  not  consider 
the  "  Slav  idea  "  to  have  any  real  basis  ;  he  is 
not  of  opinion  that  it  corresponds  with  the  real 

'  A  detailed  account  of  this  memoir,  with  many  quotations, 
was  published  in  the  French  review  Le  Correspo?idatit,  Septem- 
ber 1913. 


26  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

interests  of  Russia.  So  far  the  defence  of  the 
"  Slav  idea "  has  had  none  but  negative  and 
harmful  results  for  Russia.  It  dragged  the  coun- 
try into  the  war  of  1877-8,  which  cleared  the 
ground  for  the  Revolution  ;  it  was  the  cause  of 
the  estrangement  between  Germany  and  Russia 
in  the  time  of  Bismarck,  and  the  dissolution  of 
the  alliance  of  "  Three  Emperors  "  which  guaran- 
teed the  western  frontier  of  Russia.  Finally,  says 
M.  Rosen,  it  "  also  pushed  us  to  the  conclusion 
of  an  alliance  with  France  which  has  involved 
us  in  interests  entirely  foreign  to  Russia  :  namely, 
the  French  desire  to  be  revenged  for  Sedan  and 
the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and,  of  late  years, 
the  Anglo-German  antagonism,  which  will  be  the 
ground  on  which  the  coming  European  war  will 
be  fought." 

For  M.  Rosen  "  the  great  Slav  ideal  "  is  merely 
the  "  verbal  gymnastics  of  writers  and  orators 
of  the  Slavophile  camp  "...  devoid  of  any  real 
foundation. 

"  All  undertakings  inspired  by  this  idea— as, 
for  example,  the  Slav  Bank,  the  exhibitions  of 
Russian  products,  the  Russian  libraries  in  Slav 
countries,  etc.,  either  remain  in  the  condition  of 
mere  projects,  or  drag  themselves  through  a 
miserable  existence.  ...  In  the  domain  of 
material  civilization,  Russia  has  no  need  of  the 
Slav  world,  nor  the  Slav  world  of  Russia.  In 
the  Slav  States  of  the  Balkans  our  industry,  which 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  27 

has  at  its  disposal  a  vast  home  market  defended 
by  extremely  high  protective  tariffs,  could  only 
at  a  loss  compete  with  the  Austro-German  indus- 
tries ;  as  for  the  Slavs  of  the  south,  their  com- 
mercial relations  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy,  their  neighbour,  will  always  be  more 
advantageous  than  their  relations  with  distant 
Russia. 

"  From  the  intellectual  standpoint,  the  Slavs 
of  the  Balkans  (and  still  more  those  of  Austria), 
despite  a  somewhat  factitious  Germanophobia, 
evidently  prefer— and  this  is  very  natural — to  tap 
directly  and  at  first  hand  the  Western  sources, 
and  principally  those  of  Germany.  ...  As  for 
the  sympathies  of  the  Austrian  Slavs,  which  we 
are  told  are  irresistibly  pro-Russian,  it  is  only 
too  obvious  that  their  flirtations  with  us  have 
one  sole  object,  and  that  essentially  a  selfish  one  : 
it  is,  to  flaunt  before  the  Austrian  Government 
the  bogy  of  Pan-Slavism  under  Russian  hege- 
mony, in  order  to  obtain  from  it  the  desired  con- 
cessions. .  .  .  Our  continual  advances,  in  the 
press  and  in  the  speeches  of  certain  amateur  poli- 
ticians, toward  the  Austrian  Slavs,  have  in  the 
end  impelled  Austria  to  retort  by  very  undesir- 
able and  even  dangerous  advances  to  our  own 
'  Mazeppists,'  '  Ukrainophiles,  and  other  ele- 
ments hostile  to  the  Russian  Empire,  which  enter- 

'  The  supporters  of  the   pohcy  inaugurated   by  the  famous 
Cossack  hetnian  Mazeppa. 


28  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

tain  treacherous   dreams   of  the  dismemberment 
of  Russia." 

Baron  Rosen  pronounces  in  favour  of  an 
understanding  with   Austria. 

"  The  only  cause  of  armed  conflict  with  Austria 
that  can  be  foreseen  is  precisely  the  opposition 
which  we  are  offering  to  her  Balkan  policy.  .  .  . 
This  antagonism  is  the  cause  of  a  state  of  affairs 
very  dangerous  for  us,  thanks  to  which,  every 
time  any  disturbance  occurs  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula,  arises  the  possibility  that  Austria  will 
intervene  as  the  Power  chiefly  interested  by  reason 
of  her  geographical  position,  and  for  us  the  possi- 
bility of  a  conflict  with  her,  and  therefore  of  a 
European  conflagration." 

Russia,  M.  Rosen  holds,  ought  to  reconcile 
herself  to  the  Austrian  penetration  of  the 
Balkans. 

"  Austria,  like  Germany,  is  passing  through  a 
period  of  growth.  .  .  .  The  only  possible  outlet 
is  indicated  by  her  geographical  position  ;  rejected 
by  the  Germanic  Confederation,  she  has  turned 
her  eyes  toward  the  Slav  south.  The  movement 
of  Austria  toward  the  Slav  south  does  not  clash 
with  the  real  interests  of  Russia.  On  the  other 
hand,  Austria  will  meet  with  complications  which 
should  sufficiently  make  her  aware  of  the  value 
of  amicable  relations  with  Russia." 

An  alliance  between  Russia  and  Germany  ap- 
peared to  M.  Rosen  to  be  even  more  necessary. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  29 

Allied  with  France  and  England,  Russia  finds 
herself  in  a  camp  hostile  to  Germany.  M.  Rosen 
believes  that  the  entire  responsibility  of  this 
hostility  falls,  not  upon  Russia  but  upon  Fjrance 
and  England.  "  In  the  forefront  of  the  causes 
of  this  reciprocal  hostility  we  see  the  irreconcil- 
able antagonism  between  France  and  Germany, 
founded  on  the  French  idea  of  revenge  for  Sedan 
and  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  To  this  cause 
has  been  added,  of  late  years,  another,  which  is 
the  Anglo-Germanic  antagonism  founded  on  com- 
mercial, industrial,  and  colonial  competition,  and 
rivalry  in  the  matter  of  naval  armaments.  These 
two  motives  are  absolutely  alien  to  the  vital 
interests  of  Russia." 

During  the  first  twenty  years  which  followed 
the  war  of  1870-71,  France  was  so  weak  and 
Germany  so  powerful,  that,  "  thanks  to  the 
enormous  disproportion  of  the  forces  at  their 
disposal,  war  was  for  one  of  the  parties  a  super- 
fluity and  for  the  other  an  impossibility."  Such 
a  situation  M.  Rosen  regards  as  ideal,  and  he  is 
greatly  disturbed  by  the  fact  than  an  alliance  with 
Russia  has  re-established  the  equilibrium  of 
forces.  It  is  true  that  during  those  twenty  years 
Germany  enjoyed  a  hegemony  in  Europe,  and 
that  to-day  she  wishes  once  more  to  achieve 
that  hegemony.  But  this  tendency  of  Germany 
toward  hegemony  is  dangerous  only  to  Western 
Europe,  not  to  Russia,  says  M.  Rosen,  who  finds 


30  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

it  "  absolutely  impossible  to  comprehend  "  how 
the  German  domination  in  Europe  can  be  opposed 
to  the  interests  of  Russia,  which  is  rather  an 
Asiatic  Power.  "  By  abandoning  to  Germany 
supremacy  in  the  Western  portion  of  Europe,  and 
by  dissociating  herself  completely  from  all  rival- 
ries between  European  Powers  based  on  interests 
purely  European,  Russia  would  assure  herself  of 
the  security  of  her  western  frontier,  and  would 
have  her  hands  free  for  the  accomplishment  of 
her  mission  in  Asia." 

To  yield  Europe  to  the  Prussian  Moloch  and 
to  take  Asia  in  exchange — such,  according  to  M. 
Rosen's  opinion,  is  the  supreme  national  duty  of 
Russia.  Such  an  alliance  with  Germany  would 
be  the  more  profitable  to  Russia  in  that  it  would 
enable  Germany  to  undermine  the  naval  supre- 
macy of  England,  and  such  a  decrease  of  power 
is  in  the  interests  of  Russia— so  Baron  Rosen 
believes. 

Russia's  confidence  in  France  and  England 
rests  "  on  fragile  bases,"  he  says,  and  "  the  confi- 
dence of  Germany  is  incommensurably  more 
precious  to  us." 

Commenting  upon  the  ideas  expressed  in  M. 
Rosen's  memoir,  of  which  we  have  given  a 
detailed  summary,  a  French  review  remarked 
that  these  ideas  revealed  ''  an  atavistic  German- 
ism,'" and  that  "'  if  it  had  amused  Herr  Bethmann- 
Holweg    to    give    his    advice    to    the     Russian 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  31 

Ambassador  in  Berlin,  this  is  the  advice  he  would 
have  given." 

Let  us  now  analyse  the  actual  international 
position  of  Russia  before  the  war,  so  that  we 
may  judge  whether  the  Germanophile  counsels 
of  Baron  Rosen  did  really  constitute  good  advice, 
and  whether  they  corresponded  with  the  true 
interests  of  the  country. 


CHAPTER    II 

I.  Russia  in  the  Concert  of  the  Powers.  The  Franco-Russian 
Alliance.  Was  the  position  of  France  offensive  or  defensive  ? 
II.  The  Anglo-French  Alliance.  The  rivalry  between  Ger- 
many and  England.  The  Anglo-Franco-Russian  entente  and 
its  political  character. 


Despite  the  lamentations  of  the  supporters  of 
her  "  Asiatic  orientation,"  the  recoil  of  Russia 
from  the  Far  East  and  her  "  return  "  to  the  West 
was  an  accomplished  fact.  This  fact  confronted 
the  Russian  State,  with  the  complex  problem  of 
its  attitude  toward  the  other  European  States, 
and  its  position  in  the  famous  "  Concert  "  of 
Great  Powers.  To  a  very  appreciable  extent  this 
position  was  no  doubt  determined  by  the  recent 
history  of  Russia's  foreign  policy,  which  has  been 
characterized  by  the  Franco -Russian  Alliance  and 
the  Anglo-Franco-Russian  entente. 

The  Franco-Russian  Alliance  is  of  a  double 
character — financial  and  politico-military.  Doubt- 
less the  economic  and  financial  element  was  pre- 
ponderant at  the  birth  of  this  strange  union  of 
the    republican    democracy    of    France    and    the 

33 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  33 

monarchical  autocracy  of  Russia.  Yet  we  cannot 
deny  the  importance  of  the  political  and  military 
considerations  which  have  pushed  France  into  the 
arms  of  Tsarism,  These  considerations  have 
made  themselves  felt  more  especially  of  late 
years.  After  Russia's  defeat  in  the  war  with 
Japan,  after  the  ruin  of  almost  her  entire  navy, 
and  the  heavy  losses  in  men  and  material  suffered 
by  the  army,  the  military  power  of  Russia  was 
gravely  compromised.  Germany  immediately 
profited  by  this  breach  of  equilibrium,  consoli- 
dating her  international  position,  both  economic 
and  political.  One  may  say,  without  exaggera- 
tion, that  the  great  misfortunes  suffered  by  Russia 
during  the  war  of  1904-5  brought  prosperity  to 
Germany, 

In  the  first  place,  Germany  succeeded  in  ex- 
ploiting the  very  embarrassing  situation  of  her 
eastern  neighbour  in  the  year  1904,  by  securing 
from  Russia  a  Customs  Treaty  highly  profitable 
to  German  trade  and  industry.  At  the  same  time 
Germany  was  redoubling  her  efforts  to  increase 
her  military  forces,  and  this  increase  became  most 
rapid  immediately  upon  the  enfeeblement  of  the 
Russian  army  at  the  close  of  the  war.  In  the 
year  1905  the  German  Empire  took  a  gigantic 
stride  in  this  direction ;  for  in  that  year  the 
Reichstag  voted  a  Military  Law  which  increased 
the  armed  forces  of  the  Kaiser,  not  merely  from 
the  numerical  point  of  view,  but  also  from  that 

3 


34  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

of  the  technical  material  of  war.  During  the 
seven  years  that  followed  the  efforts  of  Germany 
in  the  direction  of  preparing  for  war  became 
continually  more  and  more  intensive,  and  France 
was  left  far  behind  in  the  matter  of  military 
expenditure. 

During  these  seven  years  Germany  expended 
£300,000,000  on  her  military  forces,  while 
France  spent  only  £236,000,000.  This  repre- 
sents a  surplus  of  £64,000,000  for  the  period 
of  seven  years,  or  more  than  £9,000,000  annu- 
ally. The  use  which  Prussian  militarism  has 
made  of  its  supremacy  is  well  known.  By 
exploiting  the  weakness  of  Russia  the  Kaiser's 
Government  has  on  several  occasions,  since  the 
year  1904,  systematically  provoked  France.  The 
culminating  point  of  this  provocation  was  the 
famous  coup  d'Agadir  of  191 1,  when  the  Kaiser 
threw  into  the  scales  of  a  diplomatic  con- 
versation the  weight  of  a  warship,  and,  by 
means  of  this  cunning  stroke  of  blackmail, 
obtained,  without  a  shot  being  fired,  a  consider- 
able portion  of  the  French  possessions  in  the 
Congo. 

In  speaking  thus  of  the  systematic  provoca- 
tion practised  by  Germany,  I  do  not  in  the  least 
intend  to  represent  France  as  an  inoffensive 
white  lamb  devoured  by  a  ferocious  wolf. 
Modern  France  is  a  country  like  other  capitalist 
nations— an  armed  nation,  a  nation  with  a  colonial 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  35 

policy,  etc.  But  in  the  social  and  economic 
structure  of  France  there  are  characteristics  which 
render  her  more  pacific  and,  if  I  may  so  express 
myself,  more  defensive  than  aggressive  Germany, 
France  is  a  country  of  great  financiers  on  the 
one  hand,  and  of  small  hoarders  on  the  other.  It 
is  a  country  of  large  and  small  investors.  But 
the  investor,  the  stock-holder,  is  the  most  pacific 
type  of  the  modern  bourgeois  ;  which  is  easily 
comprehensible,  for  in  case  of  armed  conflict  the 
investor  is  the  worst  sufYerer,  by  reason  of  the 
fall  of  securities  of  all  descriptions.  The  pre- 
dominance of  the  investor  in  the  bourgeois  society 
of  France  explains  the  fact  that  in  spite  of  the 
conquest  of  Alsace-Lorraine  by  the  Germans — 
in  spite  of  "the  wound  in  her  side  which  France," 
to  quote  M.  Viviani,  "  has  for  half  a  century 
silently  endured  " — the  idea  of  a  war  against 
Germany  was  not  really  attractive  to  the  French 
mind.  The  Germans  were  perfectly  well  aware 
of  this  fact.  In  1909  the  well-known  German 
professor  and  patriot,  Herr  Delbriick,  published 
an  article  '  in  which  he  demonstrated  that  it  was 
beyond  a  doubt  that  the  majority  of  the  French 
people  did  not  desire  war  with  Germany,  and 
that  the  idea  of  la  revanche  had  lost  a  great 
measure  of  its  power.  France  is  the  banker  of 
Europe,  says  Professor  Delbriick,  and  a  European 
war  might  result  in  the  stoppage  of  the  payments 
'  Freussischc  Jahrl'lic/ier,  January  1909,  vol.  T34. 


36  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT   WAR 

of  interest  on  her  loans,  which  would  be  a  terrible 
blow  to  the  nation. 

The  majority  of  the  bourgeois  democrats  of 
France  were  not  only  opposed  to  an  aggressive 
policy  towards  Germany,  but  were  even  inclined 
to  entertain  the  idea  of  a  Franco-German  entente. 
This  pacific  tendency  was  supported  also  by  the 
Socialist  workers  of  France,  who  did  their  utmost 
to  avert  the  melancholy  possibility  of  an  armed 
conflict  between  their  country  and  Germany,  and 
who,  as  a  class,  offered  the  life  of  that  noble 
tribune  of  the  French  people,  Jean  Jaures,  as  a 
tragic  proof  of  their  sincere  devotion  to  the 
propaganda  of  peace. 

Finally,  it  is  easy  to  realize  that  a  republican 
State  is  in  general  far  less  adapted  to  an  offensive 
and  warlike  policy  than  an  absolute  or  semi- 
absolute  monarchy.  At  all  events,  M.  Marcel 
Sembat,  a  notable  Socialist,  and  a  member  of  the 
Ministry  of  National  Defence,  asserts  in  cate- 
gorical fashion,  in  a  volume  published  by  him 
shortly  before  the  war,  and  which  created  a  con- 
siderable sensation,  that  there  is  an  almost  natural 
opposition  between  the  republican  ideal  and 
offensive  warfare. 

"  The  militarist  republic,  the  Nationalist  re- 
public, the  warlike  republic — we  have  here  not 
a   doctrine  but   a  blunder,"  he   writes. ^ 

'  Marcel  Sembat,  Faites  tin  Roi,  sinon  ^aiies  la  Faix,  Paris, 
1914. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  37 

This  is  not  to  say  that  a  democratic  republic 
is  incapable  of  defending  itself— the  experience 
of  the  First  Republic  revealed  its  defensive  capa- 
cities— but  the  bureaucratic  and  democratic  system 
is  undoubtedly  less  adapted  to  a  policy  of  aggres- 
sion and  international  brigandage  than  an  auto- 
cratic and  absolutist  system.  And  this  is  merely 
another  argument  in  favour  of  democracy. 

The  perpetual  peril  of  an  armed  conflict  with 
Germany  forced  France  to  seek  the  surest  pos- 
sible of  guarantees  against  this  peril.  Many 
politicians  saw  such  a  guarantee  in  a  Franco- 
German  entente.  The  conferences  of  Members 
of  Parliament  held  at  Basle  and  Berne  were  the 
praiseworthy  achievement  of  these  men.  But 
these  very  conferences  proved  that  although  in 
France  the  majority  of  the  true  democrats  sin- 
cerely desired  peace  and  an  understanding  with 
Germany,  public  opinion  in  the  latter  country  was 
not  so  pacific,  and  the  attitude  of  the  German 
members  in  respect  of  their  French  colleagues 
was  somewhat  reserved.  This  explains  why  the 
French  democracy  could  not  risk  a  radical  change 
of  foreign  policy,  or  withdraw  its  diplomatic  and 
military  contract  with  Russia.  This  contract, 
in  spite  of  all  its  weak  and  obscure  points, 
represented,  for  France,  a  certain  guarantee  in 
the  event  of  German  aggression.  Even  those 
Frenchmen  who  were  opposed  on  principle  to 
the  alliance  with  Russia  were  obliged  to  accept 


38  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

it  in  practice,  at  all  events  pending  the  realiza- 
tion of  a  Franco-German  entente.  This  contra- 
diction between  the  theoretical  negation  of  the 
Russian  alliance  and  its  practical  acceptation  is 
mentioned,  we  shall  find,  in  the  same  work  of 
M.   Sembat's  of  which  we  have  spoken. 

"Russia?  Russia  is  of  no  use  to  us,"  writes 
M.  Sembat,  "and  we  are  no  manner  of  use  to 
Russia,  save  to  supply  her  with  money.  The 
three  weeks  of  mobilization  and  the  counter- 
attack of  Austro-Hungary,  favoured  by  the  Polish 
revolt,  forbid  us  to  count  on  her  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war."  ^ 

But  a  few  pages  farther  on  M.  Sembat  says  : 
"  The  Russian  alliance  has  incontestably  amelio- 
rated, to  the  profit  of  France  .  .  .  the  ratio  of 
the  [French  and  German]  military  forces."  ^ 

So,  with  considerable  reserve,  and  almost 
against  its  will,  the  French  democracy  was 
obliged  to  accept,  for  the  time  being,  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  policy  of  the  Franco  -  Russian 
alliance,  as  a  feeble  yet  necessary  guarantee 
against  a  German  invasion. 

II 

The  German  peril  also  gave  rise  to  the  Anglo- 
French  alliance,  the  basis  of  which  was  laid  down 
by  the  Convention  concluded  in  1904— that  is,  at 

'  Marcel  Sembat,  Faites  tin  Roi,  sinon  faites  la  Paix,  Paris, 
1914.  ^  Ibid. 


BEFORE  THE   WAR  39 

a  time  when  the  Russian  forces  were  absorbed 
by  the  conflict  with  Japan,  so  that  Germany  had 
her  hands  free  on  her  eastern  frontier.  The  de- 
fensive character  of  the  Anglo-French  alliance 
is,  I  consider,  beyond  all  doubt.  It  was  defensive 
at  its  birth,  and  it  was  still  defensive  several 
months  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  as  we 
cannot  fail  to  see  from  the  correspondence 
between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the  French 
Ambassador  in  London,  M.  Cambon,  in 
November   19 12. 

"  If  either  Government,"  wrote  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  "  has  serious  reasons  for  fearing  an  un- 
provoked attack  on  the  part  of  a  third  Power, 
or  any  other  event  which  should  jeopardize  the 
general  peace,  that  Government  should  immedi- 
ately consult  with  the  other,  to  determine  whether 
they  should  not  take  concerted  action  in  order 
to   prevent   aggression   and   to   maintain   peace." 

In  reply  to  this  letter,  M.  Cambon  wrote  :  "I 
am  authorized  to  declare  to  you  that  in  the  event 
of  one  of  our  two  Governments  having  grave 
reason  to  apprehend  either  the  aggression  of  a 
third  Power  or  any  event  threatening  to  the 
general  peace,  that  Government  would  imme- 
diately consult  with  the  other  as  to  whether  the 
two  Governments  should  take  concerted  action 
with  a  view  to  preventing  aggression  or  pre- 
serving  peace."  ' 

^  See  the  Livre  Jaune   of    the    Ministry  of   Foreign  Affairs, 
Paris,   1914. 


40  KUS8IA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

It  follows  from  these  documents,  which  re- 
mained secret  until  the  declaration  of  war,  and 
were  published  by  M.  Viviani  only  during  the 
session  of  the  French  Parliament  of  the  4th  of 
August,  1 9 14,  that  the  Anglo-French  alliance 
was  formed  by  the  two  contracting  Powers,  not 
with  a  view  to  "  hemming  in  Germany,"  as  the 
latter  believed  (perhaps  quite  sincerely),  but  in 
order  to  obtain  a  mutual  guarantee  against 
Kaiserism. 

For  England  such  a  guarantee  was  even  more 
necessary  than  for  France,  because  Germany 
regarded  England  as  her  principal  rival.  "  Our 
future  is  on  the  sea,"  declared  W-ilhelm  II  at 
Stettin  in  his  speech  of  the  23rd  September,  1890. 
Hence  his  preoccupation  concerning  the  augmen- 
tation of  the  German  Navy.  A  French  writer  who 
has  taken  it  upon  himself  to  comment  upon  the 
thoughts  expressed  by  the  German  Emperor  on 
this  subject  states  that  "  in  considering  the 
Emperor  Wilhelm's  ideas  relating  to  the  navy  one 
must  distinguish  between  two  points  of  view  :  one 
commercial,  the  other  military.  In  the  first  place, 
the  Emperor  has  a  very  clear  conception  of  the 
great  part  which  sea  power  plays  in  the  com- 
mercial and  industrial  development  of  a  people. 
It  is  by  sea  that  one  sets  forth  to  conquer  the 
markets  of  the  world  ;  hence  the  necessity  of  a 
great  mercantile  marine,  and  the  importance  of 
the   old    Hansa      Towns,      Bremen,      Hamburg, 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  41 

Liibeck,  and  Stettin,  and  the  capital  part 
played  by  the  great  steamship  companies.  But 
secondly,  those  various  parts  of  the  globe  in  which 
the  German  Empire  gains  a  footing  by  means  of 
its  trade  are  vulnerable  points.  ...  Its  fresh 
triumphs,  its  pacific  conquests,  excite  jealousy, 
create  inevitable  rivalry,  and  necessarily  provoke 
conflicts.  .  .  .  Only  one  arm  will  enable  a 
country  to  triumph  in  struggles  of  this  nature— 
namely,   a  powerful   battle-fleet."  ' 

But  both  forms  of  German  expansi-on  by  sea- 
commercial  expansion  and  naval  and  military 
expansion— result  in  placing  her  in  competition 
with  England.  From  the  commercial  point  of 
view  this  competition  may  be  expressed  in  the 
following  figures  : 

Exports.  In  1907.  In  1913. 

Germany         ...  ^345,000,000  ...  ^^505, 000,000 

England          ...  ^435,000,000  ...  ^535,000,000 

France             ...  ;!^2  2  5,000,000  ...  ;^275,ooo,ooo 

United  States...  ^^405, 000,000  ...  ;^525,ooo,ooo 

Although  England  still  maintains  her  supre- 
macy in  absolute  figures,  the  German  exports 
are  increasing  much  more  rapidly  relatively 
speaking.  It  is  true  that  the  German  exports 
are  artificially  stimulated  by  means  of  premiums 
paid  by  the  State  to  the  exporters.  Be  that  as 
it  may,  the  prevailing  idea  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment is  to  ensure  that  German  capitalism  shall 

'  Jules  Arren,  Guillau?ne  II,  Ce  quHl  dit,  ce  quHl  pense,  Paris, 
191 1,  pp.  159-60. 


42  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

have  its  "  place  in  the  sun."  But  where  is  this 
place  to  be  found  ?  Germany  can  do  no  other 
than  wrest  it  away  from  her  neighbours.  This 
was  done  in  191  i,  when  a  large  slice  of  the 
French  Congo  was  obtained  for  nothing.  But 
much  more  might  be  obtained  from  England.  The 
attempt  must  be  made.  But  first  of  all  England's 
naval  supremacy  must  be  wrested  from  her.  And 
here  Germany  sets  herself  feverishly  to  build 
battleships  and  cruisers.  England  is  forced  to 
note  this  move  and  reply  to  it,  and  the  Anglo - 
German  commercial  rivalry  becomes  a  military 
rivalry.  And,  as  I  have  already  stated  in  my 
book  "  Modern  Russia,"  "  this  rivalry  appears 
to  be  the  axis  of  European  world-politics." 

The  present  war  has  absolutely  confirmed  this 
idea.  The  Germans  themselves  say  that  England 
is  their  principal  adversary.  In  1908  the 
German  patriot  Professor  Delbriick  wrote  that 
the  lesser  questions  of  international  politics  are 
not  solved  in  and  by  themselves,  but  in  respect 
of  greater  antagonisms,  and  that  the  Austro- 
Serbian  disputes  must  be  adjudged,  in  the  long 
run,  in  the  light  of  the  Anglo-German  an- 
tagonism. And  now,  since  the  declaration  of 
war,  another  well  -  known  German  publicist, 
Maximilian  Harden,  writes  in  Zukunft  (Octo- 
ber 17,  1 9 14)  that  the  annexation  of  Belgium 
by  Germany  is  necessary  so  that  she  may  crush 
England.      "  Is   it   not   there   [in   Belgium]   that 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  43 

all  German  hearts  to-day  are  longing,  impetu- 
ously, and  in  a  spirit  at  times  too  insulting,  for 
a  victory  over  England  ?  "  England  is  even  more 
bitterly  hated  by  the  German  Jingoes  than  is 
Russia.  In  December,  1914,  a  Social-Demo- 
cratic (  !  )  German  journal  admitted,  with  un- 
heard-of cynicism  :  "  The  conflict  with  Tsarism  is 
popular,  but  what  was  the  meaning  of  the  ancient 
battle-cry?  Never  that  we  were  to  make  war 
with  the  purely  ideological  and  political  object 
of  defeating  Tsarism.  .  .  .  Our  political  enemy 
is  our  economic  enemy— England." 

Herr  Lenard,  Professor  of  Physics  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Heidelberg,  delivers  himself  as  follows, 
in  a  pamphlet  published  some  two  or  three  months 
after  the  declaration  of  war  :— 

"  Away  with  all  considerations  relating  to  what 
is  termed  English  culture.  The  principal  nest, 
the  chief  academy  of  all  hypocrisy  on  the  banks 
of  the  Thames,  must  be  demolished  to  its  foun- 
dations, if  we  would  obtain  a  favourable  result." 

Even  the  German  poets  expend  their  lyrical 
fire  in  hatred  of  England.  The  most  popular  of 
the  modern  poets  in  Germany  is  Ernst  Lissauer. 
Why?  Because  he  wrote  the  "  Song  of  Hatred  of 
England." 

Our  hatred  we  will  ne'er  abate, 
Who  know  the  one  and  only  hate  : 
We  love  as  one,  we  hate  as  one. 
We  have  one  foe,  and  one  alone — 

England  ! 


44  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT   WAR 

In  this  connection  a  German  critic,  speaking 
of  the  lyric  poetry  to  which  the  present  war  has 
given  birth,  has  written  :  "  It  is  worthy  of  remark 
that  the  warhke  poetry  of  Germany  knows 
nothing  of  national  hatred  of  France  and  Russia. 
France  and  Russia  are  adversaries,  while  Eng- 
land is  the  enemy.'' 

The  aggressive  and  threatening  attitude  of 
Germany  during  the  last  few  years  has  pushed 
England  and  France  alike  toward  an  understand- 
ing with  Russia.  But  my  English  readers  are 
well  aware  that  the  idea  of  this  understanding  was 
much  debated,  and  even  opposed,  by  the  demo- 
cratic elements  in  England,  which  were  shocked 
by  the  concubinage  of  their  free  country  with 
the  despotism  of  the  Tsars.  In  Russia,  too,  the 
understanding  with  England  has  not  everywhere 
been  welcomed.  The  Conservatives  and  the 
parties  of  the  Right  in  particular  pronounced 
themselves  resolutely  as  against  the  entente. 

Remember,  for  instance,  the  sentiments  ex- 
pressed in  respect  of  England  by  the  Russian 
reactionaries  during  the  visit  of  the  French 
Premier  to  Petersburg,  in  the  summer  of  19 12. 
Prince  Meschersky,  the  editor  of  the  ultra-Con- 
servative GrazJidanin,  wrote  that  "  close  friend- 
ship between  Russia  and  Germany  is  a  more 
advantageous  and  lasting  blessing  for  France 
than  dependence  on  ever  capricious,  ever  selfish, 
and  ever  insincere  England."     And  the  organ  of 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  45 

the  "  Black  Bands,"  Zemschina,  spoke  as  follows  : 
"  In  short,  England  wants  to  egg  us  on,  and  to 
weaken    Germany   through    us,    though   we   may 
have  to  undergo  another  war  like  that  of    1 8  i  2 
as  a  result.     But  Heaven  preserve  us  from  the 
privilege  !      It  is  time  for  us  to  give  up  playing 
the  part  of  the  saviours  of  Europe,  and  especi- 
ally of  England."     And  M.  Menshikov  declared, 
in  the  Novoe  V  re  my  a  :    "  I  do  not  see  the  advan- 
tage to  the  French  and  ourselves  to  be  obtained 
by  averting  war  between  England  and  Germany. 
On  the  contrary,  such  a  war  could  only  be  bene- 
ficial both  to  France  and  to  ourselves.     With  the 
present   preponderance   of   England's   Navy   and 
the  difficulty  of  a  large  descent  on  her  shores, 
such  a  war  is  likely  to  end  in  the  destruction  of 
the  whole  German  and  half  the  English  Navy. 
Neither    France    nor    Russia    would   have    much 
reason  to  grieve  on  that  account."     And  another 
journal— an  organ  of  the   "  True  Russians,"  the 
Russkoe  Znamia,  was  even  more   candid   in   its 
expressions  :      "  Every    misfortune    sufi'ered    by 
England,    every   weakening   of   her   power,    only 
causes  joy  to  Russia  (  !  ?)  and  to  pull  her  chest- 
nuts out  of  the  fire  for  her  is   unworthy  of  the 
Russian   people."  ' 

'  I  quote  from  Darkest  Russia  (the  issue  for  the  21st  of 
August,  191 2).  As  for  the  antipathy  of  the  Russian  reactionaries 
for  France,  it  is  so  well  known  that  I  need  not  enlarge  upon 
it  here. 


46  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

The  Russian  Liberals,  on  the  contrary, 
favoured  an  entente  with  England.  Generally 
speaking,  the  idea  of  an  x\nglo-Franco-Russian 
alliance  is  supported  in  Russia  by  the  Liberal 
and  Democratic  bourgeoisie,  while  the  Right 
opposes  to  this  the  ideal  of  a  "  Holy  Alliance  " 
of  the  three  monarchies— the  Romanoff,  Hapsburg 
and  Hohenzollern.  But,  happily,  perhaps,  for 
the  progress  and  the  democracy  of  Europe,  this 
alliance  could  not  be  realized,  and  the  Austro- 
German  alliance,  which  has  caused  so  much 
misery  to  humanity,  was  not  transformed  into 
the  Austro-Russo-German  alliance,  which  would 
have  caused  even  more,  and  would  have  been  far 
more  dangerous  to  Europe. 


CHAPTER     III 

I.  The  Balkan  War  and  the  Balkan  League. — II.  The  Turco- 
German  friendship. — III.  Austria  in  the  Balkans  and  her 
conflict  with  Serbia  and  Russia.  The  problem  of  Con- 
stantinople and  the  Dardanelles. 

I 

The  tragic  and  awful  symphony  of  the  world- 
war,  now  being  executed  by  the  formidable 
orchestra  of  millions  of  rifles  and  thousands  of 
cannon,  had  for  its  prelude  the  Balkan  War,  or 
rather   the   two   wars   in   the   Balkans. 

The  economic  causes  of  the  first  Balkan  War 
are  well  known.  The  Christian  nations  of  the 
Balkans,  whose  development  toward  the  north 
and  west  was  cut  short  by  the  proximity  of  the 
great  European  Powers,  had  only  one  object  : 
to  procure  outlets  on  the  south  and  south-east 
of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  through  provinces  occu- 
pied by  the  Turks.  Among  the  democratic 
elements  of  the  Balkan  States  there  were  those 
who  proposed  to  solve  the  problem,  not  by  the 
sanguinary  means  of  a  war  against  Turkey,  but 
by  the  creation  of  a  "  Republican  Federation  of 

47 


48  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

the  peoples  of  the  Balkans  and  the  Near  East," 
which  would  have  comprised  Greece,  Serbia, 
Bulgaria,  Roumania,  and  Turkey,  both  European 
and  Asiatic. 

Two  consecutive  conferences  convoked  by  all 
the  Socialist  parties  of  the  Balkans  declared 
themselv^es  of  this  opinion.  But  this  noble  dream, 
whose  realization  would  have  assured  the  Balkan 
States  against  a  war  among  themselves  on  the 
one  liand  and  the  aggression  of  Austria  or  Russia 
on  the  other,  was  not  realized,  because  of  the 
egoism  of  the  Governments  of  the  Balkan  States 
and  the  brutal  and  erroneous  policy  of  the  Young 
Turks.  The  manifesto  of  the  Socialists  of  Turkey 
and  the  Balkan  States,  published  at  the  end  of 
the  year  1 9 1  2,  gives  the  following  description  of 
this   policy  : — 

"If  we  emphasize  the  grave  responsibility  of 
the  Balkan  States  in  the  .  .  .  war,  as  well  as 
in  the  past,  when  they  hindered  the  internal  trans- 
formation of  Turkey — if  we  accuse  European 
diplomacy,  which  has  never  desired  serious  re- 
forms in  Turkey,  of  duplicity — we  do  not  in  any 
way  wish  to  belittle  the  responsibility  of  the 
Turkish  Governments.  We  denounce  them  to  the 
civilized  world,  to  the  people  of  the  Empire,  and 
particularly  to  the  Mohammedan  masses,  without 
whose  help  they  would  not  have  been  able  to 
uphold  their  domination.  We  reproach  the 
Turkish  regime  with  the  complete  absence  of  real 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  49 

liberty  and  equality  for  the  nations— an  absolute 
lack  of  security  and  of  any  guarantee  of  the  life  or 
the  rights  and  property  of  the  citizens— the  non- 
existence of  justice  and  of  a  well-organized  and 
impartial  administration.  It  has  upheld  a  system 
of  the  most  harassing  taxation.  It  has  turned 
a  deaf  ear  to  all  demands  of  reform  that  might 
benefit  Mohammedan  and  other  peasants  and 
workers.  It  has  supported  only  its  feudal  sub- 
jects or  nomadic  tribes  armed  against  the  de- 
fenceless agriculturists.  By  their  proverbial 
inertia  the  Turkish  Governments  have  done 
nothing  but  provoke  and  maintain  poverty,  ignor- 
ance, emigration  and  brigandage,  and  massacres 
without  number  in  Anatolia  and  Rumelia— in  a 
word,  anarchy,  which  serves  to-day  as  a  pretext 
for  intervention  and  for  war. 

"  The  hope  that  the  new  regime  would  put  an 
end  to  the  past  by  inaugurating  a  new  policy 
has  been  disappointed.  The  successive  '  Young 
Turk  '  Governments  have  not  only  continued  the 
errors  of  the  past  ;  they  have  used  the  authority 
and  the  prestige  of  an  apparent  parliamentary 
system  in  order  to  apply  a  policy  of  denationali- 
zation and  oppression,  together  with  an  exces- 
sive bureaucratic  centralization,  which  has  ignored 
the  rights  of  nationalities  and  the  demands  of  the 
working  classes.  The  members  of  the  new 
regime  have  in  some  respects  even  outdone  those 
of    the    old,    which    had    raised    the    systematic 

4 


50  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

assassination  of  political  opponents  to  the  height 
of   a   governmental   policy."  ' 

There  is  nothing  surprising  in  the  fact  that 
the  Governments  of  four  Balkan  States  desired, 
and  were  able,  profiting  by  the  crimes  and  errors 
of  the  Turkish  Government,  to  form  a  military 
league  against  the  latter  and  to  declare  war  upon 
it.  Neither  is  it  surprising  that  the  Russian 
Government  lent  its  aid  to  the  enterprise,  per- 
ceiving in  it  an  efficacious  means  of  sapping  the 
power  of  Turkey  and  opposing  to  Austria  the 
coalized  forces  of  the  Balkan  League.  But  if 
Russia  assisted  in  the  creation  of  the  Balkan 
League  and  the  first  Balkan  War,  Austria  in  her 
turn  contributed  toward  the  dissolution  of  this 
League,  and  to  the  declaration  of  the  second 
Balkan  War,  by  pushing  Bulgaria  into  a  conflict 
with  Greece  and  Serbia,  which  enabled  Turkey 
to  recapture  Adrianople,  and  in  some  degree  to 
recoup  herself  for  her  losses.  The  rapid  disso- 
lution of  the  Balkan  League  was  a  piece  of  very 
successful  policy  on  the  part  of  Austria,  who 
thenceforward  no  longer  had  to  face  a  coalition 
of  four  Balkan  States,  but  was  able  profitably 
to  exploit  the  disagreements  created  between 
Bulgaria  and  her  recent  allies. 

^  See  the  English  edition  of  the  "  Manifesto  of  the  Socialists 
of  Turkey  and  the  Balkans.  To  the  Working  People  of  the 
Balkans  and  Asia  Minor.  To  the  Labour  International.  To 
Public  Opinion."      igi2. 


BEFORE   THE    WAR  51 


II 

Another  factor  greatly  making  for  the  success 
of  the  Austro-German  policy  was  the  enormous 
and  exclusive  influence  of  Germany  in  Turkey. 
The  stages  by  which  this  influence  was  evolved 
are  well  known.  The  point  of  departure  was  the 
year  1895,  when  all  Europe  was  thrilled  by  the 
massacres  of  the  Armenians  in  Turkey,  and  when 
the  Government  of  Wilhelm  II,  alone  among  the 
Governments  of  Europe,  took  the  part  of  Turkey, 
and  the  German  Emperor  came  forward  for  the 
first  time  as  the  supporter  of  the  old  Turkish 
regime.  This  service  was  well  paid  by  Turkey, 
who  made  several  important  concessions  to  Ger- 
man capital. 

The  same  story  was  repeated  in  1905,  in  con- 
nection with  the  Macedonian  question,  when 
Germany  refused  to  take  part  in  a  naval  demon- 
stration against  Turkey,  which  was  designed  to 
put  pressure  on  the  Sultan's  Government  in  order 
to  force  it  to  put  into  effect  the  reforms  promised 
to  Macedonia.  Jean  Jaures  wrote  at  the  time  that 
the  German  Emperor  wished  to  spare  the  Sultan, 
firstly,  because  he  wished  Germany's  assistance 
to  Turkey  to  be  paid  for  by  various  privileges 
afforded  to  German  capital,  and  secondly,  because 
the  Sultan  was  one  of  the  representatives  of  the 
monarchical     idea    and     of    absolute    power     in 


52  RUSSIA   AND    THE    GREAT   WAR 

Europe.'  The  quays  of  Constantinople,  exploited 
by  German  concessionaires,  the  railways  of 
Turkey  in  Asia,  built  and  exploited  by  German 
capital,  together  with  other  concessions  and  com- 
mercial or  undustrial  imdertakings — such  was  the 
payment  in  kind  which  the  Germans  received  at 
the  price  of  the  innocent  and  unavenged  blood 
of  Armenia  and  Macedonia.  The  concession  to 
build  the  Bagdad  Railway  marked  the  climax  of 
German  influence  in  Turkey,  for  it  opened  wide 
the  door  for  German  emigration  into  Asia  Minor. 
The  activities  of  Marshal  Von  der  Goltz  Pasha 
marked  the  climax  of  her  political  and  military 
penetration   of   Turkey. 

The  abolition  of  the  Old  Turk  regime  and  the 
beginning  of  the  Young  Turk  era,  which  made 
practically  no  change  in  the  internal  life  of 
Turkey,  left  its  foreign  policy  also  unchanged  : 
German  influence  continued  to  be  predominant. 
The  dispatch  of  a  military  Mission,  with  General 
Liman  von  Sanders  at  its  head,  securqd  the 
Turkish  Army  as  a  docile  weapon  in  German 
hands.  Germany  regarded  Turkey  as  her 
"private  game-preserve,"  and  on  the  i6th  of 
January,  1913,  t"he  German  Ambassador  in  Con- 
stantinople, Baron  von  Wagenheim,  publicly  de- 
livered a  speech  threatening  Russia,  in  which  he 
said  :  "  Germany  will  never  allow  Russia  to  exert 
pressure  on  Turkey.  Neither  now  nor  in  the 
'  See  his  article  in  BHunianite,  November  27,  1905. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  53 

future  shall  we  permit  any  one  to  lay  hands  on 
Anatolia."  '  As  for  the  Germans  themselves, 
they  have  laid  their  hands,  not  only  on  Anatolia 
but   on  many   other   Turkish   provinces. 

Posing  as  the  champion  of  Turkish  indepen- 
dence, Germany  in  reality  deprived  the  country 
of  any  independence  whatever.  And  when  the 
hour  struck  Germany  cast  Turkey  to  the  flames 
without  even  asking  her  consent  or  what  was  her 
will.  For  it  is  a  well-established  fact  that  the 
German  mercenaries  in  the  service  of  the  Turkish 
Government  began  hostilities  against  the  non- 
fortified  towns  of  Russia  without  even  warning 
the  Turkish  Government,  which  found  itself 
confronted  by  the  accomplished  fact,  and  had 
not  sufficient  courage  to  refuse  to  follow  down 
the  path  by  which  the  German  officers  were 
dragging   it. 

Ill  , 

Before  effecting  the  penetration  of  the  Balkans, 
Germany  pushed  Austria  thither.  This  is  already 
an  old  story.  Having  excluded  Austria  from 
the  Federation  of  the  Germanic  States,  having 
closed  all  outlets  toward  the  north,  the  Prussian 
monarchy  pointed  out  the  way  to  the  south, 
toward  Salonica  and  other  ports  of  the  Balkans. 

'  There  was  a  question  of  reforms  in  Armenia.  The  speech 
was  delivered  by  Herr  von  Wagenheim  at  the  German  Teutonia 
Club,  in  Constantinople. 


54  RUSSIA   AND   THE    GREAT   WAR 

According  to  the  ideas  of  the  German  Imperial- 
ists, the  march  of  Austria  toward  the  south,  and 
her  penetration  of  the  Balkans^  was  to  be  the 
prelude  to  the  complete  and  final  triumph  of 
German  domination  over  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 
But  in  her  penetration  of  the  Balkans  Austria 
encountered  the  resistance  of  the  Slav  States  in 
general,  and  of  the  Serbs  in  particular.  The 
legitimate  nature  of  this  resistance  was  not  denied 
even  by  certain  elements  of  Austrian  society.  For 
instance,  the  Social-Democratic  party  (German) 
in  Austria,  in  its  manifesto  of  the  i  8th  of  October, 
1 9 1  2,  accusing  both  Italy  and  Russia  of  "  pre- 
paring for  war,"  at  the  same  time  declared  : — 

"  Austria-Hungary,  placed  between  Russia  and 
Italy,  is  guilty  in  a  high  degree.  This  Empire, 
incapable  of  relieving  its  people,  suffering  the 
most  terrible  want  during  the  rise  in  the  price  of 
bread,  powerless  to  stop  civil  war  among  its  own 
peoples,  governing  Hungary  with  the  brutal 
violence  of  a  Tisza  and  a  Lucacs,  burdening 
Croatian  Slavonia  with  the  dictatorship  of  Cuvaj, 
failing  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  to  redeem  the 
promise  made  thirty-four  years  ago  to  emancipate 
the  Christian  peasants  from  Turkish  feudal 
serfdom—this  Empire  now  poses,  as  if  it  had  not 
enough  to  do  in  its  own  country,  as  judge  and 
arbitrator  over  the  distant  Balkan   States. 

"  The  Austrian  people  have  only  one  interest 
in     the     Balkans  :      the     peaceful     exchange     of 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  55 

merchandise  with  the  Balkan  peoples.  Our 
manufacturers  wish  to  sell  their  products  in 
Serbia  and  Bulgaria,  In  exchange  we  want  from 
the  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  peasantry  their  cattle 
and  their  cereals.  The  fact  that  this  exchange 
of  products  has  been  made  onerous,  and  has  for 
many  years  been  obstructed,  is  due  to  no  fault 
of  the  Serbians  or  the  Bulgarians.  It  is  the  fault 
of  the  agrarian  party  of  Austria-Hungary.  In 
order  to  raise  the  price  of  cattle  throughout 
Austria-Hungary  by  avoiding  foreign  competi- 
tion, the  rich  agrarians  caused  our  frontiers  to  be 
closed  to  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  cattle.  If  we  do 
not  buy  cattle  in  the  agricultural  countries  of  the 
Balkans,  these  countries  will  naturally  eliminate 
our  products  from  their  markets.  This  is  the 
obstacle  to  our  commerce  in  the  Balkans.  But 
to  remove  this  obstacle  it  is  not  necessary  to  send 
our  soldiers  to  the  frontier.  The  barrier  will 
fall  if  we  break  the  power  of  the  agrarian  party 
in  Austria-Hungary,  and  if  we  pull  down  the 
custom-houses. 

"  We  do  not  want  war  against  Serbia,  we  want 
war  against  the  famine  policy  of  our  agrarians. 
That  is  the  Balkan  policy  we  need.  .  ,  .  Neither 
do  we  want  to  spill  the  blood  of  our  soldiers  in 
order  to  prop  up  the  rotten  feudalism  of  Turkey, 
and  assure  it  of  the  subserviency  of  the  Slav 
populations.  And  little  Serbia,  which  has  no 
mor^   inhabitants   than   the   city   of   Vienna,   will 


56  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

certainly  not  become  a  danger  to  Austria  by 
taking  a  few  miserable  villages  !  .  .  .  Austria - 
Hungary  has  committed  enough  crimes  against 
the  poor  southern  Slav  populations.  Only  by 
military  dictatorship  will  she  be  able  to  govern 
the  Slavs  of  the  south,  who  are  under  her 
domination.  By  her  economic  and  agrarian 
policy  she  has  reduced  the  peasants  of  Serbia 
to  despair.  She  would  even  drive  the  wSlavs 
of  the  south  into  the  arms  of  Russian  Tsarism, 
were  she  to  shed  Serbian  blood  at  this  junc- 
ture in  order  to  uphold  the  Turkish  suzerainty 
over  a  Serbian  peasantry ;  were  she  to  pre- 
vent the  Serbian  peasants,  whose  products  she 
will  not  accept,  from  finding  access  to  other 
markets.  Precisely  because  we  are  the  enemies 
of  Russian  Tsarism,  whose  expansion  represents 
the  greatest  danger  to  European  civilization,  we 
ask  Austria-Hungary  not  to  take  the  aggressive 
by  opposing  the  interests  of  the  southern 
Slavs."  ' 

Unhappily  the  Austro  -  Hungarian  agrarians 
were  stronger  than  the  pacifist  elements  of  their 
country.  Directly  the  Balkan  League  was  dis- 
solved the  Austrian  Government  began  to  seek 
a  pretext  to  strangle  Serbia,  and  to  clear  a  road 
to  the  ports  in  the  south  and  south-west  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  across  the  political  and  mili- 

^  See  the  English  edition  of  the  "  Manifesto  of  the  Social- 
Democratic  Party  of  Austria,"  October  1912. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  57 

tary  ruin  of  the  Serb  State.  Such  a  plan  was 
bound  to  involve  Austria-Hungary  in  a  conflict 
with  Russia,  above  all  as  Germany  desired  that 
conflict  even  more  than  did  Austria  herself. 

As  we  shall  presently  see,  Russia's  policy 
toward  the  Austro-German  alliance  was  in  no 
manner  provocative.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  a 
rather  weak  and  amiable  policy.  But  Russia, 
despite  her  weakness  and  the  sympathies  of  her 
ruling  classes  for  their  German  colleagues,  could 
not  remain  completely  impassive  before  Austria's 
attempt  to  strangle  Serbia.  The  German  patriot 
and  professor  Herr  Delbriick  wrote  in  1909  that 
"  Italy  and  Russia  could  not  permit  the  continual 
penetration  by  Austria  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula," 
and  the  Serbian  people  "  could  not  remain 
tranquil  while  enclosed  on  two  sides  by  Austro- 
Hungary  and,  having  no  outlet  to  the  sea,  it 
saw  before  it  the  inevitable  prospect  of  fall- 
ing into  a  complete  dependence  upon  that 
Power."  I 

To  realize  plainly  what  might  be  the  result  to 
Russia  of  the  German  and  Austrian  domination  of 
the  Balkans,  we  must  once  more  remember  that 
the  greater  part  of  Russia's  exports  of  grain 
passes  by  way  of  the  Black  Sea  and  the 
Dardanelles.  On  this  export  trade  depends,  not 
only  the  agricultural  economy  of  Russia  but  also 
the  Budget  of  the  State.  If  Turkish  rule  on 
-  See  Freussische  Jahrbiicher,  January,  1909,  vol.  134. 


58  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

the  banks  of  the  Bosphorus  is  not  always  agree- 
able to  Russia,  a  German  and  Austrian  domina- 
tion of  a  military  character  would  be  extremely 
dangerous  to  her,  and  not  to  Russia  alone,  but 
to  Italy,  France,  and  England.  As  for  Russia 
herself,  her  economic  and  political  situation  on 
the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  might  become  abso- 
lutely insupportable  and  untenable,  in  the  event 
of  the  Balkans  and  Constantinople  being  con- 
quered by  Germany  and  Austria.  The  Baltic  is 
already  closed  by  a  powerful  German  fleet.  If 
the  Black  Sea  were  closed  also  Russia  would 
find  herself  in  a  cul-de-sac  and  would  become 
the  economic  and  political  vassal  of  the  Austro- 
German   bloc. 


CHAPTER    IV 

I.  The  economic  relations  between  Russia  and  Germany.  The 
commercial  exchange  between  these  two  countries.  The 
success  of  German  trade  in  the  Russian  market  facilitated 
by  the  anti-Semitic  policy  in  Russia. — II.  The  Customs 
Treaty  of  1904  and  the  problem  of  its  renewal.  The 
necessity  of  abolishing  the  Protectionist  system  in  Russia. 
Why  was  not  the  Russo-German  economic  enfe?ite  realized  ? 

I 

In  addition  to  the  general  political  questions 
which  divide  Germany  and  Russia,  there  are  also 
certain  special  problems  which  result  in  the  oppo- 
sition of  the  two  nations. 

The  economic  relations  between  Russia  and 
Germany  were  markedly  intensive  and  well  de- 
veloped before  the  war.  To  characterize  these, 
it  will  suffice  to  say  that  according  to  the  date 
communicated  to  the  First  Russian  Export  Con- 
gress (which  met  at  Kiev  in  the  early  part  of 
1914),  50  per  cent,  of  the  total  Russian  imports 
come  from  Germany.  Germany  and  Russia, 
therefore  mutually  satisfy  the  half  of  their  several 
economic  needs  and  their  demands  on  external 
markets.       In     1901     GeiTnany    imported    from 

Russia   1 8 7- 6  million  roubles  worth  of  merchan- 

59 


60  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

dise,  while  Russia  took  from  Germany  goods  to 
the  value  of  216-9  million  roubles.  In  the  same 
year  England  imported  from  Russia  goods  to  the 
value  of  1 45" 5  million  roubles,  and  exported  to 
Russia  goods  to  the  value  of  izyi  million 
roubles.  In  1909  the  German  goods  imported 
into  Russia  amounted  to  3 63' 3  million  roubles, 
and  the  Russian  export  to  Germany  387' i 
millions,  while  for  England  the  corresponding 
figures  were  1279  ^.nd  2 2 8" 9  million  roubles. 
As  for  the  other  European  countries,  their  com- 
mercial exchange  with  Russia  is  of  little  value 
compared  with  the  German  trade.' 

But  the  most  important  factor  in  this  problem 
is  the  qualitative  aspect  of  the  commercial  rela- 
tions between  Germany  and  Russia.  Many 
Russian  economists  assert  that,  thanks  to  the 
fiscal  and  commercial  policy  of  Germany,  Russia 
is  economically  dependent  on  the  former  country. 
This  opinion  is  expressed,  not  only  by  those 
economists  who  support  the  interests  of  the  great 
capitalists  but  also  by  the  democratic  and  inde- 
pendent economists,  whose  view -point  is  that  of 
the  great  masses  of  the  people.  For  instance, 
one  of  the  most  notable  students  of  Russian 
economics,  M.  Oganovsky,  a  representative  of 
the  "  populist  "  (narodnik)  movement,  states  that 
the  world  does  not  contain  any  great  independent 

^  The  figures  are  cited  from  the  Annual  of  the  journal  JietcA 
for  the  year   191 2. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  61 

Power  which  could  possibly  find  itself  in  the 
position  of  the  colony  of  another  Power,  and  that 
Russia  alone  constitutes  an  exception  to  this 
rule.  I 

"  Russia  was  gradually  becoming  more  and 
more  of  a  German  colony— in  this  sense  notably, 
that  the  Russian  people  were  becoming  an  object 
of  exploitation  by  the  upper  classes  of  the  German 
people.  In  1904,  profiting  by  our  embarrassing 
situation,  the  German  Government  managed,  at 
the  moment  of  concluding  the  Customs  Treaty 
with  Russia,  to  assure  itself  of  immense  advan- 
tages, which  cost  our  agricultural  producers  over 
a  thousand  million  roubles.  The  extremely  high 
customs  duties  which  were  imposed  on  Russian 
agricultural  products  imported  into  Germany  by 
the  treaty  of  1904  protected  the  German  Junkers 
from  the  competition  of  the  Russian  wheat- 
growers,  and  forced  the  latter  to  lower  the  price 
of  their  products  in  order  to  sell  them  in  the 
German  market.  As  for  the  compensation  re- 
ceived by  Russia  in  the  form  of  the  increase  of 
the  customs  duties  on  the  products  of  German 
industry,  this  compensation,  according  to  the 
report  of  the  Russian  Council  of  State,  '  could 
not  be  otherwise  than  burdensome  to  the  rural 
economy,  which  consumed  foreign  articles  (such 
as   agricultural   machinery,    etc.),   as   well   as    to 

'  "One  of  the  Causes  of  the  War,"  an  article  in  the   Yejeme- 
siatchny  Journal,  Petrograd,  October   19 14. 


62  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

Russian  industry,  which  needs  articles  of  foreign 
production   for   its   technical   equipment.'  "  ^ 

We  may  judge  how  far  the  commercial  treaty 
of  1904  facilitated  the  economic  conquest  of 
Russia  by  Germany  by  the  following  fact  :  Ger- 
many exported  to  Russia,  an  agricultural  country 
par  excellence,  not  only  industrial  products  but 
a  large  quantity  of  corn.  In  1902  Germany  ex- 
ported to  Russia  only  106,000  cwt.  of  rye;  in 
1905  (a  year  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Customs 
Treaty  of  1904)  the  amount  had  risen  to 
603,000  cwt.,  and  in   191  i  to  2,105,000  cwt. 

"During  the  last  few  years  the  importation  of 
German  rye  has  attained  figures  more  or  less  re- 
markable, and  it  is  said  that  the  principal  cause 
of  this  phenomenon  is  the  fiscal  policy  of 
Germany  during  the  last  twenty  years."  2 

During  the  period  1907- 11  the  quantity  of 
rye  imported  from  Germany  into  Russia  amounted 
to  some  I  5  per  cent,  of  the  total  exports  of  rye 
from  Russia  to  foreign  countries.  During  the 
same  period  Germany  exported  to  Russia  more 
than    16  per  cent,  of  her  total  export  of  rye. 

And  here  I  must  remark  that  the  success  of 
German  competition  was  facilitated,  not  only  by 
the    mistaken    Customs    Treaty   but   also    by   the 

'  Cited  from  the  article  by  M.  Finn-Yenotaevsky,  "  The 
Causes  of  the  World  War,"  in  the  review  Sovremenny  Mir,  Petro- 
grad,  October  19 14. 

'^  M.  L.  Litochenko,  "  German  Rye  in  the  Russian  Market," 
an  article  in  the  review  Viestnik  F^z^w/j',  Petersburg,  January  1913. 


BEFORE   THE    WAR  63 

errors  of  the  domestic  policy  of  tfie  Russian  auto- 
cracy, and  above  all  by  an  absurd  anti-Semitism. 
In  1 9 1 3  I  published,  in  articles  appearing  in  the 
English  weekly  journal  Darkest  Russia,  a 
whole  series  of  facts  which  demonstrate  only  too 
clearly  the  complete  absurdity  of  this  policy  from 
the  standpoint  of  national  economy.  I  can  but 
repeat  what  I  said  in  these  articles  :— 

"  If,  for  instance,  we  turn  to  the  position  of 
affairs  in  the  commercial  ports  on  the  Baltic,  we 
shall  find  here,  too,  the  ruinous  traces  of  the 
Government's  anti-Semitic  policy.  -We  may  take 
as  an  example  Libau,  which  also  plays  an  im- 
portant part  in  Russian  trade.  Through  Libau 
corn,  timber,  etc.,  are  exported,  and  herrings  and 
other  articles  imported.  During  the  last  few 
years  it  has  been  noticed  that  Libau  has  been 
falling  behind  the  German  port  of  Konigsberg 
in  the  progressive  development  of  its  trade,  and 
that  the  German  port  has  been  growing  more 
and  more  successful  in  its  competition  with  the 
Russian.  At  the  beginning  of  191 1  the  com- 
mittee of  the  Libau  Exchange  investigated  the 
causes  of  this  phenomenon,  and  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  chief  cause  of  the  success  of 
Konigsberg  and  of  the  backwardness  of  Libau 
was  the  restriction  of  Jewish  rights  in  the  latter. 
If  the  herring  trade  is  passing  from  Libau  to 
Konigsberg,  it  is  because  at  Konigsberg  the 
Russian    Jews,   who   act   as   middlemen   between 


64  RUSSIA   AND   THE    GREAT   WAR 

the  importer  and  the  consumer,  are  allowed  free- 
dom of  residence  and  of  trade,  and  may  possess 
warehouses,  and  so  on,  whereas  at  Libau,  which 
is  outside  the  Jewish  Pale  of  Settlement,  the  Jews 
are  deprived  of  these  privileges,  and  therefore 
prefer  to  carry  on  their  trade  at  Konigsberg. 
In  the  same  way  other  branches  of  trade,  such 
as  the  export  of  timber,  suffer  because  the  Jews, 
who  are  the  chief  middlemen,  are  not  permitted 
freely  to  perform  all  those  operations  which  are 
necessary  for  selling  and  delivering  the  exported 
goods.  The  Retch,  in  recording  this  statement, 
added  at  the  time  that  '  the  revival  of  trade  in 
the  other  neighbouring  German  towns,  such  as 
Memel,  Tilsit,  etc.,  is  also  due  to  the  emigration 
of  Russian  Jews  who  had  no  right  to  reside  in 
their  own  country  outside  the  Rale  of  Settlement. 
In  Prussia  the  Jews  are  allowed  to  move  from 
place  to  place,  and  to  trade  with  freedom.  It 
is  a  fact  that  Russian  Jews  are  found  at  the  head 
of  all  the  big  export  firms.'  Such  are  the  fruits 
of  the  anti-Semitic  policy,  which,  according  to 
its  inspirers  and  agents,  seeks  to  benefit 
'  national  '  interests.  The  Government  declares 
that  it  restricts  the  activity  of  the  Jewish  mer- 
chants with  the  object  of  handicapping  them  in 
the  competition  with  Russian  merchants,  and  with 
a  view  to  regenerating  '  national  '  trade.  But 
in  reality  the  persecution  of  the  Jews  has  merely 
promoted  the  d^cay  of  Russian  centres  of  foreign 


BEFORE   THE  WAR  65 

trade   and   the    prosperity   of   German    towns    at 
their  expense. "^ 

II 

The  term  of  the  commercial  treaty  concluded  in 
1904  was  to  have  expired  at  the  end  of  191  5. 
The  problem  of  the  renewal  of  this  treaty  was 
already  being  discussed  many  months  before  the 
war,  and  this  discussion  contributed  not  a  little 
to  the  cooling  of  the  relations  between  the  two 
neighbouring  countries.  This  is  noted  as  far 
back  as  the  beginning  of  1914  by  the  Parisian 
review  La  Courrler  Europeen,  which  states,  in 
this  connection,  that  "  the  approaching  expira- 
tion of  the  Russo-German  commercial  treaty  is 
the  occasion  of  much  bluff,  menace,  and  compro- 
mise." To  this  observation  I  replied  in  one  of 
my  articles  which  appeared  in  the  English  press 
that  "  if  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  '  bluff  '  in 
the  controversy  between  the  journalists  of  the 
two  nations,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
economic  interests  of  the  directing  parties  are 
at  the  bottom  of  this  unfriendly  '  discussion  '  be- 
tween the  Russian  and  German  Nationalists. 
'  We  are  aware,'  says  the  Lokal-Anzeiger  of 
Berlin,  '  how  passionately  the  Russians  are  pre- 
paring for  the  discussion  of  the  renewal  of  the 
treaty.    .    .    .   They  are  searching  for  weapons  to 

•  Darkest  Russia^  August  13,  19 13,  "The  Economics  of  Anti- 
Semitism." 

5 


66  RUSSIA    AND    THE    GREAT   WAR 

use  against  the  German  negotiators.'  To  this  the 
Den  of  Petersburg  repUes  :  '  The  Germans  are 
blackmailing  us  in  order  to  frighten  us  and  to 
secure  all  the  advantages  of  the  new  commercial 
treaty.'  The  very  fact  that  material  and  economic 
interests  are  involved  in  the  Russo-German  con- 
flict renders  it  most  dangerous  to  the  peace  of 
Europe ;  for  if  men  to  -  day  no  longer  go 
crusading  for  religious  matters^  they  are  ready 
enough  to  wage  war  for  the  sake  of  increasing 
their  export  of  wheat,  or  pigs,  or  mineral 
produce."  ' 

•What  was  the  attitude  of  the  various  ele- 
ments of  Russian  society  in  respect  of  this 
serious  problem  of  the  economic  relations 
with  Germany  and  the  renewal  of  the  treaty 
of    1904? 

The  simplest  attitude  was  that  of  the  Govern- 
ment. From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Russian 
bureaucracy  a  customs  tariff  ought  to  be  erected 
in  such  a  fashion  as  to  yield  large  revenues  for 
the  State  Treasury.  Fiscal  necessities  were  more 
than  satisfied  by  the  Protectionism  extant  in 
Russia.  In  1901  the  customs  duties  yielded  the 
Russian  Treasury  197  million  roubles;  in  1904, 
2285  million;  in  1908,  278'5  million;  and  in 
19 1 2,  326  million. 

In   Russia,   as   a  rule,   indirect   taxation   is  far 

'  See  my  article  "  Russia's  Tariff  Wall "  in  Darkest  Russia, 
March  15,  1914. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  67 

more  highly  developed  than  direct  taxation.  High 
customs  duties  are  perfectly  consistent  with  the 
financial  system  of  Russia  ;  in  1904  all  the  direct 
taxes  together  yielded  only  135  million  roubles, 
while  the  customs  dues  alone  poured  228  millions 
into  the  treasury.  In  19 14,  according  to  the 
budgetary  estimates,  the  direct  taxes  should  have 
yielded  264  millions,  and  the  customs  due  350 
millions.  In  1904  the  customs  dues  formed  only 
one-ninth  of  the  total  of  the  indirect  taxes,  but 
in  1 9 1 4,  according  to  the  estimates,  they  would 
have  formed  one-sixth  part.  The  customs  dues, 
therefore,  are  a  precious  morsel  in  the  eyes  of 
the  high  Russian  bureaucracy,  and  the  latter  are 
well  content  with  them. 

Protectionism  is  also  a  gratifying  policy  to 
certain  groups  of  large  industrial  capitalists. 
High  import  duties,  by  eliminating  foreign  com- 
petition, and  artificially  disturbing  the  equilibrium 
between  supply  and  demand,  allow  them  to  in- 
crease the  prices  of  their  goods  and'  to  monopolize 
the  home  market  for  their  own  selfish  profit. 
Such  monopolization  is  all  the  easier  because  in 
many  cases  the  customs  duties  which  are  imposed 
on  articles  imported  into  Russia  are  so  high  that 
they  result,  not  merely  in  the  "  protection  "  of 
the  national  industries  but  in  the  prohibition  of 
foreign  imports.  Often  the  duties  imposed  are 
greater  than  the  value  of  the  object  taxed  ;  for 
example,   a   pood   of   cast-iron    costs    40   to    42 


68  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

kopecks  in  Russia,  and  the  import  duty  on  cast- 
iron  is  45  kopecks  per  pood.' 

In  addition  to  yielding  large  revenues  to  cer- 
tain groups  of  wealthy  manufacturers,  the  customs 
tariff  also  enriches  certain  financial  groups,  as 
an  artificial  increase  of  the  "  surplus  value  "  of 
industrial  enterprises  results  in  an  inflation  of 
stock,  and  shares  at  a  premium  result  in  stock- 
jobbing and  speculation. 

As  for  the  masses  of  the  people,  and  the 
national  economy,  in  the  truer  and  wider  sense 
of  the  term,  the  present  Protectionist  system  is 
in  no  way  profitable  to  them.  In  the  first  place, 
an  artificial  inflation  of  prices  causes  a  decreased 
consumption.  And  in  Russia,  we  find,  prices 
are  hig'h,  while  consumption  is  lower  than  in 
other  European  countries.  In  1910  the  annual 
consumption  of  cast-iron  was  14  poods  per  head 
in  the  United  States,  1 1  poods  in  England,  i  o 
poods  in  Germany,  and  only  1^  poods  in  Russia. 
It  is  the  same  with  other  products.  The  de- 
velopment of  consumption  is  impossible  in  Russia 
without  a  lowering  of  prices,  and  this  is  impos- 
sible failing  the  demolition  of  the  high  tariff  wall 
which  surrounds  the  Russian  market,  transform- 
ing it  into  a  "  preserve  "  in  the  hands  of  a  few 
monopolists.  These  monopolists,  in  search  of 
gain,  sometimes  create  an  artificial  want  of  this 
or  that  article — an  "  industrial  famine."  Thus, 
'  About  lo'oSd.  and  loSd  per  36  lb. 


BEFORE   THE  WAR  69 

of  late  years  Russia  has  known  "  famines  "  of 
coal,  cast-iron,  etc.,  by  which  the  State  itself  has 
suffered  very  considerably,  as  State  undertakings 
such  as  railways,  etc.,  have  lacked  the  materials 
or  products  which  they  required.  More  than 
once  the  Government  has  been  forced  to  suspend 
the  import  duties  on  such  products,  and  allow 
them  a  free  entrance  from  abroad,  since  there 
was  no  other  means  of  holding  in  check  the  greed 
of  the  monopolists. 

Could  a  better  proof  be  found  of  the  absurdity 
of  the  modern  Protectionist  system? 

Protection  by  means  of  import  duties  is  harm- 
ful to  the  interests  of  the  national  economy 
because  it  fetters  the  foreign  trade  of  Russia. 
In  preventing  the  free  entry  of  foreign  merchan- 
dise Russia  finds  the  doors  of  other  countries 
closed  against  her  products.  And  so  far  the  total 
value  of  her  foreign  trade  is  less  than  the  total 
of  the  State  Budget,  while  in  England  (a  Eree 
Trade  country)  the  value  of  the  foreign  trade  is 
many  times  greater  than  the  State  Budget. 

And  it  may  be  affirmed  that  Protection  is  in 
the  long  run  harmful  to  the  true  interests  of 
Russian  industry  itself.  This  is  not  a  paradox. 
By  eliminating  foreign  competition  it  deprives  the 
Russian  capitalist  of  energy  and  initiative,  and 
transforms  our  industrial  monarchs  into  pre- 
tenders, too  insufficiently  preoccupied  with  the 
technique  and  the  perfecting  of  the  means  of 
production   of   their   undertakings. 


70  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

Finally,  the  political  consequences  of  Protec- 
tion are  extremely  negativ^e,  because  it  corrupts 
the  industrial  bourgeoisie,  subjects  it  to  a  Govern- 
mental tutelage,  and  deprives  it  of  the  spirit  of 
opposition  to  and  independence  of  a  reactionary 
Tsarism. 

Unhappily,  not  all  the  ideologists  of  the  capi- 
talist bourgeoisie  have  a  clear  comprehension  of 
the  disadvantages  of  the  Protectionist  system, 
and  among  them  there  are  some  who  would  still 
further  expand  and  reinforce  this  lamentable 
system.  Peter  Struve,  for  example,  the  ideo- 
logical father  of  the  Russian  Liberal  Party,  insists 
that  our  Protectionism  ought  to  be  developed  in 
all  its  "  logical  consequences,"  which  include 
"  the  exportation  of  Russian  products  at  low 
prices."  Russian  produce,  in  fact,  says  M. 
Struve,  ought  to  be  cheaper  to  the  foreigner  than 
to  the  Russian.  To  make  this  possible,  the  State 
ought  to  repay  to  the  Russian  exporters  the 
customs  duties  which  they  pay  on  importing 
merchandise  from  other  countries.  But  M. 
Struve  himself  realizes  that  this  "  logical  conse- 
quence "  cannot  be  welcomed  by  public  opinion, 
which,  in  his  own  words,  "  is  inspired  with  senti- 
ments hostile  to  Protectionism,"  and  he  fails  to 
understand  that  the  repayment  of  import  duties 
does  not  constitute  an  abatement  of  Protection, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  an  aggravation.  The  whole 
Liberal  section  of  Russian  society,  says  M.  Struve 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  71 

regretfully,    would    pronounce    against    such    a 
measure. 

The  true  democracy  of  Russia  is  opposed  to 
Protectionism,  for  reasons  which  I  have  already 
expounded.  But  we  must  not  forget  that  Russia 
can  play  a  large  part  in  the  foreign  markets  only 
as  a  grain-exporting  country.  "  -We  must  permit 
ourselves  no  illusions  as  to  the  possibility  of  such 
a  development  of  our  industry  as  would  enable 
us  to  organize  a  considerable  exportation  of  its 
products,"  says  Professor  Migulin,  a  member  of 
the  superior  committee  of  the  Ministry  of 
Finance.  On  the  contrary,  the  exportation  of 
the  products  of  the  rural  economy  of  Russia  is 
already  well  developed,  and  has  a  great  future 
before  it.  In  191 3  the  total  value  of  the  Russian 
export  trade  was  1,427  million  roubles,  which 
was  made  up  as  follows  :  Cereals,  546  million 
roubles  ;  eggs,  87  millions  ;  butter,  68  millions  ; 
linen,  107-6  millions;  timber,  152-5  millions; 
grain  other  than  cereals,  47  millions,  etc.  Agri- 
cultural produce  forms  the  principal  clement  of 
the  Russian  export  trade.  But  the  exportation 
of  agricultural  produce  into  Germany  and  other 
countries  will  be  free  only  if  the  importation  of 
foreign  merchandise  into  Russia  is  also  free.  The 
opening  of  the  commercial  frontiers  presents  no 
danger  to  Russian  agriculture  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  possibility  of  foreign  competition,  because 
the  natural  wealth  of  Russia  is  so  great  and  the 


72  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

cost  of  production  of  cereals  relatively  so  low 
that  Russian  grain  can  easily  overcome  all  com- 
petition from  abroad — if  only  the  changing  social 
and  political  conditions  of  Russian  life  will  give 
the  liberty  necessary  for  the  manifestation  of 
economic  energy  and  initiative. 

The  idea  of  the  abolition  of  Protectionism  and 
the  institution  of  Free  Trade  with  Germany  would 
be  welcomed,  not  only  by  the  Russian  but  also 
by  the  German  democracy.  The  working  classes 
of  Germany  had  long  been  discontented  with  the 
Protectionist  system  of  their  own  country,  ex- 
ploited as  it  was  by  the  agrarians,  who  en- 
deavoured to  obtain  a  monopoly  of  the  home 
market,  and  to  draw  enormous  revenues  from 
the  increased  prices  of  articles  of  prime  necessity. 
Of  late  years  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  neces- 
saries has  become  so  great  that  the  German 
Government  has  been  forced  to  open  a  free 
passage  for  the  importation  of  Russian  meat,  and 
this  temporary  measure  was  acclaimed  by  the 
working  classes. 

One  might  imagine,  too,  that  the  industrial 
circles  of  Germany  would  have  consented  to  the 
revision  of  the  commercial  treaty  with  Russia 
in  the  direction  of  an  abatement,  or  even  the 
complete  suppression,  of  import  duties,  as  the 
immense  Russian  market  would  then  have  been 
open  to  them.  But  the  German  Agrarians, 
the  Prussian  Junkers,  violently  opposed  any  idea 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  73 

of  revising  the  treaty  in  this  direction.  On  them 
rests,  as  far  as  Germany  is  concerned,  the  chief 
responsibihty  for  the  political  and  economic  con- 
flict with  Russia,  as  the  German  Democratic  Press 
has  stated.  Vor^^^arts,  on  April  lo,  1914,  de- 
clared that  "  it  is  the  egotistical  obstinacy  of  the 
German  Agrarians  alone  which  explains  the  gene- 
sis of  economic  and  political  discord  between 
Germany  and  Russia." 


CHAPTER    V 

I.  The  internal  life  of  Russia  before  the  war.  Economic  pro- 
gress and  the  re-birth  of  the  popular  movement. — II.  The 
policy  of  the  Government.  Recent  success  of  the  libera- 
tive  movement.  The  political  strike  and  the  popular 
demonstrations  of  July  19 14  in  Petersburg. 

I 

The  better  to  comprehend  the  situation  created 
for  Russia  by  the  war,  we  must  briefly  glance 
at  the  condition  of  the  internal  life  of  the  nation 
before  the  war. 

We  will  commence  with  an  analysis  of  the 
economic  development  of  Russia,  because  the 
economic  factor  is  to  the  social  and  political  life 
of  a  people  what  matter  is  to  the  biological  life 
of  the  organism. 

After  the  years  of  the  great  crisis  and  the 
subsequent  stagnation,  the  industrial  and  com- 
mercial activity  of  Russia  resumed  its  course,  and 
from  1909  onwards  the  country  was  again 
traversing  a  period  of  economic  progress. 

Here   are   some   significant   figures  : — 

In  1909  there  were  in  Russia  14,733  industrial 

establisliments    subject    to    the    control    of    the 

74 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  75 

Inspection  of  Factories  (without  counting  mining 
enterprises).  The  number  of  workers  employed 
in  these  estabhshments  was  1,832,783.  In  1910 
the  number  of  estabhshments  had  risen  to  i  5,721, 
and  that  of  the  workers  to  1,951,955;  for  the 
year  191  i  the  figures  were  16,600  and 
2,051,198;  for  the  year  191 2  they  were 
17,356  and  2,151,191.  So  for  a  period  of  four 
years  we  have  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
factories  and  workshops  representing  2,623  new 
estabhshments,  and  an  increase  of  3  18,408  in  the 
number  of  workers.  In  1908  all  the  industrial 
undertakings  of  Russia,  mines  included,  produced 
merchandise  to  the  value  of  4,707  million 
roubles  ;  in  1 9 1 2  this  sum  had  increased  to 
5,134  million  roubles.  In  191  i,  19 12,  and  the 
first  eight  months  of  1913,  no  less  than  856 
shareholders'  companies  for  purposes  of  indus- 
trial exploitation  were  founded  in  Russia,  their 
capital  amounting  to  a  total  of  1,088  million 
roubles. 

This  economic  revival  came  after  a  long  and 
painful  crisis  and  depression,  and  brought  with 
it  a  revival  of  political  life.  The  workers  in  the 
factories  and  workshops,  who  in  all  modern 
countries  constitute  the  principal  revolutionary 
power,  do  so  in  Russia  also.  The  economic 
crisis,  and  the  diminution  in  the  number  of 
workers,  enfeebled  not  only  their  material  forces 
but   also  their  moral   resistance.      But   with   the 


76  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

increasing  economic  activity  of  the  country,  their 
power  began  to  revive.  The  demand  for  labour 
increased,  and  the  workers  once  more  feU  that 
they  formed  a  necessary  element  of  the  economic 
and  social  life  of  their  country.  They  wished 
to  profit  by  the  increasing  demand  for  labour 
by  demanding  an  increase  of  wages,  which  were 
very  low  during  the  period  of  the  crisis,  and 
improved  conditions  of  labour,  which  were  more 
than  unsatisfactory.  The  workers'  organizations, 
the  trades  unions,  broken  by  the  years  of  the 
industrial  crisis  and  political  reaction,  began  to 
spring  up  once  more  in  spite  of  all  the  adminis- 
trative restrictions  and  police  persecutions. 

The  co-operative  movement  also  began  to  de- 
velop, especially  among  the  peasants.  Towards 
the  middle  of  1914  the  total  number  of  co-opera- 
tive societies  in  Russia  increased  to  19,325,  with 
more  than  9  million  members,  and  an  annual 
balance-sheet  of  800,000  million  roubles.  A 
Russian  economist  asserts  that  "  in  the  co-opera- 
tive movement  at  least  two-thirds  of  all  the 
peasants'  savings  of  Russia  have  already  been 
absorbed."  ' 

But  although  the  Tsar's  Government  tolerates 
co-operation  to  a  certain  extent,  it  opposes  the 
trades  unions  with  all  its  might,  as  it  opposes  the 
tendency  to  strike,  and  all  political  organization 
of  the  working-classes.  And  during  the  last  few 
^  See  the  Rousskija  Viedomosti,  19 14,  No.  271. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  77 

years  we  have  seen  in  Russia  what  we  saw  before 
the  year  1905.  The  development  of  industry 
is  inevitably  giving  rise  to  the  labour  movement, 
but  the  archaic  legislation  of  the  autocratic  regime 
and  the  reactionary  administration  will  not  allow 
the  movement  to  develop  in  a  legal  form.  Every 
demand  on  the  part  of  the  workers,  even  the 
most  limited  and  modest,  is  regarded  by  the 
Government  as  a  "  revolt  "  which  must  be  piti- 
lessly suppressed.  From  this  policy  resulted  the 
ghastly  "  tragedy  of  the  Lena."  On  the  4/1 7th 
of  April,  191 2,  the  striking  miners  of  the  gold- 
mines of  the  Lena  (in  Siberia)  were  shot  down 
like  ferocious  beasts  simply  because  they  dared 
peaceably  to  ask  of  their  employers  and  the  local 
administration  that  the  conditions  of  their  labour 
should  be  bettered,  that  their  wages  should  be 
paid  more  regularly,  that  their  wives  should  not 
be  employed  in  rough  and  dirty  tasks,  that  they 
should  not  be  given  spoiled  and  putrid  food,  etc. 
Five  hundred  killed  and  wounded  were  left  on 
the  desert  banks  of  the  great  Siberian  river- 
innocent  victims  of  the  Tsarist  regime. 

But  their  hot  blood  melted  the  snow  and  ice 
of  that  dead  silence  and  depression  which  had 
overtaken  Russian  society  during  the  years  of 
the  reaction.  A  great  popular  movement  sprang 
from  the  graves  of  these  unknown  workers. 
While  in  1 9 1  o  the  official  statistics  recorded  only 
222   cases  of  strikes,   in   which   46,000  workers 


78  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

were  involved,  in  1 9 1 2  the  number  of  strikers 
in  Russia  had  risen  to  1^070,000,  of  whom 
821,000  were  "  pohtical  strikers." 

To  appreciate  this  movement  we  must  remember 
that  in  Russia,  where  the  law  allows  the  people 
hardly  any  legal  possibility  of  expressing  its 
demands,  where  the  press  has  practically  no 
freedom,  and  liberty  of  assemblage  is  all  but 
unknown,  the  "  political  strike  "  is  the  sole 
means  of  efificacious  public  protest  which  remains 
to  the  workers. 

The  elections  to  the  Duma  at  the  end  of  191  2, 
which  took  place  in  an  atmosphere  of  open  ad- 
ministrative pressure  and  political  falsification, 
proved  that  Russian  society  had  not  lost  the  spirit 
of  opposition,  and  that  the  attitude  of  the  popular 
masses  was  still  resolutely  opposed  to  that  of  the 
Government.  Despite  all  difficulties  and  per- 
secutions, the  Independent,  Democratic,  and 
Socialist  Press  is  coming  to  life  again,  and  the 
years  191 3-14  saw  the  appearance  in  Petersburg 
of  three  daily  papers  of  the  Extreme  Left— one 
Socialist  -  Revolutionary  in  tendency  and  two 
Socialist-Democratic — not  to  speak  of  a  great 
Radical  daily  (ostensibly  "  without  party  "), 
and  a  few  monthly  or  bi-monthly  reviews  of  the 
same  complexion.  When  the  Censorship,  the 
police,  and  the  judiciary  suppress  one  of  these 
organs  it  is  at  once  re-issued  under  another 
name  ;    when  one  of  the  editors  is  arrested,  his 


BEFORE  THE   WAR  79 

place  is  filled  by  the  following  day,  and  the 
difficult   work  of  propaganda   is   continued. 

The  "  educational  movement  "  also  underwent 
a  rapid  development— that  is,  the  action  of  the 
popular  universities,  libraries,  and  public  confer- 
ences and  classes,  most  of  which  were  organized 
by   the   workers   themselves. 

But  instead  of  making  concessions  to  the  public 
consciousness,  which  had  awakened  from  its 
"  social  slumber,"  Tsarism  continued  its  negative 
policy  of  reaction  and  repression.  It  undertook 
a  regular  campaign  of  persecution  against  acade- 
mic autonomy  and  the  Liberal  professors  (most 
of  whom  are  more  than  moderate  in  their  political 
opinions).  M.  Kasso,  Minister  of  Public  Instruc- 
tion, disported  himself  among  the  superior, 
secondary,  and  inferior  schools  "  like  a  hippo- 
potamus m  a  china-shop  "  in  the  words  of  a 
Russian  publicist.  The  Government  was  also 
conducting  an  active  anti-Semitic  propaganda, 
which  consisted  not  only  of  words,  but  of  actions 
also,  setting  on  the  stage  the  spectacle  of  a 
"  ritual  murder  " — the  Beiliss  affair— arranged  by 
the  "  Black  Bands,"  the  police,  and  the  judiciary. 
Arrests  and  deportations  of  members  of  the 
political  organizations  belonging  to  the  Left 
continued   uninterruptedly. 

But  all  these  measures  were  in  vain.  It  became 
evident  that  although  the  Government  possessed 
material  power,  it  had  no  true  social^  moral,  and 


80'  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

political  power.  And  since  191 2  we  have 
witnessed  in  Russia  a  self-exhaustive  process 
which  has  seemed  to  deprive  the  reaction  of  all 
dominating  ideas,  of  any  positive  programme, 
while  the  popular  movement  has  continually  in- 
creased in  force,  until  in  19 14,  finding  before 
it  the  mechanical  obstacles  of  repressive  police 
measures,  it  overflowed  them  and  rushed  through 
the  streets— in  the  literal  sense  of  the  word.  In 
the  middle  of  July  19 14  the  workers  of  Peters- 
burg and  many  other  industrial  centres  proclaimed 
a  political  strike  in  order  to  protest  against  the 
innumerable  arrests  of  the  leaders  of  the  Labour 
Movement  and  the  editors  of  journals,  the  severe 
penalties  inflicted  on  strikers,  etc.  The  number 
of  workers  who  took  part  in  this  strike  amounted 
to  250,000  in  Petersburg  alone.  Directly  the 
general  strike  was  declared,  meetings  were  held 
in  the  yards  of  the  factories  and  in  the  streets. 
Great  public  demonstrations  took  place  in  the 
streets  and  squares  of  the  capital,  followed  by 
bloody  collisions  between  the  workers  and  the 
police,  and  the  inhabitants  of  Petersburg  saw 
barricades  thrown  up  as  in   1905. 

The  situation  of  the  Government  had  become 
all  the  more  critical  in  that  even  before  the  strike 
and  its  popular  manifestations  it  had  found  itself 
all  but  isolated.  The  very  moderate  elements 
even  were  ill  content  with  it.  M.  Gutshkov,  ex- 
President  of  the  Duma  and  leader  of  the  "  Octo- 


BEFORE    THE   WAR  81 

brists,"  openly  predicted  the  inevitability  of  a 
revolution  in  Russia.  Other  leaders  of  the 
moderate  parties  declared  that  no  organized  and 
positive  action  was  possible  as  long  as  the  existing 
Government  remained  in  power.  The  leader  of 
the  right  wing  of  the  Constitutionalists  (the 
Cadets),  M.  Maklakov,  invited  the  Duma  to 
"  perish  with  honour,"  because  it  was  then 
"  living  in  dishonour." 

In  such  a  political  atmosphere  the  revolutionary 
uprising  of  the  people  was  extremely  dangerous 
to  the  Government.  It  was  on  the  brink  of  an 
inevitable  fall. 

But  then  came  the  war,  and  the  situation  was 
suddenly  transformed.  The  danger  of  foreign 
aggression  forced  the  masses  of  the  Russian 
people  to  check  the  remarkable  impetus  of  its 
struggle  for  liberty  and  to  occupy  itself  with  the 
problems   of   national    defence. 


6 


CHAPTER    VI 

I.  The  Russian  finances.  The  increase  in  the  Budget.  The 
revenues. — II.  The  expenditure — how  divided.  Military 
expenditure. — III.  The  reserves  available.  The  new  loan  of 
1914.     Its  strategical  and  military  destination. 

I 

What  was  the  material  power  of  the  Russian 
State  before  the  commencement  of  the  great 
European  war — that  is  to  say,  what  were  its 
financial  and  military  resources  ? 

The  year  19 14  was  marked  in  the  history  of 
Russian  finances  by  a  change  of  Ministers  ;  M. 
Kokovtsov  was  replaced  by  M.  Bark,  after  twelve 
years  at  the  head  of  the  Ministry  of  Einances. 
What  was  the  outcome  of  these  ten  years  of  work  ? 

In  1904,  at  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  Budget  of  the 
Russian  Empire  amounted  to  2,063  millions 
of  roubles.  In  1914  it  was  3,558  millions; 
an  increase  of  1,500  millions,  or  75  per  cent, 
in  ten  years.  The  increase  in  the  Budget 
was  greater  and  more  speedy  than  the  increase 
in  the  population;  in  1904  the  burden  or 
incidence  of  the  Russian  Budget  was  expressed 
by  a   figure   of    13    to    14   roubles   per   head   of 

82 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  83 

population,  while  in  19 14  it  had  risen  to  21 
roubles  per  head— so  that  it  was  one  and  a  half 
times  as  heavy  as  it  was  ten  years  earlier.  And 
as  the  average  of  our  national  revenue  amounts 
only  to  50  or  60  roubles  per  head,  the  Russian 
people  pays  the  State  30  to  40  per  cent,  of  its 
annual  income.  We  may  therefore  say  that  in 
Russia  the  State  exhausts  the  material  forces  of 
the  people  by  its  bad  financial  system.  But  de- 
spite this  fact,  or  indeed  because  of  it,  the  State 
coffers  always  suffer  from  a  chronic  deficit,  like 
the  lean  kine  seen  by  Joseph  in  his  sleep,  which 
ate  the  fat  kine,  but  were  themselves  no  fatter 
by  so  doing. 

In  1904  the  budgetary  deficit  of  the  Russian 
Empire  was  80  million  roubles;  in  1905  it  was 
15  millions;  in  1906,  481  millions;  in  1907, 
295  millions;  in  1908,  181  millions;  and  in 
1909,  131  millions.  So  for  a  period  of  six  years 
only  the  total  of  the  annual  deficits  amounted  to 
1,183  millions.  This  huge  deficiency  was  filled 
by  two  colossal  loans  which  were  negotiated  in 
Paris— a  loan  of  2,250  million  francs  in  1906 
and  one  of  1,400  millions  in  1909.  In  addition 
to  these  two  great  financial  operations  the  Russian 
Government  concluded  several  smaller  loans. 

Two  good  harvests,  those  of  1,909  and  19 10, 
and  the  forced  exportation  of  grain,  slightly 
ameliorated  the  commercial  balance-sheet  of  the 
country,   and  the   Minister  of  Einances   already 


84  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

began  to  boast  of  the  absence  of  a  deficit.  But 
as  the  Russian  Budget  has  no  solid  social  and 
economic  base  beneath  it,  the  deficit  soon  ap- 
peared again,  and  in  1 9 1 4,  according  to  the  esti- 
mates, the  deficit  would  have  been  23  millions 
of  roubles.  The  Minister  of  Finances  hoped  to 
cover  this  by  the  aid  of  the  "  free  reserves  ''' 
of  the  Treasury.  But  the  "  free  reserves  "  them- 
selves are  in  reality  merely  the  product  of  pre- 
ceding loans,  and  represent,  not  the  net  revenue 
of  the  State,  but  its  anterior  indebtedness. 

During  the  years  1904-14  the  National  Debt 
rose  from  7,000  million  roubles  to  10,000 
millions.  This  is  an  increase  of  3,000  millions, 
or  43  per  cent,  in  ten  years.  As  for  the  annual 
payments  into  the  sinking  fund  and  interest, 
these  were  403  million  roubles  in  19 14,  while 
in  1904  they  were  299  millions — an  increase  of 
25  per  cent. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  internal  structure  of 
the  Russian  Budget  since   1904. 

Here  we  have  the  tabulated  revenues  :— 


1904. 

Million  roubles. 

1914. 

Million  roubles. 

Direct  taxes    ... 

.. 

134-9 

264 

Indirect  taxes 

... 

418-6 

709-2 

Customs,  etc.... 

... 

104-2 

232-4 

State  railways 

.. 

454-5 

858-3 

State  properties 

.. 

117 

259-7 

Alcohol  monopoly 

.. 

543-5 

935-9 

Other  monopolies 

.. 

70-9 

133-7 

Payments   made   by 

peasants 

to  redeem  their  ho 

dings  ... 

88-8 

Other  sources... 

»  •  •                  •  •  • 

85-9 

128-2 

BEFORE  THE  WAR  85 

Comparing  these  two  columns  of  figures,  you 
will   see   that    the   sources   of    revenue   have    re- 
mained much  what  they  were.     In   1914,  as  ten 
years   ago,   Tsarism   obtained   the  money   which 
it  needed  principally  by  means  of  indirect  taxes. 
While   the   direct   taxes   have  increased   only  by 
130   millions,    and   amounted    in    191 4    to    264 
millions,    the   indirect    taxes    have    increased    by 
291    millions,   and  their  total  amounted  to    709 
million  roubles.     But  the  indirect  taxation  of  the 
people  is  not  confined  to  indirect  taxes  properly 
so  called.     The  import  duties,  the  alcohol  mono- 
poly, etc.,  must  also  be  regarded  as  indirect  taxes 
on  the  various  articles  of  consumption  and  pro- 
ducts.    And  if  we  add  up  the  total  of  all  these 
indirect  taxes   in   their   various   forms   we  get   a 
sum  of   1,136  millions  of  roubles  for   1904,  and 
2,010  for  19 1 4,  the  absolute  increase  being  874 
million  roubles  ;    but  the  relative  increase  is  also 
great;    in   1904  the  indirect  taxes  constituted  54 
per  cent,  of  the  total  Budget,  and  in   19 14  they 
had  risen  to   60  per  cent.      Erom  this   point  of 
view   the  evolution  of  the  Russian  Budget   pre- 
sents a  spectacle  very  different  to  that  which  we 
behold  in  the  other  European  States,   in  which 
we    find    a    tendency    toward    the    increase    of 
indirect    taxes    and    the     diminution    of    direct 
taxes. 


86  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

II 

A  few  words  as  to  the  partition  of  the  expendi- 
ture. The  greater  portion  of  the  budget  of 
expenditure  is  swallowed  up  by  the  abyss  of 
unproductive  expenditure.  For  example,  the 
"  costs  of  administration  "  increased  in  seven 
years  (1907-14)  from  282  millions  to  480 
millions,  while  the  expenditure  on  the  arts 
and  public  instruction  increased  from  84  to  176 
millions.  The  expenditure  in  respect  of  the  de- 
velopment of  agriculture,  which  in  1907  was  46 
millions,  was  88  millions  in  191 4.  One  rouble 
per  head  per  annum  for  education  and  half  a 
rouble  per  head  for  agriculture— such  is  the  ex- 
penditure on  these  items  in  the  most  illiterate 
and  the  most  largely  agricultural  country  of 
Europe  !  As  a  contrast,  the  unproductive  ex- 
penses are  extremely  high;  their  total  in  19 14 
attained  the  colossal  sum  of  2,000  million  roubles, 
or   four-sevenths  of  the  whole  Budget. 

As  for  the  military  expenditure,  which  more 
especially  concerns  us  here,  it  is  to-day  one 
and  a  half  times  as  great  as  in  1907  ;  in  place  of 
500  millions  spent  in  that  year,  Russia  spent  more 
than  750  million  roubles  on  her  Army  and  Navy 
in   1 91 3. 

The  distribution  of  the  military  expenditure  in 
1 9 1 3  was  as  follows  :  Payment  of  officers  of  the 
Army  and  Navy,    138  million  roubles;    payment 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  87 

of  soldiers  and  sailors,  348  million  roubles  ;  pro- 
visioning of  the  Army  with  flour,  3 08  million 
roubles  ;  with  meat,  butter,  vegetables,  salt,  etc., 
72  million  roubles.  Forage  (oats,  hay,  etc.)  for 
horses,  2 8' 6  million  roubles  ;  equipment  of  the 
Army,  47  million  roubles  ;  purchase  of  horses,  5 
million  roubles.  Artillery  material  and  arma- 
ments of  infantry  and  cavalry,  3 5- 5  million 
roubles  of  the  ordinary  Budget  plus  42  millions 
of  the  extraordinary  Budget;  total,  7  7' 5 
millions.  Material  for  the  engineering  arm, 
2' 9  million  roubles  of  the  ordinary  Budget  plus 
ID'S  millions  of  the  extraordinary  Budget.  Con- 
struction and  reparation  of  fortresses,  etc.,  and 
other  defensive  works,  2 4' 4  millions  of  the  ordi- 
nary plus  199  of  the  extraordinary  Budget. 
Construction  and  maintenance  of  non-defensive 
works,  44' 6  millions.  Maintenance  of  barracks 
and  buildings  of  the  military  administration,  etc., 
34-9  millions.  Medicines  and  surgical  material, 
etc.,  I  million  of  the  ordinary  and  13  of  the 
extraordinary  Budget. 

These  figures  refer  to  the  budgetary  estimates 
for  19 1 3.  As  for  the  expenditure  of  the  Navy, 
we  quote  the  figures  relating  to  the  Budget  of 
1 9  I  2  :— 

The  construction  of  battleships  for  the  Baltic 
Squadron,  29  millions  ;  construction  of  battle- 
ships, torpedo-boats,  and  submarines  for  the  Black 
Sea   Fleet,    239   millions  ;     repairing   vessels   of 


88  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR  \ 

war,  etc.,  i8  million  roubles  ;  total,  716  million 
roubles.  Naval  artillery,  256  millions;  tor- 
pedoes and  wireless  telegraphy,  5  millions.  Fuel 
(coal,  petroleum,  etc.)  for  the  Navy  and  naval 
ports,  I  5-8  millions  ;  works  of  naval  ports,  dock- 
yards, and  slips  and  repairs  to  same,  6-2  millions. 

Ill 

In  addition  to  the  sums  destined  for  the  annual 
expenditure,  the  Russian  Treasury  has  at  its  dis- 
posal a  floating  balance  or  "  free  reserve."  In 
the  Report  on  the  Budget  for  191 3,  the  Minister 
of  Finances  stated  that  this  reserve  amounted, 
in  January  1913,  to  450  million  roubles.  Accord- 
ing to  the  Report  for  the  following  year,  this 
reserve  had  increased,  and  on  January  i,  19 14, 
amounted  to  550  millions.  The  Minister  of 
Fiaances  naturally  explained  the  existence  of  this 
floating  balance  as  being  the  result  of  the  wise 
economy  of  his  prudent  administration,  but  in 
reality  it  was  only  a  result  of  the  State's  indebted- 
ness. In  the  Minister's  Report  on  the  Budget 
for  1 9 1 3  we  find  the  proof  ;  the  total  balance- 
sheet  of  the  State  revenues  for  the  five  preceding 
years  (1908-12)  showed  a  figure  of  14,275 
million  roubles,  while  the  expenditures  were 
13,825  millions.  The  difference  between  these 
two  sums  forms  the  425  millions  of  the  floating 
balance  or  "  free  reserve."  But  if  we  recall  the 
fact  tliat  350  millions  of  revenue  were  produced 


BEFORE  THE  WAR  89 

during  these  five  years  by  loans,  we  shall  find 
that  the  true  "free  reserve"  consists  of  loo 
millions  only,  while  the  remainder  (350  millions) 
represents  the  debit  account  of  the  Russian 
Empire  during  those  years. 

The  floating  balance  of  the  Treasury  was  re- 
garded by  the  Russian  Government  more  particu- 
larly as  the  reserve  necessitated  by  the  possibility 
of  war.  At  the  end  of  his  Report  on  the  Budget 
of  19 1 4  M.  Kokovtsov  emphasized  "  the  neces- 
sity of  preserving  intact  the  free  reserves  of  the 
Treasury  "  because  "  the  possession  of  this  free 
balance,  while  fortifying  the  financial  position  of 
Russia,  and  eliminating  the  necessity  of  State 
loans,  seems  to  be  particularly  important  in  the 
present  state  of  the  political  interests  of  the 
various   Powers." 

These  words  were  spoken  at  the  end  of  the 
year  1913.  At  the  same  time  the  question  of 
a  new  Russian  loan,  to  be  floated  in  Paris,  was 
mooted. 

On  the  14th  of  December,  19 13,  the  well- 
informed  financial  contributor  to  the  Parisian 
Journal,  M.  Monthoron,  expressed  himself  as 
follows  :— 

"  We  must  hold  ourselves  ready  for  every 
eventuality.  One  of  the  first  cares  of  every 
Government  that  is  solicitous  for  the  defence  of 
this  country  must  be  to  ensure  that  defence  in 
such  a  manner  that  we  in  France  should  not  be 


90  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

called  upon,  in  the  event  of  a  conflict,  to  support 
alone  the  first  onslaught  of  the  Triplice.  For 
this  purpose  it  is  necessary  at  all  costs  to  assist 
our  friend  and  ally  to  carry  out  a  rapid  mobili- 
zation on  his  western  frontier.  This  is  the  im- 
portant task  which  M.  Delcasse  has  pursued  in 
Petersburg.  It  is  with  a  view  to  its  realization 
that  engagements  were  entered  into  in  high 
quarters  before  the  rise  of  M.  Doumergue  to 
power,  with  the  object  of  securing  the  speedy 
completion  of  the  Russian  railway  loan  by 
January   15th  at  the  latest." 

Another  organ  of  the  Parisian  press,  the 
Correspondant,  a  Clerical  review,  gave  the  history 
of  the  negotiations  for  this  loan  in  its  issue  of 
the   25th  of  December,    1913: — 

"  A  Parisian  financier,  very  much  in  the  public 
eye,  employed  his  leisure  by  going  to  Russia  in 
a  purely  private  capacity  in  order  to  seek  an 
opportunity  for  some  large  stroke  of  business. 

"  France  was  about  to  vote  the  Three  Years' 
Bill— in  other  words,  was  about  to  reach  the  limit 
of  the  military  burden  which  she  could  assume. 
Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  was  still  able  to 
increase  the  numbers  and  the  might  of  her  Army. 
'Hence  the  urgent  necessity  of  demanding  from 
the  Russian  Alliance  a  really  effectual  assistance, 
which  would  guarantee  peace  by  making  a  con- 
flict a  priori  dangerous  to  our  eastern  neighbours. 
But  this  assistance  could  be  '  serious  '  only  if  it 


BEFORE  THE   WAR  91 

would  realize  without  delay  the  entire  programme 
indicated  by  the  French  General  Staff,  and  would 
permit,  by  the  creation  of  strategic  railways,  of 
the  preparation  of  the  means  of  transport  and 
circulation  indispensable  to  the  mobilization  of 
the  Western  Army  of  Russia. 

"  In  the  fulfilment  of  this  programme  the  crea- 
tion of  railways  seemed  to  be  of  the  greatest 
importance.  It  was  only  necessary  for  our 
eminent  financier  to  go  to  M.  Kokovtsov  and  say 
to  him,  more  or  less  in  the  following  words  : 
'  You  have  a  pressing  and  imperious  need  of 
money  ;  railways  are  indispensable  to  you.  Now 
we  are  able  to  build  them  and  guarantee  their 
success  ;  and  we  are  ready  once  again  to  place 
our  enormous  reserves  of  capital  at  your  service. 
But  we  impose  on  you  the  construction  of 
strategic  lines  which  can  be  utilized  in  the  event 
of  conflict.' 

"  The  manner  in  which  all  this  was  said  gave 
the  implicit  impression  that  the  man  who  spoke 
with  such  assurance  was  at  least  invested  with 
an  official  mission. 

"  The  Minister  was  extremely  reserved.  But 
it  seemed  to  him,  reasonably  enough,  impossible 
that  a  proposition  so  definite  should  be  put 
forward  merely  as  a  private  matter.  Neverthe- 
less, he  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  conceal 
the  fact  that  a  simple  agreement  did  not  appear 
inacceptable. 


92  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

"  A  few  days  later  our  Minister  of  Finances 
received  in  his  turn  a  visit  from  this  '  private  ' 
negotiator.  '  I  believe  I  can  apprise  you,  M. 
le  Ministre,  having  last  week  seen  M.  Kokovtsov, 
of  an  opportunity  of  constructing  strategic  rail- 
ways in  Russia  on  condition  that  the  French 
market  will  be  open,  for  a  term  of  five  years, 
to  500  million  francs  of  Russian  bonds  per 
annum.' 

"  Meanwhile  the  Petersburg  Government  dis- 
creetly inquired  through  its  Ambassador  whether 
an  agreement  on  the  basis  indicated  was  possible. 
The  French  Government  made  the  same  inquiries 
through  M.  Delcasse. 

"  Finally  the  agreement  was  negotiated."  ' 

A  syndicate  of  five  great  Parisian  banks  under- 
took to  organize  the  issue  of  the  new  loan,  whose 
total,  made  up  by  annual  instalments,  was  to  con- 
sist of  51  milliards  of  francs— £220,000,000. 
The  first  instalment  of  £20,000,000  was  issued 
early  in   19 14. 

The  same  journal  has  explained  the  motives 
which  determined  France  to  risk  this  colossal 
financial  operation. 

If,  in  the  event  of  a  Franco-German  war, 
"  Russia  did  not  enlist  herself  heart  and  soul  from 
the  very  first  days  of  the  war^  and  if  by  misfortune 
we  [the  French]  were  to  meet  with  serious  re- 
verses at  the  outset,  who  would  venture  so  far  to 
*  Le  Corresponda?it,  September  25,  1913. 


BEFORE  THE  WAR  93 

rely  on  the  chivalry  of  our  ally  as  to  feel  assured 
that  he  would  engage  himself,  the  game  once 
being  lost,  in  a  struggle  which  would  be  without 
issue  as  without  profit  to  him  ?  Who  could 
guarantee  that  Russia  would  not  act  with  oppor- 
tune weakness  ?  On  every  count  it  is  therefore 
in  our  interests  to  ensure  that  Russia  shall 
assume,  from  the  first  moment  of  the  war,  an 
offensive  which  would  furnish  the  proof  of  her 
absolute  fidelity  to  our  case.  .  .  .  Now  it  is 
obvious  that  in  the  present  condition  of  the 
Russian  railway  system  it  would  not  be  possible 
for  her  to  succeed  in  such  a  task." 

I  must  add  that  the  heads  of  the  Russian  Army 
themselves  indicated  the  scanty  development  of 
the  railway  system  of  Western  Russia  as  the  chief 
cause  of  the  military  superiority  of  the  Austro- 
German  bloc  over  Russia.  General  Kuro- 
patkin,  in  his  confidential  report  of  1900,  stated 
that  Russia  at  that  time  had  only  nine  lines  of 
railroad  running  toward  the  Austro  -  German 
frontier,  while  Austria  and  Germany  had  twenty- 
five  lines  running  toward  the  Russian  frontiers. 
During  the  fourteen  years  which  have  elapsed 
since  that  report  was  written  the  superiority  of 
Germany  and  Austria  in  this  particular  has  con- 
siderably  increased. 

But  the  railway  problem  is  of  primordial  im- 
portance in  modern  warfare.  As  was  very  justly 
said   by   one    of    the   characters    in    a    novel    by 


94  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT   WAR 

Anatole  F.rance,  "  In  the  event  of  a  war  the  real 
generals   will  be  the   station-masters." 

The  experience  of  the  present  war,  with  its 
rapid  and  extensive  transport  of  great  masses  of 
troops  from  one  frontier  to  another,  has  proved 
that  M.  Anatole  Erance's  creation  was  perfectly- 
correct   in  his   statement. 


If 

I  1^ 


CHAPTER    VII 

I.  The  evolution  of  the  Russian  Army  since  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century. — II.  The  military  forces  of  Russia 
compared  with  those  of  Austria  and  Germany. — III.  The 
Russian  Navy. 

I 

In  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  before 
the  Crimean  War,  the  mihtary  forces  of  Russia 
were  already  of  considerable  importance  from 
the  point  of  view  of  numbers.  In  January  1853 
there  were  in  Russia  532  battalions  of  infantry, 
225  squadrons  of  cavalry,  105  batteries  of  field 
artillery,  30  mounted  batteries,  4  mountain 
batteries,  and  9  battalions  of  engineers.  This 
was  the  active  army,  properly  speaking.  There 
were  also  reserve  units  :  i  6  battalions  of  infantry, 
24  squadrons  of  cavalry,  10  batteries  of  field 
artillery,  3  batteries  of  mounted  artillery,  and 
2  battalions  of  engineers.  To  these  we  must 
add  53  battalions  of  the  "home  guard"  and  a 
large  number  of  special  corps  and  "  commands." 
In  all,  the  total  number  of  soldiers  was  968,000, 
and  the  number  of  generals  and  officers  was 
27,700.  The  muskets  and  cannon  were  very 
poor. 


95 


96  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

The  soldiers  were  recruited  among  the  peasants 
(serfs)  and  the  meshtshanie  (small  townsfolk), 
the  duration  of  service  being  twenty  years  !  The 
officers  were  badly  trained. 

The  Crimean  War  demonstrated  the  bad  con- 
dition of  the  Russian  forces  and  the  necessity 
of  reform.  The  term  of  military  service  was 
diminished,  and  the  level  of  the  corps  of  officers 
was  raised  by  the  establishment  of  compulsory 
examinations  for  those  who  wished  to  attain  the 
rank  of  officer. 

The  Austro-Prussian  War  of  1866  contributed 
greatly  to  the  technique  of  artillery  fire,  and 
Russia  followed  the  example  of  Prussia  in  all 
that  concerns  the  construction  of  cannon  and 
small  arms,  and  replaced  the  old  muskets,  first 
by  Carl^  rifles  and  then  by  the  Berdan  model. 

The  war  of  1870-71  once  more  gave  an 
impulse  to  the  development  of  the  armed  forces 
of  Russia :  rifled  cannon  were  introduced  in 
the  artillery  and  the  Government  established 
universal  military  service,  which  was  not,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  particularly  universal,  as  there 
were  numerous  exceptions  or  privileges  in  the 
case  of  this  or  that  category  of  persons.  It 
must  be  admitted  that  the  Minister  of  War  of 
those  days— M.  Milutin— did  not,  in  his  en- 
deavours to  improve  the  state  of  the  Russian 
Army,  attribute  much  importance  to  the  quanti- 
tative  factor,    and    in    1876    the   Russian    Army 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  97 

numbered  only  73  i,ooo  men— a  lower  figure  than 
that  of  1853.  But  the  famous  European  system 
of  "  armed  peace  "  impelled  Russia,  together  with 
all  the  other  great  European  States,  to  increase 
her  military  forces,  which,  in  1880,  after  the 
Russo-Turkish  War,  numbered  894,000  men, 
with  32,000  generals  and  officers,  and  in  19 13, 
1,224,000  men  (not  counting  the  Cossacks)  and 
57,700  generals  and  officers.  At  the  same  time 
the  technique  of  artillery  and  infantry  fire  was 
perfected  by  the  introduction  of  repeating  rifles 
and  quick-firing  guns. 

The  reactionary  period  of  Alexander  III  has 
left  its  mark  on  the  life  of  the  Army  as  on  the 
general  life  of  the  people.  The  liberal  measures 
of  Milutin,  who  wished  to  improve  the  education 
—not  merely  professional  but  general— of  the 
officers,  were  suppressed,  and  the  military  schools 
were  reorganized  in  such  a  manner  that  the 
officers  whom  they  gave  to  the  Army  could  not 
be  over-intelligent.  The  condition  of  the  troops 
was  very  bad.  As  a  result  the  great  army  of  the 
great  Russian  Empire  was  beaten  by  little 
Japan . 

"  The  debacle  of  the  war  against  Japan  proved 
emphatically  the  weakness  of  our  armed  force 
and  the  necessity  of  urgent  reforms,"  said  a  Rus- 
sian writer  on  military  subjects.  "  But,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  all  the  reforms  after  the  war 
consisted  of  some  changes  of  uniform.    In  addi- 

7 


98  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

tion  to  this,  the  Minister  of  War  has  of  late 
years  persistently  applied  himself  to  the  increase 
of  the  effective  of  the  Army,  the  number  of 
generals  and  officers  and  military  officials,  and 
the  bureaucracy  of  the  central  administration  of 
the  Army." 

It  is  true  that  the  term  of  compulsory  service 
has  been  reduced  from  four  to  three  years. 
"  However,  this  was  done,  not  because  the 
Ministry  of  War  considered  it  necessary,  but  in 
response  to  the  pressure  of  the  revolutionary 
demands  of  the  soldiers,"  says  the  same  author. 

In  1910  the  effective  of  the  Army  was  re- 
organized by  suppressing  the  units  of  the 
permanent  reserves  and  replacing  them  by 
skeleton  units  or  cadres,  on  which  the  units 
were  to  be  formed  on  mobilization.  Finally,  in 
the  spring  of  19 13,  the  increase  of  the  armies 
of  other  European  Powers  was  followed  by  an 
increase  in  the  strength  of  the  Russian  Army, 
and  a  considerable  addition  to  the  number  of 
guns,  etc.  But  we  know  nothing  precisely  con- 
cerning the  dimensions  of  this  increase,  and  it 
was  determined  on  during  the  secret  sessions  of 
the  Duma.  Of  late  years  also  much  money  has 
been  expended  on  military  aviation, 

II 

According  to  the  figures  relating  to  the  end  of 
1913,   the   total   strength  of  the  military  forces 


BEFORE   THE   WAR 


99 


of     Russia     before     the     present     war     was     as 
follows  '  : — 


Armies. 

In  Europe — 
Petersburg 
Vilna 
Warsaw 
Kiev 
Odessa 
Moscow 
Kazan 
Caucasus 


Total 

In  Asia — 

Turkestan 
Omsk 
Irkutsk    ... 
The  Amur 
Frontier  Guards  of 
the  Trans- Amur 

Total 


a 
o 


144 

160 
168 

72 
160 

80 
118 


1,038 


44 
16 

64 
96 

24 

244 


c 
o 

•c 

3 
cr 
C/3 


60 

60 

180 

118 

36 

49 

30 
92 


48 

6 

20 

17 

36 

244 


-r-    ui 


.Si  «  &" 
S  cii 


Sa     e  o< 


51 
51 
60 

63 
27 
60 
30 
27 


12 
6 

24 

30 


5 
4 

13 
6 
2 

4 
2 
6 


17 


72 


5 
I 

4 
14 

4 
28 


^5 


10 
10 

4 
10 


4 
6 


625        369        42        26        60 


I 

4 
9 


3 
3 

2 
6 


15 


3 
6 


14 


My  readers  will  understand  that  not  all  these 
forces  could  immediately  be  utilized  on  the 
western  frontier  in  case  of  a  war  against  the 
Austro-German  hloc.  Part  of  the  corps  would 
have  to  remain  on  the  other  frontiers  as  observing 
forces,  and  another  portion  could  be  utilized  only  a 
long  time  after  the  declaration  of  war  on  account 
of  the  slowness  of  mobilization  and  concentration 
in  Russia.  Consequently,  according  to  the  cal- 
culations of  a  competent  specialist,  the  numerical 

'  I  borrow  these  figures  from  the  well-informed  contributor  to 
Le  CorrespOTidant  (see  the  issue  for  December  25,  1915). 


100  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

situation  of  the  belligerents,  in  the  event  of  a 
war  between  Russia  and  the  Austro-German  bloc, 
should  be  as  follows  :— 


i 

1 

<u.S 
cS3 

eries 
oise 
lery. 

■a 

r! 

SCO 

Batt 
of  H 
Artil 

ll 

Russia 

•  •• 

608 

418 

215 

28 

3 

36 

9 

Austro-German 

coali- 

tion 407         328         294  32         2         19  4 

Commenting  on  these  figures,  the  specialist 
who  gives  them  states  that  they  are  liable  in 
themselves  to  produce  an  erroneous  impression. 
"  If  they  are  interpreted  according  to  the  rules 
of  simple  arithmetic,  they  seem  to  confer  upon 
Russia  a  crushing  numerical  superiority  over  her 
adversary.  The  reality  is  quite  otherwise  : 
nothing  is  less  certain  than  the  superiority  of 
the  Russian  troops  over  the  troops  of  the  Austro- 
German  coalition."  ^  And  this  because  the  Rus- 
sian Army  takes  many  times  longer  to  mobilize 
and  to  concentrate  than  do  the  armies  of  Austria 
and  Germany. 

To  what  a  degree  Germany  was  sure  of  her 
military  superiority  over  Russia  we  may  judge 
from  the  fact  that  the  German  General  Staff  in 
times  of  peace  maintained  only  six  army  corps 
on  the  Russian  frontier,  while  there  were  nine- 
teen on  the  French  frontier. 

We  shall  see  later  that  the  ex-Minister  of  War, 

*  Le  Correspondant,  December  25,  1915,  p.  1072, 


BEFORE  THE  WAR  101 

General  Kuropatkin,  declared  long  ago  that  the 
Austro -German  were  superior  to  the  Russian 
forces. 

Ill 

After  the  naval  battle  of  Salamin,  in  1854, 
the  Russian  Government  concentrated  the  whole 
force  of  its  Black  Sea  Fleet  in  the  roadstead  of 
Sebastopol,  and  there  sunk  it,  in  order  to  bar 
the  way  to  the  forts  of  Sebastopol  to  the  enemy's 
vessels.  Thus  perished  the  principal  naval  force 
of  Russia.  As  for  the  Baltic  Fleet,  at  that  period 
it  consisted  of  wooden  sailing  ships,  and  was  of 
no  military  value. 

In  1856  the  Russian  Government  elaborated 
a  proposal  for  the  construction  of  a  new  fleet, 
but  the  Treaty  of  Paris  did  not  permit  Russia  to 
possess  vessels  of  war  in  the  Black  Sea.  Only 
thirty  years  later,  in  1886,  did  the  Black  Sea 
float  the  first  Russian  ironclads. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  reign  of  Alexander  III, 
in  1892,  Russia  had  in  the  Baltic  5  ironclads, 
more  or  less  modern,  actually  afloat,  while  4  were 
under  construction  ;  i  o  ironclads,  of  very  old 
pattern  (buflt  in  1864-8)  ;  10  monitors  ;  i  gun- 
boat (and  2  under  construction)  ;  i  2  first-class 
cruisers,  1 1  of  the  second-class  (built  before 
1880)  ;  3  torpedo-destroyers  (plus  2  under  con- 
struction) ;  10  coast-defence  ships,  3  training- 
ships,  and  5  transports.     In  the  Black  Sea  there 


102  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

were  5  battleships,  of  the  "  round  "  Popov  type 
(very  antiquated)  ;  i  first-class  cruiser  ;  2  de- 
stroyers (plus  one  under  construction)  ;  6  gun- 
boats ;  and  2  transports  under  construction. 
Besides  these  Russia  had  her  "  Siberian  flotilla," 
composed  of  2  gunboats  and  2  transports  ;  and 
a  "  Caspian  flotilla,"  consisting  of  4  armed  steam- 
ships and   2  gunboats   (built  in    1866). 

Towards  the  period  of  the  war  with  Japan  the 
principal  naval  forces  of  the  Russian  Empire 
were  to  be  found  in  the  Pacific,  where  there 
were  8  battleships,  1 1  first-class  cruisers, 
6  second-class  cruisers,  7  gunboats,  2  destroyers, 
31  large  torpedo-boats  and  4  small.  The 
Baltic  Fleet,  which  constituted  the  sole  reserve 
of  the  Russian  Navy,  was  strong  in  numbers 
but  negligible  in  quality.  Of  its  8  battleships, 
5  were  forty  years  old  ;  3  of  its  large  cruisers 
were  built  before  1878,  and  so  forth.  For  the 
most  part  they  were  not  real  warships,  but  "  old 
boxes,"  as  Wilhelm  II  called  them.  All  the  same, 
this  "  squadron  "  was  sent  against  the  Japanese, 
who   completely  destroyed  it. 

At  the  end  of  1905  Russia  no  longer  had  a 
fleet ;  part  of  it  was  sunk  and  part  had  been 
taken  by  the  Japanese.  Half  a  century  after  the 
battle  of  Salamin  she  was  once  more  left  without 
a  navy. 

The  Government  had  to  consider  the  question 
of  the   creation   of   a   new   fleet.      This   question 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  103 

was  much  discussed  in  the  Duma  and  in  the 
Press.  Some  of  the  experts  asserted  that  Russia, 
being  a  continental  Power,  with  no  colonial 
policy,  had  no  need  of  a  fleet  save  for  the 
defence  of  her  own  coast  (torpedo-boats,  sub- 
marines, etc.).  The  others,  and  the  Minister  of 
Marine  among  them,  wished  to  continue  the  old 
policy  and  to  build  large  battleships,  and,  above 
all,  cruisers.  Three  times  the  Duma  refused  the 
necessary  credit  for  the  construction  of  battle- 
ships, but  the  Tsar,  ignoring  the  vote  of  the 
Duma,    sanctioned    the    requisite    expenditure.     • 

In  1 9 1 3  the  naval  forces  of  Russia  were  as 
follows  : — 

In  the  Baltic  :  9  battleships  (of  various  ages, 
built  between  1887  and  1891);  3  armoured 
cruisers,  more  or  less  modern ;  6  modern 
cruisers;  6  gunboats;  50  destroyers;  28  tor- 
pedo-boats;   12  submarines;    18  transports,  etc. 

In  the  Black  Sea  :  7  battleships  (plus  3  under 
construction);  2  cruisers;  4  gunboats;  13 
destroyers  (plus  9  under  construction);  14 
torpedo-boats ;  4  submarines  (plus  7  under 
construction)  ;    3  transports,  etc. 

The  "  Siberian  flotilla "  was  composed  of  2 
cruisers,  9  large  and  i  small  torpedo-boats, 
I   gunboat,    12  submarines,  and   9  transports. 

The  "flotilla  of  the  Amur"  consisted  of  18 
river  gunboats. 

The  "  Caspian  flotilla  "  consisted  of  2  gunboats. 


104  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

In  all,  the  Russian  Navy  in  19 13  was  com- 
posed of  29  large  and  230  small  units,  mostly  of 
an  old  type.  On  the  ist  of  January  191 3  the 
number  of  sailors  was  46,300.  The  officers  com- 
prised :  135  general  officers  and  admirals;  677 
superior  officers;  2,257  officers;  614  civil 
officials,  and  280  physicians  and  surgeons.  Thus 
for  each  large  warship  there  were  5  admirals, 
1 04  other  officers,  i  o  doctors,  and  2 1  civil 
officers.  A  hypertrophy  of  the  military  bureau- 
cracy and  an  atrophy  of  the  fighting  power- 
such  is  the  picture  of  the  present  condition  of  the 
Russian  Fleet.  It  is  superfluous  to  add  that  the 
German  Navy  is  of  a  crushing  superiority  com- 
pared with  the  Russian  Navy. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

I  Did  Russia  desire  the  war?  The  two  Russias,  popular  and 
governmental.  The  pacific  tendencies  of  the  Russian 
peasants  and  working-men. — II.  Official  Russia  and  its 
attitude  towards  the  Austro-German  coalition.  The  poli- 
tical, military,  and  ideological  recoil  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment from  the  Austro-German  expansion. — III.  The  war  and 
the  Revolution.     The  Russian  reaction  and  the  Prussian. 


Did  Russia  desire  the  present  war? 

In  discussing  this  question  we  must  first  of  all 
admit  of  another :  Of  which  Russia  are  we 
speaking?  For  one  cannot  speak  of  a  single 
Russia.  There  are  two  Russias.  One  is  the 
popular  Russia,  democratic  Russia,  the  Russia 
of  vast,  labouring,  suffering  human  masses.  The 
other  is  the  Russia  of  the  "  directing  elements," 
the  nobles  and  the  upper  bureaucracy. 

Popular  Russia,  the  Russia  of  the  peasants, 
workers,  and  lower  middle-class  townsfolk,  did 
not  desire  the  war,  simply  because  the  popular 
masses  in  Russia,  as  in  all  European  countries 
to-day,  are  in  general  opposed  to  war,  except  it 
be  waged  in  defence  of  their  country  and  against 
an  armed  foreign  invasion.     I  could  in  this  con- 

105 


106  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

nection  cite  many  declarations  to  this  effect,  made 
and  renewed  more  than  once  by  the  popular 
parties  of  Russia,  The  representatives  of  the 
peasants  and  the  working-classes  in  the  Duma 
have  always  declared,  in  the  name  of  their  man- 
datories, that  the  peasant  population  and  the 
industrial  workers  did  not  desire  war,  and  that 
they  protested  against  all  those  blunders  of  the 
Government  which  might  lead  to  war  with  a 
neighbouring  State.  Again,  in  the  early  part  of 
19 13,  during  the  Balkan  crisis,  the  Social- 
Democratic  section  of  the  fourth  Duma  (this 
fraction  is  the  sole  legal  representation  of  all 
the  workers  of  Russia)  sent  an  open  letter 
to  the  Social-Democratic  parties  of  Austro- 
Hungary,  in  which  occurred  the  following  : — 

"  Thanks  to  the  work  of  international  diplo- 
macy, and  in  the  first  place  of  the  Austrian 
and  Russian  diplomats,  the  dread  menace  of  a 
general  sanguinary  conflagration,  and  primarily 
of  a  Russo-Austrian  conflict,  is  still  hovering  over 
Europe.  .  .  .  Although  every  attempt  to  throw 
two  nations  against  each  other  is  ...  a  crime 
against  humanity  and  reason,  a  war  between 
Russia  and  Austria — a  w^ar  which  would  be  a 
savage  melee  of  nations  and  races— would  be  a 
veritable  incarnation  of  madness. 

"  The  people  of  Russia  have  no  motive  which 
would  give  them  a  shadow  of  justification  for 
such  a  crime.      The   peasant  masses  of  Russia 


BEFORE  THE  WAR  107 

have  nothing  to  seek  in  the  Balkans  ;  they  need 
agrarian  and  fiscal  reform  in  their  own  country. 
The  Russian  peasantry,  ruined  and  starving,  is 
not  a  supporter  of  Imperialism ;  it  is  merely 
its  victim.  And  the  same  is  true  of  the  masses 
of  the  lower  middle-classes  in  the  towns,  who 
are  crushed  by  the  weight  of  militarism.  As 
regards  the  Russian  proletariat,  it  cannot  become 
the  supporter  of  Imperialism,  as  it  constitutes 
the  class  most  severely  prejudiced  by  the  present 
system  of  political  lawlessness,  arbitrary  police 
rule,  and  nationalistic  bacchanalia."  ' 

The  representatives  of  the  rural  democracy, 
the  Trudoviki  (Labour)  Party,  pronounced  them- 
selves no  less  systematically  opposed  to  any  war- 
like and  aggressive  policy,  and,  as  we  shall 
presently  see,  even  after  the  declaration  of  the 
war  by  Germany,  the  representatives  of  labour 
and  the  peasantry  in  the  Duma  voted  against 
the  military  credits  in  order  to  proclaim  before 
all  the  world  their  profound  aversion  to  the  war 
and  their  pacificist  sentiments. 

II 

But   although   popular   Russia   did   not    desire 

the    war,    perhaps    official    Russia    desired    and 

provoked  it. 

^  Quoted  from  the  Bulletin  Periodique  du  Bureau  Socialiste 
International^  Brussels,  1913,  No,  II,  p.  3.  This  journal  is 
published  in  three  languages,  French,  German,  and  English. 


108  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

This,  of  course,  is  what  the  German  Govern- 
ment says  in  its  White  Book. 

"  Russia  desired  the  war,"  says  the  White  (  !  ) 
Book. 

"  Russia  has  Ht  the  incendiary  torch,"  repeats 
the  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire,  Herr 
Bethmann-Holweg,  in  the  Reichstag,  on  the 
4th   of  August    1914. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  leader  of  the  Russian 
Government,  M.  Goremykin,  solemnly  declared, 
in  a  speech  delivered  before  the  Duma  on  the 
Sth  of  August  19 14,  that  Russia  did  not  desire 
the  war.  The  same  declaration  was  made  by 
M.  Sazonov,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  who 
stated,  during  the  same  session,  that  it  was  not 
the  Russian  policy  that  threatened  the  peace  of 
the  world  ;  and  by  the  President  of  the  Duma, 
M.  Rodzianko,  who  also  repeated  that  Russia 
did  not  wish  for  war. 

So  we  are  confronted  by  two  theories,  abso- 
lutely contradictory  and  diametrically  opposed. 
Which  is  nearer  the  truth  ? 

Before  replying  to  this  question  let  us  calmly 
analyse  the  objective  facts. 

In  the  first  place,  we  must  take  a  retrospective 
glance  at  Russian  politics  as  they  were  after  the 
close  of  the  war  against  Japan  before  we  can 
form  an  opinion.  Was  the  Russian  policy  at 
that  time  of  an  aggressive  character  or  other- 
wise?     Readers    who    have    read    my   "Modern 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  109 

Russia  "  (which  was  pubHshed  a  year  before  the 
war)  will  remember  that  I  therein  demonstrated 
that  the  Russian  policy  after  1904  was  merely 
a  systematic  recoil  from  the  Austro-German 
coalition.  This  recoil  manifested  itself  under 
three  forms  :    political,  military,  and  ideological. 

From  a  political  point  of  view  Russia  has  made 
many  concessions  to  Germany  and  Austria.  In 
1904  she  concluded  a  commercial  treaty  with 
Germany,  whose  conditions  Germany  dictated. 
During  the  famous  interview  between  M. 
Isvolsky  and  Baron  von  Aerenthal  at  Buchlose, 
Russia  surrendered  to  Austria  in  the  matter  of  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  At  the 
Potsdam  interview  the  Tsar  gave  his  "  German 
cousin  "  a  free  hand  in  the  matter  of  the  Bagdad 
railway,  in  respect  of  the  German  march  to  the 
Persian  Gulf  and  the  gates  of  British  India. 

From  the  military  point  of  view  we  can  point 
to  a  recoil  of  a  purely  material  and  geographical 
nature.  In  19 10  the  Russian  General  Staff 
withdrew  the  "  armed  frontier  "  of  the  Empire 
from  the  political  frontier  dividing  Russia  from 
Germany,  and  moved  the  principal  points  of  con- 
centration of  the  Russian  troops  several  hundreds 
of  miles  to  the  east.  The  Russian  Staff  ex- 
plained this  measure  as  depending  on  strategical 
considerations,  but  the  French  military  press 
found  it  almost  "  a  violation  of  the  Franco- 
Russian      convention,"      and      this      opinion      is 


110  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

expressed  even  in  the  military  statistical  annuals. 
For  example,  in  the  annual  dealing  with  VEtat 
militaire  des  toutes  les  Nations  da  Monde  for 
1 9 14,  published  by  a  French  military  publishing 
house,  I  we  read,  in  this  connection,  that  "  the 
decrease  in  the  number  of  army  corps  of  the 
Russian  army  hitherto  accumulated  on  the 
western  frontier  and  the  constitution  of  a  central 
mass  which  the  development  of  the  railway 
system  would  make  it  possible  rapidly  to  trans- 
port to  the  points  threatened,"  are  "  arrange- 
ments incontestably  favourable  to  the  rapidity 
and  regularity  of  the  Russian  mobilization,  hut 
which  have  the  defect  of  leaving,  at  the  outset, 
the  field  of  battle  more  open  than  in  the  past 
to  the  eventual  adversaries  in  the  west,  and  which 
might  have  been,  on  these  grounds,  the  subject 
of  extremely  sharp  criticism  from  outside 
Russia'' 

"Outside  Russia"  means  in  France.  There 
was  reason  to  suppose  that  the  new  distribution 
of  the  military  forces  of  Russia  was  inspired 
chiefly  by  Russia's  fear  of  Germany  and  the 
desire  of  Tsarism  to  be  on  agreeable  terms  with 
its  powerful  neighbour.  I  could  cite  yet  further 
"  httle  infidelities  "  of  this  kind — infidelities  on 
the  part  of  Russia  toward  France  Xand  England 
too)— but  the  facts  I  have  already  cited  are  suffi- 
cient to  prove  that  official  Russia  not  only  was 
'  By  Berger-Levrault,  Paris,  1914,  p.  147. 


BEFORE  THE  WAR  111 

not  seeking  a  quarrel  with  the  Austro-German 
coalition,  but  more  than  once  sought  to  evade 
such,  even  to  the  verge  of  humiliation. 

Even  before  the  debacle  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  the  heads  of  the  Russian  Army  were  by 
no  means  disposed  to  belittle  the  superiority  of 
the  Austro-German  forces  as  compared  with 
those  of  Russia.  "  Comparing  the  Russian  and 
German  forces,  the  invasion  of  Russia  by  German 
troops  is  more  probable  than  the  invasion  of 
Germany  by  Russian  troops,"  writes  General 
Kuropatkin  in  his  secret  report  (1900),  and  he 
adds  :  "  Our  western  frontier,  in  the  event  of 
a  European  war,  would  be  in  such  danger  as 
has  never  been  known  in  all  the  history  of 
Russia." 

I  imagine  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  insist  on  the 
fact  that  after  the  Japanese  War,  which  resulted 
in  the  total  annihilation  of  the  Russian  Navy  and 
a  great  loss  of  military  power,  the  military 
superiority  of  Germany  became  even  more  con- 
siderable. It  is  true  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment elaborated  a  new  naval  and  military 
programme,  but  in  July  19 14  this  programme 
was  still  far  from  being  realized,  and  it  may  be 
affirmed  that  on  the  eve  of  the  present  war  Russia 
was  not  ready  to  wage  war  against  the  Austro- 
German  bloc.  The  German  and  Austrian 
Governments  well  knew  this,  and  on  the  28th  of 
July    1914    the    British    Ambassador    in    Berlin 


I 


112  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

transmitted  to  his  Government  the  following 
remarks  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  this 
connection  : — 

"  My  Austrian  colleague,"  telegraphed  the 
British  Ambassador,  "  said  to  me  to-day  that 
a  general  war  was  most  unlikely,  as  Russia 
neither  wanted  nor  was  in  a  position  to  make 
war.  I  think  that  that  opinion  is  shared  by  many 
people  here."  ' 

This  opinion  of  the  official  circles  of  Austria 
and  Germany  would  suffice  to  demonstrate  that 
all  their  subsequent  assertions  that  Russia  desired 
the  war  have  no  correspondence  with  the  truth 
and  are  contradicted  by  their  own  words.  The 
diplomatic  and  military  withdrawal  of  Russia 
from  Germany  and  Austria  found  its  ideological 
expression,  not  only  in  non-official  literature,  but 
even  in  the  declarations,  official  and  semi-official, 
of  members  of  the  Government  and  the  representa- 
tives of  the  upper  bureaucracy.  I  have  already 
quoted  the  confidential  memoir  of  Baron  Rosen, 
who  was  quite  recently  one  of  the  inspiring  forces 
of  the  foreign  policy  of  Russia,  and  who  claims 
that  this  policy  should  be  adapted  to  the  interests 
of  Germany  and  Austria.  Fear  of  German  aggres- 
sion is  implicit  or  expressed  in  all  his  speeches 
or  writings.  Germany,  he  says,  "has  only  two 
outlets.     Either  she  must  divert  Russia  from  her 

^  Correspondence  relating  to  "  Great  Britain  and  the  European 
crisis,"  London,  19 14. 


n 


^ 


k 


BEFORE  THE  WAR  113 

alliance  with  France,  or  prepare  to  deal  Russia 
such  a  blow  that  she  would  remain  disarmed 
for  a  long  time  afterwards."  "  Germany  will 
not  hesitate  to  follow  the  example  of  Japan,"  he 
says  in  the  same  memoir,  which  was  published, 
as  we  know,  shortly  before  the  present  war. 

During  the  diplomatic  crisis  resulting  from  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the 
Governmental  press  of  Russia  published  inspired 
articles  and  semi-official  declarations  in  which 
was  expressed  the  same  idea  of  the  necessity  of  a 
Russian  withdrawal  before  Austria,  and  in  which 
the  "  Slav  idea  "  was  represented  as  a  ridiculous 
prejudice  or  an  archaic  superstition.  To  the 
highly  justifiable  complaints  of  the  Serbs,  who 
asked  the  Russian  Government  why  it  did  not 
impose  its  veto  on  the  Austrian  annexation  of 
the  two  provinces  populated  by  Serbs,  Tsarism 
coolly  replied  :  "  We  have  our  own  interests  to 
consider,  which  do  not  coincide  with  the  interests 
of  the  Slav  world  in  general  and  of  Serbia  in 
particular." 

These  pronouncements  provoked  a  great 
resentment  among  the  Slavophiles  and  the 
Panslavists  of  Russia,  who  reproached  the 
Government  with  deserting  the  "  Slav  cause,"  of 
breaking  with  all  the  historic  traditions  of  the 
country,  and  of  being  guilty  of  what  was  almost 
a  betrayal,  having  regard  to  its  political  duties 
and   engagements.      As    for   these    same   Slavo- 

8 


114  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

philes  and  Panslavists,  they  had  no  influence  in 
the  democratic  world  of  Russia,  and  were  quite 
powerless.  A  French  journal  referred  to  their 
propaganda  as  being  merely  "  relatively  inoffen- 
sive gymnastics,"  and  stated  that  when  the 
Government  cried  "  Silence,  urchins  !  "  all  held 
their  peace.' 

Ill 

Finally,  the  last  point  on  which  we  must  dwell 
a  moment  is  the  problem  of  the  relations  between 
the  domestic  situation  in  Russia  and  the  foreign 
policy  of  Tsarism.  Here  I  will  remind  the  reader 
of  what  I  said  in  my  book  "  Modern  Russia  "  :— 

"  Considerations  of  internal  politics  have 
always  weighed  very  perceptibly  on  the  external 
activity  of  the  Russian  monarchy.  The  latter 
has  always  regarded  the  rumour  of  victory  as 
a  means  of  impressing  the  imagination  of  its 
subjects,  and  of  justifying  the  enslavement  of 
the  people  by  the  excessive  power  of  the  State 
in  international  relations.  Whenever  Russian 
Tsarism  has  had  reason  to  fear  a  revolutionary 
movement  it  has  thrown  itself  into  some  warlike 
adventure.  For  example,  the  insurrection  of  the 
Decembrists  (1825)  hastened  the  fourth  Russo- 
Turkish  War  (1828);  the  Crimean  War  was 
hastened  by  the  signs  of  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment of  the  preceding  years  ;    and  the  same  was 

'  Le  Correspondant,  September  1913,  p.  1032. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  115 

true  of  the  Oriental  campaign  (1877-8)  and  the 
Russo-Japanese  War.  But  after  this  last  cam- 
paign and  the  revolution  of  1905  the  process 
became  useless  and  the  autocracy  abandoned  it. 
.  .  .  Tsarism  had  considerable  experience  of  this 
kind  during  and  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
It  saw  revolutionary  manifestations  in  the  Army, 
and  more  especially  in  the  Navy ;  it  has  seen 
cruisers  flying  the  red  flag  and  fortresses  in  the 
hands  of  insurgents,  and  does  not  wish  to  repeat 
the  experience.  This  is  why  it  avoids,  and  will 
avoid  so  long  as  it  is  possible  to  do  so,  any  armed 
conflict  with  a  European  Power.  .  .  .  We  have 
the  right  to  assert  that  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment of  the  popular  masses,  the  working  classes, 
the  peasants,  the  Army,  and  the  Navy,  is  the 
best  and  principal  guarantee  of  a  pacific  attitude 
on   the   part   of   the   Russian  monarchy."  ^ 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
Germany  counted  on  the  possibility  of  a  revolu- 
tion in  Russia  during  the  war  as  one  of  the 
elements  of  her  military  movement  against  the 
Russian  Army.  Curious  revelations  of  Germany's 
anticipation  will  be  found  in  the  Yellow  Book  of 
the  French  Government.  This  book  contains  a 
secret  official  report  on  the  reinforcement  of  the 
German  Army,  written,  we  may  suppose,  by  a 
member  of  the  German  General  Staff.  In  the 
second  chapter  of  this  report  we  find  the  descrip- 
'  "Modern  Russia,"  pp.  215  and  228. 


116  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

tion  of  various  prospects  favourable  to  Germany 
in  the  event  of  a  war. 

"  It  will  be  necessary,"  we  read,  "  to  excite 
disturbances  in  the  North  of  Africa  and  in 
Russia.  This  is  a  means  of  absorbing  the  forces 
of  the  enemy.  .  .  .  Risings  provoked  in  time 
of  war  by  political  agents  need  to  be  carefully, 
prepared,  and  by  material  means.  They  ought 
to  break  out  simultaneously  with  the  destruction 
of  the  means  of  communication  ;  they  should 
have  a  direct  figurehead,  who  may  be  found 
among  the  influential  religious  or  political 
leaders."  • 

The  German  monarchy,  whose  characteristics 
are  authority,  a  strong  policing,  and,  above  all, 
order,  wishes  to  sow  revolutionary  ideas  a.mong 
its  neighbours,  the  more  easily  to  defeat  them. 
Could  one  imagine  a  more  hypocritical  policy? 
This  hypocrisy  seems  all  the  greater  when  we 
remember  that  Wilhelm  II,  on  the  28th  of  July 
19 14  (two  days  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war), 
appealed  to  Nicholas  II  in  a  dispatch  in  which 
he  demanded  for  Austria  liberty  to  crush  little 
Servia,  in  the  name  of  the  principles  of  the 
monarchy    and    the    counter-revolution. 

"  The    unscrupulous    agitation    which    has    for 

years  been   conducted  in   Serbia  has  led  to  the 

monstrous     attempt     of     which     the     Archduke 

Francis   Ferdinand  was   the  victim.      The  frame 

'  See  the  Livre  Jaune,  p.  11. 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  117 

of  mind  which  led  the  Serbs  to  assassinate 
their  own  prince  and  his  consort  still  prevails 
thoughout  the  country.  You  will  doubtless 
agree  with  me,"  says  Wilhelm  II  to  Nicholas  II, 
"  that  both  of  us,  you  as  much  as  I,  have,  as  have 
all  sovereigns,  a  common  interest  in  insisting  that 
those  who  are  morally  responsible  for  this  terrible 
murder  shall  receive  the  punishment  they  deserve." 

Germany  has  always  been  represented  by  the 
Russian  reaction  as  the  surest  friend  of  the  auto- 
cratic regime  in  Russia.  The  entire  Press  of 
the  Extreme  Right  always  made  this  affirmation, 
even  on  the  eve  of  the  war.  The  leader  of  the 
Russian  anti-Semites,  M.  Purishkevitch,  was 
known  for  his  amicable  relations  with  the  most 
notorious  representatives  of  the  Prussian  reac- 
tion. Another  leader  of  the  Russian  reactionaries, 
the  deputy  Markov,  wrote  two  or  three  months 
before  the  war  that  Russian  Tsarism  ought  to 
conclude  a  Holy  Alliance  with  German 
Kaiserism.  To  the  Russian  reactionaries  Ger- 
many is  a  pious  monarchical  nation,  while  France 
is  "  impious  and  republican  "  and  England  "  per- 
fidious and  Masonic." 

These  ideological  ties  between  the  Russian 
reaction  and  the  German  monarchy  are  fortified, 
so  to  speak,  by  the  ties  of  physical  parenthood. 
The  German  elements  occupy  an  important  place 
in  the  Imperial  family  of  Russia,  in  the  Courts, 
and  in  the  Tsar's  personal  suite,  and  play  a  great 


118  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

part  in  the  superior  bureaucracy  and  even  the 
higher  commands  of  the  Army.  A  Russian 
publicist  who  has  given  much  study  to  this 
interesting  question  has  estabUshed  the  fact  that 
among  the  general  officers  of  the  Russian  Army 
there  are  many  Germans  of  the  Protestant  "  con- 
fession "  :  in  1902  there  were  144,  and  180  in 
1905,  without  numbering  the  generals  of  German 
origin  whose  fathers  have  been  "  re-baptized " 
and  become  Orthodox,  or  have  themselves  under- 
gone that  process;  in  1905  there  were  157 
"  Orthodox "  Germans  among  the  Russian 
generals.  "And  what  is  most  curious,"  adds 
the  said  publicist,  "  is  that  it  is  notoriously  among 
the  German  officers  of  the  Russian  Army  that  we 
find  the  most  rabid  partisans  of  the  Orthodox 
Church,  of  the  autocracy,  of  True-Russian 
Nationalism,  and  the  most  savage  reac- 
tionaries." ' 

If  we  now  examine  the  civil  bureaucracy  in 
Russia  we  shall  find  many  German  names  also 
among  the  best-known  representatives  of  the 
political   reaction . 

Here,  again,  is  a  fact  which  permits  us  to 
affirm  that  official  and  Governmental  Russia 
could  not  have  desired  war  with  Germany.  Not 
only  did  it  not  desire  it,  but  evaded  it  until  the 

'  M.  N.  Rubakin,  "  The  Russian  Bureaucracy  in  Figures," 
an  article  in  the  review  Rousskiya  Mysl,  Moscow,  1907, 
pp.  49-50- 


BEFORE   THE   WAR  119 

moment  when  the  war  was  forced  upon  Russia 
by  Germany,  and  when  a  fresh  withdrawal  of  the 
Russian  Government  before  the  Austro-German 
plot  was  already  absolutely  impossible. 

But,  say  the  defenders  of  Germany,  it  is  per- 
haps quite  possible  that  Russia  did  not  desire 
the  war  in  1914.  But  she  was  preparing  for  it 
in  19 1 8  or  1920.  And  in  order  to  save  herself 
from  attack  Germany  found  herself  forced  to 
wage   a   preventive   war. 

This  argument  seems  to  me  to  have  no  honest 
meaning  behind  it.  Imagine,  for  example,  that 
I  have  reason  to  "  suppose  "  that  you  perhaps 
have  the  "  intention  "  to  kill  me  in  five  years' 
time.  Does  that  give  me  the  right  to  kill  you 
to-day?  Any  assassin  might  appeal  to  such  an 
argument  in  order  to  represent  himself  as  an 
innocent  victim  of  the  man  he  has  assassinated. 


PART    II 
IN    THE    BLOODY    FRAY 


CHAPTER    I 

I.  The  diplomatic  documents  and  the  political  reality.  The 
opinion  of  a  httle  Chinese  scholar  and  a  great  European 
scientist. — II.  The  international  tension  in  July  19 14  and 
the  question  of  responsibility.  The  Austro-German  aggres- 
sion and  the  part  played  by  Russia.  Could  Russia  have 
anticipated  the  war  ? 

I 

I  READ  in  the  papers  an  amusing  story  of  a  little 
Chinese  schoolboy,  whose  teacher  suggested  that 
he  should  write  a  "  composition  "  on  the  origins 
of  the  war.  This  is  what  he  wrote  in  his  exercise- 
book  : — 

"  At  this  very  moment  there  is  a  great  war  in 
Europe.  The  war  began  because  the  prince  of 
Austria  went  to  Serbia  with  his  princess.  A  man 
in  Serbia  killed  them.  Germany  wrote  letters  to 
Austria  saying,  '  I  will  help  yoH.'  Russia  wrote 
a  letter  to  Serbia,  '  I  am  on  your  side.'  France 
was  not  anxious  to  fight  but  got  ready  her 
soldiers.  Then  Germany  wrote  a  letter  to 
France  :  '  You  must  not  make  ready  ;  for  if  you 
do  I  will  beat  you  in  nine  hours.'  And  Germany 
began  to  fight  with  France  and  marched  through 

123 


124  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT    WAR 

Belgium.  Belgium  said  :  '  I  am  a  country  and 
not  a  road  for  you.'  And  Belgium  wrote  a  letter 
to  England  saying  what  Germany  had  done. 
And  so  England  went  to  help  Belgium." 

This  explanation  of  the  causes  of  the  present 
war  pleased  me  greatly,  because  it  seemed  to  me 
to  be  near  the  truth.  Is  it  not  true  that  the 
"  Austrian  prince  "  "  went  to  Serbia  "  ?  Is  not 
Bosnia  peopled  almost  exclusively  by  Serbs — is 
it  not  truly  Serbia?  Is  it  not  true  that  Germany 
wrote  letters  to  Austria  in  order  to  incite  her  to 
provocative  action  and  violence  ?  And  that 
Russia  wrote  a  letter  to  Serbia  so  that  she  should 
not  on  this  occasion  be  left  isolated  and  weak  in 
the  face  of  this  violence?  Is  it  not  true  that 
France,  who  "  was  not  anxious  to  fight,"  was 
forced  to  "  make  ready  "  her  soldiers  in  order  to 
defend  herself  against  invasion  by  Germany  ?  Is 
it  not  true,  finally,  that  Belgium  is  a  country  and 
not  "  a  road  "  for  the  Prussian  troops,  and  that 
England  had  not  only  a  right  but  a  duty  to  fulfil 
in  protesting  against  the  treatment  of  a  free 
country  as  though  it  were  no  more  than  "  a  road," 
and  to  aid  little  Belgium,  who  has  become  for 
ever  great  in  the  history  of  the  centuries  ? 

The  truth  which  I  found  in  the  naive  composi- 
tion of  a  little  Chinese  boy  I  do  not  often  find 
in  the  more  learned  ''  compositions  "  of  the  great 
European  diplomatists — in  all  these  White  Books, 
Black   Books,  Brown  Books.      These  books  de- 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  125 

compose  the  white  Hght  of  truth,  as  a  prism 
decomposes  the  Hght  of  day,  into  a  number  of 
discordant  colours. 

The  minutes  of  heavy  diplomatic  tension  which 
preceded  the  war  have  already  given  birth  to  an 
abundant  literature  of  comment— for  the  most 
part  interested  and  partial.  But  in  all  this  lite- 
rary inundation  there  are  none  the  less  a  few  solid 
islands  on  which  the  reader's  mind  can  find 
refuge  from  the  flood  of  lies  and  inventions.  As 
such  an  island  I  may  especially  indicate  the 
remarkable  analysis  of  the  events  which  preceded 
the  war  made  by  the  celebrated  Italian  historian 
Guglielmo  Ferrero  (author  of  the  great  work  on 
"  The  Grandeur  and.  Decadence  of  Rome  "). 
Here  is  what  he  has  written  on  this  subject  :— 

"  In  the  fatal  week  between  the  24th  and  the 
31st  of  July  there  were  two  distinct  periods.  In 
the  first  place  it  was  Austria  who  endangered 
the  peace  of  Europe,  by  her  aggressive  and  belli- 
cose policy,  and  by  taking  no  notice  of  the 
reiterated  and  extremely  plain  declarations  of 
Russia.  Whatever  one  might  reproach  Russia 
for,  she  cannot  be  reproached  for  a  lack  of 
frankness  during  this  crisis,  for  she  declared, 
from  the  outset,  to  all  the  world,  Austria  and 
Germany  included,  that  she  would  not  abandon 
Serbia  to  her  fate,  but  would  mobilize  if  Serbia 
were  attacked,  Germany,  on  the  other  hand, 
during  these  first  few  days,  assisted  in  the  de- 


126  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

velopment  of  the  crisis,  by  oscillations  whose 
intention  it  is  not  easy  to  penetrate,  and  at  whose 
inward  motives  we  can  with  difficulty  guess.  She 
began  with  veiled  threats,  then  relapsed  into  a 
sort  of  indolent  optimism  ;  finally  she  tried  to 
induce  Russia  to  capitulate,  while  exercising 
pressure  in  Paris,  and  effected  the  miscarriage, 
one  by  one,  of  the  British  attempts  at  mediation 
by  a  passive  resistance.  During  the  last  days 
of  July  the  roles  were  changed  :  Austria  became 
more  and  more  conciliatory  and  Germany  more 
and  more  aggressive,  so  that  Germany  sent  her 
ultimatum  to  Russia  on  the  very  day  when  Austria 
was  on  the  point  of  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  her  neighbour.  The  critical  moment  of  this 
sudden  fatal  change  was  the  29th  of  July. 
It  was  on  the  29th  that  Germany,  suddenly  re- 
verting to  her  plan,  already  dallied  with  on  the 
26th,  of  inducing  Russia  to  capitulate,  substituted 
herself  for  Austria,  protested  at  Petersburg  against 
the  mobilization  on  the  Austrian  frontier,  and 
finally  threatened  mobilization  and  war  if  Russia 
continued  to  mobilize,  thus  rendering  desperate 
an  already  critical  situation. 

"  It  seems^  then,  impossible  to  maintain,  as  the 
Berlin  Government  has  done  by  all  the  means 
at  its  disposal,  that  Germany  was  provoked  by 
Russia,  England,  and  France.  In  all  this  terrible 
business  these  three  Powers  had  pushed  the 
spirit  of  conciliation  to  its  extreme  limit.     They 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  127 

could  not  have  gone  farther  without  being  guilty 
of  an  act  of  national  renunciation.  Their  policy, 
moreover,  was  throughout  the  whole  of  this  week 
perfectly  clear  and  intelligible.  Even  with  the 
few  documents  we  possess  it  can  readily  be 
comprehended.  No  enigmas  ;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  German  policy,  especially  that  of  the  29th  of 
July,  is  indecipherable.  Why  on  the  29th,  less 
than  twenty -four  hours  after  the  Chancellor  had 
made  his  excellent  and  pacific  proposals  to  the 
British  Ambassador,  did  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment suddenly  summon  Russia  to  cease  her  mobi- 
lization against  Austria,  when  the  latter  Power 
did  not  as  yet  feel  herself  sufficiently  threatened 
by  the  Russian  preparations  to  complain  of  them? 
This  seems  to  be  the  capital  point  of  the  whole 
affair.  Unhappily  it  is  also  the  point  on  which 
all  the  official  and  other  German  publications  pre- 
serve the  profoundest  silence.  The  explanation 
which  Herr  Jagow  gave  to  M.  Jules  Cambon  on 
the  30th — namely,  that  '  the  heads  of  the 
Army  insisted  ' — is  too  concise  and  insufficiently 
clear. 

"  So  long  as  we  are  given  no  other  explanation 
we  are  obliged  to  rely  on  the  only  one  which  at 
present  seems  credible.  There  was  a  war  party 
in  Germany.  It  was  composed  for  the  most  part 
of  irresponsibles,  belonging  to  all  classes  of 
society.  Professors,  journalists,  politicians,  great 
nobles,  high  officials,  military  and  civil,  all  com- 


128  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

plained,  after  1905,  that  the  foreign  policy  of 
Germany  had  become  too  feeble.  The  solution 
of  the  Morocco  question  had  displeased  many 
of  them.  For  ten  years  all  kinds  of  societies 
liad  been  energetically  striving  to  affect  public 
opinion.  The  Pan-Germanic  propaganda  had 
infected  all  classes  and  worlds  :  the  Court,  the 
Parliament,  the  administration  of  the  universities, 
the  banks,  and  so  on.  All  these  factors  had 
created  an  internal  situation  which  the  Govern- 
ment could  not  indefinitely  resist.  We  shall 
certainly  one  day  learn  by  what  intrigues  it  was 
induced  to  order  the  German  Ambassador  in 
Russia  to  take,  on  the  29th,  the  fatal  step  which 
provoked  the  war.  It  is  not  improbable,  when 
that  time  comes,  that  we  shall  find  that  the  re- 
sponsible persons  were  reduced  to  executing  the 
will  of  the  irresponsible.  It  is  even  possible  that 
the  German  Government  believed  it  might  suc- 
ceed by  intimidation  alone,  as  it  had  done  in 
1909.  If  so,  it  was  deceived.  Unhappily  states- 
men were  never  guilty  of  an  error  of  calculation 
which  had  more  terrible  results.  This  explains 
why  the  question  of  responsibility  has  so  excited 
Europe  and  America.  On  this  question  depend, 
in  all  probability,  the  destinies  and  the  future  of 
a  political  system  which  was  regarded,  until  these 
last  few  months,  as  established  on  a  foundation 
of  granite." 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  129 

II 

To  these  just  reflections  of  the  well-known 
Italian  historian  I  will  add  simply  a  few  extracts 
from   documents. 

In  its  White  (  !)  Book  the  German  Govern- 
ment accuses  France  and  Russia  of  encouraging 
Serbia  in  her  "threats  "  (sic)  against  the  existence 
of  Austria-Hungary.  But  in  the  telegram  sent 
by  Sir  Maurice  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  in 
Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  (on  the  31st  of 
July  1 914)  we  read:  "The  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor has  explained  to  me  that  Russia  does  not 
desire  to  intervene  unduly  in  Serbian  affairs  .  .  . 
and  that  as  far  as  the  Austrian  demands  are 
concerned,  Russia  has  advised  Serbia  to  give  way 
to  them  as  far  as  possible  without  sacrificing  her 
independence."  But  the  tactics  of  Austria,  or 
rather  of  Germany  and  Austria,  were  intended  to 
make  reconciliation  with  Serbia  impossible,  as 
may  be  seen  by  Sir  Edward  Grey's  telegram  to 
the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  dispatched  on 
the  27th  of  July:  "The  German  Secretary  of 
State  has  himself  said  that  there  were  items  in 
the  Austrian  Note  which  one  could  hardly  expect 
Serbia  to  accept."  The  same  opinion  was  ex- 
pressed even  more  cynically  by  the  editor  of 
Zakunft,  Maximilian  Harden,  who  wrote  as 
follows  in  his  issue  for  the    ist  of  August  :— 

^'  If  monarchs  desire  to  go  to  war  they  do  so, 

9 


130  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

and  then  instruct  an  industrious  jurist  to  prove 
that  the  right  is  on  their  side.  ...  In  the 
Viennese  note  to  Serbia,  whose  brazen  arrogance 
has  no  precedent  in  history,  each  phrase  bears 
witness  that  Austria  -  Hungary  desired  the 
war.  .  .  .  Only  a  war,  for  which  the  best  minds 
of  the  army  were  thirsting,  .  .  .  could  cure  the 
fundamental  ills  of  the  two  halves  of  the  Austrian 
Empire,  and  of  the  monarchy.  .  .  .  Only  the 
refusal  and  not  the  acceptance  of  the  claims  put 
forward  in  the  Note  could  have  profited  Vienna. 

"  The  question  has  been  asked  :  where  was 
the  plan  of  campaign  elaborated — in  Vienna  or 
Berlin?  And  some  hasten  to  reply:  In  Vienna. 
Why  do  people  tolerate  the  propagation  of  such 
dangerous  fables  ?  Why  not  say  the  thing  that 
is  (because  it  must  be)  :  namely,  that  a  com- 
plete understanding  in  all  matters  existed  between 
Berlin  and  Vienna?  "  ' 

We  can  but  thank  Herr  Harden  for  these 
cynical  avowals,  which  facilitate  our  search  for 
the  most  responsible  authors,  or  rather  the  guilty 
criminals  of  this  "  world-war."  After  the 
admissions  of  the  German  journalist,  can  we  ask 
whether  Russia,  France,  and  England  did  all  they 
could  to  prevent  the  conflict  premeditated  and 
coldly  provoked  by  Germany  and  Austria?  My 
readers  may  like  me  to  give  yet  a  few  more 
interesting  quotations.     Gn  the    15th  of  July  M. 

*  See  Herr  Harden's  article  in  Zukunftiox  August  i,  1914. 


_J,> 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  131 

Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  wrote 
to  his  Government  :  "  Certain  organs  of  the 
Viennese  press,  discussing  the  military  organiza- 
tion of  France  and  Russia,  represent  these  two 
countries  as  being  in  no  condition  to  have  their 
say  In  European  affairs,  which  would  make  it 
appreciably  easier  for  the  Dual  Monarchy,  sup- 
ported by  Germany,  to  subject  Serbia  to  any 
treatment  it  chooses  to  impose  on  her.  The 
Milltarische  Rundschau  '  admits  as  much  without 
hesitation  :  '  The  moment  is  still  favourable  for 
us.  .  .  .At  the  present  moment  the  Initiative 
belongs  to  us;  Russia  Is  not  ready;  the  moral 
factors  (  !)  and  justice  (!!!)  are  on  our  side,  as 
well  as  force.'  "  -  In  another  document — a  Consu- 
lar report  submitted  to  the  French  Government 
on  the  2  1st  of  July— we  read:  "There  is  here 
[in  Vienna],  and  also  in  Berlin,  a  clan  which 
accepts  the  idea  of  a  general  conflict ;  in  other 
words,  a  conflagration.  The  leading  idea  is 
probably  that  it  would  be  best  to  act  before 
Russia  has  completed  her  extensive  improvements 
of  her  army  and  railroads,  and  before  France 
can  complete  the  details  of  her  military  organiza- 
tion." 3  It  is  thus  proved  that  the  Austro- 
German  coalition  desired  the  war  independently 
of  whatever  attitude  might  be  assumed  by  Russia, 

'  The  most  influential  military  organ  in  Austria. 
="  Quoted    from  the  Yellow  Book   published    by    the   French 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Paris,  19 14,  p.  28.         3  Ibid.,  p.  30. 


132  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

France,  or  England.  What  could  Russia,  under 
these  circumstances,  have  done  to  avoid  war? 
Cast  Serbia  into  the  jaws  of  German  militarism? 
But  this  would  have  been  an  action  of  incredible 
cowardice  and  treachery.  This  the  German 
Government  understood  very  well,  as  we  see  from 
the  dispatch  sent  by  Wilhelm  II  to  Nicholas  II 
on  the  24th  of  July,  in  which  the  German 
Emperor,  speaking  to  the  Tsar  of  the  impression 
produced  in  Russia  by  the  Austro  -  German 
aggression  against  Serbia,  said  :  "  I  do  not  by 
any  means  attempt  to  conceal  from  myself  the 
difhculty  which  you  and  your  Government  are 
experiencing  in  resisting  the  manifestations  of 
public  opinion."  Wilhelm  II  himself  admits  that 
public  opinion  in  Russia  had  reason  to  feel 
uncomfortable  at  the  idea  of  looking  on  at  the 
ignoble  attempt  on  the  part  of  two  great  States, 
both  armed  to  the  teeth,  to  strangle  a  little  nation. 
Those  who  think  that  Russia  may  thus  have 
been  responsible  for  the  outbreak  of  the  present 
war  often  make  the  following  objection  :  How, 
they  ask,  can  you  suppose  that  Russian  Tsarism, 
which  has  oppressed  and  now  oppresses  so  many 
peoples  in  its  own  Empire,  was  sincerely  anxious 
to  defend  Serbia?  To  this  question  I  frankly 
reply  :  I  am  not  a  friend  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment. I  do  not  believe  in  the  "sincerity" 
of  the  intentions  of  the  autocratic  Government. 
1    know    that   it   oppresses   many   peoples.      But 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  133 

this  is  no  reason  why  it  should  commit  a  final 
act  of  cowardice,  and  abandon  Serbia  to  the 
Austro-German  sword.  And  if  the  Russian 
Government  dared  to  oppose  the  brutal  violence 
to  which  Serbia  was  to  be  subjected  by  the  armed 
forces  of  the  Russian  army,  it  performed  a  good 
action  independently  of  its  "  inward  intentions." 
Autocratic  Tsarism  is  not  a  good  thing,  but  would 
it  have  been  any  better  had  it  been  guilty  of  an 
act  of  treason  towards  the  little  Serbian  nation, 
which  looked  to  Russia  for  its  salvation? 

Do  you  consider  that  one  should  expiate  the 
sins  one  may  have  committed  by  a  fresh  crime, 
the  dishonour  which  has  stained  one  by  a  new 
infamy  ? 

I  do  not  believe  it.  And  even  among  the 
Germans  there  were  those  who  did  not  believe 
it— at  least,  there  were  before  the  war— who 
believed  that  Russia  not  only  had  the  right  to 
support  Serbia  against  Austria,  but  that  she  was 
obliged  to  do  so.  A  few  days  before  the  declara- 
tion of  war  the  Social  -  Democratic  journal 
Vorivdrts,  expressing  the  thoughts  of  the  labour- 
ing classes  of  Germany,  made  a  frank  declaration 
of  this  opinion,  saying  that  Russia  could  not 
renounce  her  duty  to  defend  Serbia  against  the 
pressure   of   Austria. 


CHAPTER    II 

I.  The  Russian  Government  and  Russian  society  confronted 
with  an  unexpected  war. — 11.  The  session  of  the  Duma. 
The  agreement  between  the  majority  of  the  parties  and 
representatives. — III.  Why  the  Extreme  Left  did  not  vote 
for  the  mihtary  credits. 

I 

Not  only  was  the  present  war  not  desired  by- 
Russia— it  was  entirely  unexpected  by  that 
country,  as  was  emphasized  by  the  Russian  press 
as  well  as  by  the  declaration  of  the  Government 
in  the   Imperial   Duma. 

"  On  the  2  0th  of  July  (old  style)  was 
published  the  Imperial  ukase  relating  to  the 
resumption  of  your  interrupted  labours  a 
month  ago  in  the  midst  of  what  seemed  to  be 
profound  peace."  In  such  words  the  President 
of  the  Council  of  Ministers  addressed  the 
members  of  the  Duma.  "  During  this  month 
events  of  the  greatest  historical  importance  have 
occurred.  One  after  another,  like  claps  of 
thunder,  they  have  burst  over  the  life  of  Russia 
and  Europe,  long  prepared  by  the  invisible  course 
of  history,  yet  sudden  in  their  happening." 

134 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  135 

How  far  not  only  the  members  of  the  great 
public,  but  even  those  persons  who  made  it  their 
special  business  to  study  the  problems  of  foreign 
politics,  were  from  entertaining  any  supposition 
of  the  possibility  of  an  imminent  outbreak  of 
war,   we  may   judge   from   the  following   fact  :— 

Two  and  a  half  years  ago  one  of  my  friends, 
M.  Pavlovitsh,  who  is  one  of  the  most  assiduous 
students  of  international  relations,  wished  to 
publish  a  French  pamphlet,  in  which  he  demon- 
strated that  the  eventuality  of  armed  conflict 
between  Germany  and  England  was  incredible. 
During  a  private  interview  he  told  me  that  he 
had  intended  to  entitle  his  pamphlet  "  The  War 
Impossible."  "  There  is  no  need  to  exag- 
gerate," I  said  ;  "we  have  no  guarantee  of  the 
impossibility  of  this  war."  M.  Pavlovitsh  gave 
in  and  entitled  his  pamphlet  "  The  Improbable 
War."  I 

This  was  in  1 9  i  2 .  In  i  9  1 4,  two  or  three 
months  before  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war, 
the  same  writer  (who  is,  I  repeat,  one  of  the 
best-informed  and  profoundest  students  of  these 
questions  in  Russia)  delivered  a  lecture  in  which 
he  attacked  the  "  alarmists  "  who  circulated  false 
rumours  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  conflict  between 
Russia  and  Germany,  and  these  attacks  were 
repeated  by  him  in  an  article  published  almost  on 

'  Michel  Pavlovitsh  :  Le  Coniiit  Angio-Allemand.     La  guerre 
improbable,  Paris,  191 2. 


136  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

the  eve  of  the  declaration  of  war.  Thus  m  Russia 
the  war  was  completely  unexpected,  even  by 
persons  well  informed  as  to  international  ques- 
tions. As  for  the  "  simple  profane,"  the  masses 
of  the  population,  to  them  the  war  was  truly  like 
a  thunderbolt  out  of  a  clear  sky.  And  this  is  a 
circumstance  we  must  always  take  into  con- 
sideration if  we  would  appreciate  the  events 
which  followed  the  declaration  of  war  and  the 
attitude  of  official  and  popular  Russia  in  respect 
of  this  national  and  international  disaster. 

On  the  20th  of  July  19 14  (old  style),  that  is, 
on  the  2nd  of  August  by  European  reckoning, 
the  following  manifesto  was  issued,  relative  to 
the  declaration  of  war  by  Germany  upon 
Russia  : — 

"We,  Nicholas  II,  by  the  grace  of  God 
Emperor  and  autocrat  of  all  the  Russias,  Tsar 
of  Poland,  Grand  Duke  of  Finland,  etc.,  etc. 
"  Declare  to  all  our  faithful  subjects  : 
"  Following  her  historic  traditions,  Russia,  who 
in  faith  and  in  blood  is  one  with  the  Slav  peoples, 
has  never  regarded  their  fate  with  indifference. 
The  brotherly  feelings  of  the  Russian  people  for 
the  Slavs  have  reawakened  with  unanimous 
impulse  and  peculiar  force  during  these  last  few 
days,  at  the  moment  when  Austria-Hungary  pre- 
sented to  Servia  demands  which  were  manifestly 
such  as  a  sovereign  State  could  not  accept. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  137 

"  Despising  the  conciliatory  and  pacific  reply 
of  the  Serbian  Government  and  refusing  the 
benevolent  mediation  of  Russia,  Austria  hastily 
resorted  to  an  armed  attack,  which  she  opened 
by  the  bombardment  of  the  undefended  city  of 
Belgrade. 

"  Forced,  by  these  new  conditions,  to  take 
necessary  measures  of  precaution,  we  gave  the 
order  that  the  Army  and  the  Navy  should  be 
placed  on  a  war  footing  ;  but,  careful  of  the 
blood  and  the  wealth  of  our  subjects,  we 
employed  all  our  efforts  to  secure  a  pacific  issue 
of  the   negotiations   then   proceeding. 

"  In  the  midst  of  these  friendly  relations  the 
ally  of  Austria,  Germany,  despite  our  hopes  that 
we  should  always  remain  good  neighbours,  and 
shutting  her  ears  to  the  assurances  which  we 
gave  her  that  the  measures  taken  were  taken 
without  any  hostile  intention  towards  her — Ger- 
many proceeded  to  demand  that  these  measures 
should  be  revoked,  and,  having  received  a  refusal, 
suddenly  declared  war  upon  Russia. 

"  Now  it  is  no  longer  a  matter  only  of  taking 
the  part  of  a  sister  nation  unjustly  wronged  ; 
but  of  defending  the  honour,  the  dignity,  and  the 
integrity  of  Russia  and  her  position  among  the 
Great  Powers.  We  firmly  believe  that  in  order  to 
defend  the  Russian  soil  our  faithful  subjects  will 
rise  all  as   one  man,   filled  with  abnegation. 

"  In  the  dread  hour  of  trial,  let  intestine  dis- 


138  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

senslons  be  forgotten,  that  the  union  of  the  Tsar 
with  his  people  may  be  yet  more  firmly  consoli- 
dated, and  that  Russia,  rising  as  a  single  man, 
may  repulse  the  insolent  attack  of  the  enemy. 

"  With  a  profound  faith  in  the  righteousness 
of  our  cause  and  a  humble  confidence  in 
Almighty  Providence,  we  invoke  in  our  prayers 
the  Divine  benediction  upon  Holy  Russia  and 
our  valiant  troops. 

"At  St.  Petersburg,  the  20th  of  July  (old 
style)  of  the  year  19 14  in  the  era  of  Jesus  Christ, 
and  the  twentieth  year  of  our  reign. 

"  Nicholas." 

I  will  call  the  attention  of  my  readers  to  the 
phrase  which  I  have  italicized  in  this  manifesto, 
the  phrase  calling  the  subjects  of  the  Tsar  to 
forget  "intestine  dissensions."  As  we  shall 
presently  see,  the  Government  itself  did  not 
respond    to   this    appeal. 

While  issuing  the  proclamation  here  quoted 
on  the  2nd  of  August,  the  Russian  Government 
also  issued  on  the  same  day  a  ukase  of  the  Tsar 
concerning  the  convocation  of  the  legislative 
assemblies.  "  In  the  midst  of  the  heavy  trials 
sent  upon  our  country,"  says  the  ukase,  "  and 
wishing  to  be  in  perfect  union  with  our  people, 
we  have  thought  it  well  to  convoke  the  Council 
and  the  Imperial  Duma."  The  Prime  Minister 
explained  verbally  to  the  Duma  that  the  Govern- 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  139 

merit  proposed  in  future  to  address  itself  also  to 
the  Legislative  Assembly.  "  The  legislative  insti- 
tutions must  understand  that  in  the  future  they 
too  will  be  convoked  to  sit  in  extraordinary  ses- 
sion if  circumstances  necessitate  such  a  step." 
The  members  of  the  Duma  welcomed  this  con- 
stitutional promise  with  applause,  which  is  easily 
comprehensible  if  we  remember  that  in  Russia 
the  autocratic  Government  ordinarily  regards  the 
legislative  body  as  a  negligible  factor.  But  while 
appreciating  the  "  constitutionalism "  for  once 
manifested  by  Tsarism  we  must  not  exaggerate 
its  degree,  and  we  must  not  forget  that  the 
Government  itself  has  explained  its  constitu- 
tionalism by  very  mercenary  reasons.  "  War 
being  declared  against  us,"  said  the  Prime 
Minister  in  the  Duma,  "  the  Government  could 
not  occupy  itself  with  the  means  of  meeting  the 
military  expenditure.  .  .  .  The  Minister  of 
Finances  will  make  you  acquainted  with  the 
measures  which  are  proposed  in  the  first  place. 
The  necessity  of  these  measures  is  one  of  the 
reasons  for  the  convocation  of  the  legislative 
institutions." 

It  is  true  that  the  Premier  added  that  "  this 
is  only  an  external  reason  and  not  the  most 
important,"  and  that  the  Duma  ought  at  such 
a  moment  "to  be  the  expression  of  the  popular 
thoughts  and  feelings."  But  here  a  question 
of  principle  arises  :    for  this  very  Duma  to  which 


140  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

Tsarism  addressed  its  "  constitutional  appeal  " 
was  created  by  Tsarism  to  assist  in  a  coup  d'etat, 
which  was  accomplished  in  1907,  at  the  time  of 
the  brutal  dissolution  of  the  second  Duma  ;  it 
was  by  no  means  created  by  Tsarism  to  be  the 
expression  of  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  the 
people,  but  to  be  a  docile  instrument  of  reaction. 
None  the  less,  I  am  ready  to  admit  that  the 
Convocation  of  this  Duma,  the  result  of  a  coup 
d'etat,  was  an  act  of  greater  constitutionalism 
than  the  convocation  of  no  Duma  at  all— a  very 
possible  proceeding. 

11 

The  extraordinary  session  of  the  Duma  for  the 
8th  of  August  1 9 1 4  was  opened  by  a  speech 
delivered  by  the  President,  M.  Rodzianko,  from 
which  I  will  quote  the  more  important  state- 
ments : — 

"  We  all  know  very  well  that  Russia  did  not 
desire  the  war,  that  ambitions  of  conquest  are 
foreign  to  the  Russian  people,  but  that  destiny 
itself  has  seen  fit  to  involve  us  in  an  act  of 
justice.  .  .  .  The  die  is  cast.  .  .  .  Calmly, 
without  anger,  we  can  say  to  those  who  are 
attacking  us  :  Lay  down  your  arms.  .  .  .  Our 
people  is  good  and  pacific,  but  terrible  when 
forced  to  defend  itself.  .  .  .  The  Russian  hero 
will  not  hang  his  head  in  dejection,  whatever 
trials  he  may  experience  ;    his  stalwart  shoulders 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  141 

will  support  everything.  ...  At  this  hour  our 
thoughts  and  our  hopes  are  yonder  on  the  fron- 
tiers, where  our  valiant  Army  and  our  valiant  and 
courageous  Fleet  '  go  forth  fearlessly  to  battle. 
...  As  for  us  who  remain  at  home,  let  us  accept 
our  duty,  the  duty  of  labouring  without  ceasing 
to  assure  bread  to  those  families  which  are 
deprived  of  their  heads  ;  let  the  Army  know, 
not  by  our  words  alone  but  by  our  actions,  that 
we  shall  not  allow  their  families  to  suffer 
poverty." 

At  the  close  of  the  President's  speech  the 
official  declarations  were  made,  in  the  name  of 
the  Government,  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

"  Russia  did  not  desire  the  war,"  said  M.  Gore- 
mykin.  "The  Government  has  conscientiously 
sought  some  means  of  extricating  itself  peacefully 
from  the  complicated  situation  which  has  over- 
taken it,  seizing  upon  even  the  faintest  hope  of 
averting  the  rain  of  blood  which  threatened  us. 
But  there  are  limits  even  to  the  pacific  spirit  of 
Russia.  Fully  conscious  of  the  heavy  responsi- 
bility which  weighed  upon  it,  for  the  Imperial 
Government  to  have  continued  humbly  to  with- 
draw from  the  challenge  flung  down  before  it 
would  have  meant  the  renunciation  of  our  position 
as  a  Great  Power  ;  it  would  have  been  a  fatal 
error  ;  it  would  have  humiliated  us  without  in  any 
'  Unhappily,  almost  non-existent. 


142  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

way  modifying  the  course  of  events,  which  was 
not  decided  by  us. 

"  The  war  has  opened,  and  it  only  remains  for 
us  to  repeat  the  words  which  have  resounded 
throughout  the  world  :  We  shall  prosecute  this 
war,  whatever  its  character,  until  the  end.  In 
all  the  many  centuries  of  Russian  history  there 
has  been  perhaps  but  one  national  conflict,  that 
of  1 8 1 2,  which  could  for  importance  be  com- 
pared with  the  events  now  imminent.  The 
Government  is  in  no  way  blinded  by  presump- 
tion ;  it  clearly  realizes  the  fact  that  this  war 
will  demand  an  extreme  effort  of  all  its  forces, 
many  victims,  and  a  courage  equal  to  all  the 
blows  of  Fate.  But  the  Government  cherishes 
an  immovable  faith  in  its  final  success,  for  it  has 
an  illimitable  faith  in  the  great  historic  mission 
of  Russia." 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  then  gave  the 
deputies  a  long  explanation  of  the  international 
situation  on  the  eve  of  the  war,  and  the  part 
played  by  Russia. 

"  In  these  difficult  hours,  in  which  resolutions 
heavy  with  responsibilities  have  been  taken,  the 
Government  has  derived  strength  from  the  feeling 
that  it  is  in  perfect  agreement  with  the  popular 
conscience."  Thus  M.  Sazonov.  "  When  the 
moment  comes  for  history  to  pronounce  its  impar- 
tial verdict,  I  have  the  firm  conviction  that 
this    verdict    will    be    in    our    favour.    .    .    .   Our 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  143 

enemies  are  striving  to  cast  upon  us  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  scourge  now  desolating  Europe, 
but  their  calumnies  cannot  lead  into  error  any- 
one who  will  with  conscientious  attention  follow 
the  Russian  policy  of  these  last  few  years  and 
these  last  few  days.  ...  It  was  not  the  policy 
of  Russia  that  threatened  the  peace  of  the  world. 
.  .  .  You  know  what  has  been  the  occasion  of 
the  war ;  torn  by  intestine  disorders,  Austria 
resolved  to  escape  from  them  by  striking  a  blow 
which,  while  impressing  the  world  with  her 
power,  should  humiliate  us .  To  that  effect  Serbia 
was  chosen.  .  .  .  You  are  not  ignorant  of  the 
conditions  under  which  the  ultimatum  was  pre- 
sented to  Serbia.  By  submitting  to  them  she 
would  have  become  the  vassal  of  Austria.  It 
is  clear  that  non-intervention  on  our  part  would 
have  been  equivalent  to  the  abandonment  of  our 
ancient  character  of  defender  of  the  Balkan 
peoples.  And  at  the  same  time  it  would  have 
involved  the  admission  that  the  will  of  Austria, 
and  that  of  Germany,  who  stands  behind  her, 
is  the  law  of  Europe,  and  that  neither  we,  nor 
France,  nor  England  can  admit.  (Prolonged 
applause.) 

"  No  less  than  we,  our  valiant  Allies  sought 
with  all  their  might  to  preserve  peace.  Our 
enemies  blundered  :  they  took  these  efforts  for 
signs  of  weakness.  Even  after  the  provocation 
given  by  Austria,  Russia  declined  no  attempt  at 


144  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

a  peaceful  solution  of  the  conflict.  In  this  direc- 
tion all  efforts  that  could  be  made  were  made 
honestly  and  prosecuted  to  the  end  by  us  and  by 
our  Allies.  .  .  .  We  held  firmly  to  one  condition 
only  :  ready  to  accept  any  compromise  that  could 
have  been  admitted  by  Austria  without  diminish- 
ing her  prestige,  we  excluded  all  that  might  have 
attacked  the  sovereignty  and  the  independence  of 
Serbia. 

"  From  the  outset  we  did  not  conceal  our  point 
of  view  from  Germany.  There  is  no  doubt  that, 
had  it  wished,  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  might,  with 
a  single  imperious  word,  have  checked  its  ally, 
as  it  did  during  the  Balkan  crisis.  But  in  reality 
Germany,  who  until  the  last  few  days  never 
ceased  to  assert  in  so  many  words  her  desire  to 
influence  Vienna,  rejected  one  by  one  all  the 
propositions  put  forward,  and  replied  by  mere 
empty  assurances. 

"  Time  was  passing  ;  the  negotiations  did  not 
advance.  Austria  savagely  bombarded  Belgrade. 
.  .  .  The  obvious  object  was  to  gain  time  by 
means  of  negotiations  and  to  confront  Europe 
and  ourselves  with  the  accomplished  fact  :  the 
humiliation  and  annihilation  of  the  Serbian  State. 
Under  these  conditions  we  could  not  abstain  from 
taking  natural  measures  of  precaution,  all  the 
more  as  Austria  had  already  mobilized  the  half 
of  her  Army.  When  the  mobilization  was  ordered 
in  Russia  our  Emperor  gave  his   Imperial  word 


IN  THE   BLOODY  FRAY  145 

to  the  Emperor  of  Germany  that  Russia  would 
not  resort  to  the  employment  of  force  so  long 
as  a  hope  existed  of  arriving  at  a  pacific  solu- 
tion under  the  conditions,  full  of  moderation, 
which   I   have   already  indicated. 

"  This  voice  was  not  heard.  Germany  declared 
war,  first  upon  us,  then  upon  our  Allies.  Losing 
all  self-control,  she  trampled  on  the  sacred  rights 
of  two  States  whose  neutrality  she  had  solemnly 
guaranteed  by  her  own  signature,  in  agreement 
with  the  other  Powers."  (Cries  from  all  the 
benches  of  "  Shame  !      Shame  !  ") 

"  We  can  only  bow  our  heads  before  the 
heroism  of  the  Belgian  people,  which  did  not 
fear  to  struggle  against  the  huge  German  Army." 
(Thunders  of  applause.  The  deputies  persis- 
tently acclaimed  the  representative  of  Belgium, 
who  was  in  the  Diplomatic  box.) 

"  The  procedure  of  Germany  has  not  failed  to 
arouse  the  profound  indignation  of  the  vvTiole 
civilized  world,  and,  above  all,  that  of  chivalrous 
France,  who,  with  ourselves,  has  risen  in  the 
defence  of  right  and  justice."  (A  fresh  outburst 
of  applause.  Cries  from  deputies  of  "  Long  live 
France  !  "  The  deputies  rose  to  their  feet  and 
the  French  Ambassador  received  a  long  ovation.) 

"  Need  I  add  that  England  shares  the  same 
feelings  ?  She  also  responded  as  one  man,  and 
saw  that  it  was  necessary  to  shatter  the  preten- 
sions   of    Germany    to    impose    her    burdensome 

10 


146  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

hegemony  upon  the  whole  of  Europe."  (Another 
outburst  of  applause.  Great  enthusiasm.  This 
time  the  British  Ambassador  received  the 
ovations  of  the  Duma.) 

"  We  are  fighting  for  our  Fatherland  ;  we  are 
fighting  for  its  prestige  and  its  position  as  a 
Great  Power.  We  will  not  accept  the  yoke  of 
Germany  and  her  ally  in  Europe."  (Violent 
shouts,  "bravoes,"  frantic  applause.)  "The  same 
motives    are    guiding   our   Allies." 

After  the  declarations  of  the  Prime  Minister 
and  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Duma 
listened  to  a  long  series  of  speeches  from  dele- 
gates belonging  to  various  parties  of  the  Duma. 
These  speeches  proved  that  a  perfect  agreement 
prevailed  among  the  great  majority  of  the 
members  of  the  Duma  in  all  that  related  to  their 
attitude  in  respect  of  the  war.  But  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  declarations  of  the  parties  of 
the  Right  were  very  insignificant  in  their  con- 
tents. The  representative  of  the  Centre  confined 
himself  to  exclaiming  :  "  Long  live  the  Tsar,  the 
People,  and  victory  !  "  The  representative  of  the 
Nationalists  expressed  his  opinion  that  "  in  the 
difficult  and  glorious  moment  through  which  we 
are  passing  Russia  is  called  upon  to  repair  some 
of  her  historic  faults."  (One  may  read  into  these 
words  a  reproach  addressed  to  the  Russian 
Government  for  its  policy  of  "  recoil "  before 
the    Austro-German    bloc   in    1909,    etc.)      The 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  147 

representative  of  the  Octobrists  declared  :  "  My 
political  friends  have  sent  me  here  to  express 
their  firm  conviction  that,  before  the  invasion 
now  threatening,  we  shall  all  be  united  ;  we  are 
all  equally  ready  to  sacrifice  our  goods,  our  lives, 
and  those  of  our  nearest  and  dearest,  in  order 
to  struggle  against  the  enemy  which  is  striving 
to  ruin  the  strength  and  liberty  of  our  great 
country." 

The  situation  was  highly  embarrassing  to  the 
Extreme  Right,  which  had  long  defended  in  its 
press  the  idea  of  a  union  between  the  Russian 
autocracy  and  the  German  monarchy.  The 
spokesman  of  the  Extreme  Right  was  M .  Markov, 
who,  as  was  later  established,  had  as  recently  as 
April  1 9 1 4  published  articles  in  which  he  insisted 
on  the  necessity  of  replacing  the  alliance  with 
France  (impious  and  republican)  and  the  entente 
with  England  (perfidious  and  Free-Masonic  (  ! )  ) 
by  a  worthy  union  of  the  Russian  reaction  with 
the  Prussian  reaction.  None  the  less,  M.  Markov 
was  under  the  necessity  of  declaring  that  his 
party  "  awaited  the  victory "  of  Russia  over 
Germany . 

The  declaration  of  the  Democratic  Constitu- 
tionalists (the  Cadets)  was  made  in  their  name 
by  the  deputy  Milukov. 

"  The  parliamentary  group  of  the  Liberal 
Party,"  he  said,  "  has  more  than  once  raised  in 
the  Duma  the  questions  which  have  been  touched 


148  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

upon  by  the  two  first  speakers  who  ascended  this 
tribune."  He  referred  to  the  representatives  of 
the  Labourites  and  the  Social-Democrats,  whose 
declarations  will  presently  be  cited.  "  Its  opinion 
on  these  questions  is  well  known  to  all.  It  is 
needless  to  say  that  no  external  circumstances 
can  modify  it.  When  the  moment  has  come  our 
party  will  once  more  attack  these  questions,  and 
will  once  again  point  out  the  only  path  that  can 
lead  to  the  eternal  regeneration  of  Russia.  It 
hopes  that  in  passing  through  the  severe  trials 
which  await  us  our  country  will  draw  nearer  to 
its  sacred  object.  But  at  the  present  moment 
other  questions  confront  us,  affecting  us  all  too 
profoundly,  and  another  task  is  before  us,  a 
terrible  and  august  duty,  a  task  which  im- 
periously calls  for  an  immediate  solution.  We 
must  concentrate  all  our  forces  in  the  defence 
of  the  State,  against  an  external  enemy,  who 
pretends  to  sweep  us  from  his  path  in  order  that 
he   may   establish   a    world-wide   supremacy. 

"  Our  cause  is  a  just  cause.  We  are  struggling 
to  liberate  our  country  from  a  foreign  invasion, 
to  liberate  Europe  and  the  Slav  world  from  the 
Germanic  Hegemony,  to  liberate  the  entire  world 
from  the  intolerable  yoke  of  armaments  which 
never  fail  to  increase,  ruining  peaceful  workers 
and  perpetually  provoking  fresh  armed  con- 
flicts. 

"  In  this  struggle  we  are  all  one  ;   we  make  no 


IN  THE  BLOODY  FRAY  U9 

conditions,  we  put  forward  no  claims,  we  simply 
throw  into  the  balance  of  conflict  our  firm  will 
to  vanquish  the  aggressor." 

I  believe— and  many  Russian  citizens  are  of  the 
mind— that  the  Democratic  Constitutionalists  have 
committed  a  grave  blunder  in  declaring  that  they 
"  put  forward  no  claim's,"  for  there  were  ques- 
tions (for  example,  that  of  a  political  amnesty) 
which  should  not  have  been  set  aside  even  at 
such  a  moment.  And  this  political  blunder 
on  the  part  of  the  Cadets  was  imme- 
diately emphasized  by  the  declaration  of 
the  Labour  Party.  But  before  speaking 
of  this  declaration  I  must  cite  the  resolution 
voted  by  the  Duma  at  the  close  of  the 
session  : — 

"  Having  heard  the  explanations  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  being  convinced,  not  without  a  feeling 
of  satisfaction,  that  it  has  exhausted  every  means 
of  maintaining  peace  compatible  with  the  pres- 
tige of  Russia  as  a  Great  Power,  the  Imperial 
Duma  expresses  the  firm  conviction  that  in  the 
present  hour  of  trial,  before  the  advancing  threat 
of  war,  all  the  peoples  of  Russia,  united  in  a 
common  sentiment  of  love  for  their  country,  and 
convinced  of  the  justice  of  their  cause,  are  ready 
to  rise  at  the  appeal  of  their  Sovereign,  in  order 
to  defend  their  country,  its  honour,  and  its  riches. 
The  Duma  derives  from  this  sentiment  a  calm 
assurance  in  the  invisible  strength  and  glorious 
future  of  Russia. 


f 


150  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

"  Proceeding  to  the  order  of  the  day  and  ex- 
pressing the  desire  to  collaborate  in  the  defence 
of  the  country  and  the  protection  of  the  families 
of  the  reservists,  the  Duma  sends  its  brotherly 
greeting  to  the  valiant  defenders  of  our  country 
who,  with  abnegation,  are  accomplishing  their 
heroic  task." 

This  resolution,  and  the  projected  legislation 
introduced  by  the  Government,  were  voted  by 
the  Duma  unanimously,  but  in  the  absence  of 
two  parties  of  the  Extreme  Left,  who,  not  wishing 
to  participate  in  the  vote,  left  the  hall  of  the 
Duma  before  it  was  taken. 

Ill 

Before  leaving  the  hall  of  session  the  Trudo- 
vlki,  who  represented  the  peasant  democracy,  and 
the  Social-Democrats,  who  represented  the  in- 
dustrial workers,  made  declarations  in  which  they 
expounded  their  point  of  view  in  all  that  con- 
cerned the  war. 

•The  party  of  the  Trudoviki  had  responded  to 
the  appeal  of  the  Government  and  the  Cadets 
concerning  the  propriety  of  ignoring  all  intestine 
dissensions    in    the   following   words  : — 

"  Citizens  of  Russia,  let  us  remember  that 
you  have  no  enemies  among  the  working- 
classes  of  the  belligerent  countries.  While 
defending  to  the  uttermost  all  that  is  dear  to 
us  against  the  attempts  at  conquest  made  by  the 


IN  THE   BLOODY  FRAY  151 

hostile  Governments  of  Germany  and  Austria, 
remember  that  this  horrible  war  would  not  have 
taken  place  if  the  great  ideals  of  democracy- 
liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity— had  inspired  the 
activities  of  ruling  Russia  and  the  Governments 
of  all  countries.  And  now,  even  in  this  terrible 
hour,  the  authorities  do  not  forget  the  internal 
dissensions  of  the  country  ;  they  do  not  amnesty 
those  who  have  striven  for  the  liberty  and  happi- 
ness of  their  country  ;  they  will  not  make  peace 
with  the  non-Russian  peoples  who  have  pardoned 
everything  and  are  fighting  with  enthusiasm  at 
our  side  for  the  common  Fatherland.  And  in 
place  of  alleviating  the  situation  of  the  labouring- 
classes,  the  Government  imposes  on  them  pre- 
cisely the  chief  weight  of  military  expenditure 
by  the  augmentation  of  the  indirect  taxes." 

But  while  throwing  the  responsibility  for  the 
war  on  all  the  Governments,  the  Social- 
Democrats  proclaimed  that  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  Socialists  to  defend  their  country  against  a 
foreign  invasion. 

"  The  proletariat,  the  perpetual  champion  of 
liberty  and  the  interests  of  the  people,  will  always 
defend  the  treasure  of  civilization  amassed  by 
the  people  against  all  attempts,  no  matter  from 
whence  they  come,"  said  the  spokesman  of  the 
Social-Democrats  in  the  Duma. 

And  in  speaking  thus  the  representative  of 
Russian  Social-Democracy  in  the  Duma  was  but 


152  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

following  the  tradition  established  by  the  Social- 
Democratic  sections  of  preceding  Dumas : 
notably  the  Social-Democratic  section  of  the 
second  Duma,  whose  members  were  sent  to  penal 
servitude  for  supposed  implication  in  a  "  military 
conspiracy "  invented  by  the  police,  declared 
through  one  of  its  spokesmen  that  "  if  the 
foreign  oppressors  declare  war  on  Russia  the 
proletarian  youth  would  seize  their  rifles  and 
resist  them  as  they  resisted  their  oppressors  at 
home." 

The  same  idea  was  expressed  by  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  Trudovlki,  who  made  use  of  lan- 
guage so  simple  and  affecting  as  to  produce  a 
profound  impression  on  that  very  majority  of  the 
Duma  which  in  general  and  on  the  same  day  had 
been  more  than  chilly  in  its  attitude  toward  the 
Extreme   Left. 

"  -We  have  the  immovable  conviction,"  said  the 
Labour  deputy,  "  that  the  great  Russian 
democracy,  united  to  all  the  other  forces  of  the 
country,  will  offer  a  decisive  resistance  to  the 
enemy  who  shall  attack  us,  and  will  defend  its 
native  soil  and  the  culture  created  by  the  sweat 
and  blood  of  the  generations.  We  believe  that 
on  the  field  of  battle,  in  the  hour  of  suffering, 
the  brotherhood  of  all  the  peoples  of  Russia  will 
be  cemented.  A  single  will  shall  be  born  of 
them  which  at  home  will  deliver  the  people  from 
its  terrible   chains.    .    .    . 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  153 

"  Peasants  and  workers,  and  all  you  who  desire 
the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  Russia,  in  these 
days  of  heavy  trials  temper  your  spirits  !  Gather 
up  all  your  strength,  and,  having  defended  the 
country,  set  it  free  ! 

"  To  you,  our  brothers,  who  are  shedding  your 
blood  for  the  Fatherland,  our  deep  respect  and 
our   fraternal   greeting  !  " 

However,  while  admitting  that  the  working- 
classes  in  field  and  factory  should  energetically 
participate  in  the  defence  of  the  country,  the 
Labour  group  and  the  Social-Democratic  section 
took  no  part  in  the  vote  on  the  resolution  or  the 
projected  legislation  referring  to  military  credits. 
To  understand  this  attitude  we  must  in  the  first 
place  remember  that  the  position  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  peasants  and  industrial  workers 
in  the  present  Duma  is  quite  peouHar,  and  unlike 
that  of  any  other  parties  in  the  Duma.  While 
all  the  other  parties  accept  the  existing  "  Con- 
stitution," and  act  as  legal  components  of  the 
latter,  the  Labour  group  and  the  Social-Demo- 
crats deny  the  Constitution  on  principle.  For 
them  the  Duma  is  not  a  "  national  representa- 
tion," but  the  result  of  a  brutal  coup  d'etat. 
This  is  why  they  cannot,  from  the  political  and 
moral  point  of  view,  associate  themselves  with 
the  acts  of  a  Government  which  violated  its 
constitutional  promises  in  1907,  or  with  the 
declarations   of  a   Duma  created  as   a   result   of 


154  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

political  violence  committed  against  the  people  ; 
they  believe  they  have  no  right  to  take  the 
slightest  part  in  the  doings  of  the  present  Govern- 
ment, or  of  the  Duma,  which  is  the  instrument  of 
that  Government.  In  acting  thus  they  consider 
that  they  are  accomplishing  their  sacred  duty  to 
the  people. 

This  is  one  reason  why  the  Extreme  Left 
refused  to  take  part  in  the  voting  of  the  Duma. 
Another  reason  is  found  in  the  desire  of  the 
Labour  deputies  and  the  Social-Democrats  to 
remain  faithful  to  their  Socialist  principles,  and 
the  obligations  assumed  by  the  Socialist  Parties 
of  the  whole  world  at  the  international  Socialist 
Congresses,  which  advised  the  Socialist  repre- 
sentatives in  all  Parliaments  not  to  vote  for  mili- 
tary credits,  in  order  thus  to  express  their  per- 
petual protest  against  militarism  and  warfare. 
Can  we  reproach  the  Russian  Socialist  deputies 
because  they  honestly  obeyed  the  resolutions  of 
their  Congress,  and  have  observed  their  obliga- 
tions even  in  face  of  a  foreign  invasion  ?  All 
we  can  say  of  them  is  that  they  acted  like  honest 
men— perhaps  even  too  honest  if  we  compare  their 
attitude  with  the  miserable  conduct  of  their 
German  "  comrades,"  who  have  followed  the 
battle-car   of   their   Kaiser   like   docile   slaves. 


CHAPTER    III 

I.  The  action  of  the  Government.  The  administrative  measures 
taken  in  relation  to  the  war. — II.  Financial  measures  ;  the 
new  taxes  and  loans.  The  prohibition  of  the  sale  of 
alcohol. — III.  The  domestic  policy  of  Tsarism  during  the 
war. 

I 

War-TIME,  when  a  foreign  invasion  threatens  the 
country,  is  not  a  very  favourable  moment  for 
internal  reforms— above  all,  when  the  Government 
of  the  country  at  war  is  not,  as  a  rule,  disposed 
to  progressive  and  reformative  action.  However, 
even  from  the  measures  relating  to  the  immediate 
task  in  hand  in  time  of  war  one  can  always  form 
an  opinion  of  the  general  character  of  the  policy 
of  the  central  power. 

Immediately  war  was  declared  a  "  state  of 
war "  was  proclaimed  throughout  the  whole 
Empire,  and  the  power  was  transferred  from  the 
hands  of  the  civil  administration  to  the  hands  of 
the  military  governors.  But  this  measure  in 
reality  changed  little  or  nothing  in  the  life  of  the 
people,  for  even  in  times  of  peace  the  Russian 
citizen  lived  under  a  system  of  various  "  excep- 

155 


156  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

tional  regulations."  None  the  less,  as  we  shall 
presently  see,  the  proclamation  of  a  state  of  war 
was  followed  by  certain  fresh  restrictive  measures, 
in  many  cases  sensible  enough  in  view  of  those 
meagre  "  rights  of  man  "  which  already  existed 
in    Russia. 

But  before  speaking  of  the  negative  side  of 
the  domestic  policy  of  Tsarism  during  the  war 
I  must,  in  order  to  be  impartial,  draw  the  atten- 
tion of  my  readers  to  its  more  or  less  positive 
side. 

Any  Government,  in  any  war,  is  confronted 
with  two  principal  tasks  :  firstly,  it  must  place 
the  armed  forces  of  the  country  on  a  war  footing 
and  "  organize  victory  "  ;  in  the  second,  it  must 
organize  the  rearguard  of  the  army  and  ensure 
its  solidity. 

In  the  rearguard  of  the  Russian  Army  two 
points  were  especially  vulnerable— the  frontier 
regions  of  Poland  and  the  Transcaucasian  region, 
which  would  receive  the  first  blows  from  the 
enemy,  and  whose  fidelity  to  the  Russian  cause 
ought  as  promptly  as  possible  to  be  assured.  And 
here  Tsarism,  which  has  wasted  much  time  over 
useless  and  harmful  national  persecutions,  found 
it  necessary  to  renounce  altogether  its  old  policy, 
and  to  assume  the  attitude  of  a  "  liberator  "  of 
the  Poles  and  Armenians,  whose  sympathies 
appeared  so  precious  on  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
On  the  9th  of  August  the  Commander-in-Chief 


IN  THE  BLOODY  FRAY  157 

of  the  Russian  Army,  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas, 
pubhshed  his  famous  Proclamation  to  the 
Poles  : — 

"  Poles  I 

"  The  hour  has  sounded  when  the  sacred  dream 
of  your  fathers  and  your  grandfathers  may  be 
realized.  A  century  and  a  half  has  passed  since 
the  living  body  of  Poland  was  torn  in  pieces, 
but  the  soul  of  the  country  is  not  dead.  It  con- 
tinues to  live,  inspired  by  the  hope  that  there 
will  come  for  the  Polish  people  an  hour  of 
resurrection  and  of  fraternal  reconciliation  with 
Great  Russia.  The  Russian  Army  brings  you 
the  solemn  news  of  this  reconciliation,  which 
obliterates  the  frontiers  dividing  the  Polish 
peopleSj'^which  it  unites  conjointly  under  the 
sceptre  of  the  Russian  Tsar.  Under  this  sceptre 
Poland  will  be  born  again,  free  in  her  religion 
and  her  language  and  her  autonomy.  Russia 
only  expects  from  you  the  same  respect  for  the 
rights  of  those  nationalities  to  which  history  has 
bound  you. 

"  With  open  heart  and  brotherly  hand  Great 
Russia  advances  to  meet  you.  She  believes  that 
the  sword  with  which  she  struck  down  her 
enemies  at  Griinwald  is  not  yet  rusted.  From 
the  shores  of  the  Pacific  to  the  North  Sea  the 
Russian  armies  are  on  the  march.  The  dawn 
of  a  new  life  is  beginning  for  you,  and  in  this 


158  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

glorious  dawn  is  seen  the  sign  of  the  Cross,  the 
symbol  of  suffering  and  of  the  resurrection  of 
peoples." 

Six  weeks  later  (on  the  1 7th  of  September) 
the  Tsar  addressed  the  following  manifesto  to 
the  Armenians  : — 

"  Armenians  I 

"  In  one  sublime  impulse  all  the  peoples  of 
our  great  Russia,  from  east  to  west,  have  risen 
to  my  call.  Armenians,  after  five  centuries  of 
the  tyrannical  yoke  beneath  which  so  many  of 
your  blood  have  succumbed,  while  others  are  yet 
suffering  the  most  abominable  outrages,  the  hour 
of  liberty  has  at  last  sounded  for  you.  The 
Russian  people  recalls,  not  without  pride,  its 
illustrious  Armenian  children.  The  Lazarevs,  the 
Melikovs,!  and  others  besides,  have  fought  by 
the  side  of  their  Slav  brothers  for  the  glory  of 
their  country. 

"  Your  ancient  fidelity  is  to  me  a  pledge  that 
you  will  succeed,  in  these  solemn  days,  in  per- 
forming your  whole  duty  in  a  spirit  of  unshake- 
able  faith  in  the  final  success  of  our  armies  and 
our  just  cause. 

"  Armenians,  united  with  your  brothers  in  blood 
under  the  sceptre  of  the  Tsars,  you  will  at  last 
know   the  benefits  of  liberty  and   justice." 

'  Armenian  Generals  who  fought  in  the  Russo-Turkish  War 
of  1877-8. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  159 

Referring  to  these  proclamations,  many  sceptics 
have  spoken  of  an  "  august  demagogy,"  of  the 
insincerity  of  the  intentions  of  Tsarism,  etc.  But 
I  beheve  we  ought  to  accept  the  fact,  such  as 
it  is.  And  it  is  a  fact,  and  a  very  important 
fact,  that  the  danger  of  war  has  compelled 
Tsarism  to  make  before  the  whole  world  promises 
of  liberation  to  two  oppressed  peoples.  The  per- 
formance of  these  promises  will  depend  on  the 
efforts  of  the  Russian  democracy  and  the  demo- 
cracies of  the  allied  nations,  but  it  is  a  great 
moral  and  political  victory  that  the  Russian 
Government  should  have  made  a  solemn  admis- 
sion that  its  ancient  policy  of  oppression  was 
completely  erroneous — that  it  is  not  by  means  of 
the  knout,  but  of  a  liberal  policy,  that  the 
sympathies  of  nations  are  to  be  won.' 

^  As  for  the  reproach  of  "august  demagogy,"  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  German  Emperor  has  no  rivals  in  this  respect. 
Here  is  the  text  of  a  proclamation  addressed  by  William  II 
to  the  Poles  of  Russia  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  : — • 

"  Poles,  you  will  certainly  recollect  that  one  night  the  bells  of 
the  holy  convent  of  Swati  Gori  (The  Sacred  Hills)  began  to  ring 
although  no  human  hand  had  touched  the  bell  ropes.  All  pious 
persons  then  understood  that  a  great  event  had  come  to  pass, 
which  was  announced  by  this  very  miracle.  This  event  was  my 
decision  to  fight  against  Russia,  to  restore  to  Poland  all  her 
sacred  things,  and  to  unite  her  to  Germany,  the  most  cultured 
nation. 

"  I  have  dreamed  a  prodigious  dream.  I  saw  the  Holy  Virgin, 
who  commanded  me  to  save  her  holy  habitation,  which  was 
threatened  with  a  great  danger.  She  gazed  at  me  with  tears 
in  her  eyes,    and  I  have  accomplished  her  will.     May  this  be 


160  RUSSIA  AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Another  victory— this  time  not  moral  only,  but 
actual  —  concerns  the  relations  between  the 
Government  and  the  organs  of  local  self- 
government  and  private  societies.  In  order 
to  safeguard  the  rearguard  of  the  Army,  the 
Government  had  to  organize  assistance  for  the 
families  of  the  reservists,  by  inviting  the  muni- 
cipal organizations,  etc.,  to  take  part  in  the  work. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  assistance  of  these  organi- 
zations and  of  societies  and  associations  of  many 
kinds  was  necessary  to  the  work  of  evacuating 
sick  and  wounded  soldiers,  the  creation  of 
hospital  trains,  hospitals,  centres  of  supply,  etc. 
To  satisfy  all  these  urgent  and  complex  needs 
the  local  government  bodies  and  private  associ- 
ations required  a  complete  liberty  of  action.  But 
this  liberty  of  action  was  non-existent,  as  the 
actions  of  the  municipalities  and  zemstvos  were 
hampered  by  various  bureaucratic  regulations ; 
the  members  of  their  executive  organizations 
might  exercise  their  functions  only  after  receiving 
a  special  "  confirmation  "  from  the  Ministry, 
which  could  always  oppose  its  veto  to  the 
inclusion  of  this  or  that  person  ;  and  even  the 
persons    employed    by    the    municipalities    and 

done  by  your  agency,  O  Poles !  And  come  forth  to  meet  my 
soldiers  as  one  goes  to  meet  brothers  and  saviours  !  Poles  ! 
know  that  those  who  will  be  on  my  side  will  be  largely  rewarded. 
Those  who  set  themselves  against  me  will  perish.  God  and  the 
Holy  Virgin  are  with  me.  She  Herself  has  raised  the  sword  to 
aid  Poland." 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  161 

zemstvos  had  first  to  be  submitted  to  the 
approval  and  authorization  of  the  local  Gover- 
nor, who  could  dismiss  them  "  without  explana- 
tion of  motives."  All  these  regulations,  harmful 
enough  in  time  of  peace,  were  especially  intoler- 
able in  time  of  war,  when  the  work  of  public 
bodies  and  private  associations  had  to  be  quickly 
and  freely  organized.  The  Government,  there- 
fore, was  obliged  to  remove  these  restrictions— 
if  not  de  jure,  then  de  facto.  The  central 
authority  declared  that  all  public  and  private 
organizations  assisting  the  State  to  give  aid  to 
sick  and  wounded  soldiers  should  be  considered 
Governmental  institutions.  "  All  attempts  to 
hinder  in  any  way  whatsoever  the  labours  of 
these  public  and  private  organizations  may 
destroy.jJieir  keen  and  creative  spirit  and  initi- 
ative, and  merely  hamper  the  great  and  holy 
work,"  wrote  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  his 
circular  letter  to  the  Governors.  And  when  the 
municipalities  began  to  invite  the  services  of 
doctors  and  administrative  officials  for  their 
hospitals  and  hospital  trains,  together  with  female 
nurses  and  other  employees,  without  the  previous 
authorization  of  the  Governors,  neither  the  latter 
nor  the  Ministry  dared  to  protest.  And,  as  we 
shall  see  in  a  later  chapter,  thanks  to  the  with- 
drawal of  these  restrictions,  a  remarkable  task 
has  been  performed  by  Russian  society. 

After  a  while,  unhappily,  the  Government  once 

11 


162  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

more  began  to  limit  the  activities  of  the  social 
organizations ;  for  example,  it  dissolved  the 
"  Free  Society  for  Economic  Studies  "  of 
Petrograd,  which  had  done  much  to  alleviate 
the  misery  caused  by  the  v^ar.  It  was  closed 
by  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  who  found 
that  the  little  libraries  organized  by  the 
said  society  for  sick  and  wounded  soldiers 
contained  books  and  pamphlets  which,  although 
approved  by  the  Censor,  were  none  the  less 
"  too   Liberal  "   in  tendency. 

II 

Where  was  the  money  for  the  war  to  be  found  ? 
We  have  seen  that  the  financial  situation  of  the 
Russian  State  before  the  war  was  by  no  means 
brilliant.     The  war  could  only  make  it  still  more 
difficult.     "  The  war  which  broke  out  during  the 
latter   half   of   the   year— the   greatest   and   most 
difficult,  in  respect  of  the  mobilized  means  and 
forces,    of    all    the    wars    that    Russia    has    ever 
waged— calls  for  an  unprecedented  strain  on  the 
resources  of  the  State  Treasury,"  said  the  Minister 
of  Finances,  describing  the  situation  in  his  report 
on  the  Budget  Estimates  of  191  5.     At  the  same 
time  the  war  forced  the  Government  to  prohibit 
the   sale  of  alcohol,   thereby  depriving  it  of   its 
greatest  source  of  revenue. 

To  fill  the  enormous  deficiency  in  the  Budget 

and  to  cover  the  cost  of  the  war  the  Government 

took   the   following  measures  :— 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  163 

In  the  first  place,  it  sought  to  limit  the  ordi- 
nary expenditure  already  settled  by  the  Budget 
of  19 14.  This  limit  was  fixed  at  300  million 
roubles.  Then  it  issued  various  internal  and 
foreign  loans,  for  a  short  term  :  notably  the  loan 
of  July  23rd  (old  style)  which  amounted  to 
40  million  roubles  ;  the  loan  of  August  22nd,  of 
300  million  roubles  ;  the  loan  of  October  3rd, 
of  400  million  roubles  ;  the  loan  of  October  6th, 
of  400  million  roubles,  plus  114  millions  placed 
in  England  :  making  a  total  of  1,714  millions  in 
two  and  a  half  months.  To  this  sum  we  must 
add  500  millions  of  "floating  reserves"  and  a 
balance  of  180  millions  not  expended  by  the 
Ministers  of  War  and  the  Marine  (referring  to  the 
Budget  of  the  preceding  year),  and  we  have  a 
total  of  2,500  million  roubles,  placed  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  State  during  the  first  two  and  a  half 
months  of  the  war. 

As  for  the  monetary  circulation,  it  was,  accord- 
ing to  the  Minister  of  Finances,  in  no  immediate 
danger.  The  legislation  voted  by  the  Duma  on 
the  8th  of  August,  19 14,  enabled  the  State  Bank 
to  issue  notes  not  covered  by  the  metallic  funds 
to  the  amount  of  1,500  million  roubles.  The 
reserve  gold  at  the  moment  when  war  was 
declared  was  1,700  million  roubles,  and — so 
stated  the  Minister  of  Finances  in  the  Duma — the 
total  issue  of  the  Bank  was  thereby  more  than 
half    covered.       "  In    Germany,"    continued    the 


164  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR  'i 

1 

V 


Minister,  "  the  legal  metallic  guarantee  in  time 
of  peace  is  only  one-third.  Our  guarantee  is 
therefore  superior  even  in  time  of  war."  In 
saying  this  the  Russian  Minister  of  Finances 
doubtless  fell  into  an  exaggeration  ;  we  cannot 
deny  that  the  financial  and  monetary  system  of 
Germany  is  more  solid  than  that  of  Russia,  as 
this  solidity  is  not  guaranteed  merely  by  the 
"  floating  reserves  "  of  the  Treasury,  but  by  the 
entire  wealth  of  the   country. 

We  cannot  even  approximately  calculate  what 
the  war  will  cost  Russia.  The  specialists  do  not 
always  agree  in  their  solutions  of  this  problem. 
The  Petrograd  professor  M.  Friedmann  states 
that  the  war  is  costing  20  to  30  million  roubles 
per  diem,  or  600  to  8  00  million  roubles  per  month, 
and  that  in  six  months  Russia  would  spend  3,500 
to  5,000  million  roubles.  Another  Russian 
expert  calculates  the  mamtenance  of  the  Army, 
during  the  war,  to  cost  3  roubles  per  soldier 
per  diem.  For  an  army  of  7  million  men  this 
would  mean  21  million  roubles  per  diem,  or  630 
million  roubles  per  month.  In  his  report  on  the 
Budget  Estimates  for  191 5  the  Minister  of 
Finances  stated  that  "it  is  extremely  difficult  to 
form  an  opinion  as  to  the  general  extent  of  the 
extraordinary  expenditure  in  time  of  war,  as  one 
cannot  tell  how  long  the  war  will  last,  and  I 
do  not  consider  that  I  have  the  right  to  divulge 
any  approximate  calculations  of  the  necessary 
expenditure." 


;V 


IN   THE   BLOODY  FRAY  165 

But  one  thing  we  can  affirm  :  the  ordinary 
resources  of  the  Russian  Treasury  cannot  cover 
this  expenditure — above  all,  when  we  consider 
that  many  of  these  resources  are  diminished  by 
the  war,  which  has  checked  the  commercial  ex- 
change of  Russia  and  the  outer  world,  depriving 
the  State  of  its  customs,  revenues,  etc. 

To  cover  the  deficit  the  Government  has  taken 
the  measure  familiar  to  it  :  has  commenced  to 
increase  the  burden  of  taxation.  The  augmenta- 
tion of  the  direct  taxes  should  yield,  in  191  5,  a 
surplus  of  87  million  roubles  in  comparison  with 
previous  years  ;  the  augmentation  of  the  indirect 
taxes  (taxes  on  sugar,  matches,  petroleum, 
tobacco,  etc.)  should  yield  95  million  roubles; 
the  increased  railway  tariffs  are  expected  to  pro- 
vide 228  million  roubles  ;  and  so  on.  The  total 
increase  in  all  taxes,  etc.,  may  in  191  5  yield  a 
surplus  of  500  million  roubles  of  extra  revenue. 
But  as  the  mere  prohibition  of  the  sale  of  alcohol 
will  occasion  a  loss  of  650  million  roubles,  it 
will  be  understood  that  the  Government  has  to 
seek  fresh  sources  of  revenue.  If  Russia  had 
possessed  a  popular  and  democratic  Government, 
the  latter  might  no  doubt  have  found  the 
necessary  resources  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  ;  it  might,  for  instance,  have  confiscated  the 
useless  properties  and  funds  of  convents  and 
churches,  have  monopolized  the  mines  and  oil- 
wells,    and    established    a    progressive    and    pro- 


166  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

portional  tax  on  private  property,  etc.  But 
Tsarism,  the  friend  of  the  rich  and  the  privileged, 
is  not  willing  to  take  such  simple  measures  as 
these.  It  prefers  to  increase  the  indirect  taxes, 
which  are  taxes  on  poverty,  and  it  appeals  to 
the  allied  nations  for  money.  And  I  must  con- 
fess that  the  form  of  the  requests  which  Russia 
has  addressed  to  France  and  England  is  not 
always  precisely  .  .  .  correct.  For  example, 
the  two  well-known  Russian  economists  Profes- 
sors Migulin  and  Goldstein^  demonstrating  that 
it  was  the  duty  of  France  and  England  to  provide 
money  for  the  war,  employed  arguments  which 
might  almost  be  regarded  as  a  species  of  skilful 
blackmail.  "  Our  objects  in  this  war  do  not 
coincide  with  the  objects  of  our  Allies,"  argued 
one  of  these  professors  in  his  articles.  "  For 
France  and  England  the  principal  enemy  is 
Germany,  while  for  us  it  is  Austria.  After  the 
occupation  of  Galicia  we  can  confine  ourselves 
to  defensive  tactics,  while  for  our  Allies  it  is 
necessary  that  we  should  continue  an  offensive 
against  Germany.  But  an  offensive  war  costs 
far  more  than  a  defensive  war,  and  if  our  Allies 
wish  our  army  to  continue  the  offensive  war  they 
must  give  us  the  money  for  the  organization  of 
such  a  war." 

Such  arguments  as  these  I  find  extremely  dis- 
gusting ;  the  reader  might  suppose  that  the 
Russian  Army  is  a  horde  of  mercenaries  which 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  167 

will  fight  in  this  or  that  fashion,  according  to 
the  amount  of  money  which  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment may  receive  for  its  services.  Such  a  sup- 
position would  be  an  unthinkable  insult  to  the 
Russian  people,  and  no  Russian  democrat  would 
accept  responsibility  for  the  professors'  argu- 
ments. 

In  the  far  from  reassuring  picture  of  the 
financial  situation  of  Russia  during  the  war  there 
is  yet  one  bright  spot.  I  refer  to  the  prohibition 
of  the  sale  of  vodka. 

And  it  must  be  understood  that  the  initiative 
of  this  measure  came  from  the  people  itself.  E.or 
a  long  time  the  more  thoughtful  elements  of  the 
population  have  demanded  the  cessation  of  the 
sale  of  alcohol  by  the  State.  But  the  Government 
ignored  these  demands,  and  continued  to  draw 
hundreds  of  millions  of  roubles  from  the  intoxica- 
tion and  brutalization  of  the  masses  of  the  people, 
taking  no  notice  of  the  resolutions  forwarded  by 
the  municipalities  and  rural  communes  concern- 
ing the  abolition  of  the  vodka  trafific.  The  only 
means  of  action  remaining  to  those  who  strove 
to  combat  alcoholism  was  a  moral  propaganda. 
And  in  this  connection  we  have  of  late  years 
witnessed  an  interesting  phenomenon :  in  the 
various  Russian  cities  "  abstainers'  clubs  "  have 
been  formed,  managed  by  bratzy,  or  "  little 
brothers,"  whose  members  give  a  solemn  promise 
to    abstain    from    the    consmnption   of    alcoholic 


168  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

drinks.  "  This  movement  had  a  slightly  mystical 
or  sectarian  character,"  writes  a  Russian  pub- 
licist.' And  for  some  years  the  moral  impulse 
of  this  propaganda  has  opposed  itself  to  the  policy 
of  popular  alcoholization  practised  by  Tsarism 
for  many  years  past.  The  criticism  of  the 
Democratic  press,  the  protests  of  labour  organi- 
zations, medical  societies,  etc.,  have  finally  over- 
come the  resistance  of  the  Government,  and  on 
the  3  I  St  of  J  anuary,  1 9 1 4,  a  rescript  of  the  Tsar 
was  published  which  ordered  local  administrators 
to  take  into  consideration  the  will  of  the  people 
as  expressed  in  the  resolutions  concerning  the 
suppression  of  the  vodka  traffic,  and  to  close  the 
vodka  shops  where  the  population  so  demanded. 
After  the  publication  of  this  Imperial  rescript 
a  wave  of  anti -alcoholic  propaganda  swept 
through  all  Russia.  Between  February  and  July 
of  1 9 1 4  one-tenth  of  the  total  number  of  vodka- 
shops  maintained  by  the  State  were  closed  by 
the  wish  of  the  local  population.  In  certain 
districts  the  movement  was  remarkable  in  its 
dimensions ;  in  the  Government  of  Riazan  no 
less  than  309  vodka-shops  out  of  a  total  of  391 
were  closed,  or  79  per  cent. 

On  the  I  7th  and  1 8th  of  J  uly  (old  style),  when 
the  Russian  Army  was  being  mobilized,  the  sale 
of  alcoholic  drinks  was  discontinued  over  practi- 

'  A  Borissov,    in   the   review   Rousskiya    Zapiski^    Petrograd, 
November,  19 14. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  169 

cally  the  entire  territory  of  the  Empire.  But 
this  was  only  a  temporary  measure,  and  the 
Government  had  the  intention  of  recommencing 
its  disastrous  trade  after  a  brief  period  of  delay. 
However,  the  people,  seizing  a  favourable 
moment  and  pretext,  expressed  its  desire  to 
see  the  sale  of  vodka  completely  discontinued. 
Labour  associations,  municipalities,  zemstvos, 
rural  communes,  and  co-operative  societies  de- 
manded that  the  sale  of  alcohol  should  be  pro- 
hibited "  for  the  whole  duration  of  the  war,  and 
if   possible   for   ever." 

The  Government  was  once  more  forced  to  give 
way  before  the  popular  pressure.  On  the  1 6th 
of  August  the  Russian  journals  published  an 
official  communication  according  to  which  the 
Enxperor  "  indicated  to  the  Minister  of  Finances 
that  the  existing  situation  demanded  a  change 
in  the  point  of  view  concerning  the  means  tending 
to  the  diminution  of  alcoholism,  and  that  in  place 
of  palliatives  the  question  of  more  decisive 
measures  must  be  confronted — notably  the  ques- 
tion of  a  reconstruction  of  the  whole  Budget  on 
the  basis  of  a  gradual  elimination  therefrom 
of  the  enormous  revenues  derived  from  the 
monopoly  of  alcohol." 

The  Ministry  of  Finances  conducted  an  inquiry 
into  the  results  of  the  temporary  suppression  of 
the  sale  of  alcohol.  In  Moscow,  according  to 
the    data    of    the    examining    magistrates,    "  the 


170  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

number  of  crimes  and  misdemeanours  in  common 
law  for  the  period  included  between  the  17th 
of  July  and  the  13th  of  August  had  diminished 
by  47  per  cent,  compared  with  the  normal."  In 
the  city  of  Simbirsk  "  the  criminality  diminished 
by  one-half ;  in  Orel  by  80  per  cent.  ;  in  Odessa 
by  75  per  cent.  ;  and  in  Kostroma  by  95  per 
cent." 

Industrial  employers  stated  that  "  the  suppres- 
sion of  wine-shops  has  increased  the  productivity 
of  labour."  This  fact  is  verified  by  one  of  the 
contributors  to  the  Journal  des  Debuts.  "  In  the 
Russian  factories  and  foundries,"  he  writes,  "  the 
returns  of  labour  very  sensibly  increased  [after 
the  suppression  of  the  sale  of  alcohol].  In  this 
respect  figures  are  cited  which  we  have  not  the 
courage  to  reproduce,  so  great  is  the  difference 
between  the  two  sets  of  figures.  But  in  a  coal- 
mine with  which  we  are  well  acquainted  the 
verified  increase  in  the  yield  is  fifteen  per  cent. 
The  figures  for  Monday's  work,  which  used  to 
be  bad  in  the  extreme,  are  now  normal." 

In  spite  of  all  these  facts  the  superior  financial 
bureaucrats  were  ill -pleased  by  the  suppression 
of  the  drink  traffic,  which  had  yielded  them  ample 
revenues.  A  member  of  the  Einance  Committee, 
M.  Migulin,  asserted  in  his  articles  that  "  the 
absolute  suppression  of  the  sale  of  alcoholic 
drinks  will  probably  not  be  successful  if  it  is 
long  persisted  in,"  etc.     But  the  people  continued 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  171 

its  protests  against  alcoholism.  The  jury  of  one 
of  the  provincial  Courts  of  Assizes  inserted  in 
one  of  its  verdicts  the  declaration  that  alcoholism 
is  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  crime.  "  Drink- 
ing," it  said,  "  is  worse  than  the  present  war. 
The  devastation  of  war  can  be  repaired,  but 
nothing  can  be  expected  of  alcoholism  save  a 
general   peril." 

On  the  22nd  of  August  an  ordinance  of  the 
Tsar  was  published  relating  to  the  suppression 
of  the  sale  of  alcohol  and  alcoholic  drinks  "  until 
the  end  of  the  war."  A  month  later — on  the  28th 
of  September — at  a  meeting  of  the  "  Union  of 
Christian  Abstainers  of  Russia  "  a  telegram  from 
the  Tsar  to  the  president  of  the  Union  was 
read  in  which  Nicholas  II  made  the  declara- 
tiom.  "  I  have  already  decided  to  suppress 
for  ever  the  sale  of  vodka  by  the  State  in 
Russia." 

A  few  groups  of  manufacturers — distillers,  wine- 
merchants,  etc.— attempted  to  protest  against  the 
suppression  of  the  drink  traffic.  But  the  press 
put  them  in  their  place.  "  No  compromises,  no 
half -measures.  .  .  .  The  ruin  of  whole  branches 
of  industry  ?  So  be  it  !  What  else  can  be  done  ? 
Ought  we  to  poison  the  people  in  order  to  benefit 
the  revenues  of  3,000  distillers  of  vodka  and  a 
few  thousand  owners  of  vineyards  and  breweries  ? 
Can  we  compare  the  losses  of  the  distillers, 
owners    of    vineyards,    and    breweries,    with    the 


172  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT   WAR 

great  and  net  profit  which  will  accrue  to  Russia 
from   her  complete   sobriety?  "^ 

Drawing  up  the  general  profit  and  loss  account 
of  the  abolition  movement,  a  Russian  publicist 
wrote   as   follows  :— 

"  One  of  the  melancholy  peculiarities  of 
Russian  life  consists  of  the  extreme  contrast 
between  the  interests  and  opinions  of  the 
laborious  population  on  the  one  hand  and  those 
of  the  ruling  classes  on  the  other.  .  .  .  And 
here,  suddenly,  instead  of  contrasts  we  see  an 
unlooked-for  harmony.  In  their  opinions  con- 
cerning alcoholism,  in  their  aspirations  towards 
the  purifying  of  their  daily  existence  of  bruta- 
lizing drunkenness,  the  masses  of  the  labouring 
people  are  at  one  with  the  obvious  and  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  propertied  classes. 
And  this  agreement  gives  birth  to  an  imposing 
power.  .  .  .  The  forces  of  the  Government 
appear  to  form  a  solidarity  with  the  forces  of 
society  and  of  the  people  ...  it  would  seem 
that  there  is  no  room  for  doubt  .  .  .  this  time 
the  war  against  alcoholism  must  be  victorious."  - 

"  Unhappily,"  adds  the  same  writer,  "  the 
Government  programme  includes  no  creative 
measures."  To  consummate  the  renascence  of 
the  life  and  energies  of  the   Russian  people,   it 

'  In  the  review  Gorodskoie  Dielo  ("  Municipal  Work  "), 
Petrograd,  1914,  No.  18. 

'  A.  Borissov,  in  the  article  already  cited. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  173 

is  not  enough  to  forbid  the  consumption  of 
vodka ;  to  accomphsh  this  the  whole  system 
of  the  State  must  be  reformed,  and  all  the 
conditions   of  popular  existence. 

Ill 

Having  granted  certain  concessions  to  society, 
having  abolished  the  drink  traffic,  which  had  so 
long  poisoned  the  body  and  soul  of  the  people, 
Tsarism  doubtless  believed  that  all  its  political 
and  moral  obligations  were  fulfilled.  It  even 
began  to  reward  itself  for  making  these  con- 
cessions by  reinforcing  the  restrictive  measures 
affecting  other  domains  of  the  life  of  its  sub- 
jects. 

Ijnmediately  after  war  was  declared  the 
Government  suppressed  the  entire  opposition 
press — even  the  very  moderate  section  thereof. 
For  instance,  the  journal  Retch,  the  organ  of 
moderate  Liberalism,  was  suppressed,  and  its 
editors  were  compelled  to  humiliate  themselves 
by  a  "  repentance  "  and  a  promise  to  obey  the 
Government,  in  order  to  redeem  the  right  to 
publish  their  journal.  All  the  Labour  journals, 
and  the  majority  of  the  "  alien "  journals 
(Ukrainian,  Lettish,  etc.)  were  suppressed. 
Many  labour  associations,  trades  unions,  work- 
ing-men's clubs,  and  other  societies  were 
broken  up.  Searches  were  made  in  the  houses 
of  persons  who  were  "  suspect  "   (not  as  spies, 


174  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GKEAT   WAR 

but  on  account  of  their  political  convictions), 
while  numerous  arrests  and  deportations  com- 
pleted the  picture. 

The  Russian  Government  was  not  willing  to 
follow  the  good  example  afforded  by  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  other  belligerent  countries,  all  of 
which  proclaimed  an  amnesty  for  political 
offenders.  While  inviting  the  citizens  to  for- 
get the  "  intestine  discords  "  of  the  country,  the 
Russian  Government  itself  forgot  nothing,  but 
left  the  prisons  and  penal  establishments  full  of 
prisoners  at  the  very  moment  when  the  brothers 
of  those  prisoners  were  marching  to  the  front  to 
die  for  their  country.  If  the  moral  of  the  army 
is  to  be  strong  and  healthy,  the  moral  of  the 
whole  people  should  be  so.  But  by  continuing  its 
political  persecutions  the  Russian  Government, 
instead  of  facilitating  the  heavy  task  of  the  Army, 
rendered  it  more  difffcult. 

The  story  of  the  arrest  of  M,  Bourtzev,  the 
famous  writer  on  provocation,  shows  us  how 
destitute  is  the  Russian  Government  of  elemen- 
tary tact.  Bourtzev,  after  the  declaration  of 
war  and  the  pubhcation  of  the  proclamation  to 
the  Poles,  believed  in  the  "  liberalism  "  of  the 
Government,  and  began  to  preach  to  the  revolu- 
tionaries and  political  emigres  the  necessity  of 
a  reconciliation  with  Tsarism.  To  prove  the 
sincerity  of  his  ideas  and  his  confidence  in  the 
Government,  he  left  the  foreign  country  in  which 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  175 

he  had  for  some  years  been  living  as  a  political 
refugee,  and  went  to  Russia^  hoping  to  be  of 
use  to  his  country  during  the  difficult  period  of 
the  war.  Directly  he  reached  the  Russian  frontier 
Bourtzev  was  arrested  and  thrown  into  prison, 
and  after  some  months'  confinement  he  was  tried 
and  condemned  to  deportation  for  life  to  Siberia 
for  the  crime  of  lese-majeste — that  is,  for  writing 
a  few  articles  in  which  he  expressed  his  opinion 
of   the   Tsar   with   insufficient   respect. 

A  still  more  painful  impression  was  produced 
upon  the  entire  Russian  democracy  by  the  arrest 
of    five    working-men    deputies    of    the    Social - 
Democratic   Party.      The   pretext   given   for  this 
arrest  was  that  the  police  had  discovered  in  the 
rooms  of  one  of  these  deputies  the  manuscript 
of  a  proposed  resolution  concerning  the  revolu- 
tionary propaganda  in  the  Army.   But  this  pretext 
was   completely   futile,   for   the   mere   possession 
by  a  deputy  of  a  proposed  resolution,  which  might 
have  been  sent  to  him  by  goodness  knows  whom, 
cannot  in  general  be  regarded  as  a  crime  ;    and 
in  this  particular  case  this  anti-militarist  docu- 
ment was  sent  to  the  deputies  from  across   the 
frontier,  by  a  small,  irresponsible  group  of  men 
who  did  not  represent  any  party  organization,  and 
who   had    distributed   this   manuscript   resolution 
among  the  Russian  Socialist  emigres  long  before 
the  arrest  of  the  deputies.     Moreover,  the  tenor 
of    the    document,    whose    irresponsible    authors 


176  RUSSIA   AND   THE  GREAT   WAR 

spoke  of  the  necessity  of  transferring  the  revo- 
lutionary propaganda  to  the  field  of  battle,  was 
so  inoffensive  in  its  complete  stupidity  that  every- 
body readily  realized  that  no  serious  politician 
could  possibly  have  taken  it  seriously. 

The  absurdity  of  the  arrest  of  these  five  depu- 
ties was  so  obvious  tha.t  it  gave  rise  to  discontent 
even  among  the  Octobrists,  who  justly  reproached 
the  Government  with  disturbing,  by  its  own 
actions,  the  "  national  imion  "  to  which  it  was 
summoning  the  people.  At  first  the  Government 
wished  to  hand  the  five  deputies  to  the  military 
authorities  and  to  cause  them  to  be  tried  by  court 
martial  (for  high  treason,  etc.),  but  the  President 
of  the  Duma,  according  to  the  journal  Nache 
Slovo,^  was  able  to  prevent  this  act  of  stupidity. 

None  the  less  the  deputies  remain  in  prison, 
and  will  be  cited  before  the  ordinary  courts, 
which  will  no  doubt  condemn  them,  although  they 
are    "  guilty  "   of   nothing. 2 

I    need    not    here    enumerate    other    arbitrary 

'  A  Russian  daily  published  in  Paris,  No.  3,  1915. 

=  After  these  lines  were  written  the  news  came  from  Russia 
that  the  five  deputies  were  condemned  to  deportation  to  Siberia. 
And  why?  Not  on  account  of  "treason,"  of  which  the  Public 
Prosecutor  accused  them,  but  because  they  were  members  of  the 
Social-Democratic  Party.  Here  is  a  proof  of  the  absurdity  of 
the  present  political  system  of  Russia.  The  Social-Democratic 
group  in  the  Duma  is  lawful,  but  the  party  to  which  it  belongs 
is  illegal !  Social- Democratic  deputies  cannot  be  arrested  and 
deported  as  such,  but  they  may  be  deported  as  members  of  an 
illegal  party  ! 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  177 

actions  on  the  part  of  the  Government  which 
have  been  committed  since  the  declaration  of  war. 
One  such  action  is  like  another  ;  there  is  nothing 
new  about  them.  But  I  should  like  to  draw 
my  readers'  attention  to  one  particular  circum- 
stance. The  Russian  journal  Golos  ('  The 
Voice  "),  published  in  Paris,  stated,  in  its  Petro- 
grad  letter,  that  there  was  a  moment  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  when  Tsarism  was  ready  to  make 
great  concessions  in  its  domestic  policy.  This 
was  the  moment  when  Germany  had  already 
declared  war  upon  Russia,  but  when  the  final 
decision  of  England  was  not  yet  known.  The 
Russian  Government  was  afraid  to  face  Germany 
alone,  and  was  conscious  of  its  weakness  ;  it 
was  anxious  to  win  the  sympathies  of  its  people. 
With  this  object  in  view  it  was  actually  on  the 
-p©int  of  issuing  a  constitutional  manifesto  more 
comprehensive  than  that  of  October  30th, 
1905,  but  at  the  very  last  moment  it  received 
the  assurance  that  England  would  join  in  the  war, 
and,  its  external  situation  being  strengthened, 
Tsarism  no  longer  thought  it  necessary  to  make 
concessions  to  the  people,  and  the  manifesto  was 
not  issued. 

It  is  the  greatest  pity  that  the  French  and 
English  Governments  have  not  brought  pressure 
to  bear  upon  the  Russian  Government,  with  a 
view    to    compelling    it    to    cease    its    reactionary 

policy.    Such  pressure  would  be  justified,  not  only 

12 


178  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

from  the  humanitarian  point  of  view,  but  also 
from  the  point  of  view  of  our  Allies'  own  in- 
terests ;  for  all  that  weakens  the  Russian  people 
during  the  war  also  weakens  our  Allies. 


CHAPTER    IV 

I.  The  nationalist  problem  and  the  war.  The  various  nationalities 
of  the  Russian  Empire  before  the  international  war. — II.  The 
Polish  problem.  Why  have  the  Russian  Poles  become 
Russophiles  ?  —  III.  The  Armenian  problem. — IV.  The 
Ukraine. — V.  Finland. — VI.  The  position  of  the  Jews. 
Their  conflict  with  the  Poles. — VII.  The  nationalist  problem 
in  the  Baltic  Provinces. 


I 


More    than   twenty   different   nations   and   races 
inhabit  the  territory  of  the  Russian  Empire.     The 
complexity   of    the   national    composition    of    the 
Russian   populace   gives   rise  to   serious   difficul- 
ties, even  in  time  of  peace.      In  times  of  inter- 
national tension,  and  especially  in  time  of  war, 
it  is  a  hundred  times  more  embarrassing.     This 
fact  was   officially  stated  by  the   ex-Minister  of 
War,  General  Kuropatkin,  who  wrote  in  his  con- 
fidential report  for   1900  that  "  the  extension  of 
the  frontiers  of  Russia  in  all  directions  has  led 
Russia  to  occupy  territories  inhabited  by  various 
foreign    and   hostile    nationalities.       To-day   the 
frontiers  of  the  inner  Russia  are  surroimded  by 
populations    which    are    only    distantly    allied   to 

179 


180  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

the  Russian  people ;  and  in  this  sense  the 
frontiers  of  Russia  were  in  1900  less  advan- 
tageous from  a  military  point  of  view  than  they 
were  in   i  700."  ' 

The  political  blindness  of  Tsarism  and  its 
Governmental  incapacity  still  further  complicated 
the  dangerous  situation  in  the  frontier  districts, 
whose  populations,  oppressed  by  the  Russian 
reaction,  manifested  a  great  and  well-justified 
discontent. 

Yet  although  the  General  Staffs  of  Germany 
and  Austria  counted  on  this  discontent  as  a 
support  to  their  strategical  operations,  they  were 
completely  disappointed  and  disillusioned.  The 
great  majority  of  the  "  alien  "  populations  of 
Russia  remained  faithful  to  her,  and  their  loyalty 
was  so  great  and  so  sincere  that  the  Russian 
Government  itself  must  have  been  astonished 
thereby. 

II 

In  the  Duma,  during  the  session  of  the  8th 
of  August  19 1 4,  the  leaders  of  the  various 
national  groups,  one  by  one,  ascended  the  tribune 
to  proclaim  their  fidelity  to  Russia. 

Among  all  these  henceforth  historical  declara- 
tions that  which  produced  the  greatest  impression 
was  that  of  the  Polish  kolo  (circle),  in  whose 
name  the  deputy  Yaronski  declared  : — 

^  Cited  from  my  "Modern  Russia,"  second  edition,  p.  214. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  181 

"  At  this  historic  moment,  when  Slavism  and 
the  Germanic  world,  led  by  our  ancient  enemy, 
Prussia,  meet  in  a  fatal  shock,  the  situation  of 
the  Polish  people,  deprived  of  its  independence 
and  the  possibility  of  freely  manifesting  its  will, 
appears  a  tragic  one.  This  tragedy  resides,  not 
only  in  the  fact  that  our  country  is  the  theatre 
of  the  war  and  all  its  horrors,  but  also  in  this  : 
that  the  Polish  people,  torn  into  three  parts,  will 
see  its  sons  in  each  of  the  hostile  camps. 

"  Although  territorially  divided,  we  must,  with 
our  Slav  sentiments  and  sympathies,  form  a 
single  whole.  This  policy  is  not  only  dictated 
by  the  justice  of  the  cause  in  which  Russia  has 
intervened,  but  also  by  our  political  reason.  The 
world-wide  importance  of  the  events  through 
which  we  are  passing  should  relegate  to  the 
second  place  all  domestic  matters. 

"  Please  God,  Slavism,  under  the  supremacy 
of  Russia,  will  deal  the  Teutons  such  a  blow 
as  was  dealt  them  at  Griinwalden  five  hundred 
years  ago  by  Poland  and  Lithuania.  May  the 
blood  we  shall  spill  and  the  horrors  of  a  war 
which  for  us  is  fratricidal  lead  to  the  reunion 
of  the  three  portions  of  the  sundered  Polish 
people." 

In  connection  with  this  declaration  of  the 
Polish  representatives  in  the  Duma,  we  must  in 
the  first  place  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that  it  was 
made    when    the    proclamation    of    the    Russian 


182  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

generalissimo  had  not  yet  been  issued.  Secondly, 
we  must  note  that  the  ideas  expressed  in  the 
declaration  of  the  Polish  deputies  are  shared  by 
the  majority  of  the  nobles  and  the  bourgeoisie,  and 
a  great  part  of  the  peasantry  of  Russian  Poland. 
It  was  not  merely  an  expression  of  the  opinion 
of  politicians  and  parliamentarians,  but  the  true 
sentiment  of  the  propertied  classes  of  Poland. 
This  "  Russo-Polish  "  patriotism  and  this  hatred 
of  the  Germans  manifest  themselves  in  the  most 
unexpected  ways.  The  Polish  public,  in  the 
theatres  of  Warsaw,  demanded  the  performance 
of  the  Russian  National  Anthem  by  the  orchestra, 
and  the  Polish  ladies  offered  flowers  to  the 
Russian  soldiers  leaving  Warsaw  for  the  front. 
It  is  said  that  the  greatest  of  Polish  writers, 
Sienkievicz,  expressed  his  feelings  concerning  the 
present  war  in  a  distinctly  "  Russophile  " 
manner ;  and  the  best  known  of  the  Polish 
poets,  modem,  M.  Micinski,  went  to  Moscow 
especially  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  a  Russo- 
Polish  propaganda  in  that  city. 

Russian  society  was  amazed  by  all  these  facts, 
and  one  of  the  leading  Russian  poets,  M .  Brusov, 
expressed  the  feelings  which  arose  within  him 
at  the  sight  of  this  astonishing  spectacle  in  a 
little  poem  entitled  "  Warsaw  "  :— 

For  the  first  time  I  solitary  tread, 

Joyful  of  heart,  the  streets  of  Warsaw  town  ; 

The  bloody  dream,  the  dreadful  fame,  are  dead  : 
The  fatal  years  no  longer  weigh  me  down. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  183 

They  were  !     But  no  ! — they  have  not  passed  away  : 
The  centuries'  work  one  moment  may  not  mine. 

And  yet,  may  be,  the  work  begins  to-day  : 
To-day  the  sun  in  heaven  is  for  a  sign. 

Oh,  may  it  shine  indeed  to  mark  this  day 

Whereon  our  voices  found  a  brother's  speech  ; 

All  that  till  now  our  tongues  refused  to  say, 
All  that  we  cherished  dumbly  out  of  reach. 

Not  on  a  strait  and  narrow  path  we  meet 

As  poet  meeting  poet ;  I  have  come 
Down  the  broad  highway  on  these  Russian  feet, 

And  as  a  Russian  I  was  welcomed  home ! 

And  in  the  streets  the  shouts  about  me  ring 

Like  verses  of  a  poem  chiming  true. 
And  Polish  women  autumn's  blossoms  bring 

To  Russia's  joyous  warriors  marching  through  ! 

Another    well-known    Russian    poet,    M.    Bal- 
"mont,  has  written,  on  the  same  subject,  a  poem 
entitled  "  The  Carnival  of  Blood  "  :— 

Soil  of  Russia,  soil  of  Poland, 

Land  of  Poland,  land  of  Russia  ! 

I  behold  you,  visions  so  familiar ! 

Yonder  blows  the  wind  and  drives  the  snow  ! 

O  forests,  marshes,  meadows,  plains  ! 

The  storm  whistles;  the  rumbling  of  falling  grenades, 

The  shrill  of  the  shrapnel,  the  rumble  and  clamour 

Roaring  death's  carnival  song,  prolonging  his  hour  ! 

Oh,  how  long  is  his  hour !     What  a  world  of  blood 

Destiny  yet  has  to  drink,  ere  at  length 

The  goblet  of  ruddy  wine  is  drained  to  the  lees  ! 

Yet  not  for  ever  shall  her  brows  be  knit : 

One  day  a  Spring  undreamed  of  shall  come  to  us, 

Russia  with  Poland  ;  oh,  holy,  virgin  lands  ! 


184  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

But,  to  tell  the  truth,  what  appeared  to  poets 
remote  from  political  life  as  a  "  day  of  be- 
ginning "  and  "an  undreamed-of  spring"  was 
really  no  more  than  a  day  of  reckoning,  of 
drawing  up  a  historical  balance-sheet,  and  those 
who  have  attentively  analysed  the  economic  and 
social  evolution  of  Russian  Poland  will  not  be 
surprised  by  all  these  phenomena.  The  process 
of  capitalistic  development  has  united  Poland  to 
Russia  by  the  indestructible  bonds  of  commercial 
exchange.  The  annual  produce  of  the  factories 
and  workshops  of  Poland  represents  a  value  of 
I, coo  million  roubles,  and  two-thirds  of  this  is 
consumed  by  the  Russian  market.  And  in  spite 
of  all  the  errors  and  horrors  of  the  policy  of 
reactionary  Tsarism,  the  forces  of  economic 
evolution  have  cleared  the  ground  for  a  new 
ideology,  as  far  as  the  propertied  classes  in 
Poland  are  concerned.  This  new  ideology 
manifests  itself  to-day  in  this  "  Russo-Polish  " 
patriotism,  which  at  times  perhaps  seems  even 
too  Russophile  and  too  enthusiastic. 

As  for  the  poorer  classes  of  Polish  society, 
as  for  the  proletariat,  the  political  tendencies  of 
this,  the  most  revolutionary  element  of  modern 
Poland,  are  of  another  kind.  For  a  long 
time  now  the  more  thoughtful  of  the  Polish 
workers  have  abandoned  the  idea  of  a  Polish 
war  of  independence,  and  have  dreamed  rather 
of  a  conflict  of  classes.     There  is  only  one  very 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  185 

small  group  of  Polish  Socialists  which  holds  a 
different  opinion  ;  this  group,  even  before  the 
war,  vas  conducting  a  propaganda  inciting  to 
a  national  insurrection  of  the  Poles  against 
Russia.  But  this  propaganda  had  no  success 
among  the  populace— firstly,  because  its  Utopian 
character  was  too  obvious,  and  secondly,  because 
the  propaganda  was  supported  by  the  Austrian 
Government.  Here  is  the  proof  of  the  latter 
assertion. 

In  the  month  of  October  19 12  the  committee 
at  the  head  of  this  little  group  of  Socialists  pub- 
lished, in  Warsaw,  a  secret  proclamation,  in 
which  the  possibility  of  a  coming  war  between 
Austria  and  Russia  was  referred  to,  and  which 
offered  advice  to  all  Polish  patriots  in  Russia  to 
be  followed  in  the  event  of  war.  This  advice 
was  as  follows  : — 

1 .  In  the  event  of  the  mobilization  of  the 
Russian  Army,  "  the  appeal  to  the  citizens 
[relative  to  the  mobilization^  will  be  distri- 
buted as  generally  as  possible. 

2.  "As  to  all  those  comrades  who  have 
suffered  the  misfortune  of  being  mobilized,  or 
who  are  incorporated  in  the  Russian  Army,  we 
recommend  them  above  all  to  conduct  a  propa- 
ganda in  favour  of  revolutionary  ideas  among 
the  troops.  We  do  not  recommend  them  to 
provoke  a  revolt,  because  under  these  circum- 
stances   the    revolt    would    be    useless.       Should 


186  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

war  break  out,  no  matter  with  whom,  we  advise 
you  to  injure  Russia  by  all  possible  means.  For 
instance,  all  kinds  of  weapons  of  war,  instru- 
ments, means  of  transport,  munitions  of  war, 
telegraphs,  telephones,  etc.,  must  be  destroyed. 
Fulfil  your  duty  as  a  soldier  deliberately  and 
at  your  ease,  so  that  you  may  at  length  desert 
and  allow  yourself  to  be  taken  prisoner,  so  that 
you  may  give  the  enemy's  army  full  information 
concerning  the  Russian  Army."  ' 

When  I  tell  you  that  the  "  Socialist  "  Com- 
mittee which  gave  such  advice  to  the  Polish 
"  patriots  "  in  Russia  performed  its  functions 
under  the  benevolent  protection  of  the  Austrian 
Government,  and  that  the  armed  "  legions  " 
which  it  organized  were  organized  with  the 
authorization  of  the  Austrian  police,  you  will 
understand  that  we  are  dealing,  not  with  Polish 
socialism,  but  simply  with  the  interests  of  the 
Hapsburg  dynasty,  which  were  mistaken  for  the 
interests  of  "  Polish  independence "  by  a  few 
naive  individuals  who  dreamed  of  the  liberty  of 
Poland,  but  could  not  realize  that  dream  by  their 
own  action,  and  therefore  decided  to  become  the 
tools  of  the  Austrian  policy. 

But  this  "  Austrian  orientation "  of  Polish 
patriotism  did  not  enjoy  any  success  among  the 

^  See  the  circular  of  the  Polish  Socialist  Party  published  in 
Warsaw  in  October  191 2.  Quoted  from  the  Bidleiifi periodique 
du  Bureau  Socialiste  International,  third  year,  No.  9,  pp.  18-19. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  187 

masses  of  the  people  in  Russian  Poland.  The 
great  majority  of  the  Polish  working-men 
Socialists  understood  that  such  a  propaganda, 
which  really  favoured  the  organization  of  a 
"  patriotic  "  military  espionage  in  the  Russian 
Army  for  the  benefit  of  the  Austrian  Army,  had 
nothing  in  common  with  the  aims  and  strivings 
of  the  Socialists.  To  the  appeal  of  the  Austro- 
Polish  patriots  the  most  influential  labour 
organizations  of  Russian  Poland — those  of  the 
Polish  Social-Democratic  Party  and  the  Jewish 
Bund— replied  that  they  did  not  accept  the  idea 
of  an  "  Austrian  orientation  "  and  that  "  the 
"  proletariat  of  Poland  conformed,  in  its 
revolutionary  policy,  with  that  of  the  Russian 
proletariat."  ' 

I  happened  to  obtain  an  interview  with  a  well- 
known  Polish  Socialist  who  remained  in  Poland 
during  the  first  months  of  the  war.  He  described 
the  mood  of  the  Polish  working-classes  in  the 
following  terms  :  "  When  the  workers  in  Poland 
hear  rumours  of  a  labour  movement  in  Petro- 
grad  or  elsewhere  in  Russia  they  are  greatly 
interested— as  much  so  as  if  had  been  in  Poland 
—while  if  they  are  told  anything  about  the  Polish 

^  See  the  declarations  of  the  "  Labour  Council "  of  Warsaw 
and  of  the  Central  Committees  of  the  four  principal  Socialist 
organizations  in  Poland  published  since  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
Cited  from  the  Russian  edition  of  the  Bulletin  of  the  Bund, 
January  191 5,  No.  7,  p.  11. 


188  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

workers  in  Cracow  they  remain  almost  indifferent." 
This  is  a  manifestation  of  the  results  of  that 
historic  process  which  has  welded  Russia  and 
Poland  into  one  economic  organism  and  has 
created  a  solid  basis  for  the  community  of 
interests  of  the  Polish  and  Russian  proletariats. 
And  by  one  of  the  ironies  of  history  the  very 
Socialist  labour  movement  which  was  always  so 
persecuted  by  Tsarism  is  at  present,  objectively 
speaking,  playing  a  part  which  is  extremely  use- 
ful in  preserving  the  integrity  and  unity  of  the 
Russian  State. 

Naturally,  the  revolutionary  proletariat  of 
Poland,  as  well  as  that  of  Russia,  does  not  wish 
to  preserve  the  Russian  State  in  its  present  form, 
with  an  autocracy,  a  system  of  government  by 
police,  etc.  It  desires  to  transform  it  into  a 
democratic  State,  but  by  means  of  its  own 
efforts,  and  not  by  the  help  of  the  German 
and  Austrian  monarchies.  Not  with  Austria  and 
Germany  against  Russia,  but  with  the  Russian 
people  against  the  Russian  reaction— such  is  the 
creed  of  the  best  and  most  thoughtful  elements 
of  the  popular  masses  in  Poland. 

Ill 

If  we  now  turn  our  attention  from  Poland  to 
the  Caucasus — or  rather  to  the  Trans-Causasian 
region— we   shall  there   find  a   political   situation 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  189 

analogous  in  many  ways  txD  that  existing  in 
Poland.  In  the  Trans -Caucasian  country  there 
is  a  people  as  unfortunate  as  the  Polish,  or 
perhaps  even  more  unfortunate ;  for  while 
Poland  has  been  divided  among  three  European 
States,  all  more  or  less  civilized,  Armenia 
has  been  divided  between  three  States,  of  which 
one— Russia— is  half-Europeanized,  while  the 
other  two— Persia  and  Turkey—were  and  still 
are  almost  completely  barbarous.  Every  one 
remembers  the  horrors  of  the  Armenian 
massacres  organized  by  the  Turks— not  only 
by  the  Old  Turks  in  the  days  of  the  Red  Sultan, 
Abdul  Hamid,  but  more  recently  also  by  the 
Young  Turks,  the  friends  of  the  German 
Emperor.  Read  the  works  of  Armenian 
writers,  and  your  heart  will  be  filled  with 
mortal  anguish  before  these  terrible  visions 
of  death  and  devastation  which  haunt  the  echoing 
palace  in  which  the  poetic  Muse  of  Armenian 
letters   dwells  :— 

"  The  demons  play  at  ball  with  the  skulls  of 
men  of  genius  ;  children  devour  the  grass  which 
has  grown  from  their  fathers'  ashes  ;  maidens 
wear  on  their  opulent  bosoms  the  roses  which 
have  blossomed  above  the  earth  of  the  grave  ; 
and  the  monstrous  bats  of  Death  fan  with  their 
wings  the  parchment  visage  of  humanity.  The 
rapacious  vultures  tear  with  fury  the  quivering 
heart  of  the  peasant,  and  greedily  drink  his  warm 


190  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

blood  ;  the  iron  shoes  of  the  horses  sink  into 
bleeding  trunks  or  crush  the  skulls  of  the 
wounded." 

Such  is  the  grisly  aspect  under  which  the 
world  appears  in  the  eyes  of  one  of  the  best- 
known  Armenian  writers,  M.  Avetis  Aharonian.' 

"  Who  does  not  weep  in  our  country?  "  he 
cries  in  another  of  his  tragic  tales. 

"  My  heart  is  wounded,  mangled,  rent.  There 
is  no  room  for  another  knife,  another  arrow  : 
to  make  fresh  wounds  in  it  is  no  longer  possible. 
...  Its  blood  is  a  boiling  sea  upon  the  brazier 
of  my  sorrow  !  " 

It  is  thus  that  an  old  Armenian  woman,  one 
of  whose  sons  was  "  torn  in  pieces  "  by  the 
Turks,  while  the  other  perished  in  fight,  laments 
before  the  image  of  the  Mother  of  God.  All 
the  history  of  Armenia,  all  her  sorrows  and 
sufferings,  speak  to  us  in  the  prayers  of  this 
old  woman. 

After  the  dethronement  of  Abdul  Hamid  and 
the  Young  Turk  "  revolution  "  the  Armenians  of 
Turkey  looked  for  an  amelioration  of  their  pain- 
ful situation,  but  their  hopes  were  disappointed, 
and  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  advent  of  a  great 
international  conflict  and  the  beginning  of  the 
Russo-Turkish  hostilities  was  welcomed  by  the 
Armenian  people  as  the  dawn  of  freedom. 

'  A.   Aharonian,   "  Towards  Liberty."     A  French  translation 
was  published  in  Paris  in  191 2 


\ 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  191 

It  is  true  that  in  Russia  the  Armenians  are 
not  yet  free,  any  more  than  the  other  peoples  of 
the  Tsar's  Empire,  the  Russian  included.  But 
in  spite  of  the  Tsarist  reaction,  the  conditions 
of  the  Armenians  in  Turkish  Russia  were  not 
so  terrible  as  those  of  their  brothers  in  Turkey, 
especially  of  late  years,  since  the  Tsar's  lieu- 
tenant in  the  Caucasus,  Count  Vorontzov- 
Dachkov,  has  endeavoured  to  win  the  sympathies 
of  the  Armenian  middle  classes,  in  order  to 
oppose  them  to  the  separatist  movement  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  Turcophile  propaganda  on  the 
other.  The  Armenian  bourgeoisie  was  very 
willing  to  conclude  a  pact  with  the  Russian 
Government,  as  its  economic  interests  pushed  it 
towards  union  with  Russia.  As  the  coal  of 
Dombrova,  the  stuffs  of  Lodz,  and  other  Polish 
products  sold  in  the  Russian  market  prepared 
the  ground  for  Russophile  sentiments  among  the 
propertied  classes  of  Poland,  so  the  petroleum 
of  Baku  and  the  products  of  the  Caucasian  mines 
exploited  by  the  Armenian  bourgeoisie  have 
drawn  them  into  contact  with  the  economic 
organism  of  the  Russian  State  and  have  made 
them  almost  Russophile. 

But  I  will  make  way  for  an  Armenian  patriot 
and  democrat  publicist,  M.  Varandian,  who  in 
December  19 14  wrote  the  following  lines  con- 
cerning the  Russo -Armenian  relations  and  the 
hopes  of  his  people  :— 


192  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

"  The  ancient  Armenian  race,  which  for  many 
centuries  was  in  the  vanguard  of  civiHzation  in 
Asia,  and  which,  after  losing  its  pohtical 
mdependence  in  the  fourteenth  century,  was, 
like  Poland,  divided  among  three  powerful 
monarchies,  must  now  recover  its  autonomy  in 
order  the  better  to  accomplish  its  traditional 
mission,  that  of  an  intermediary  agent  between 
the  East  and  the  West." 

So  reason  the  publicists  favourable  to  the 
cause  of  Armenia.  Has  not  the  Tsar  himself, 
in  his  recent  manifesto,  promised  his  "  dear 
Armenians  "  to  restore  their  liberties?  And  now 
—great  event  !— Nicholas  II  himself  visits  the 
Caucasus,  for  the  first  time  since  his  corona- 
tion (in  1894).  He  goes  to  the  Armenian 
cathedral  in  Tiflis,  addresses  the  aged  patriarchs, 
and  exhorts  his  subjects  of  whatever  nationality 
faithfully  to  serve  the  great  Russian  fatherland. 
Then  he  turns  toward  the  frontier,  traversing 
the  great  centres  of  Russian  Armenia,  until  he 
reaches  Sarykamich.  Never  has  the  Tzar 
journeyed  so  far  in  these  domains  ;  the  curiosity 
and  surprise  are  general.  At  ordinary  times  the 
Autocrat  of  All  the  Russias  would  not  have  dared 
to  approach  these  formidable  centres  of 
Caucasian   Carbonarism.    .    .    . 

A  wave  of  enthusiasm  swept  Russian  Armenia 
from  end  to  end  ;  the  Armenian  volunteers  came 
forward     by     thousands ;     among     them     were 


IN   THE   BLOODY    FRAY  193 

hundreds  of  students  at  the  Universities  of 
Petersburg,  Moscow,  and  Kiev.  Corps  were 
organized  in  the  University  towns  of  France  and 
Switzerland. 

While  their  co-religionists  on  the  other  side 
of  the  frontier  were  loyally  doing  their  duty  by 
the  Russian  State,  the  Armenians  of  the  Caucasus 
lent  their  aid  to  the  Russian  troops,  in  order  to 
free  their  country  from  the  Ottoman  yoke.  For 
a  moment  they  had  put  their  hopes  in  Young 
Turkey,  in  the  internal  regeneration  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  ;  but  the  ultranationalist  policy 
of  Enver  Bey  and  Talaat  Bey,  and,  above  all, 
the  terrible  tragedy  of  Adana,  plainly  demon- 
strated to  the  blindest  that  Old  and  Young 
Turkey  were  much  the  same,  and  that  there 
could  be  no  safety  for  a  Christian  people  under 
Turkish  rule. 

At  the  same  time  there  was  a  reversal  of  the 
Armenian  policy  towards  Russia,  thanks  to  the 
Viceroy  of  the  Caucasus,  Count  Vorontzov- 
Dachkov.  The  old  policy  of  violent  Russi- 
fication  was  abandoned  ;  it  had  never  met  with 
success,  and  only  ended  in  an  Armenian  revolu- 
tion (1903).  An  able  and  intelligent  man,  the 
aged  Vorontzov-Dachkov  understood  the  great 
importance  of  Armenia  to  Russia— Armenia, 
"  that  sole  oasis  in  the  vast  Mussulman  desert." 

Will  this  new  orientation  of  the  Russian  policy 
in   Armenia  be  lasting?     Will  the   promises   of 

13 


194  RUSSIA   AND    THE   GREAT   WAR 

liberty  be  kept?  Sceptics  refer  to  the  lament- 
able precedents;  neither  in  1826,  at  the  time 
of  the  Russo -Persian  War,  in  which  the  whole 
population  of  Armenia  took  part,  with  the  Arch- 
bishop of  Tiflis  at  its  head,  nor  in  1878,  at 
the  time  of  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  which  was 
conducted  by  Armenian  generals  (the  com- 
mander-in-chief himself,  Loris-Melikov,  being 
an  Armenian,  and  later  on  Minister  and  dictator 
of  Russia),  were  the  hopes  of  Armenia  fully 
realized. 

This  distrust,  which  is  very  natural,  was  swept 
away  by  the  enthusiasm  engendered  by  the  war 
against  Turkey,  and  the  Armenian  democracy 
is  morally  and  materially  giving  its  support  to 
Russia  in  this  great  conflict. 

IV 

We  must  now  deal  with  the  Jewish  problem 
as  it  affects  the  present  war. 

The  situation  of  the  Russian  Jews  is  extremely 
painful,  even  at  ordinary  times,  for  among  all 
the  oppressed  and  unfortunate  elements  of  the 
Russian  population  the  Jewish  race  is  the  most 
unfortunate   and  most   severely  oppressed. 

"  In  Russia  the  domination  of  the  aristocracy 
and  the  absolute  monarchy  has  survived  more 
completely  than  in  any  other  capitalist  country  ; 
and  this  feudal  and  absolutist  domination,  as  we 


IN  THE  BLOODY  FRAY  195 

know,  finds  its  chief  point  of  support  in  a  policy 
of  religious  intolerance,  racial  hatred,  and 
oppression  of  racial  minorities  :  a  policy 
which  weighs  more  heavily  on  the  Jews  than 
on  any  other  of  the  subject  peoples  of  the 
Empire.  Tied  hand  and  foot  by  various  '  laws 
of  exception  '  and  by  the  arbitrary  rule  of  the 
bureaucracy,  the  Jew,  who  is  subject  to  educa- 
tional restrictions  which  make  it  impossible  for 
him  to  receive  the  same  instruction  as  that 
received  by  other  members  of  the  Empire,  and 
for  whom  the  famous  '  line  of  residence  '  or  Pale 
was  instituted,  which  prevents  him  from  moving 
about  in  search  of  livelihood — the  Jew  is  more 
closely  acquainted  than  any .  with  poverty  and 
ruin."  I 

Add  to  this  the  pogroms  organized  by  the 
"  Black  Bands  "  and  encouraged  by  the  superior 
bureaucracy ;  remember  the  famous  "  ritual 
murders  "  invented  by  the  Russian  reaction  and 
stage-managed,  as  far  as  the  law  is  concerned, 
by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  itself,  and  you  will 
be  of  the  same  opinion  as  the  author  just  quoted, 
and  will  repeat  with  him  : — 

"  The  position  of  the  Jews  in  Russia  is 
altogether  exceptional .  The  contemporary  history 
of  the  European  peoples  knows  nothing  like  it." 

Yet  when  war  was  declared  the  Jewish  popu- 
lation of  Russia  showed,  for  the  most  part,  that 
^  L.  Hersch,  Le  Juif  Erra7it  d'aujourdhui^  Paris,  1913. 


196  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

it  was  greatly  attached  to  its  country,  although 
Russia  is  but  a  cruel  stepmother  to  her  Jewish 
children.  In  all  the  towns  and  cities  of  the 
"  zone  of  residence  "  or  Jewish  Pale  there  were 
great  patriotic  demonstrations  :  the  Jews  march- 
ing through  the  streets  with  the  rolls  of  the 
sacred  Torah  and  the  national  flag,  and  even 
the  portrait  of  the  Tsar.  The  superior  Jewish 
bourgeoisie  contributed  largely  to  the  collections 
made  for  the  victims  of  the  war,  and  among  the 
young  Jews  a  propaganda  was  carried  out  in 
favour  of  voluntary  enlistment  in  the  Russian 
Army.  This  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Jews 
astonished  even  the  Russian  anti-Semites,  whose 
too  notorious  leader,  M.  Purishkevitch,  expressed 
this  astonishment  in  the  following  phrase  : — 
"  I  never  thought  the  Jews  were  so  amiable  !  " 
Some  of  the  anti-Semites  tried  to  compromise 
this  strange  patriotism  by  explaining  it  by  the 
fear  of  pogroms.  But  this  miserable  explana- 
tion does  not  tally  with  the  facts.  The  truth 
is  that  the  economic  interests  of  the  Jewish 
bourgeoisie  are  one  factor,  and  the  psychological 
effect  of  the  war  upon  the  Jewish  intellectuals 
is  another. 

What  are  the  economic  interests  which  give 
rise  to  Russian  patriotism  among  the  Russian 
Jews  in  spite  of  all  the  sufferings  of  the  Jews 
in  Russia?  We  shall  find  a  reliable  answer  to 
this    question   in   an  article   from   the   pen   of  a 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  197 

Jewish    publicist   which   appeared   in   a    Russian 
journal  : — 

"  The  very  motives  which  determine  the 
patriotic  and  warlike  feeling  of  the  middle 
classes  of  the  various  nationalities  in  Russia 
apply  absolutely  to  the  Jewish  bourgeoisie.  An 
advantageous  commercial  treaty  with  Germany, 
the  possession  of  the  Dardanelles,  or  at  least 
their  neutralization,  the  supremacy  of  Russian 
exports  in  the  markets  of  Western  Asia  and  the 
Balkans,  and,  finally,  the  economic  development 
of  the  whole  Empire— all  that  the  Russian 
bourgeoisie  hopes  to  win  from  the  war— is  also 
the  subject  of  the  '  patriotic  hopes  '  of  the  Jewish 
bourgeoisie  in  Russia.  For  the  latter,  although 
the  racial  stnjggle,  thanks  to  economic  compe- 
tition, is  increasingly  bitter  in  middle-class 
circles,  is  none  the  less  of  one  flesh  with  the 
Pan-Russian  bourgeoisie,  and  is  bound  to  it  by 
a  community  of  economic  interests  and  aspira- 
tions. Especially  in  the  industrial  regions  of 
the  Pale,  where  the  Jewish  bourgeoisie  plays  a 
very  considerable  part,  does  this  co -unity  of 
interests  manifest  itself  most  fully. 

In  the  south  and  south-west  of  Russia  in 
particular  the  Jewish  bourgeoisie  plays  a  very 
important  part  in  the  corn  trade  with  Germany, 
and  desires  victory  over  the  latter  in  order  that 
after  the  war  a  Russo -German  treaty  may  be 
concluded  in  the  interests  of  the  grain  exporters. 


198  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

The  committees  of  the  Exchanges  at  Ekatermo- 
slav,  Nikolaev,  and  Odessa  express  these  aspira- 
tions .  Still  greater  are  the  hopes  of  the  industrial 
and  commercial  employers  of  the  south,  and 
there  are  many  Jews  among  them  ;  these  antici- 
pate victory  in  the  Near  East.  In  another 
great  industrial  region— Poland— the  Jewish 
bourgeoisie  plays  a  considerable  part  in  a 
highly  developed  commercial  exchange  with 
Germany,  and  the  question  of  a  commercial 
treaty  with  the  latter  country  is  of  vital  interest 
to  it.  On  the  other  hand^  in  its  industrial 
and  commercial  activities  the  Jewish  bourgeoisie 
of  this  region,  as  well  as  the  Polish  bourgeoisie, 
has  relations  with  the  markets  of  the  whole  of 
Russia.  A  Zionist  organ,  the  Razsviet,  which 
is  by  no  means  inclined  to  exaggerate  the 
economic  ties  binding  the  Jews  to  Russia,  states 
in  this  connection  :  '  The  economic  interests  of 
the  Jews  in  Poland  have  of  late  bound  the  Jews 
more  and  more  closely  to  Russia,  and  the 
prospect  of  the  separation  of  Poland  from 
Russia,  or  of  its  annexation  to  this  or  that  neigh- 
bouring State,  would  for  them  mean  complete 
impoverishment .' 

"  We  perceive  the  very  motives  at  work  here 
which  compel  the  Polish  bourgeoisie  to  assume 
a  negative  position  in  respect  of  what  is  known 
as  the  '  Austrian  orientation.'  "  ' 

^  See  the  Russian  journal  Golos,  1914. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  199 

Such  is  the  present  mentahty  of  the  mass  of 
the  Jewish  bourgeoisie  in  Russia.  As  for  the 
lower  middle-class  Jews,  who  constitute  the 
majority  of  the  Jewish  population  of  Russia,  they 
will  be  found— so  asserts  the  publicist  already 
cited— to  be  under  the  ideological  influence  of 
their  wealthier  brothers,  on  whom  they  are 
economically   dependent. 

But  the  Jewish  author  I  have  quoted,  while 
he  justly  estimates  the  economic  factors  of  the 
patriotic  attitude  of  the  Jews  in  Russia,  is  almost 
silent  as  to  the  psychological  aspect  of  the  ques- 
tion. But  it  is  essential  to  understand  this 
aspect,  above  all,  if  we  wish  to  understand  the 
mental  state  of  the  intellectual  Jews,  many  of 
whom  believe  that  the  present  war  was  forced 
upon  Russia,  and  that  it  is  Russia's  duty  to 
defend  herself  against  the  brutal  aggression  of 
Germany.  Unhappily,  the  stupid  policy  of  the 
Government  is  damping  the  enthusiasm  of  these 
Jewish  "  patriots,"  and  has  created  a  psycho- 
logical tragedy  which  is  well  defined  by  the 
following  private  letter,  which  was  published  in 
the  Russian  press.  The  letter  was  written  by 
a  Jewish  lady  living  in  Petrograd  :— 

"  We  are  passing  through  a  terrible  time. 
Just  think  :  it  is  human  blood  that  is  being 
shed  !  It  is  horrible.  We  all  of  us  felt  so 
enthusiastic,  and  we  are  all  cursing  Wilhelm. 
Only    one   man— and    so   much    blood,    so   many 


200  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

tears  on  his  account  !  When  the  war  was  first 
declared  we  Jews  were  extraordinarily  sincere 
in  what  we  felt  :  all  of  us,  literally,  were  ready 
to  give  everything— life  and  all— for  our  country. 
For  each  one  of  us,  in  some  strange  fashion, 
is  attached  to  Russia  and  loves  his  native 
country.  There  were  many  volunteers  :  every- 
body wanted  to  volunteer  in  the  Army,  to  sacri- 
fice himself  and  to  give  what  he  could,  with 
a  single  heart.  I  personally  often  felt  ashamed 
to  think  that  I  could  so  soon  forget  the  Beiliss 
affair  and  all  the  humiliations  and  outrages- 
forget  them  so  completely  that  I  felt  as  if  they 
had  happened  a  long  time  ago,  in  other  times. 
.  .  .  But  to-day  we  are  being  gradually  brought 
back  to  a  sense  of  reality,  and  we  feel  nothing 
but  shame  and  sorrow  after  our  enthusiasm. 

"  It  is  true  that  the  blood  rushes  to  our  hearts 
when  we  see  our  dear  soldiers  passing,  or  when 
we  hear  about  them,  or  think  of  them ;  but 
we  are  not  left  to  dream  ;  they  are  forcing  us 
to  wake  to  a  sense  of  reality.  Already  there 
is  nothing  left  of  our  dreams  !  We  have  awaked 
to  the  same  injustice,  the  same  humiliations  and 
outrages,  although  there  are  nearly  400,000  Jews 
in  the  Russian  Army,  and  among  them  many 
heroes  who  have  already  merited  the  Military 
Cross  for  their  brave  deeds. 

"  All  is  as  it  was  before  ;  the  situation  is  even 
growing    worse.    ...    It    is    terrible!      At    this 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  201 

moment,  when  one  and  all  have  their  hearts  full 
of  feeling  and  their  hands  full  of  work,  these 
cowards  are  nevertheless  continually  inventing 
fresh  humiliations  for  the  Jews.  .  .  .  No,  if 
even  now,  in  these  terrible  times,  these  gentry 
are  capable  of  such  a  base  and  cowardly  atti- 
tude, one  cannot  expect  any  decency  from  them. 
"  S.  made  preparations  to  leave  for  the  front, 
for  the  firing-line ;  he  wanted  to  enlist  as  a 
volunteer,  to  fight  the  Germans  ;  they  refused 
him  because  he  was  a  Jew.  Then  he  entered 
for  a  course  of  instruction  at  the  Samaritans' 
College,  in  order  to  go  to  the  front  as  a  nurse 
or  ambulance-assistant  ;  he  wished  particularly 
to  go  right  to  the  front,  where  the  danger  is 
greatest,  where  men  can  perhaps  be  of  use  who 
are  willing  to  sacrifice  their  lives.  But  he  is 
a  Jew,  and  as  a  Jew  it  was  impossible  for  him 
to  go.  At  the  present  moment  he  and  X.  are 
organizing  a  military  hospital  and  revictualling- 
station  for  soldiers  at  the  extreme  front ;  he 
is  working  twenty  hours  a  day,  and  when  I  call 
him  back  to  reality  by  reading  what  the  papers 
have  to  say  of  the  new  pleasantries,  the  new 
administrative  measures  affecting  us  Jews,  he 
scolds  us,  telling  us  that  we  oughtn't  to  think 
of  such  things  just  now  (but  how  can  they 
humiliate  us  so  at  such  a  time  ! ),  and  he  afhrms, 
on  his  word  of  honour,  that  if  he  is  not  killed, 
and  if  the  situation  is  the  same  after  the  war, 


202  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

that  he  will  leave  Russia  for  ever  ;  but  to-day 
he  anticipates  a  better  future  and  is  ready  to 
give  his  life.  God  grant  that  S.  may  be  right, 
but  at  present  our  life  is  painful  in  the  extreme. 
With  all  our  hearts  we  desire  to  be  patriots,  but 
they  won't  let  us  ;  they  repulse  us.  Well,  let 
God  judge  them  !  "  ^ 

While  the  Jewish  "  intellectuals  "  living  in  the 
interior  of  Russia  are  subjected  to  much  moral 
suffering,  the  Jewish  population  of  the  famous 
Pale  are  the  victims  of  indescribable  physical 
suffering  as  well.  On  the  i6th  of  January  the 
Parisian  journal  L Humanlte  published  a  remark- 
able appeal  from  the  Jewish  Labour  Party  in 
Russia.  In  this  appeal  of  the  Bund,  entitled 
"  To  the  Civilized  World,"  we  find  an  affecting 
description  of  their  incredible  sufferings  :— 

"  The  theatre  of  war  in  Russia  includes 
more  particularly  Poland  and  certain  provinces 
of  Lithuania,  which  form  part  of  the  Jewish  Pale. 
The  Jewish  population  of  these  regions  is  com- 
pletely ruined  by  the  war,  and  a  great  portion 
of  it  is  literally  starving. 

"  Thousands  of  Jews  are  forced  to  fly 
from  destitution  and  the  invaders.  And  here 
the  solicitude  of  the  Government  gets  to  work. 
The  Government  allows  no  Jew  to  cross  the  limits 
of  the  Ghetto ;  those  who  have  succeeded  in 
finding  shelter  in  towns  outside  the  Ghetto  are 
'  See  the  journal  Golos  for  the  26th  of  November,  19 14. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  203 

arrested,  punished,  and  sent  back  to  their  ruined 
homes.  There  are  few  exceptions  to  this  rule, 
even  for  Jewish  soldiers  wounded  on  the  battle- 
field, once  they  have  left  hospital. 

"  European  countries  will  learn  with  amaze- 
ment that  while  France,  England,  and  Switzer- 
land are  welcoming  the  Belgian  refugees  .  .  . 
the  Russian  Government  refuses  its  own  subjects 
the  right  of  migration.    .    .    . 

"  But  this  is  not  all.  .  .  .  Soldiers  de- 
moralized by  the  anti-Semite  propaganda  have 
in  Poland  organized  a  series  of  pogroms.  The 
Jews  are  massacred  and  their  property  pillaged. 
Even  in  Lodz,  that  "  Russian  Manchester," 
boasting  half  a  million  inhabitants,  there  was 
during  the  Russian  occupation  a  pogrom  which 
lasted  several  days.  The  Jews  of  Poland  are 
literally  beyond  the  pale  of  the  law. 

"  In  other  localities  .  .  .  the  forced  exodus 
of  Jews  is  accomplished  under  the  most  inhuman 
conditions.  Thousands  of  wretched  beings,  men, 
women,  and  children,  sick  and  well,  drag  them- 
selves on  foot,  sometimes  for  whole  weeks,  over 
the  relatively  short  distance  which  divides  them 
from  the  only  town  in  which  they  can  count 
on  shelter— Warsaw.  Children  die  on  the  road, 
women  give  birth  to  premature  children  .  .  . 
mothers  lose  their  nurselings,  and  suddenly  dis- 
cover, to  their  horror,  that  they  are  clasping 
empty  shawls  to  their  bosoms.    .    .    . 


204  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

"  Here  is  a  quotation  from  a  Petrograd 
journal  :  '  At  two  o'clock  the  road  to  Warsaw 
was  covered  by  the  Jewish  population  of 
Grodzisk.  There  were  about  1,500  families, 
and  of  these  nearly  300  were  the  families  of 
soldiers  with  the  Army.  .  .  .  Between  five  and 
six  o'clock  we  came  to  Blone,  twelve  versts  from 
Grodzisk.  But  they  would  not  let  us  enter  the 
village  ...  we  had  to  go  round  it,  across  a 
flooded  plain.  W^e  made  litters,  and  so  carried 
the  women  and  children  as  far  as  the  highway. 
.  .  .  The  night  fell,  cold  and  wet,  the  sticky 
mud  retarding  our  steps,  and  we  went  painfully 
forward,  insulted  and  sometimes  searched  by  the 
soldiers.  .  .  .  One  woman  gave  birth  to  a 
child  ;  another  had  a  miscarriage  ;  another  died 
by  the  roadside.    .    .    .'  " 

This  is  typical.  LHumanite  quotes  another 
and  similar  account.  And  "  directly  the  exiles 
have  abandoned  their  belongings  they  are  looted 
by  soldiers  and  thieves ;  not  only  shops,  but 
private  houses  are  sacked. 

"  Such  was  the  fate  of  the  Jews  of  Grodzisk, 
Skemevitz,  Sochatchov,  Lovitch,  Gura-Calvary, 
Novo-Alexandrovno,  Cosennitz,  Ivangorod,  and 
many  other  towns.  More  than  100,000  refugees 
have  sought  an  asylum  in  Warsaw. 

"  The  least  pretext  suffices  to  bring  a  Jew 
before  a  Council  of  War,  which  condemns  him 
to  death  or  hard  labour    ...   if  there  is  abso- 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  205 

lutely  no  proof  .  .  .  he  is  condemned  to 
corporal  punishment,  and  forbidden  to  live  in 
the  town  during  the  period  of  the  war. 


"  And  to  explain  these  atrocities  the  authori- 
ties have  invented  a  fresh  calumny  worthy  of 
the  famous  Beiliss  affair  :  the  Jews  would  assist 
the  Germans  !  What  amazing  hypocrisy  !  The 
Government  has  called  more  than  250,000  Jews 
to  the  colours.  It  awards  medals  to  Jewish 
soldiers  who  have  distinguished  themselves  in 
battle.  The  patriotic  press.  .  .  has  often 
emphasized  the  patriotism  of  the  Jewish  people, 
its  generous  gifts,  the  number  of  Jewish  volun- 
teers, etc.  In  a  number  of  towns  the  Tsar  has 
received  Jewish  delegates  and  has  thanked  the 
Jews  for  their  '  devoted  attachment.'  .  .  .  The 
object  of  the  manoeuvre  is  obvious.  The  legend 
of  '  Jewish  treason,'  created  at  a  moment  of 
supreme  national  excitement,  a  more  effectual 
legend  than  that  of  the  '  ritual  murders,'  ought 
to  inspire  the  great  masses  of  the  Russian  people 
with  an  implacable  hatred  and  a  thirst  for 
vengeance.  And  in  case  of  necessity  this  will 
serve  as  a  means  for  diverting  the  popular  wrath 
and  directing  it  against  the  Jews." 

In  the  Duma,  on  the  8th  of  February,  191  5, 
M.  Sazonov,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  reply- 
ing to  the  revelations  concerning  the  persecution 


206  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

of  the  Jews  in  the  theatre  of  war,  stated  that 
these  revelations  "  were  merely  the  inventions  of 
German  calumniators,"  and  that  he  "  categoric- 
ally gave  the  lie  to  the  calumny "  that  "  the 
Russian  troops  had  organized  pogroms  against 
the  Jews."  As  to  this  ministerial  denial,  I  may 
say,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  troops  are  not 
accused  of  these  barbarous  actions  ;  the  soldiers 
are  not  responsible,  but  the  men  who  lead  the 
troops,  and  the  representatives  of  the  anti-Semitic 
policy.  Secondly,  if  the  Russian  Government 
sincerely  wishes  to  cleanse  itself  of  the  stain  of 
these  shameful  accusations  it  can  do  so  very 
simply :  it  need  only  abolish  immediately  all 
restrictions  affecting  the  unhappy  Jewish  popula- 
tion .  So  long  as  it  does  not  do  so  the  accusation 
lies  against  it,  despite  all  the  verbal  denials  of 
the   Ministers. 

The  terrible  responsibility  which  rests  on  the 
Government  and  the  commanders  of  the  Russian 
Army  is  unhappily  shared  by  the  Polish 
Nationalist  politicians.  For  years  they  have 
conducted  an  anti-Semitic  propaganda  in  Poland, 
of  the  most  barbarous  nature,  terrorizing  the 
Jewish  population  by  threats  and  organizing 
boycots  of  Jewish  merchants  and  artisans. 
Even  the  group  of  Revolutionary  Nationalists— 
the  Polish  Socialist  Party— which  at  present 
represents  the  "  Austrian  orientation  "  in  Polish 
society— has  supported  this  ignoble  propaganda. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  207 

During  the  discussion  in  the  Duma  of  the  pro- 
posal for  municipal  self-government  in  Poland, 
the  Polish  deputies  made  a  pact  with  the  Russian 
anti-Semites  for  the  purpose  of  limiting  the  elec- 
toral rights  of  the  Jews  in  Poland  at  municipal 
elections. 

Anti-Semitism  has  in  Poland  assumed  such 
brutal  forms  that  a  Jewish  Nationalist,  who  is 
also  a  well-known  Zionist  writer,  M.  Jabotinsky, 
declared  that  the  Polish  politicians  had,  by  their 
policy  towards  the  Jews,  proved  that  they  were 
not  yet  ripe  for  Polish  autonomy,  and  that  they 
were  in  need,  "  not  of  autonomy  but  of  a  wise 
Russian  Governor."  This  declaration,  however, 
was  only  an  exaggeration  provoked  by  the  heat 
of  the  Polo-Jewish  conflict.  In  reality,  the  Jews 
in  Poland  have  completely  thrown  in  their  lot 
with  that  of  the  Poles,  and  regard  Poland  as 
their  mother-country.  But  it  is  easily  under- 
stood that  to  see  conflict  between  the  Poles 
and  the  Jews  pleases  the  Russian  Government, 
as  it  hopes  to  exploit  that  conflict  in  its  own 
interests,  according  to  the  old  principle  :  Divide 
et  impera  ! 

During  the  war,  unhappily,  the  Polo-Jewish 
conflict  has  by  no  means  been  appeased,  and 
the  Polish  Nationalist  press  has  greatly  contri- 
buted to  the  propagation  of  the  legend  of  the 
"  treason  "  of  the  Jews  and  their  relations  with 
the  Germans. 


208  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

V 

While  in  Poland  the  racial  problem  is  com- 
plicated by  the  conflict  between  the  Poles  and 
the  Jews,  in  the  Baltic  Provinces  it  is  aggravated 
by  the  conflict  between  the  Germans  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  Letts  and  Esthonians  on  the  other. 
This  conflict  is  not  purely  racial  in  character, 
as  it  also  is  based  on  a  social  and  economic 
struggle.  The  Germans  of  the  Baltic  Provinces 
are  in  the  numerical  minority,  but  the  entire 
nobility  of  the  region  is  German,  and  holds  in 
its  hands,  not  only  the  landed  property  but  also 
all  the  political  influence,  furnishing  the  Russian 
reaction  with  many  of  its  most  notorious  leaders  ; 
while  the  Esthonians,  and,  above  all,  the  Letts, 
constitute  the  lower  middle -classes  and  the 
peasantry  of  the  country,  are  noted  for  their 
democratic  ideas,  and  have  given  to  the  Russian 
revolution  many  of  its  noblest  supporters,  and 
martyrs  who  have  died  for  the  liberty  of  the 
people. 

In  order  to  comprehend  the  attitude  assumed 
in  respect  of  the  war  by  the  German  aristocracy 
of  the  Baltic  Provinces  and  the  lower  middle- 
class  democracy,  compare  the  tone  and  the  sub- 
stance of  the  two  folloAving  declarations,  which 
were  made  before  the  Duma  on  the  8th  of  August, 
1914:— 

The  representative  of  the  Germans,  a  Baltic 
noble,   stated  : 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  209 

"  In  the  name  of  my  political  friends,  I  have 
the  honour  to  declare  that  the  German  popula- 
tion of  the  Baltic  Provinces,  which  has  always 
been  composed  of  faithful  subjects,  is  ready 
always  to  rise  in  defence  of  the  throne  and  the 
Fatherland.  We  shall  not  content  ourselves  with 
voting  for  the  military  measures  proposed  to  us, 
but,  following  the  example  of  our  ancestors,  we 
are  ready  to  sacrifice  our  lives  and  our  property 
for  the  unity  and  the  greatness  of  Russia." 

The  delegate  of  the  Estho-Lettish  group  ex- 
pressed  the   latter's    attitude    as   follows : 

"  One  of  the  first  blows  struck  by  the  enemy 
was  struck  at  part  of  the  country  which  I  repre- 
sent. This  was  at  Libau.  But  the  German 
sovereign  was  greatly  mistaken  if  he  believed 
that  this  blow  would  find  any  echo  in  the  hearts 
of  the  inhabitants,  or  incite  them  to  demonstra- 
tions hostile  to  Russia.  On  the  contrary,  the 
population  of  the  Baltic  Provinces,  in  which  Letts 
and  Esthonians  form  the  vast  majority,  replied 
to  the  German  fire  by  a  deafening  shout  :  '  Long 
live  Russia  !  '  And  it  will  be  the  same  in  future, 
amid  the  severest  trials.  There  is  not  a  man 
among  the  Letts  who  does  not  understand  that 
all  we  have  realized  could  have  been  realized 
only  under  the  aegis  of  the  Russian  eagle,  and 
that  the  accomplishment  of  all  we  still  hope  for 
is  possible  only  if  the  Baltic  Provinces,  in  the 
future  as   in  the  past,  form  an  integral  part  of 

14 


210  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

our  great  Russia.  This  is  why  we  see,  at  the 
present  moment,  in  our  country,  such  mental 
enthusiasm,  and  such  a  desire  to  take  part  in  the 
defence  of  our  dear  country.  These  great  days 
have  proved  that  neither  race,  nor  language,  nor 
creed  can  prevent  us,  Letts  and  Esthonians,  from 
being  ardent  Russian  patriots  and  from  standing 
side  by  side  with  the  great  Russian  people  to 
encounter  the  insolent   enemy. 

"  Into  the  sea  of  blood  in  which  the  tyrant 
of  Europe,  the  tyrant  who  has  his  home  in  Berlin, 
wished  to  bathe,  the  Letts  and  the  Esthonians  will 
if  need  be  shed  the  last  drop  of  their  blood,  so 
that  this  man,  the  perpetual  menace  of  peace, 
may  not  only  bathe  himself  in  that  sea,  but  be 
drowned  therein. 

"  In  these  great  days  we  shall  prove  that  we 
are  capable,  not  only  of  enthusiastic  patriotism, 
but  also,  in  domestic  affairs,  of  that  self-control 
which  is  indispensable  to  the  success  of  our  arms 
on  the  field  of  battle.  We  have  many  accounts 
to  settle  with  the  Germans  of  the  Baltic 
Provinces,  but  we  shall  not  choose  this  moment 
for  settling  them.  When  we  have  passed  through 
these  terrible  times  we  shall  present  these 
accounts  for  your  examination,  and  I  am  pro- 
foundly convinced  that  in  the  new  radiance  of 
the  sun  of  peace  the  prejudices  which  some  of 
you  may  still  entertain  will  be  dissipated.  At 
the   present   moment   there   is   for   us    Letts   and 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  211 

Esthonians  one  object  which  surpasses  all  others  : 
it  is  to  repulse  the  attack  of  the  common  enemy. 

"  At  this  historic  moment  I  declare  in  the  name 
of  the  Lettish  and  Esthonian  deputies  that  we 
shall  march  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the 
Russian  people  until  the  termination  of  the 
present  conflict,  which  is  a  just  and  holy  conflict. 
Not  only  our  sons,  our  fathers,  and  our  brothers 
will  fight  in  the  ranks  of  the  Army,  but  at  home 
also,  under  every  roof,  at  every  step,  the  enemy 
will  encounter  a  desperate  adversary  ;  he  may 
deprive  us  of  life,  but  from  the  dying  themselves 
he  will  hear  but  one  cry  :    '  Long  live  Russia  !  '  " 

The  celebrated  French  novelist,  M.  Romain 
Rolland,  has  published  in  the  Swiss  press  an 
interesting  letter  sent  him  by  a  Lettish  revolu- 
tionary, which  deals  with  the  question  of  the 
existing  relations  between  the  Germans,  the 
Russians,  and  the  Letts  in  the  Baltic  Provinces. 
I  believe  such  "  human  documents  "  help  us  to 
comprehend  the  truth  better  than  any  abstract 
dissertations.  For  this  reason  I  make  way  for 
the  writer  of  this  letter.     He  says  : — 

"  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what  those 
German  writers  and  professors  who  speak  of  a 
holy  war  against  barbarous  Russia  mean  by  that 
in  practice.  Would  they  wish  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  the  revolutionary  parties  to  dethrone 
the  Tsar  ?  But  these  parties  would  proudly  refuse 
to  accept  the  aid  of  militarist  Prussia.      Would 


212  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

they  liberate  the  neighbouring  peoples  oppressed 
by  Russia — the  Poles,  for  instance— by  incorporat- 
ing them  in  the  German  Empire  ?     But  every  one 
knows  that  those  Poles  who  are  German  subjects 
have    suffered    at    the    hands    of    the    German 
Government  a  treatment  far  worse  than  that  of 
which  the  Russian  Poles  complain  with  reason. 
"  There    remain   the    Baltic   Provinces.      Here 
for  centuries  the  Germans  have  had  their  pioneers 
among   the   great   landlords    and   the   merchants 
of  the  cities.     Although   Russian  subjects,  they 
will  doubtless  welcome  the  German  armies  with 
open  arms.     But  the  majority  of  the  population, 
of    the    Lettish    and    Esthonian    peoples,    would 
regard    the    annexation    of    these    provinces    by 
Germany  as  the  worst  of  calamities.    .    .    .   The 
geographical  situation  of  our  country  has  brought 
upon  the  Letts  the  singular  misfortune  of  suffer- 
ing the  German  yoke  before  the  Russian.    And, 
as    compared    with    the    Germans,    the    Russians 
appeared  to  us  as  liberators.     For  centuries  the 
Germans  kept  us  by  brute  force  in  a  state  com- 
parable to  slavery.    Only  fifty  years  ago  the  Rus- 
sian  Government   gave   us   our  freedom,   but   at 
the  same  time  committed  the  grave  injustice  of 
leaving  all  our  land  in  the  hands  of  German  pro- 
prietors.     In  spite  of  all,   we  have  managed  in 
twenty    or    thirty    years    to     redeem     from    the 
Germans  a  portion  of  our  soil,  and  to  attain  a 
certain  level  of  culture,  thanks  to  which  we  are 


IN  THE    BLOODY  FRAY  213 

regarded,  with  the  Fmns  and  the  Esthonians,  as 
the  most  advanced  nation  of  the  Russian  Empire. 
"  The  German  journals  call  us  ungrateful  .  .  . 
for  the  benefits  of  that  culture  which  they  boast 
of  having  brought  us.  .  .  .  We  follow  the  word 
KuUurtrdger  (  !  )  with  a  mark  of  exclamation, 
for  the  actions  of  the  Germans  have  made  the 
word  a  term  of  derision.  We  acquired  our  cul- 
ture in  spite  of  them,  against  their  will.  Even 
to-day  it  is  the  German  representatives  in  the 
Duma  who  oppose  the  rare  intentions  of  the 
Russian  Government  to  introduce  a  few  reforms 
in  the  Baltic  Provinces.  .  .  .  We  are  subject 
to  laws  and  regulations  unknown  elsewhere  in 
Europe,  which,  established  during  the  life  of 
the  feudal  system,  have  been  maintained  among 
us  by  the  efforts  of  the  great  German  land- 
lords.   .    .    . 

"  Formerly,  not  knowing  how  to  reconcile  our 
admiration  for  the  thought  and  art  of  Germany 
with  the  narrow,  cruel,  and  haughty  spirit  of 
its  representatives  in  the  Baltic  Provinces,  we 
invented  the  explanation  that  the  Germans  we 
knew  were  a  peculiar  species,  having  little  in 
common  with  other  Germans.  But  the  crimes 
committed  in  France  and  Belgium  have  proved 
us  wrong.  The  Germans  are  the  same  every- 
where when  it  becomes  a  matter  of  overruling 
and  suppressing  all  humanitarian  scruples.  .  .  . 
"  It  is   utterly   unjust  always  to   speak   of  the 


214  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

Russians  as  barbarians.  Above  all,  the  Ger- 
mans, who  always  employ  this  term  in  speaking 
of  them,  have  less  right  than  any  to  use  it. 
The  intellectual  world  of  Russia  is  not  inferior 
to  that  of  Germany  ;  it  is  different,  that  is  all . 
.  .  .  But  what  makes  the  intellectual  world  of 
Russia  more  sympathetic  than  that  of  Germany 
is  the  fact  that  it  would  be  incapable  of  justify- 
ing or  approving  of  the  barbarities  of  its  own 
Government  as  do  the  intellectuals  of  Germany. 
It  has  often  been  forced  to  keep  silent,  but  never 
has    it    excused   a   guilty   Government.    .    .    . 

"  I  do  not  idealize  the  Russians,  nor  has  my 
people  been  privileged  by  them.  On  the  con- 
trary, I  personally  have  suffered  more  from  the 
Russians  than  from  the  Germans,  and  my  people 
know  only  too  well  the  heavy  fist  of  the  Russian 
Government  and  the  stifling  breath  of  Pan- 
slavism.  In  1906  it  was  the  Lettish  peasants  and 
intellectuals  who  had  the  privilege  of  being 
flogged  the  most ;  and  it  was  they  who  furnished 
the  greatest  proportion  of  unfortunates  to  be  shot, 
hanged,  or  imprisoned  for  life.  And  since  that 
terrible  year  there  are  in  the  chief  cities  of 
Western  Europe  Lettish  colonies  of  refugees  who 
succeeded  in  escaping  from  the  atrocities  of  the 
penal  expedition  sent  into  our  country  by  the 
Russian  Government.  But  ...  at  the  head  of 
the  majority  of  the  military  detachments  sent  to 
chastise    the    country    were    officers    of    German 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  215 

nationality  who  had  asked  for  this  employment, 
and  who  displayed  such  zeal  in  shooting  down 
men  and  burning  houses  that  they  surpassed  even 
the  intentions  of  the  Russian  Government.  .  .  . 
In  cases  where  Russian  officers  inflicted  the  lash 
the  Germans  gave  the  order  for  execution. 

"  If  we  had  the  choice,  we  should  prefer  a 
Russian  Government  as  the  lesser  ill.  Our 
soldiers  have  left  for  the  front  filled  with  enthu- 
siasm .  .  .  not  to  defend  those  who  send  us 
to  Siberia  .  .  .  but  because  the  war  is  against 
Germany,  and  we  are  capable  of  any  sacrifice 
to  prevent  her  annexation  of  the  Baltic  Provinces. 
.  .  .  Panslavism  is  less  dangerous  to  the  inde- 
pendence of  small  nations  than  pan-Germanism, 

"...  The  Germans  are  systematic  oppres- 
sors. .  .  .  The  Russians  are  less  consistent; 
they  strike  at  times  cruel  and  painful  blows,  but 
from  time  to  time  they  are  capable  of  assuaging 
the  hurts  they  inflict ;  .  .  .  they  are  at  heart 
more  human  than  the  Germans,  who  often  con- 
ceal a  ferocious  animosity  beneath  an  aspect  of 
perfect  courtesy.  In  1906,  when  there  were 
executions  en  masse  in  Russia,  many  officers 
committed  suicide  .  .  .  but  the  officers  of 
German  blood  took  a  joy  in  the  performance  of 
their  duty. 

"  I  rejoice  at  the  news  of  Russian  victories 
.  .  .  yet  I  dread  a  victorious  Russia.  .  .  . 
What  have  we  to  expect  of  victorious  Tsarism  but 


216  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

a  frantic  reawakening  of  the  crushing  ideals  of 
Panslavism  ?  .  .  .  All  our  hopes  go  out  toward 
France  and  England  ;  we  should  like  to  think 
that  in  one  way  or  another  they  will  see  that 
their  ally  is  in  future  worthy  of  them,  and  of  the 
ideals  for  which  they  are  fighting.  .  .  .  We  do 
not  aspire  to  a  political  autonomy  ;  we  desire 
only  the  possibility  of  a  free  development  of  our 
intellectual,  artistic^  and  economic  forces,  with- 
out the  eternal  threat  of  Russification  or 
Germanization."  ' 

There  are,  perhaps,  exaggerations  in  that  part 
of  this  letter  which  compares  the  German  with 
the  Russian  reactionaries.  All  reactionaries  are 
equally  detestable.  But  I  quote  from  this  letter 
because  it  describes  the  feelings  of  the  non- 
German  inhabitants  of  the  Baltic  Provinces  in 
respect   of   the   German   nobility. 


VI 

Among  the  greatest  blunders  of  Tsarism  during 
the  war  we  must  emphasize  its  Finnish  policy. 

In  November  1 9 1 4,  three  and  a  half  months 
after  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Russian 
Government  issued  an  Imperial  ukase  relating 
to  the  Finnish  problem,  the  tenor  of  which  was 
as  follows  : — 

^  Letter  to  Romain  RoUand  in  the  Journal  de  Geneve,  12th  of 
October,  1914. 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  217 

"  His  Imperial  Majesty  has  sanctioned  a  pro- 
gramme of  legal  measures  relating  to  Finland, 
a  programme  which  has  been  drawn  up  by  a 
Commission  specially  appointed  by  his  Majesty 
to  that  effect.  The  Commission  finds  that  the 
programme  in  question  includes  two  principal 
groups   of  measures. 

"  I .  Measures  designed  to  fortify  the  authority 
of  the  Government  in  Finland,  so  that  the  law 
may  be  executed  and  order  maintained. 

"  2.  Measures  designed  to  establish  closer 
political  relations  and  economic  unity  in  respect 
of  Finland  and  the  rest  of  the  Empire. 

"  The  measures  which  follow  are  enumerated 
in  the  first  group  :— 

"  Revision  of  the  laws  relating  to  the  discip- 
linary responsibility  of  the  authorities  in  Finland. 
Removal  to  the  Imperial  Courts  of  all  causes 
dealing  with  offences  committed  by  Finnish  civil 
functionaries  in  the  exercise  of  their  duties  ; 
revision  of  the  Finnish  law  relating  to  the  status 
of  civil  functionaries,  in  particular  those  which 
relate  to  their  immovability,  the  modification  of 
their  oath,  and  their  right  to  attach  themselves 
to  political  parties  ;  the  training  of  a  staff  of 
officials  destined  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  Finland  and  in  particular  the  institu- 
tion of  Chairs  of  Finnish  Law  in  the  Universities 
of  the  Empire  ;  the  introduction  of  the  teaching 
of   Finnish   and   Swedish   in   the   schools   of   the 


218  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

Empire,  and  the  addition  of  Russian  to  the  sub- 
jects of  the  matriculation  examination  at  Helsing- 
fors  University ;  the  promulgation  of  a  law 
touching  the  application  to  Finland  of  the 
measure  known  as  the  Exceptional  Law ;  the 
revision  of  the  regulations  of  the  police  and 
gendarmerie  in  Finland ;  the  promulgation  of 
laws  applicable  conjointly  to  the  Empire  and 
Finland  relating  to  the  Press,  assemblies,  and 
societies  ;  the  extension  of  the  control  of  the 
Minister  of  Public  Instruction  (Russian)  over 
Finnish  educational  institutions  ;  the  adoption  of 
measures  prohibiting  the  introduction  of  arms  and 
ammunition  into  Finland,  etc.,  etc. 

"  In  the  second  group  are  enumerated  the 
following  measures  : — 

"  The  settlement  of  questions  relating  to  reli- 
gion and  the  Orthodox  Church  in  Finland  and 
the  placing  of  Orthodox  Church  schools  under 
the  authority  of  the  Holy  Synod  ;  the  extension 
to  Finland  of  import  duties  equal  to  those 
imposed  throughout  the  rest  of  the  Empire  and 
special  measures  designed  to  ensure  to  goods, 
such  as  sugar,  meat,  etc.,  produced  in  Russia, 
privileges  in  the  Finnish  market ;  the  promulga- 
tion of  a  law  common  to  Finland  and  the  Empire 
concerning  the  acquisition  and  loss  of  Russian 
nationality ;  the  extension  to  Finland  of  the 
activities  of  the  Rural  Peasants'  Bank  (Rus- 
sian)," etc.,  etc. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  219 

The  reader  will  realize  that  this  amounts  to  a 
veritable  political  and  economic  conquest  of 
Finland,  by  the  Russian  police  and  officials  on 
the  one  hand  and  by  Russian  merchandise  on 
the  other. 

The  pubUcation  of  such  a  "  programme  "  of 
"  legal  "  measures  is  a  provocation  unheard  of 
even  in  the  history  of  the  Finnish  Constitution, 
which  has  already  had  to  bear  many  an  unlawful 
blow.  This  provocation— above  all,  in  time  of 
war— shows  an  absolute  lack  of  the  most  elemen- 
tary tact  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  Government. 
One  of  the  moderate  Russian  journals,  expressing 
its  profound  amazement  at  this  programme, 
stated  that  it  belonged  to  the  past  rather  than 
to  the  future.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the 
Finnish  people,  loyal  during  the  present  war  as 
they  were  during  the  Japanese  War,  have  done 
nothing  whatever  to  merit  such  treatment,  and 
that  public  opinion,  not  only  in  Finland  but  also 
in  the  neighbouring  States  of  Sweden  and 
Norway,  was  revolted  by  these  reactionary 
measures . 

"  This  programme  of  Russification,"  exclaimed 
the  Stockholm  Dagblad,  "  is  the  very  opposite 
of  the  fine  promises  of  liberty  and  autonomy 
made  in  the  form  of  a  manifesto  to  the 
Poles  and  Galicians  by  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas." 


220  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

VII 

The  Ukrainian  problem  is  perhaps  the  least 
well  known,  as  far  as  the  European  public 
is  concerned,  of  all  the  nationalist  or  racial 
problems  existing  in  modern  Russia.  The  ex- 
planation is  that  until  recently  the  Nationalist 
movement  of  the  Ukrainians  was  cultural  rather 
than  political.  In  the  domain  of  their  national 
culture  the  Ukrainians  have  accomplished  much. 
Their  literature  is  flourishing,  and  some  of  their 
ancient  poets  (for  example,  Shevtshenko)  and 
certain  of  their  modern  authors  (Ivan  Franko, 
Vasil  Stefanik,  etc.)  would  adorn  the  literature 
of  any  country.  Ukrainian  philology  and  history, 
the  Ukrainian  arts,  and  other  manifestations  of 
the  national  genius  of  this  talented  people,  have 
undergone   a   rapid   development   of   late. 

Unfortunately,  the  erroneous  policy  of  re- 
actionary Tsarism  weighed  heavily  on  the  intel- 
lectual movements  of  the  Ukrainians.  The 
Russian  Government  opposed  it  by  every  possible 
means.  Even  the  terms  "Ukraine"  and 
"  Ukrainian  "  were  prohibited,  being  replaced 
by  "  Little  Russia  "  and  "  Little  Russian."  To 
justify  this  persecution  Tsarism  accused  the 
Ukrainians  of  "  separatist  "  tendencies.  This 
accusation  was  false,  for  the  separatist  policy 
has  not  and  could  not  have  any  hold  upon 
Ukrainian  society.     From  the  economic  point  of 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  221 

view  the  Ukraine,  which  covers  ten  Governments 
of  southern  and  south-western  Russia,  is  closely 
bound  up  with  the  economic  organism  of  all 
Russia— more  closely  even  than  Poland  and  the 
Caucasus.  The  cities  and  industrial  centres  of 
the  Ukraine  are  denationalized,  or  rather  inter- 
nationalized, for  their  population  represents  a 
great  admixture  of  races  and  languages,  the 
Russian  language  being  sensibly  predominant  in 
current  usage  and  in  the  press.  A  large  pro- 
portion of  the  Ukrainian  "  intellectuals  "  have 
been  profoundly  influenced  by  Russian  culture. 
The  most  eminent  poet  of  the  Ukraine,  Tarass 
Shevtshenko,  who  was  deported  to  the  Far  East 
by  the  Russian  Government  for  his  "  subversive 
ideas,"  was  not  only  a  Ukrainian  patriot,  but  a 
Russian  patriot  also,  and  his  dream  was  to  facili- 
tate the  ties  of  friendship  between  the  two 
peoples,  which  are  brothers  by  birth,  and  to 
compose  a  common  Russo-Ukrainian  tongue 
which  could  be  understood  by  both  peoples. 

The  Austrian  Government  has  of  late  years 
shown  itself  wiser  than  the  Russian.  It  abated 
its  persecution  of  the  Ukrainians  living  on 
Austrian  territory,  in  Bukovina,  and  Eastern 
Galicia,  granting  them  certain  concessions  in  the 
sphere  of  public  instruction  and  political  rights, 
and  the  Ukrainian  Nationalist  movement  de- 
veloped more  freely  in  Austria  than  in  Russia. 
The    Austrian    Ukrainians    (the    "  Russiny  "    or 


222  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

Ruthenians)  founded  primary  and  secondary 
schools,  in  which  the  teaching  was  in  the 
Ukrainian  tongue,  while  in  Russia  the  Ukrainian 
children  are  taught  in  Russian,  which  is  not 
their  mother-tongue. 

This  policy  of  the  Austrian  Government,  which 
was  designed  to  attract  Ukrainian  sympathies, 
was  based  upon  political  calculations.  Austria 
wished  to  create  a  separatist  movement  among 
the  Russian  Ukrainians  and  an  Austrian  "  orien- 
tation "  of  that  movement.  But  the  great 
mass  of  Russian  Ukrainians  failed  to  be 
seduced  by  Austria,  and,  in  spite  of  all  the 
injustice  which  they  suffered  at  the  hands  of 
Tsarism,  they  refused  the  idea  of  separatism, 
hoping  that  a  true  national  liberation  of  the 
Ukraine  would  come  simultaneously  with  the 
liberation  of  all  Russia  and  the  abolition  of 
the  old  state  of  affairs  throughout  the  Empire. 

After  the  declaration  of  war  the  Government 
and  the  General  Staff  of  Austria  created  a 
special  organization  known  as  the  "  Union  for 
the  Liberation  of  the  Ukraine,"  whose  object 
was  :  (  I )  to  inform  European  opinion  concern- 
ing the  Ukrainian  question,  and  ( 2 )  to  provoke 
a  "  revolution  "  in  Russian  Ukraine  which  should 
"  absorb  "  the  forces  of  the  Tsar.  This  Union, 
which  announced  itself  as  being  in  favour  of 
an  independent  Ukraine,  is  in  reality  merely  an 
ignoble  agency  of  the   Hapsburg  monarchy  and 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  223 

its  army  and  police.  Here  are  some  extracts 
from  proclamations  issued  by  the  said  Union, 
in  various  European  languages  (German,  Italian, 
English,  etc . )  :— 

"  The  unexampled  provocative  politics  of 
Russia  have  plunged  the  whole  world  into 
a  catastrophe  which  is  unequalled  in  history. 
.  .  .  The  Union  for  the  freeing  of  the  Ukraine 
is  to  represent  the  national,  political,  social,  and 
economic  interests  of  the  Ukrainian  people 
in  Russia.  .  .  .  Historical  necessity  demands  as 
a  sine  qua  noti  that  an  independent  Ukrainian 
State  should  arise  between  Russia  and  Europe. 
.  .  .  The  foundation  of  this  State  is  necessary 
and  indispensable  to  the  vital  interests  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  and  for  the  con- 
tinuous and  undisturbed  development  of  the 
German  people  in  the  monarchy  and  the  German 
Empire.  .  .  .  The  Union  for  the  Liberation  of 
the  Ukraine  foresees  the  realization  of  its 
endeavours  in  the  defeat  of  the  Russian  Empire 
by  the  United  Monarchies."  ^ 

From  these  few  quotations  it  will  be  seen  that 
what  is  really  at  stake  is,  not  the  independence 
of  Ukraine  but  simply  the  interests  of  Austria 
and  Germany.  One  of  the  inspiring  forces  of 
the  Union,  Herr  Lewicki,  a  deputy  to  the  Vienna 
Reichsrat,  openly  declared  as  much,  in  an  article 

'  See  the  proclamations  of  the  Union   for  the  Uberation  of 
Ukraine,  in  the  Ukramische  Nachrichten^  Vienna. 


224  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

published  on  the  ist  of  October,  19 14,  in  the 
Berliner  Tdgeblatt,  in  which  he  described  the 
brilliant  prospects  open  to  Austro-German  capital 
in  Southern  Russia  in  the  event  of  its  separation 
from  the  Russian  State.  These  Ukrainian 
"  patriots  "  merely  wish  to  sell  their  beloved 
country  to   the   German   capitalists. 

But  before  selling  their  country  they  sell 
themselves.  In  the  Ukrainian  Social-Democratic 
journal  Borotha  ("  The  Struggle  "),  published  in 
Geneva,  were  published  scandalous  revelations 
concerning  the  Union  for  the  Liberation  of  the 
Ukraine.  It  appears  from  these  revelations  that 
this  "  Union,"  domiciled  in  Vienna,  is  composed 
of  a  few  men  who  were  some  years  ago  excluded 
from  one  of  the  political  parties  of  Russian 
Ukraine.  Among  them  there  was  also  an  agent 
of  the  Viennese  secret  police.  The  Union,  which 
calls  itself  an  organization  of  the  Russian 
Ukrainians,  is  supported  financially  by  the 
Austrian  Government,  and  is  merely  "  a  lackey 
of  that  Government,  on  which  it  is  entirely 
and  shamefully  dependent."  ^  "  It  is  only  for 
purposes  of  advertisement  that  this  Union  calls 
itself  a  Russian  organization ;  it  is  really 
Austrian." 

In  order  to  gain  an  influence  over  the 
popular  masses  in  Ukraine  and  Russia  this  Union 
created  two  affiliated  societies  and  baptized  them 
'  ?ni&  Boroiba,  February  1915- 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  225 

by  names  which  might  attract  the  Russian  and 
Ukrainian  peasants  and  industrial  workers.  One 
of  these,  operating  from  Constantinople  (  !  ),  is 
known  as  the  "  Social-Democratic  Ukrainian 
Labour  Party,"  and  is  composed  of  a  few 
Austrian  agents.  The  other  is  known  as  the 
"  Ukrainian  Union  of  Revolutionary  Socialists," 
and  operates  from  Vienna.  Its  character  may 
be  judged  from  the  following  :  "  The  new-born 
revolutionist  and  man  of  action,  Herr  Z.  "—here 
follows  the  name  of  the  leader  of  the  Union — 
"  gathered  round  himself,  and  his  Austrian 
money,  in  Vienna,  half  a  score  of  crooks, 
drunkards,  and  vagabonds,  of  Bukovinian  or 
Galician  origin,  who  gladly  consented  to  play, 
in  Austria,  the  agreeable,  care-free,  amusing,  and 
profitable  role  of  the  Emperor's  own  revolu- 
tionists. .  .  .  The  Austrian  Government  pays 
through  the  nose.  The  Ukrainian  Revolutionary 
Socialist  Party  in  Vienna— that  is  to  say  Herr  Z. 
and  Company— draws  the  money,  flourishes,  and 
grows  rich.  It  drinks  heartily,  keeps  its 
mistresses,  goes  on  the  spree.  People  talk 
of  two  million  crowns.  For  one  small  party 
that  will  suffice  for  a  lifetime."  ^ 

It  is  superfluous  to  add  that  the  genuine 
Ukrainian  revolutionists  have  indignantly  re- 
jected  the    infamous   proposals   of   the   Austrian 

'  See   the   article    "  A    Shameful    Affair,"    published    in    the 
journal  Borotba,  February  1915.  • 

15 


226  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

Government,  and,  so  far  from  joining  these 
Viennese  "  Unions,"  have  unmasked  their  repul- 
sive features. 

But    here,    as    my    readers    will    see,    we    are 
dealing,    not    with    a    political    association,    but 
merely   an   offence   against   the   common   law,   a 
simple  fraud  sheltering  behind  a  "  national  flag," 
As  for  the  political  side  of  the  question,  it  is  in- 
contestable that  the  whole  Austro-Turco -German 
propaganda  in  Ukraine — a  movement  designed  to 
give   rise   to   a   separatist   movement   among   the 
Ukrainians— has  ended  in  a  complete  fiasco.    The 
Ukrainian   Social-Democrats  have  resolutely  set 
their    faces    against    the    Separatist    policy,    pre- 
ferring the  idea  of  the  common  struggle  of  the 
popular    masses    of    Russia    and    the    Ukraine 
against  Tsarism  and  for  democracy.     As  for  the 
Ukrainian  Liberals  and  Radicals  in  Russia,  they 
published,  at  the  moment  of  the  declaration  of 
war,  special  declarations  in  which  they  explained 
their  political  situation  in  the  following  terms  :— 
"  Owing  to  the  dismemberment  of  our  national 
organism   between  Russia  and  Austro-Hungary, 
certain  elements  of  Russian  society  were  induced 
to     believe    in    the    possibility    of    a    so-called 
'  Austrian  orientation  '  among  the  Ukrainians  in 
Russia— that  is,  a  sympathetic  feeling  in  respect 
of  the  Hapsburg  monarchy— and  to  regard  them 
as  an  unstable  element  in  time  of  international 
conflicts  such  as  the  present  war.     We  need  not 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  227 

say  that  such  suppositions  had  no  basis ;  no 
real  fact,  no  solid  argument  can  be  adduced  in 
their  support.  In  the  ideals  of  the  Ukrainian 
people,  in  their  practical  aspirations,  and  in  the 
national  development  of  that  portion  of  the 
Ukrainian  race  which  forms  a  part  of  the  popu- 
lation of  Russia,  they  have  always  imagined 
themselves  as  remaining  within  the  frontiers  of 
Russia  and  in  close  union  with  the  people  of 
Russia.  .  .  .  The  manifestation  of  the  national 
will  of  the  Russian  Ukrainians  has  never  found 
its  expression  in  hazardous  political  combinations, 
and  temptations  of  this  kind  have  never  found 
any  echo  among  the  wider  strata  of  Ukrainian 
society.  .  .  .  Ukrainian  separatism  ...  is  a 
myth.  .  .  .  The  '  Austrian  orientation  '  of  the 
Russian  Ukrainians  was  invented  by  Viennese 
politicians  as  a  bogey.  ...  In  the  hour  of  un- 
paralleled trials  to  which  our  sentiment  of 
nationality  is  now  being  subjected  we  ought  to 
display  an  understanding  of  historical  events 
corresponding  with  our  national  development,  a 
sane  political  spirit  and  an  organized  national 
will,  and  to  realize  that  the  nation  is  bound  by 
a  thousand  ties — of  blood,  kinship,  commerce, 
and  history — to  a  nation  which  is  to-day  fighting 
against  Austro-Hungary  and  the  German 
Empire.  On  crossing  the  frontiers  the  enemies 
of  Russia  will  doubtless  endeavour  to  win  the 
Ukrainian   people  to   their  side,   and,   by  means 


228  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

of  various  political  promises,  to  sow  disturbance 
among  them.  The  Ukrainians  will  not  allow 
themselves  to  be  tempted  by  this  policy  of  provo- 
cation, and  will  accomplish  their  duties  as  citizens 
of  Russia,  in  these  difficult  times,  to  the  end  : 
not  only  on  the  field  of  battle,  in  the  ranks  of 
the  warlike  troops,  will  they  fight  against  the 
infringers  of  peace  and  the  laws  of  humanity,  but 
also  as  simple  citizens,  inhabitants  of  the  country, 
who  should,  in  proportion  to  their  strength  and 
opportunities,  contribute  to  the  accomplishment 
by  the  Russian  Army  of  the  task  of  unparalleled 
gravity  which  awaits  it."  ' 

'  See  the  declaration  of  the  staff  of  the  Ukrainskdia  Jizn,  a 
review  which  counts  among  its  editors  and  contributors  the  chief 
representatives  of  Liberal  and  Radical  thought  in  Ukraine. 


CHAPTER   V 

I.  The  dread  of  a  Russian  victory  among  the  revolutionaries  and 
Socialists  of  Russia.  The  workers  do  not  share  this  dread. 
The  declarations  of  Kropotkin  and  Plechanov.  Why  is 
the  propaganda  resulting  from  this  apprehension  erroneous 
and  harmful? — II.  The  German,  Austrian,  and  Turkish 
Government's  endeavour  to  corrupt  the  Russian  revolution- 
aries. The  noble  reply  of  certain  of  these  latter  to  the 
agents  of  the  Austro-Germans  and  the  Turks.  Russian 
revolutionaries  in  the  French  Army. 

I 

The  last  lines  of  the  letter  of  a  Lettish  revolu- 
tionary quoted  in  the  last  chapter,  which  express 
the  hope  that  Germany  will  be  defeated,  but, 
at  the  same  time,  anxiety  as  to  the  possible  effect 
of  a  Russian  victory  on  the  domestic  life  of 
Russia,  suggest  a  very  serious  and  interesting 
problem.  It  is  the  problem  of  that  "  dread  of 
victory  '*  which  is  to  be  observed  among  certain 
circles  of  the  Russian  revolutionaries  and 
Socialists. 

The  leader  of  a  small  Russian  Social-Demo- 
cratic group,  M.  Lenin,  who  has  assumed  a  task 
of  doubtful  honour  and  utility,  the  propaga- 
tion of  this  "  dread  of  victory,"  formulates  his 
point  of  view  as  follows  : — 


230  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

In  the  actual  state  of  affairs  it  is  im- 
possible, from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Inter- 
national proletariat,  to  say  which  would  be  the 
lesser  evil  for  Socialism— an  Austro-German 
defeat,  or  a  Franco-Russo-English  defeat.  But 
for  us,  Russian  Social-Democrats,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
working-classes  and  of  the  toiling  mass  of  all 
the  Russian  peoples,  the  lesser  evil  would  be 
a  defeat  of  the  Tsarist  monarchy,  which  is  the 
most  reactionary  and  the  most  barbarous  of 
Governments,  and  which  oppresses  the  largest 
number  of  nationalities  and  the  largest  mass  of 
population  in  Europe  and  Asia."  ^ 

"  We  cannot  ignore  the  fact,"  says  the  same 
writer  in  another  article,  "  that  this  or  that  issue 
of  the  military  operations  will  facilitate  or  render 
more  difficult  our  work  of  liberation  in  Russia. 
And  we  say :  Yes,  we  hope  for  the  defeat  of 
Russia  because  it  will  facilitate  the  internal 
victory  of  Russia— the  abolition  of  her  slavery, 
her  liberation  from  the  chains  of  Tsarism."^ 

Another  Social-Democrat  and  Russian  pub- 
licist, M.  L".  Martov,  expresses  almost  the  same 
opinion,  but  in  a  much  more  prudent  form— in 
the  form  of  a  supposition  :— 

'  See  the  small  non-periodical  sheet,  the  Sozial-Demokrat^ 
published  in  Russian  at  Geneva,  which  is  the  personal  organ  of 
M.  Lenin,  October  19 14,  No.  33. 

=^  Ibid.,  No.  38,  February  19 15. 


IN  THE   BLOODY  FRAY  231 

"  The  failure  of  Russian  Tsarism  in  the  present 
war  .  .  .  would  only  once  more  aggravate  the 
contradictions  of  Russian  life  and  would  once 
more  make  immediate  the  problem  of  a  radical 
reconstitution   of   the   ancleii   regime  ^  ' 

As  will  be  seen,  the  Lettish  revolutionary 
whose  letter  we  reproduced  expressed  merely 
the  dread  of  victory,  while  M.  Lenin  expresses 
the  hope  that  Russia  will  be  defeated.  This 
nefarious  idea  was  expressed  in  the  draft  of  a 
resolution  of  which  I  have  already  spoken  as 
having  been  found  in  the  rooms  of  one  of  five 
Social-Democratic  deputies  who  were  arrested  at 
Petrograd.  The  anonymous  and  irresponsible 
authors  of  this  draft  state  therein  that  "  the  defeat 
of  the  Tsarist  monarchy  and  the  Tsar's  troops  " 
in  the  present  war  "  would  be  the  lesser  evil  " 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Russian  proletariat. 

■Happily,  the  Russian  workers  in  whose  name 
these  irresponsible  persons  profess  to  speak  are 
not  of  the  same  opinion.  On  the  contrary,  it 
may  be  asserted  that  the  Russian  working-classes 
are  resolutely  in  favour  of  the  defence  of  Russia 
and  her  victory.  Here  are  the  proofs  of  this 
assertion  : — 

The  prominent  German  journal  the  Leipziger 
Volkszeitung,    a    Socialist    organ,    published    the 
following  letter  describing  the  internal  situation 
in  Russia  in  the  middle  of  October    1914:— 
'  See  Golos,  1914,  No.  41. 


232  RUSSIA   AND    THE   GREAT   WAR 

"  A  great  majority  of  Russian  citizens,  and 
among  them  many  Social-Democrats,  are  con- 
vinced that  Germany  is  waging  an  aggressive 
war,  while  Russia  is  defending  herself  against 
a  German  invasion.  .  .  .  The  war  is  becoming 
more  and  more  popular  in  Russia.  .  .  .  The 
present  situation  bears  no  resemblance  to  that 
which  existed  ten  years  ago.  The  war  was  then 
a  d>Tiastic  war,  while  to-day  we  are  witnessing 
a  people's  war.  .  .  .  The  leader  of  the  Social- 
Democratic  faction  in  the  Duma,  M.  Tshkeidze, 
has  given  expression  to  the  following  opinion  : 
'  Russian  culture  is  but  a  small  and  weakly  tree, 
while  German  culture  is  a  mighty  oak.  We 
must  defend  the  weak  little  tree  of  our  culture 
from  the  peril  that  threatens  it.'  The  attitude 
towards  the  war  adopted  by  the  German  Social- 
Democratic  Party  has  made  a  profound  impres- 
sion on  the  Russian  Socialists.  The  Petrograd 
Committee  of  the  Russian  Social-Democratic 
Party  had  intended  to  publish  a  manifesto  against 
the  war,  but  immediately  following  upon  the  news 
that  the  German  Social-Democrats  had  declared 
for  the  war,  the  feeling  of  the  Russian 
Social-Democrats  was  considerably  modified. 
To-day  the  mass  of  the  Russian  workers  are 
saying  :  '  We  cannot  abandon  the  defensive 
and  allow  the  Germans  to  kill  us  ;  we  are 
obliged  to  defend  ourselves.'  The  tactics  of 
the    German    Social-Democrats    have    prevented 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  233 

many  opponents  of  the  war  from  raising  their 
voices  in  protest.  .  .  .  The  news  of  the  fate 
of  Louvain  and  Reims  and  other  similar  facts 
have  still  further  strengthened  the  state  of 
mind  we  have  described.  The  working-classes 
in  Russia  are  tranquil.  The  news  given  in  the 
German  newspapers  concerning  revolts,  strikes, 
etc.,  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  facts.  On 
the  contrary,  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  we 
have  had  no  serious  strike,  although  before  the 
war  broke  out  an  implacable  economic  struggle 
was  being  waged,  as  your  readers  know,  by  the 
workers.  A  great  movement  was  developing  in 
Petrograd,  and  barricades  had  even  been  seen 
in  the  streets." 

In  the  report  presented  by  the  Organizing 
Committee  of  the  Russian  Social-Democratic 
Party  at  the  conference  of  the  Socialists  of  the 
neutral  countries  held  at  Copenhagen,  we  fmd 
the  same  statement,  that,  "  unlike  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  the  present  war  has  become 
popular  among  the  masses."  In  a  letter  from 
Russia,  published  in  the  Russian  Social-Demo- 
cratic journal  Nache  Slovo  (in  Paris),  we  read 
that  "  the  masses  of  the  working-men  of  Russia 
are  not  of  a  Jingoist  temper,  but  the  hope  for  a 
'  Russian  defeat  '  .  .  .  would  meet  with  no 
sympathy  from  them."  And  in  the  Bulletin  of 
the  Organizing  Committee  of  the  Russian  Social- 
Democratic  Party  a  communication  from  Russia 


234  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

is  included,  according  to  which  "  there  is  no 
desire  that  Russia  should  be  defeated  to  be 
observed  among  the  working-classes." 

And  here  is  a  trifling  fact  which  may  con- 
vince you  as  to  the  feeling  of  the  Russian  workers 
during  the  war.  The  Government  gave  an  urgent 
order  to  a  factory  in  Petrograd  whose  "  hands  " 
were  noted  for  their  revolutionary  sentiments. 
The  managers  of  the  factory  informed  the 
workers  that  this  order  was  of  great  importance 
to  the  Russian  Army,  and  that  it  could,  according 
to  their  calculations,  be  completed  in  the  space 
of  one  month  if  the  men  would  work  as  hard 
as  possible.  The  men  set  to  and  completed  the 
work  in  the  space  of  twelve  days— that  is,  two 
and  a  half  times  more  rapidly  than  was  asked 
of  them. 

Compare  this  generous  attitude  on  the  part 
of  the  workers  with  the  hysterical  conduct  of 
those  few  irresponsible  intellectuals  who  are 
ready  to  rejoice  in  the  defeat  of  their  country 
when  attacked  by  a  cowardly  and  brutal  enemy, 
and  you  will  understand  that  their  appeal  could 
find  no  response  among  the  masses,  whose 
political  conscience  and  healthy  instinct  has  pre- 
served them  from  the  "  revolutionary  "  hysteria 
which  has  attacked  the  minds  of  a  few 
intellectuals. 

But  it  must  be  said  that  even  among  the  revo- 
lutionary   "  intellectuals  "    the    hysterical    desire 


IN  THE  BLOODY  FRAY  235 

for  a  Russian  defeat  has  not  encountered  much 
sympathy.  For  example,  the  ideological  leader 
of  modern  Russian  Anarchism,  M.  Kropotkin, 
insisted  on  the  necessity  of  victory  over  Germany. 
In  a  letter,  published  in  the  Russklya  Viedomosti 
(Moscow),  M.  Kropotkin,  while  attributing  the 
whole  immediate  responsibility  for  the  war  to 
the  Austro -German  alliance,  adds  :— 

"  As  for  the  consequences  which  a  victory  of 
the  Germans  would  have  for  us  Russians,  one 
refuses  even  to  think  of  them,  so  terrible  would 
they  be.  What  would  become  of  the  progress 
of  Russia  if  Germany  had  her  fortresses  on  the 
Niemen,  at  Riga,  at  Reval— a  whole  series  of 
Metzes,  destined  not  to  protect  the  conquered 
territory,  but  to  facilitate  fresh  aggression,  and 
which  would  directly  threaten  Petrograd  ?  "  From 
the  point  of  view  of  the  progress  of  the  whole 
of  Europe,  the  prospect  of  German  domination 
is  still  more  ghastly  :  "  No  one  who  does  not 
deliberately  close  his  eyes  can  fail  to  understand 
why  no  man  who  has  the  progress  of  humanity 
at  heart,  and  who  does  not  allow  his  ideas  to  be 
obscured  by  interest,  habit,  or  sophistry,  could 
possibly  hesitate.  We  cannot  but  desire  the  final 
defeat  of  Germany.  We  cannot  even  remain 
neutral  ;  under  the  present  circumstances  neu- 
trality means  complicity." 

The    eminent    writer    Georges    Plechanov,    the 
founder  of  the  Social-Democratic  Labour  Party 


236  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

in  Russia,  issued  a  public  protest  against  the 
obnoxious  propaganda  of  the  "  dread  of  victory  " 
which  had  a  great  influence  with  the  Russian 
democracy  and  proletariat.  On  the  15th  of 
October  1914,  the  organ  of  English  Social- 
Democracy,  Justice,  published  the  following  letter 
from  Plechanov  : — 

"  Dear  Comrades,— For  some  time  past  there 
has  been  a  good  deal  said  in  your  journal  about 
the  Franco-Russian  Alliance. 

"  If  I  am  not  mistaken  there  are  those  of  our 
comrades  in  England  who  take  quite  seriously 
the  statements  of  the  German  General  Staff,  that 
in  beginning  this  war,  they  desired  to  fight  against 
Russian  barbarism. 

"  This  argument  cannot  be  upheld.  Russian 
barbarism  is  the  despotism  of  the  Tsar.  But 
how  is  it  possible  to  believe  that  the  Emperor 
of  the  Junkers  has  any  intention  of  destroying 
the  power  of  the  Emperor  of  the  '  Black 
Hundreds'  ? 

"Since  our  Revolution  of  1905-6  Wilhelm  II 
has  been  the  strongest  support  of  his  brother 
Nicholas  II.  In  Russia  everybody  knows  it, 
and  so  true  is  it  that  even  at  the  present  time- 
even  during  the  war  itself — the  extreme  re- 
actionary party  leans  toward  Wilhelm .  The  organ 
of  this  party,  the  Russian  Flag  (which  is  known 
in  Russia  as  the  Prussian  Flag),  is  doing  its  best 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  237 

to  exonerate  the  Germans  from  the  atrocities 
which  have  called  forth  the  just  indignation  of 
the  entire  civilized  world. 

"  It  is  not  for  freedom  that  Germany  has 
declared  war.  No,  comrades  ;  she  made  war 
for  the  conquest  of  economic  supremacy.  That 
is  the  Imperialist  programme  which  she  strives 
to  realize. 

"  And,  so  far  as  my  country  is  concerned,  once 
vanquished  by  Germany  it  would  become  her 
economic  vassal.  Germany  would  impose  upon 
Russia  such  onerous  conditions  as  would  render 
her  further  economic  evolution  terribly  difficult. 
But  as  economic  evolution  is  the  basis  of  social 
and  political  evolution,  Russia  would  thus  lose 
all,  or  nearly  all,  the  chances  of  bringing  Tsarism 
to  an  end. 

"  That  is  why  there  is  among  us  only  the 
extreme  reactionary  party  which  can  reasonably 
hope  for  the  triumph  of  Germany. 

"  The  Socialist  world  must  not  be  led  astray 
by  the  phraseology  of  the  German  General  Staff. 
The  victory  of  Germany  means  the  setback  of 
progress  in  Western  Europe,  and  the  definite,  or 
almost  definite,  triumph  of  Russian  despotism."  i 

In  this  letter— brief,  but  remarkable  for  its 
clearness— Plechanov     overturns     the     principal 

'  See   the   issues    for   the    14th   of    November   and    26th   of 
December  19 14. 


238        RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

argument  of  the  "  partisans  of  defeat  "  among 
the  Russian  Socialists  and  demonstrates  that  this 
defeat,  from  the  standpoint  of  those  who  hope  for 
the  internal  liberation  of  Russia,  is  more  than 
undesirable. 

I  too  have  had  to  take  upon  myself  the  duty 
of  combating  the  propaganda  of  the  "  dread  of 
victory  "  and  the  desire  for  a  Russian  defeat. 
Having  observed  that  this  propaganda  found  a 
certain  number  of  supporters  among  political 
emigres,  I  have  delivered  half  a  score  of  lectures 
before  the  Russian  colonies  in  the  principal  towns 
of  Switzerland,  which  contain  large  numbers  of 
Russian  emigres.  I  also  expounded  my  argu- 
ments in  the  Nation,  which  I  cannot  do  better 
than   quote  : — 

"  From  the  psychological  point  of  view  a  desire 
for  a  Russian  defeat  is  intelligible  and  almost 
warrantable.  The  present  system  of  government 
in  Russia  is  so  harsh  and  so  severe,  it  excites 
so  much  hatred,  so  much  indignation  among 
Russian  democrats,  that  one  can  understand  and 
explain  the  psychological  causes  of  that  fear  of 
a  Russian  victory,  that  desire  for  a  defeat  of 
Tsarism,  which  one  finds  in  some  of  our  revo- 
lutionists at  the  present  moment.  But  while  it 
is  intelligible  from  the  psychological  point  of 
view,  this  attitude  may  be  refuted  from  the  point 
of  view  of  logic  and  politics. 

"  First  of  all,  those  who  believe  that  Tsarism 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  239 

would  be  crushed  by  a  German  victory  forget  a 
very  simple  and  indisputable  fact  —  that  the 
present  war,  which  is  a  war  of  the  masses,  of 
millions  and  millions  of  men,  touches  directly  on 
the  interests  of  the  people,  and,  in  case  of  defeat, 
not  only  the  Government,  but  also  the  people 
would  suffer  from  that  defeat.  I  believe  that 
the  people  would  suffer  much  more  than  Tsarism. 
Secondly,  I  hold  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  interests  of  the  movement  for  the  liberation 
of  the  Russian  people,  this  propaganda  of  '  the 
fear  of  victory  '  is  extremely  injurious.  It  is 
injurious  because  a  Russian  defeat  would  also 
be  a  defeat  of  the  French,  Belgian,  and  English 
democracies.  Russian  revolutionists  ought  always 
to  be  guided,  not  merely  by  the  interests  of  their 
own  people  and  their  own  liberty,  but  also  by 
those  of  other  peoples  and  by  the  liberty  of  all 
Europe.  Otherwise  they  would  run  the  risk  of 
falling  into  a  '  revolutionary  nationalism,'  con- 
cerned only  with  its  own  country,  and  ignoring 
the  interests  of  democracy  in  general  and  the 
political  progress  of  other  peoples.  The  propa- 
ganda of  '  a  fear  of  victory  '  seems  to  me  to  be 
also  injurious  because  it  is  addressed,  not  to  the 
active  sentiments  of  our  soul,  but  to  passive 
sentiments,  and,  as  it  were,  to  a  '  revolutionary 
despair.'  Those  who  favour  this  propaganda  are 
not  persons  who  have  the  moral  force  necessary 
for  a  struggle  against  Tsarism  ;    they  are  those 


240  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

who  do  not  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  victory 
of  the  people  over  Tsarism— a  victory  realized 
by  efforts  of  the  Russian  masses  themselves  ;  they 
are  those  who  trust  to  external  assistance,  to  a 
measure  of  liberty  imported  from  without.  That 
is  why  I  believe  that  this  propaganda  might  be 
damaging  to  our  revolution  ;  instead  of  rousing 
the  people  to  activity,  it  might  inspire  them  with 
despair  and  moral  weakness. 

"  I  say  it  '  might,'  because,  in  reality,  it  is  un- 
able to  do  this.  As  I  have  shown  in  the  pre- 
ceding quotations,  the  mass  of  the  people  and 
the  Socialist  workmen  in  Russia  do  not  share 
the  erroneous  opinion  of  the  representatives  of 
'  revolutionary  despair  ' — and  if  this  erroneous 
opinion  still  exists  it  is  only  among  some  small 
groups  of  Russian  political  exiles.  But  even 
among  these  latter  there  is  a  strong  current  of 
feeling  in  the  opposite  direction,  which  is  repre- 
sented, for  example,  by  a  Social-Democratic 
writer  well  known  in  Russia,  M.  Georges  Plecha- 
nov. 

"  Those  of  us  who  do  not  share  the  desperate 
desire  for  a  German  victory  (in  the  name  of  the 
Russian  Revolution  !)  are  often  accused  by  our 
friendly  critics  of  opportunism  in  the  face  of 
Tsarism.  This  accusation  has  been  recently 
formulated  by  an  English  Socialist,  Mr.  Bruce 
Glasier,  the  editor  of  the  Socialist  Review. 
He    mentions    the    abominable    crimes    of    the 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  241 

Russian  reaction,  and  the  profound  wounds  with 
which  it  has  covered  the  mutilated  body  of  our 
unhappy    people.      You   may   set   your   mind   at 
rest,  Mr.  Bruce  Glasier  !     We  do  not  forget  those 
crimes  and  those  wounds.     They  are  our  wounds 
and  they  still  torture  as  to-day.     But  we  wish  to 
cure  them  ourselves.     We  do  notl^elieve  that  it  is 
possible    to    cure    an    evil    by    another    and    still 
greater  evil,  that  the  wounds  caused  by  Tsarism 
can    be    cured    by    the    blows    of    German    Im- 
perialism.     Even  if  one  admits,  as  the  German 
Government  affirms,  that  the  Russian  Government 
has  desired  the  present  war,  one  cannot  desire  a 
German  victory.     Suppose,  my  English  colleague, 
that  you  were  living  on  the  sixth  floor  of  a  house, 
the  first  floor  of  which  was  occupied  by  the  land- 
lord.    That  landlord  behaves  badly  to  you,  and 
you  hate  him.     But  a  fire  breaks  out  in  the  house. 
You  even  believe  that  the  landlord  himself  has 
caused  the  fire  in  order  to  obtain  the  insurance 
money.     Would  you  not,  in  these  circumstances^ 
use  all  your  efforts  to  fight  the  fire  which  may 
destroy,  not  only  the  first  floor  but  your  own  flat 
as    well  ?      You    must    first    deal    with    the    fire, 
and   afterwards    settle   accounts    with    the    land- 
lord. 

"  These  are  the  simple  arguments  that  prevent 
me  from  trusting  to  a  military  defeat  of  Russia 
as  a  means  of  winning  our  liberty." 


16 


242  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

II 

The  propaganda  of  the  "  dread  of  victory " 
was  compromised  in  the  eyes  of  the  working- 
classes  of  our  country  by  the  stupidities  com- 
mitted by  those  who  conducted  it,  and  by  the 
machinations  of  the  Governments  of  Germany, 
Austria,  and  Turkey. 

Certain  of  those  irresponsible  politicians  who 
declared  themselves  in  favour  of  the  defeat  of 
their  country  went  as  far  as  to  insist  on  the  neces- 
sity of  boycotting  all  work  and  all  institutions 
having  any  connection  with  the  war.  The 
ridiculous  question  was  actually  asked,  whether 
a  "  revolutionary  "  has  the  right  to  participate  in 
the  struggle  against  the  misfortunes  occasioned 
by  the  war — whether  a  Socialist  has  the  right, 
for  example,  to  sew  shirts  or  knit  socks  for  the 
wounded,  etc.  When  the  Socialist  deputy  from 
the  Caucasus,  M.  Skobelev,  commenced  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  organization  of  revictualling 
stations  for  the  refugees  in  the  frontier  regions 
and  the  troops,  M.  Lenin  wrote  in  his  journal 
that  M.  Skobelev  was  devoid  of  "  an  elementary 
Socialist  sense  of  honour,"  that  he  was  the  friend 
of  Tsarism  and  the  reaction,  etc.  These  absurdi- 
ties being  printed  in  the  name  of  Socialism 
provoked  a  feeling  of  displeasure  even  among 
the  firmest  supporters  of  M.  Lenin,  and  revealed 
to    all    the    danger    of    his     quasi -revolutionary 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  243 

hysteria.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  working- 
classes  could  not  and  would  not  respond  to  these 
hysterical  appeals,  for  although  an  exiled  poli- 
tician living  in  a  neutral  country  (he  publishes 
his  journal  in  Geneva)  may  risk  uttering  such 
absurdities,  the  working  man  living  in  Russia 
can  not  only  not  adopt  them— he  cannot  even 
understand  them.  And  the  Russian  workers,  as 
far  as  possible,  endeavoured  to  aid  their  comrades 
who  were  called  to  the  colours  and  the  families 
of  the  latter. 

Moreover,  the  propaganda  in  question  was  soon 
discredited  among  the  Russian  revolutionaries  by 
the  incontestable  fact  that  the  Governments  of 
the  hostile  countries  made  attempts  to  utilize  the 
revolutionary  movement  in  general  and  its  hysteri- 
cal manifestations— that  is,  the  desire  to  see  Russia 
defeated— for  the  advantage  of  the  Turco-Austro- 
Germanic  Alliance. 

In  the  same  journal — the  Sozlal-Demokrat—m 
which  M.  Lenin  expressed  his  desire  to  see  Russia 
defeated,  the  following  letter  was  published  from 
a  Social-Democratic  workman  of  Petrograd  : — 

"  We  could  not  have  believed  that  the  German 
Social-Democrats  could  fall  so  low  as  to  associate 
themselves  with  their  Kaiser  .  .  .  even  under 
the  pretext  of  fighting  against  Russian  Tsarism. 
The  Russian  Revolution  neither  sought  nor  de- 
sired such  support.  The  news  has  been  circu- 
lated  in  Petrograd  and   throughout  the   country 


244  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

that  Wilhelm  II  counts  chiefly  on  the  Russian 
revolution.  The  attitude  of  the  German  Socialists, 
or  to  speak  more  precisely,  their  treason  against 
the  international  solidarity  of  labour,  as  well  as  the 
whole  political  situation,  made  it  impossible  for 
us  to  make  any  active  protest  against  the  war 
during  the  first  days  of  mobilization."  ' 

As  my  readers  have  already  seen,  the  rumour 
of  which  this  writer  speaks,  to  the  efifect  that 
the  German  Government  hoped  to  profit  by  the 
revolutionary  movement  in  Russia  in  its  conflict 
with  the  Russian  Army,  was  by  no  means  without 
foundation,  for  this  very  eventuality  was  fore- 
seen by  the  secret  report  of  the  German  General 
Staff.  But  this  is  not  all.  There  are  many  docu- 
ments which  prove  that  the  German,  Austrian, 
and  Turkish  Governments  have  been  taking 
practical  measures  to  attain  their  ignoble  end. 

In  certain  cases  the  Austrian  police,  which  after 
the  declaration  of  war  arrested  numbers  of 
Russian  subjects  domiciled  in  Austria,  released 
those  whom  they  knew  to  be  revolutionaries. 
Here  is  a  highly  characteristic  case,  narrated  by 
the  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Vorwdrts  (a 
Jewish  Social-Democratic  journal)  and  repro- 
duced in  the  Russian  Social-Democratic  journal 
Golos  : — 

"  In  a  small  village  of  the  Austrian  Tyrol  lived 
a  comrade  (a  Russian  emigre)  who  had  no  pass- 
'  Sozial-Demokrat,  Geneva,  19 14,  No.  t^2>- 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  245 

port.  He  was  arrested,  among  others.  During 
the  interrogation  he  declared  that  he  was  a 
poUtical  refugee,  and  had  been  obUged  to  leave 
Russia. 

"  '  To  what  section  of  the  Russian  Social-Demo- 
cratic Party  do  you  belong  ?  '  demanded  the  police 
commissary.  '  To  an  extreme  section  or  a 
moderate  section  ?  ' 

"  The  comrade  replied  :  '  I  belong  to  the  Ex- 
treme Left ;    I  am  a  supporter  of  L'enin.' 

"  Thereupon  the  commissary  became  amiable 
and  gave  him  a  safe  conduct  through  for  Switzer- 
land." ' 

Another  instance  of  the  same  kind  was  related 
to  me  by  M.  Felix  Kon,  a  well-known  Polish 
Socialist.  When  war  was  declared  he  was  in 
Lemberg.  The  local  police  arrested  three  Russian 
Social-Democrats  who  were  passing  through 
Lemberg  on  their  way  to  Russia.  M.  Kon  applied 
to  the  prefect  of  police,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining 
their  liberation.  What  was  his  astonishment 
when  he  learned  from  the  prefect  that  the  latter 
had  not  only  of  his  own  accord  released  the  three 
Socialists  arrested  by  his  agents,  but  had  given 
them  railway  tickets  and  told  them  of  the  route 
by  which  they  would  reach  Russia  most  speedily. 

In  other  cases  the  Governments  of  the  countries 
at  war  with  Russia   did  not  confine   themselves 

^  See    Vorwdrts  of  New  York,  iSth  of  September    1914,  and 
Golos,  Paris,  T3th  of  October  19 14. 


246         RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

to  a  similar  amiable  treatment  of  the  revolu- 
tionaries, whose  sincere  and  disinterested  activi- 
ties they  hoped  to  utilize,  but  even  attempted 
direct  corruption. 

Here  is  an  instance. 

The  Social-Democratic  Russian  journal  Novy 
Mir,  published  in  New  York,  inserted  in  its 
columns  the  following  communication  from  Con- 
stantinople, where  there  were  numerous  political 
refugees,  especially  from  the  Caucasus. 

"  In  Constantinople  there  are  people  who  call 
themselves  Ukrainian  and  Georgian  Nationalist- 
Separatists,  who  have  entered  into  relations  with 
the  Turkish  and  German  Governments  with  the 
object  of  effecting  a  so-called  liberation  of 
Ukraine  and  Georgia.  These  gentry  introduce 
themselves  to  the  Russian  emigres  living  in  Con- 
stantinople in  the  name  of  democracy  and  the 
revolution,  and  in  the  name  of  Socialism  even, 
and  attempt  to  involve  even  our  Social -Demo- 
cratic comrades  in  a  dirty  and  hazardous  affair. 
The  means  which  these  individuals  employ  for 
the  realization  of  their  desires  are  various,  but 
are  always  inadmissible  from  the  point  of  view 
of  simple  honesty,  to  say  no  more.  We  cannot 
say  more  for  the  moment.  The  time  will  come 
when  the  true  character  of  these  individuals  will 
be  revealed,  as  happened  in  the  case  of  similar 
'  nationalists  '  at  the  time  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  and  we  will  then  return  to  the  matter.    Our 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  247 

Social -Democratic  comrades  in  Constantinople, 
directly  the  idea  was  mooted — the  idea  of  the 
so-called  liberation  of  Ukraine  and  Georgia  by 
means  of  Turkish  and  German  aid — declared 
in  sweeping  terms,  that  they  were  opposed  to 
unions  of  this  kind,  and  regarded  the  attitude  and 
the  actions  of  these  persons  as  shameful  and 
treasonable." 

The  Russian  Social-Democratic  emigres  even 
voted  a  special  resolution  in  respect  of  the  ignoble 
propositions  made  to  them  by  the  German  and 
Turkish  agents. 

"  The  group  of  the  Social-Democratic  Labour 
Party  at  Constantinople  declare  that,  being  con- 
cerned with  the  struggle  of  the  proletariat,  on 
taking  into  consideration  the  present  situation  it 
absolutely  rejects  all  proposals  having  as  their 
aim  the  so  -  called  liberation  of  Ukraine  and 
Georgia  and  emanating  from  any  of  the  Govern- 
ments to  -  day  existing. — Constantinople,  the 
15/28  September    19 14." 

The  Russian  political  refugees  who  voted  for 
this  resolution  gave  it  as  moderate  a  form  as 
possible,  in  order  to  permit  of  its  publication 
in  the  local  press.  "  But,"  relates  the  Novy  Mir, 
"  being  far  from  numerous,  and  terrorized  by  the 
'  Nationalists,'  who  were  supported  by  the  hidden 
forces  of  the  agents  of  the  Turkish  Government," 
they  were  not  able  to  publish  even  this. 

Later    on    the    Austro-Turco-German    agents 


248  RUSSIA  AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

renewed  their  ignoble  proposals  to  the  political 
emigres  from  the  Caucasus  residing  in  Constanti- 
nople, and  the  latter  replied  that  *'  Turkey  is  one 
of  the  least  civilized  and  most  backward  of  the 
monarchies  of  Asia.  The  masses  of  the  people 
are  in  Turkey  more  oppressed  and  more  humili- 
ated than  in  any  other  country.  .  .  .  To  enter 
into  negotiations  or  to  conclude  an  agreement 
with  the  Government  of  a  country  thus 
oppressed  .  .  .  would  be  a  criminal  error, 
unfitting  the  dignity  of  a  Social-Democrat, 
or  of  a  mere  democrat  and  progressive.  .  .  . 
Turkish  policy  seeks  to  profit  by  the  popular 
movement  against,  and  the  discontent  felt  in  re- 
spect of,  the  Russian  Government  in  the  Caucasus, 
and  particularly  in  Georgia  ...  it  seeks  to 
ensure  the  profit  of  its  egoistical  and  aggressive 
interests.  ...  At  the  present  time  a  policy  of 
separatism  would  be  worse  than  harmful  to 
the  Caucasian  peoples,  and  particularly  to  the 
Georgians.  ...  A  modification  of  the  existing 
state  of  affairs  in  the  Caucasus,  and  in  Georgia  in 
particular,  is  possible  only  through  the  united 
efforts  of  the  population  and  the  revolutionary 
Russian  people."  Such  was  the  noble  reply  of 
the  Georgian  Socialists  to  the  Austro  -  Turco  - 
German  tempters  and  agents-provocateurs . 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  "  Union  for  the  Libe- 
ration of  the  Ukraine,"  organized  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Viennese  police  and  the  Austrian 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  249 

General  Staff,  sent  "  delegates  "  to  some  of  the 
Swiss  towns  in  which  Russian  political  emigres 
are  domiciled,  with  the  object  of  corrupting  them 
and  of  obtaining  their  assistance  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  an  insurrection  in  Russia  during  the  war. 
In  particular  they  approached  a  group  of 
Caucasian  (Georgian)  Social  Democrats,  and 
offered  them  money  if  they  would  work  to  pro- 
duce an  insurrection.  But  the  Caucasian  exiles 
in  Switzerland  did  as  did  their  comrades  in  Con- 
stantinople— refused  to  become  the  tools  of  the 
Hapsburg  monarchy  or  to  organize  a  revolt  in 
Russia  with  the  aid  of  Austrian  or  German 
money. 

"  We,  the  Georgian  Social-Democrats,  mem- 
bers of  the  Social-Democratic  Labour  Party  of 
Russia,  have  struggled,  and  shall  always  continue 
to  strive,  with  all  our  party,  against  the  Russian 
Government,  which  stifles  all  democratic  move- 
ments in  the  Russian  State  and  tramples  on  the 
natural  aspirations  of  the  peoples  inhabiting  that 
State.  ...  In  this  conflict  we  support  all  revo- 
lutionary movements,  all  oppositions,  and, 
amongst  others,  the  Nationalist  movement  when 
it  is  directed  against  the  Russian  Government 
and  makes  for  liberty— if  it  is  directed  by  the 
local  progressive  democracy  and  is  not  in  any 
way  contrary  to  the  ideals  and  interests  of  the 
proletariat.  But  as  to  the  proposal  of  an 
organization    which    operates    by    the    material 


250         RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

assistance  and  under  the  guidance  of  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  and  the  Hapsburgs  and  their  kin,  we 
declare  pubhcly  and  openly  that  we  do  not  know 
what  peoples  are  likely  to  be  liberated  by  them. 
On  the  contrary,  one  of  them  has  destroyed  a 
nation  as  free  and  progressive  as  Belgium  ;  and 
as  for  the  history  of  the  Hapsburgs,  it  is,  like 
that  of  Tsarism,  a  history  of  continual  subjection 
and  enslavement  of  many  peoples.  And  their 
new  ally,  Turkey,  as  all  the  world  knows,  is  noted 
for  a  barbarous  and  treacherous  policy  in  all  that 
concerns  the  small  nations.  Taking  all  these 
facts  into  consideration,  we  firmly  reject  the 
proposal  to  form  such  an  organization  as  that 
described." 

In  some  cases  the  delegates  of  the  "  Union  for 
the  Liberation  of  the  Ukraine  "  were  simply 
shown  to  the  door  by  the  Russian  revolutionaries 
whom  they  dared  to  approach.  Once,  however, 
they  nearly  caught  in  their  net  a  Caucasian  revo- 
lutionary, who,  after  the  declaration  of  war,  was 
living  in  Switzerland.  The  agents  of  the  Union 
provided  this  Russian  revolutionary  with  a  false 
Austrian  (sic)  passport  and  gave  him  money. 
He  was  then  sent  to  Vienna,  where  the  members 
of  the  Union  explained  to  him  the  necessity  of 
organizing  an  insurrection  in  Russia,  in  the 
interests  of  the  "  Russian  revolution,"  or  to  put 
the  matter  more  plainly,  in  the  interests  of  the 
Austro-German  General  Staff.     From  Vienna  he 


IN   THE    BLOODY   FRAY  251 

was  sent  to  Constantinople,  where  Herr  Parvus,  a 
German  Socialist  journalist,  gave  him  yet  further 
instruction.'  Finally  the  agents  of  the  Ukrainian 
(and  also  Austro-Turco-German)  Union  invited 
the  Russian  to  enter  a  "  Georgian  Legion  " 
organized  by  the  Turkish  Minister  of  War  with 
the  object  of  provoking  an  insurrection  against 
Russian  rule  in  the  Caucasus.  Fortunately,  the 
Russian,  although  these  gentry  had  caught  him 
in  their  treacherous  net,  perfectly  understood 
their  intentions  and  succeeded  in  escaping.  He 
returned  to  Switzerland,  where  he  revealed  their 
ignoble   machinations. 

To  conclude  the  narration  of  these  examples 
of  political  baseness,  I  will  quote  a  passage  from 
a  letter  sent  me  by  a  well-known  Ukrainian 
patriot  and  Social-Democrat  (a  patriot  in  the 
best  sense  of  the  word),  who,  during  the  first 
five  months   of  the   war,   was   living   in  Austria. 

"  A  month  ago,"  he  writes,  "  I  arrived  in  X  " 
(here  follows  the  name  of  a  Swiss  town),  "  but 
until  then  was  in  Vienna,  from  which  I  escaped 
with  much  difficulty. 

"  Living  in  Vienna  just  now  is  a  painful  busi- 
ness.    The  Ukrainian  politicians  have  nearly  all 

^  The  part  played  by  Herr  Parvus  in  this  affair  is  even  more 
disgusting  than  that  of  Herr  Sudekum,  who  undertook  the  un- 
grateful task  of  giving  treacherous  instructions  to  a  French  soldier 
imprisoned  in  Germany,  and  released  by  the  German  military 
authorities,  so  that  he  might  return  to  France  and  there  conduct 
a  "peace  propaganda." 


252  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

been  corrupted.  As  for  the  Ukrainian  and  Rus- 
sian political  refugees,  the  Austrian  Government 
gave  them  a  great  deal  of  money  for  the  purpose 
of  organizing  a  revolution  in  Russia,  thereby 
creating  such  depravation  among  my  compatriots 
that  my  nerves  could  hardly  support  the  atmo- 
sphere of  Vienna." 

To  complete  the  picture  I  will  add  that  a 
Russian  Social -Democrat  published  in  the  press 
a  letter  (over  his  own  signature)  in  which  he 
stated  that  one  of  the  principal  leaders  of  the 
Union  for  the  Liberation  of  Ukraine  was 
attached  to  the  Viennese  police  service  as  a 
secret  agent.  This  accusation  has  not  been 
contradicted. 

On  the  2nd  of  March  1 9 1 5  the  Genevese 
journal  La  Suisse  published  the  following,  which 
gives  some  idea  of  the  degree  of  baseness  and 
stupidity  of  which  the  agents  of  the  Austrian 
Government  are  capable  in  their  fruitless 
endeavours  to  corrupt  the  Russian  revolu- 
tionaries :— 

"  On  the  Tuesday  of  last  week  one  of  the 
leaders  of  the  Socialist  Party  of  Geneva  received 
a  visit  from  an  individual  who  stated  that  he 
was  delegated  by  a  Socialist  Party  in  the  East. 
A  meeting  was  arranged  for  the  same  evening 
at  the  Cafe  Grutli.  But  .  .  .  the  Genevese 
Socialist  insisted  on  receiving  further  information 
as  to  the  identity  of  his  visitor.     The  latter  was 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  253 

therefore  forced  to  show  his  cards — or  rather  his 
card. 

"  He  was  none  other  than  an  official  personage, 
Captain  B.,  the  attache  of  a  beUigerent  Power, 
residing  not  far  from  Geneva.  Without  further 
preamble  he  asked  to  be  put  in  touch  with 
persons  of  influence  in  the  Russian  Socialist 
Party. 

"  Foreseeing  his  mission,  the  Genevese  Socialist 
resolved  to  see  the  end  of  the  matter.  A  second 
interview  was  fixed  .  .  .  two  '  persons  of  in- 
fluence '  in  the  advanced  Russian  party  being 
present. 

"  '  I  am  ordered,'  commenced  the  Captain,  '  to 
put  myself  in  touch  with  influential  members  of 
the  Russian  Socialist  Party  in  order  to  get  into 
communication  with  the  interior  of  Russia .  These 
persons  have  only  to  establish  relations  with  our 
confidential  agents,  our  mercantile  [sic]  attache 
at  Berne.  But  all  this  is  absolutely  secret.'  .  .  . 
But  what  do  you  want  us  to  do  with  your 
commercial   attache  ?     -We   are  not   merchants  !  ' 

"  He  is  called  a  commercial  attache,  but  he 
really  deals  with  political  questions,  and  can  put 

you  into  touch  with  Count  .     But  when  you 

meet  him  you  must  not  seem  to  know  him.  But 
this  is  how  you  will  recognize  them  :  they  are 
both  clean-shaven,  and  Count  B.  has  fair 
hair.'    .    .    . 

"  Then  he  concluded  : 


254  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

The  enemies  of  the  Russian  Government  are 
our  friends,  our  Karneraden,  and  we  are  fighting 
together  for  civilization.' 

"  The  emissary  had  emptied  his  bag.  He  was 
not  kept  waiting  for  his  reply. 

"  '  1/  said  one  of  the  Russians,  '  am  a  political 
exile.  I  have  lived  in  Geneva,  where  I  took 
refuge,  for  ten  years.  Before  the  war  I  passed 
through  very  difficult  times.  Your  Government 
never  thought  of  me  then.  Why  does  it  display 
such  solicitude  now  concerning  the  Russian 
political   refugees   in   Switzerland  ? ' 

"  And  as  he  received  no  reply,  the  political 
refugee    continued  : 

"  '  You  say  you  are  fighting  for  civilization  ? 
But  there  is  one  State  which  is  certainly  most 
highly  civilized,  and  which  you  have  invaded — 
Belgium  !  There  is  another  and  more  demo- 
cratic State,  of  which  you  occupy  ten  depart- 
ments. On  the  other  hand,  you  are  allies  of 
Mohammed  V,  whose  Government  has  persecuted 
the  Armenians  for  more  than  three  hundred 
years.  In  that  case,  how  should  you  make  use 
of  us  in  order  to  overthrow  our  Government  to 
the  profit  of  your  alliance?  If  we  form  an 
alliance  it  would  be  with  the  proletariat  of  your 
country,  to  institute  a  social  State  which  would 
rid  us  of  our  tyrants  and  of  yours.' 

"  The  reply  of  the  Genevese  Socialist  was  not 
less  peremptory  : 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  255 

"  .  .  .  '  You  insult  the  Swiss  Socialists  by 
thinking  them  capable  of  acting  the  go-between 
for  your  Government  in  respect  of  our  Russian 
comrades  ;  you  insult  them  by  supposing  that 
they  would  place  themselves  at  your  disposal 
for  cash.  Before  the  war  you  dissolved  the 
Reichsrath  in  order  to  prevent  the  working- 
classes  of  your  country  from  protesting  against 
your  machinations.  When  at  Budapest  the  pro- 
letariat showed  itself  in  favour  of  universal 
suffrage,  you  had  it  shot  down  by  the  troops. 
It  is  very  imprudent  of  you  to  ask  the  brothers 
of  those  same  workers  to  conspire  in  favour  of 
your  Government. 

*'  '  Tell  your  superiors  that  they  have  made  a 
grave  mistake  in  supposing  that  we  should  place 
ourselves  at  their  disposal,  and  warn  them  not 
to  try  such  tricks  again.' 

"  Piteously  Captain  B.  excused  himself  :  '  You 
understand,  I  was  ordered  to  do  this.  ...  I 
am  a  man  of  straw.  I  am  forty-seven  years  of 
age    .    .    .' 

"  But  the  Genevese  and  the  Russians  left 
the  cafe,  leaving  the  Captain  to  his  reflec- 
tions." 

Such  are  the  facts.  In  the  history  of  modern 
political  infamy  they  will  doubtless  occupy  a 
place  worthy  of  them. 

It  is  very  natural  that  the  Russian  Socialist 
organizations  to  whom  the  Austro-Turco-German 


256  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

agents  made  their  ignoble  propositions  should 
have  declined  them.  Even  if  we  ignore  the 
shameful  nature  of  these  proposals,  they  were 
unacceptable,  not  only  because  their  revolutionary 
sense  of  honour  and  their  political  conscience 
would  not  permit  them  to  form  an  alliance  with 
the  monarchies  of  Austria,  Germany,  and  Turkey 
against  Tsarism.  They  wished  to  free  them- 
selves by  their  own  efforts,  not  by  the  aid  of 
Austro -German  and  Turkish  officers.  Again,  the 
majority  of  the  Russian  democrats  regard  the 
cause  of  the  Triple  Entente  in  the  present  war 
as  a  more  righteous  cause  than  that  of  the  Turco- 
German  alliance.  Not  to  speak  of  the  Russian 
democrats,  moreover,  many  of  the  Austrian 
democrats  are  of  the  same  opinion.  In  La  Suisse 
(Geneve,  2nd  of  February  191 5)  I  read  the 
following  tragic  story  :— 

"At  Saint-Imier  [Switzerland]  dwelt  a  work- 
ing-class family  whose  head  was  a  young 
Austrian,  Franz  Fingust  (born,  in  1882,  at  Mar- 
burg, in  Styria).  On  the  31st  of  January  19 14 
he  killed  himself,  having  previously  killed  his 
wife,  aged  29  years,  and  his  two  children,  aged 
7  and  20  months. 

"  It  was  by  agreement  with  his  wife  that  he 
took  this  fatal  step.  Fingust,  who  was  a  thought- 
ful man  and  a  good  worker,  had  been  called 
to  the  colours  in  Austria.  In  a  letter  addressed 
to  one  of  his  friends,  the  unfortunate  man  stated 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  257 

that  he  would  rather  die  with  his  family  than  go 
to  be  killed  in  an  unjust  cause.'" 

How  little  the  great  majority  of  Russian  Socia- 
lists and  revolutionaries  heeded  the  propaganda  of 
the  hysterical  desire  for  a  Russian  defeat  the 
reader  may  judge  by  the  fact  that  a  considerable 
number  of  the  Russian  political  refugees  in 
foreign  countries  enlisted,  as  volunteers,  in  the 
French  Army,  in  order  to  help  France  to  fight 
the  Germans.  In  order  to  emphasize  their  feel- 
ings they  formed,  in  one  of  the  "  foreign  regi- 
ments "  in  the  service  of  France  a  "  Russian 
Republican  company."  And  the  soil  of  France 
is  already  red  with  the  blood  of  the  soldiers  of 
this  company. 


17 


CHAPTER    VI 

I.  The  activities  of  public  institutions  and  private  initiative.   The 
"  Union  of  the  Zemstvos  "  and  the  "  Union  of  the  Cities." — 

II.  The  rural  communes  and  co-operative  associations  in  the 
campaign  against  the  misfortunes  produced  by  the  war. — 

III.  The  intellectual  youth  of  Russia  and  the  war. — IV.  The 
press  in  Russia  during  the  war. 

I 

While  the  military  authorities  were  mobiHzing 
the  mihtary  forces  of  Russia  against  the  foreign 
invasion,  the  mobilization  of  the  social  forces 
of  the  country  was  spontaneously  effected,  and 
those  forces  prepared  for  a  great  campaign 
against  the  misfortunes  produced  by  the  war. 
To  support  the  wives  and  children  of  reservists 
called  to  the  colours,  to  combat  the  economic 
disorder  occasioned  by  a  sudden  dearth  of  labour, 
to  help  in  the  evacuation  of  sick  and  wounded, 
to  organize  medical  relief  for  them,  to  organize 
relief  for  the  refugees  of  regions  invaded  by  the 
enemy,  to  assist  the  military  authorities  in  the 
difficult  work  of  revictualling  the  troops  and  fur- 
nishing them  with  clothing,  etc.— such  are  the 
tasks  assumed  by  public  institutions  and  private 

258 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  259 

associations,  some  of  which  already  existed 
before  the  war,  while  others  were  created  ad  hoc. 

The  most  important  of  these  organizations  are 
the  "  Union  of  the  Zemstvos  "  and  the  "  Union 
of  the  Cities."  Ten  days  after  the  declaration 
of  war  a  Congress  of  all  the  Russian  Zemstvos 
was  convoked  in  Moscow— that  is,  a  Congress 
of  all  the  local  self  -  governing  bodies  of 
Governments  and  districts.  Thirty-five  Govern- 
ments of  European  Russia  were  represented 
by  their  delegates  at  this  Congress,  which 
elected  a  Central  Committee,  composed  of 
two  delegates  from  each  Government,  The 
duty  of  this  Committee  was  to  arrange  for 
the  evacuation  and  transport  of  sick  and  wounded 
soldiers,  the  organization  of  central  depots  of 
equipment  and  medicaments,  the  creation  of 
medical  and  nursing  staffs,  the  creation  of  large 
hospitals,  etc. 

The  same  duties  were  assumed  by  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  Union  of  the  Cities,  whose 
Congress  also  was  convoked  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war.  This  Committee  is  composed  of 
delegates  from  the  municipalities,  in  the  pro- 
portion of  ten  delegates  for  each  city  having 
more  than  a  million  inhabitants,  five  from  each 
city  having  more  than  750,000  inhabitants,  three 
from  each  city  of  500-750,000  inhabitants,  two 
from  each  city  of  100-500,000  inhabitants,  and 
one  from  each  city  having  less  than  100,000 
inhabitants . 


260  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

To  give  some  idea  of  the  amount  of  work 
accomplished  by  these  two  great  organizations, 
it  is  enough  to  say  that  the  Union  of  the  Zemstovs 
organized,  in  the  space  of  three  weeks,  hospitals 
for  64,000  sick  and  wounded. 

The  forms  of  activity  of  the  public  institu- 
tions and  the  private  associations  which  have 
evolved  during  the  campaign  against  the  miseries 
of  warfare  are  extremely  varied  and  numerous. 
The  Universities,  the  scientific  societies,  work- 
shops and  factories,  the  secondary  schools,  the 
various  corporations  (those  of  the  advocates, 
school-teachers,  engineers,  etc.),  organized  their 
own  hospitals,  ambulance  -  trains,  etc.  Collec- 
tions of  money  and  of  gifts  in  kind  (clothing, 
tobacco  for  the  troops,  etc.)  were  made 
every  day  with  unfailing  success.  By  the 
middle  of  October  the  Union  of  the  Zemstvos 
alone  was  already  maintaining  130,661  beds  for 
wounded  soldiers,  thirty-five  ambulance-trains, 
three  ambulance  corps  to  care  for  the  wounded 
at  the  extreme  front,  a  great  linen  depot,  a  depot 
of  surgical  material,  a  central  pharmaceutical 
depot,  etc. I  The  same  energy  was  manifested 
by  the  Union  of  the  Cities. 

n 

But  the  most  remarkable  fact  in  the  reassuring 
picture   of   social   activity   in   Russia   during   the 
'  See  the  Sovremenny  Mir,  Petrograd,  December  19 14. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  261 

Great  War  is  the  fact  of  the  efforts  made  by 
the  people  themselves. 

The  war  broke  out  just  when  the  work  of 
the  peasants  in  their  fields  was  at  its  heaviest. 
The  call  for  reservists  deprived  the  countryside 
of  hundreds  of  thousands,  nay,  millions,  of 
workers,  who  were  so  necessary  to  the  gathering 
of  the  harvest,  the  thrashing  of  corn,  and  the 
autumn  sowings.  Grain  being  the  greatest 
wealth  of  Russia,  the  situation  might  have  been 
extremely  difficult  had  not  the  Russian  peasantry 
proved  itself  equal  to  the  occasion. 

Immediately  after  the  departure  of  the 
reservists  those  who  were  not  called  to  the 
colours  took  upon  their  shoulders  the  heavy 
agricultural  tasks  abandoned  by  those  who  had 
left  for  the  front. 

In  those  regions  of  Russia  where  the  rural 
commune,  or  mir,  still  exists  the  latter  replaced 
by  its  collective  forces  the  individual  forces  of 
the  reservists  who  had  been  forced  suddenly  to 
leave  their  peaceful  labours  for  the  labours  of 
war  and  the  harvest  of  death.  The  mirskle 
skhody  (the  assemblies  of  the  members  of  the 
rural  commune)  in  many  villages  voted  special 
resolutions  concerning  the  relief  and  assistance 
of  families  whose  members  were  called  to 
the   Army. 

The  skhod  of  the  village  of  Lipnitza  (in  the 
district  of  Sevsk)   unanimously  decides  that  the 


262  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT   WAR 

agricultural  work  in  progress  in  the  fields  of 
the  reservists  shall  be  terminated  by  the  mir, 
as  well  as  the  work  of  the  autumn  sowing  ;  neces- 
sitous families  will  receive  from  the  mir  wood 
for  fuel,  and  this  wood  is  to  be  delivered  at 
their  houses  by  the  m//--— that  is,  the  peasants 
who  have  not  gone  to  the  war  will  cut  the  wood 
and  haul  it  from  the  forest  to  the  izbas  in  which 
the  families  of  reservists  dwell  ;  and  the  poorest 
families  will  receive  gratuitously  grain  sufficient 
for  their  needs,  provided  by  other  members  of 
the  commune  by  means  of  a  special  collection. 

The  skhod  of  one  of  the  communes  of  the 
Government  of  Riazan  decided  to  take  all  neces- 
sary measures  to  ensure  that  "  not  a  single  strip 
of  land  belonging  to  a  reservist  shall  remain 
untilled." 

In  the  district  of  Saratov  the  corn  belonging 
to  reservists  was  harvested  and  carried  into  their 
barns  by  the  mirs,  which  also  undertook  the  work 
of  sowing  their  lands. 

In  the  Government  of  Oufa  the  inhabitants 
of  forty-three  villages— Russian  and  Bashkir 
villages— founded  a  "  confraternity  "  to  assist  the 
families  of  the  soldiers  in  their  agricultural 
labours   and  also  with   pecuniary  support. 

It  is  the  same  in  those  regions  where  the  rural 
commune  does  not  now  exist. 

The  peasants  of  many  of  the  villages  of  the 
Government  of  Vitebsk  took  upon  themselves  all 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  263 

work  not  terminated  by  the  reservists.  The  same 
in  the  Governments  of  Ekaterinoslav,  Kharkov, 
Moghilev,  Kherson,  etc. 

In  one  volost  (canton)  of  the  Government  of 
Poltava  the  peasants  not  called  to  the  colours 
assembled  on  the  day  appointed  in  the  fields 
belonging  to  the  families  of  soldiers  and  com- 
pleted the  necessary  labours  there  and  then. 

The  skhod  of  the  village  of  Alexandrovka,  in 
the  district  of  Ackermann  (Bessarabia),  decided 
to  leave  its  own  tasks  then  and  there  in  order 
first  to  complete  the  work  remaining  to  be  done 
on  the  fields  of  reservists.  And  so  that  the 
latter  should  not  worry  about  their  aban- 
doned fields  the  same  skhod  sent  them  the 
following  letter :  "  Identifying  itself  with  the 
destinies  of  the  dear  defenders  of  our  country, 
the  commune  of  Alexandrovka  has  decided  to 
gather  the  harvest  in  the  fields  of  the  reservists 
called  to  the  colours,  and  to  beg  them  to  accept 
the  assurance  that  their  families  will  not  be  left 
without  support." 

According  to  the  calculations  made  by  a 
statistician,  the  labour  gratuitously  furnished  by 
the  peasants  in  aid  of  the  families  of  their  fellow- 
villagers  who  have  left  for  the  front  may  be 
expressed  in  money,  approximately,  by  a  figure 
of  1 6  millions  of  roubles.  "  This  was,"  he  says, 
"  the  greatest  material  sacrifice  of  all  those  which 
were  made  by  the  various  groups  of  the  Russian 


264  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

society  and  people  during  the  first  weeks  of  the 
war."  I  To  appreciate  this  sacrifice  at  its  true 
worth  we  must  remember  that  the  rural  popula- 
tion is  the  most  indigent  portion  of  the  Russian 
population. 

In  addition  to  this  assistance  "  in  kind,"  in 
the  form  of  agricultural  labour,  the  populations 
of  the  Russian  countrysides  organized  relief  and 
assistance  for  the  families  of  soldiers. 

The  skhod  of  the  village  of  Fominki,  in  the 
Government  of  Vladimir,  decided  to  distribute 
gratuitously  seed-corn  to  necessitous  families  of 
soldiers.  The  skhod  of  the  Shungenskaia  Volost, 
in  the  Government  of  Kostroma,  imposed  on  all 
the  inhabitants  of  that  volost  a  tax  of  one  rouble 
per  head  in  order  to  organize  a  relief  fund  for 
the  benefit  of  wives  and  children  of  reservists. 
Similar  cases  were  reported  from  every  corner 
of  the  Russian  Empire. 

The  mutual  credit  organizations  and  the  co- 
operative societies  also  participated  in  the  work 
of  relief  and  assistance.  In  the  district  of 
Moghilev  the  skhods  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
the  relief  committees  the  entire  revenue  of  the 
credit  deposits  and  deposited  savings  for  the  year 
19 1 3,  and  also    1,300  roubles  in  cash.      In  the 

'  See  the  review  Yejemessiafshny  Jourital,  Petrograd,  Sep- 
tember 1914  ;  this  number  contains  an  article  describing 
the  activities  of  the  peasants  during  the  war,  from  which  I  cite 
the  above  facts. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  265 

district  of  Lipetsk  the  assembly  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  "  credit  confraternities  "  decided 
to  provide  the  families  of  soldiers  with  the 
sums  necessary  to  purchase  corn.  In  one  of 
the  districts  of  the  Government  of  Kharkov  the 
"  credit  confraternities  "  gratuitously  lent  agri- 
cultural machinery  to  the  families  of  reservists. 
The  local  union  of  the  co-operative  societies 
of  Kuban  recommended  its  members  to  estab- 
lish special  groups  of  "  guardians  "  for  those 
households  deprived  of  their  workers  by  the  mobi- 
lization, these  guardians  replacing  the  reservists 
in  the  fields.  In  some  regions  the  co-operative 
societies  not  only  lent  agricultural  machinery 
to  the  families  of  soldiers,  and  the  necessary 
implements  for  the  tilling  of  the  soil,  but  even 
bought  these  machines  especially  for  employment 
in  the  fields  of  reservists.  Many  co-operative 
societies  have  perfectly  organized  the  agricultural 
labour  of  the  district,  with  the  assistance  of  their 
non -mobilized  members. 

Sometimes  the  co-operative  societies  created 
hospitals  for  the  wounded,  workshops  for  pre- 
paring linen,  etc. 

The  Federative  Union  of  the  Co-operative 
Societies  of  Russia  and  the  People's  Co-opera- 
tive Credit  Bank  in  Moscow  addressed  the  Presi- 
dent and  deputies  of  the  Duma  in  a  message 
expressing  their  hope  that  "  in  the  organization 
of  relief  for  the  families  of  reservists  mobilized 


266  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

the  Zemstovs  will  accept,  as  their  useful  col- 
laborators, the  30,000  co-operative  societies 
existing  in  Russia,  as  these  are  the  popular 
economic  organizations  with  which  the  people  is 
most  familiar." 

In  citing  these  facts  the  Russian  publicist  who 
published  them  in  one  of  the  Petrograd  reviews 
continues  : — 

"  War  gives  rise  to  brutality,  hatred,  and  dis- 
cord ;  but  it  also  unites  mankind.  .  .  .  All  for 
each,  each  for  all — in  this  memorable  year  of 
miseries  that  touch  the  whole  people — this  call 
is  heard  as  loudly  as  the  clarion  calling  to  battle. 
The  cities  and  the  new  forces  of  the  country- 
side are  awakening.  On  the  field  of  battle 
yonder,  where  the  great  conflict  is  developing, 
the  struggle  for  the  safety  of  our  country  and 
of  European  liberty,  for  their  salvation  from  the 
yoke,  from  the  '  mailed  fist  '  of  the  haughty 
Prussian  Junkers  ;  and  here,  behind  the  army, 
the  peaceful  struggle  goes  forward  for  the 
preservation  of  the  economy  of  labour.  Every- 
where men  who  yesterday  lived  and  acted  in 
a  state  of  separation  are  beginning  to  under- 
stand that  their  destiny  is  closely  bound  up  with 
the  destinies  of  their  neighbours,  of  their  village, 
their  province  :  of  Russia,  Europe,  and  finally, 
of  the  entire  world  !  "  ' 

'  Yejemessiatshny  Journal^  Petrograd,  September  19 14. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  267 

III 

The  war  has  had  a  great  influence  on  the  mtel- 
lectual  youth  of  Russia.  And  of  this  influence  we 
must  distinguish  two  aspects. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  war  has  diverted  the 
interest  and  attention  of  our  Russian  youth  from 
the  questions  which  were  vital  to  them  before 
the  war.  Questions  relating  to  economics,  to 
matters  of  professional  and  corporative  interest, 
or  affecting  university  life,  are  forgotten  and  re- 
placed by  other  problems  concerning  the  war 
and  external  politics. 

A  great  proportion  of  the  Russian  students 
were  drawn  into  the  whirlwind  of  patriotism 
which  swept  across  all  Russia  during  the  first 
days  of  the  war.  The  force  of  this  whirlwind 
appeared  sometimes  even  too  much  for  the  youth- 
ful minds  of  these  students,  and  some  of  them 
were  for  some  time  poisoned  by  a  kind  of  intel- 
lectual chauvinism.  For  example,  a  large  group 
of  students  of  the  University  of  Petrograd  voted 
a  protest  against  the  document  signed  by  German 
scientists  which  treated  Russian  culture  as  a 
"  base  "  form  of  culture.  But  in  this  protest 
the  students  fell  into  another  exaggeration,  in- 
serting in  the  text  of  the  resolution  an  assertion 
devoid  of  meaning,  to  the  effect  that  "  the 
Russian  people  is  humiliated  in  that  which  con- 
cerns its  national  situation,  even  on  its  own  soil." 


268  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

This  assertion  may  be  interpreted  to  mean  that 
the  "  True  Russians  "  are  humihated  in  Russia 
itself  by  "  ahens  "—that  is,  Jews,  Poles,  etc.— 
which  is  untrue.  A  group  of  students  of  the 
University  of  Moscow  organized  a  "  patriotic  " 
demonstration  in  the  streets  of  the  city,  with 
national  flags,  the  portrait  of  the  Tsar,  and  the 
singing  of  the  National  Anthem.  This  demon- 
stration was  terminated  in  a  pogrom  of  the 
German  shops  and  warehouses  in  Moscow. 

But  these  excesses  of  "  patriotism  "  at  once 
provoked  numerous  protests  from  the  majority 
of  the  students.  The  representatives  of  the 
University  students  of  Moscow  published  in  the 
city  Press  an  open  letter,  in  which  they  con- 
demned these  so-called  "  patriotic  "  manifesta- 
tions, declaring,  with  indignation,  that  "  for 
the  first  time  the  word  '  pogrom  '  has  been 
coupled  with  that  of  student."  But  it  is  by  no 
means  astonishing  that  there  are,  at  this  moment, 
individuals  among  the  University  youth  of  Russia 
capable  of  expressing  their  "  patriotism  "  by  the 
pillage  of  German  goods  ;  this  is  merely  the 
result  of  the  policy  of  the  Ministry  of  Public 
Instruction,  which  during  the  years  of  reaction 
made  every  possible  effort  to  plant  in  the  grow- 
ing minds  of  the  students  reactionary  ideas  which 
have  favoured  the  creation  of  "  True  Russian  " 
organizations  among  the  students. 

But  we  may  believe  that  the  majority  of  the 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  269 

intellectual  youth  of  Russia  is  free  from  such 
"  patriotism."  Immediately  after  the  anti- 
German  pogroms  in  Moscow  dozens  of 
students'  organizations  in  that  city  declared 
that  "  the  organized  youth  of  the  University  has 
always  been  and  will  always  be  the  representa- 
tive and  the  guardian  of  pan-human  ideals  and 
will  remain  faithful  to  the  teaching  of  the  best 
minds  of  Russian  society."  ' 

At  the  University  of  Petrograd  also  were  found 
students  who  protested  against  the  baser  mani- 
festations of  chauvinistic  "  patriotism,"  and  who 
reminded  their  colleagues  that  the  external  enemy 
must  not  make  them  forget  "  the  enemies  within  " 
whom  Russian  democracy  has  to  fear. 

This  is  one  aspect  of  the  attitude  assumed  by 
the  intellectual  youth  of  Russia  during  and  in 
respect  of  the  war. 

Another  aspect  of  the  problem  is  the  practical 
activity  of  the  students  during  the  war. 

On  the  8/21  October  an  Imperial  ukase 
was  issued  which  gave  the  Minister  of  War  the 
right  to  call  to  the  colours  those  students  who 
had  a  legal  dispensation  from  military  service 
during  the  term  of  their  University  studies.  The 
Government  created  special  military  schools  (the 
course    of    study    being    abbreviated)    which    a 

'  See  the  interesting  article  by  M.  Kleinbort,  "  Youth  and  the 
War,"  published  in  the  great  Russian  review,  Sovremenny  Mir, 
in  November  1914,  p.  74  (Petrograd). 


270  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

portion  of  the  students  called  to  the  colours  were 
obliged  to  enter,  in  order  to  pass  the  examina- 
tion for  the  grade  of  officer  after  six  months' 
study.  Others  might  be  called  up  as  soldiers. 
"  The  first  impression  produced  by  this  ukase 
was  that  three-quarters  of  the  entire  mass  of 
students  would  be  called  to  serve,  mostly  as 
simple  soldiers.  But  not  a  shadow  of  discon- 
tent or  depression  was  visible  :  the  whole  youth 
of  Russia  had  but  one  wish,  that  the  orders  of 
the  ukase  should  be  accomplished  as  soon  as 
possible.  At  Petrograd,  Moscow,  Kiev,  Odessa, 
Kharkov,  Kazan,  Riga— everywhere  the  students 
marched  through  the  streets,  proclaiming  that 
they  would  not  hold  back  when  the  people,  the 
Russian  people,  was  shedding  its  blood  on  the 
field  of  battle  for  the  future  of  Russia."  ' 

But  more  remarkable  still  and  more  touching 
is  the  part  which  the  students  of  both  sexes 
are  playing  in  the  campaign  against  the  suffering 
caused  by  the  war.  The  students,  most  of  whom 
are  themselves  extremely  poor,  give  all  they  can 
from  their  slender  resources  towards  the  work 
of  relief  for  the  families  of  reservists,  aid  to  the 
wounded,  and  the  creation  of  hospitals,  etc.  But 
both  male  and  female  students  give  even  more 
in  the  shape  of  their  own  personal  services.  The 
students  of  the  Technological  Institute  at  Petro- 

'  "Youth  and  the  War,"  Sovrefnenny  Mir,  November  19 14, 
p.  72  (Petrograd). 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  271 

grad  pass  whole  days  in  the  work  of  repairing 
mihtary  motor-cars,  etc.  The  students  of  the 
Polytechnic  Institute  at  Riga  prepare  chemical 
products  and  various  articles  required  by  the  mili- 
tary hospitals.  A  very  large  number  of  students 
of  both  sexes  are  employed  as  nurses  and  bearers 
and  dressers,  working  at  the  extreme  front  and 
at  the  various  forwarding  stations.  There  are 
cities  where  the  whole  work  of  unloading  the 
hospital  trains  is  done  by  the  University  students, 
who  show  themselves,  not  only  adequate  to  a 
very  heavy  task,  but  full  of  devotion  and  ten- 
derness towards  the  poor  wounded  soldiers. 

IV 

A  few  words  as  to  the  Russian  Press  and  the 
literature  of  the  war. 

From  the  literary  point  of  view  we  observe 
in  Russia  what  was  remarked  in  other  belligerent 
countries,  notably,  that  the  poets  and  novelists 
are  not  proving  themselves  equal  to  their  task, 
and  the  best  of  their  poetical  production  appears 
miserably  inadequate  in  comparison  with  the 
grandeur  of  events.  A  dozen  or  two  theatrical 
pieces  were  written  by  Russian  dramatists  on 
warlike  subjects  a  short  time  after  the  declara- 
tion of  war,  but  these  plays,  all  full  of  a  false 
patriotism  and  chauvinism,  do  not  reveal  much 
talent  in  their  authors,  being  commonplace  and 


272  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

insignificant  productions.  The  drama  of  Belgian 
life  during  the  war  entitled  "  King,  Law,  and 
Liberty,"  written  by  the  well-known  writer 
Leonid  Andreev,  was  no  exception  to  these 
literary    platitudes. 

A  far  greater  service  has  been  rendered  to 
Russian  letters  by  those  of  our  writers  who  have 
confined  their  efforts  to  those  of  the  simple  mili- 
tary correspondent  and  have  gone  to  the  front, 
there  to  observe  and  describe  the  bloody  task  of 
the  troops.  Among  its  military  correspondents 
the  Russian  Press  includes  several  names  well 
known  to  the  public. 

Unhappily,  the  Government,  as  we  know, 
suppressed  at  one  blow  the  whole  of  the  "  Left  " 
press,  as  it  existed  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  while 
the  "  Right  "  and  reactionary  press  was  free  to 
continue  its  disastrous  work  of  poisoning  the 
mind  of  the  people.  Special  enterprises  were 
created  by  the  reactionaries,  often  with  assistance 
from  the  authorities,  for  the  purpose  of  providing 
the  people  with  "  national  and  patriotic  "  litera- 
ture during  the  war.  What  this  "  literature " 
is  you  may  judge  by  the  following  quotation  from 
a  "  popular  broadsheet  "  on  the  war,  distributed 
gratuitously  by  the  reactionaries.  Explaining 
the  causes  of  the  war,  the  author  of  this  sheet 
finds  them  in  the  fact  that  Germany  possesses 
a  Constitution  !  Wilhelm  II,  he  says,  is  good, 
extremely  good.     "'  He  always  wished  to  become 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  273 

an  autocrat,  and  if  he  were  an  absolute  monarch 
he  .  .  .  would  make  Germany  glorious  in  the 
domain  of  peaceful  work."  But  in  Germany 
there  is  a  Constitution  and  a  Parliament,  and 
the  Constitution  and  parliamentarianism  are  the 
cause  of  the  war,  which  "  once  again  shows  the 
disadvantages  of  a  constitutional  and  republican 
government." 

Citing  all  these  imbecilities,  and  stating  that 
they  are  distributed  in  great  quantities  (by  the 
hands  of  the  priests,  who  distribute  them  in  the 
churches,  etc.),  a  Russian  scholastic  review 
declares  that  "  such  a  manner  of  informing  the 
people  as  to  the  war  can  serve  no  useful  purpose 
and  may  do  much  harm."  ' 

I  cannot  pass  over  in  silence  the  propaganda 
which  during  the  war  has  been  conducted  by  the 
chief  and  official  organ  of  the  Russian  reaction, 
the  Russkole  Znamia  ("The  Russian  Flag"), 
published  by  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Union 
of  the  Russian  People,  otherwise  known  as  the 
"Black  Bands." 

In  the  middle  of  October— that  is,  ten  weeks 
after  the  outbreak  of  war— 4his  "  True  Russian  " 
organ  published  an  article  full  of  praises  of  the 
German  system  of  government  and  the  Hohen- 
zollern   monarchy. 

"  Germany    is    the    incarnation    of    a    national 

*  See  the  Russkaya  Shkola  ("  The  Russian  School"),  Petrograd, 
December  1914,  p.  21. 

18 


274  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

power,  thanks  to  these  sane  and  healthy  prin- 
ciples on  which  the  administration  of  the  States 
is  based,"  says  the  Russkoie  Znamia.  "  The 
monarchist  principle  has  found  in  Germany  a 
brilliant  exemplification."  The  dynasty  of  the 
Hohenzollerns  "  incarnates  in  itself  and  propa- 
gates lofty  principles  which  are  precious  to 
humanity."  Its  enemies  do  not  love  it  because 
they  regard  it  as  "  the  most  capable  of  the 
realization  of  the  monarchical  principle  as  an 
ideal."  "  May  these  principles  remain  wholly 
intact,  for  they  are  sane  and  healthy  and  make 
for  the  welfare  of  the  world."  The  Russkoie 
Znamia  not  only  does  not  wish  to  see  the  power 
of  the  Hohenzollerns  destroyed,  but  declares,  on 
the  contrary,  that  "  if  Germany  changes  the 
government  of  one  of  her  neighbours  from  a 
republic  to  a  monarchy,  such  a  change  will  be 
by  no  means  regrettable  from  the  point  of  view 
of  humanity,  order,  and  tranquillity  in  Europe 
and  the  successful  life  of  nations." 

Such  "  True  Russian  "  ideas  were  expressed 
by  the  organ  of  the  Extreme  Right  on  the 
morrow  of  the  occupation  and  devastation  of 
Belgium  and  the  invasion  of  a  portion  of  France 
by  the  German  troops,  and  at  a  moment  when 
Russian  soldiers  were  dying  in  defending  Russian 
soil   against   the   German   invader. 

Comment  is  superfluous. 

This  reactionary  propaganda  is  the  more  harm- 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  275 

ful  in  that  the  interest  felt  by  the  populace  in 
the  "  printed  word  "  has  enormously  increased 
during  the  war. 

"Every  village  to-day  has  its  'political  club.' 
If  you  go  to  the  office  of  the  communal  adminis- 
tration at  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  you  will 
find  there  a  crowd  of  moujiks,  old  and  young, 
and  of  boys.  The  clerk  or  some  old  soldier  who 
can  read  will  be  reading  aloud  from  the  news- 
paper, which  the  schoolmaster  has  given  him. 
He  reads  loudly  and  distinctly.  .  .  .  Everybody 
listens  attentively.  .  .  .  After  the  reading  .  .  . 
a  most  animated  conversation  ensues,  which  often 
leads   to  the  most  impassioned   discussions." 

"  The  number  of  journals  printed  is  increasing. 
Despite  the  obstacles  offered  by  the  censorship 
and  the  police,  new  journals  are  springing  up 
where  none  as  yet  existed.  .  .  .  Some  perish 
ingloriously— the  martyrology  of  the  Russian 
Press  is  long — but  others  occupy  the  place  of 
their  deceased  brothers  and  continue  the  work 
for  the  Fatherland.  Already  it  is  impossible  to 
check  this  powerful  impulse  in  the  direction  of 
the  printed  word.  ...  At  the  railway-stations 
men  and  women  and  children  push  their  way  into 
the  carriages  and  beg  the  passengers  to  give  them 
their  newspapers.  Who  are  these  people?  They 
are  the  men  employed  on  the  railways  and  the 
inhabitants  of  the  neighbouring  villages."  ^ 

'  See  "  The  War  and  the  Press "  in  the  Riisskiya  Viedomosii, 
4th  of  December  1914  (Moscow). 


*,j,<;         RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

The  aged  peasants  who  cannot  read  borrow 
the  school-books  of  then  children  and  grand- 
children and  try  to  teach  themselves. 

'*  The  peasants  read  the  newspapers  every 
evening  and  on  every  holiday.  They  meet  in 
groups  in  the  house  of  one  or  another  of  their 
number,  and  try  to  project  their  minds,  unaccus- 
tomed to  the  printed  idea,  into  distant  parts  and 
foreign  countries.  That  portion  of  the  map 
which  represents  the  seat  of  war  is  quite  black 
now ;  every  day  the  horny  fingers  travel  from 
Lemberg  to  Cracow,  from  Warsaw  to  Berlin  and 
back."  I 

So  the  war,  we  realize,  has  given  a  great 
impulse  to  the  intellectual  life  of  the  people. 

^  Rnsskaya  Shkola,  December  19 14,  p.  15. 


CHAPTER    VII  ' 

I.  On  the  field  of  battle.  The  Russian  soldier  in  the  present 
war.  Mobilization.  The  prohibition  of  the  sale  of  alcohol  and 
its  effect  on  the  Army.  The  military  chiefs. — II.  Treason 
in  the  Executive. — III.  Why  the  Russian  soldier  is  fighting 
better  against  Germany,  Austria,  and  Turkey  than  he  fought 
against  Japan. — The  "  liberation  idea  "  and  the  war. 

I 

All  the  facts  presented  in  the  preceding  chapters 
of  this  book  will  enable  the  reader  already  to 
feel  something  of  the  profound  difference  between 
the  moral  condition  and  the  military  valour  of 
the  Russian  Army  in  the  present  war  and  the 
condition  of  our  Army  in  the  war  against  Japan. 
All  observers  and  students  of  Russian  life 
unanimously  declare  that  the  manner  in  which 
the  people  regards  the  present  war  has  nothing 
in  common  with  its  conception  of  the  war  of 
1904.  The  Russo-Japanese  War  was  a  distant 
war,  which  did  not  affect  the  vital  interests  of 
the  popular  masses,  while  the  war  against 
Austria,  Germany,  and  Turkey  is  close  at  hand. 
The    Russo-Japanese    War    was   regarded   as    an 

277 


278  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

adventure  on  the  part  of  the  upper  classes,  an 
offensive  war,  and  an  unjust  war ;  while  the 
present  war,  in  the  eyes  of  the  masses,  is  a  just, 
defensive   war . 

This  difference  was  perceptible  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  mobilization.  When  the  recruits  of 
1914  were  called  up  for  medical  examination 
there  were  among  them  no  malingerers  attempt- 
ing to  escape  military  service. 

"  All  have  become  fit,"  says  a  provincial 
journal,  the  Zaouralsky  Kray,  describing  the 
medical  examination  of  the  class  of  1914  from 
the  region  of  Ural.  "  Formerly,  when  a  youth 
was  exempted  from  service  he  ran  off  at  the  top 
of  his  speed  and  got  drunk  to  express  his  delight. 
To-day  he  is  exempted,  but  he  grumbles  :  '  Why 
am  I  not  good  enough  for  the  war?  I  am  no 
worse  than  others.  They  have  taken  Peter 
and  Ivan—am  I  less  fit  than  they  ? '  Formerly 
he  fled  like  a  goat ;  to-day  one  has  to  explain  to 
him  why  he  will  be  of  no  use  to  the  Army." 

Another  provincial  paper  describes  the  depar- 
ture of  the  troops  from  a  village  in  the  Golvern- 
ment   of   Yaroslavl  : — 

"  This  year  the  departure  of  the  recruits  from 
the  villages  has  been  effected  in  an  extraordinary 
atmosphere.  .  .  .  There  was  not  a  single 
drunken  man  among  the  recruits,  and  no  painful 
scenes  took  place  when  the  new  soldiers  took 
leave   of   their   relatives.      They  marched  off   in 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  279 

orderly  ranks,  accompanied  to  the  outskirts  of 
the  villages  by  the  whole  of  the  inhabitants. 
'  Bear  yourselves  well,  for  Russia  and  the  world  of 
peasants  !  '  cry  the  old  men.  '  Come  back  heroes 
— we  will  cover  you  with  flowers  !  '  cry  the  young 
girls." 

The  mobilization  and  concentration  of  the 
Russian  Army  was  effected  much  more  rapidly 
than  was  expected,  which  is  explained,  not  only 
by  the  suppression  of  the  sale  of  vodka  but  also 
by  the  attitude  of  the  people,  who  understood 
the  gravity  of  the  moment  and  the  necessity  of 
making  the  greatest  possible  effort  against  so 
powerful  and  dangerous  an  enemy. 

The  condition  of  complete  sobriety  observed 
during  the  mobilization  has  continued  during  the 
war.  Here  is  a  reference  to  the  state  of  tem- 
perance which  prevails  even  among  the  higher 
officers  on  the  field  of  battle,  a  description  from 
the  pen  of  M.  Ludovic  Naudeau,  military  corre- 
spondent of  the  Journal.  This  description  is  the 
more  interesting  as  M.  Naudeau  was  with  the 
Russian  Army  in  Manchuria  in  1904-5  and  was 
able  to  make  a  comparison  between  what  he 
saw  then  and  what  he  saw  in   1 9 1 4  : — 

"  Ah  !  Where  is  it,  that  uproarious  restaurant- 
car  which  formerly,  at  the  time  of  the  Manchurian 
War,  used  to  stop  near  the  place  where  the 
General  Staff  was  to  be  found?  Where  is  this 
travelling    restaurant,    from    which    a     pleasant 


280  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

gaiety  emanated  even  in  the  darkest  hours,  while 
more  than  once  feminine  voices  mingled  with 
the  talk  of  the  warriors  ?  .  .  .  Where  are  those 
bottles,  capped  with  gold  or  silver,  which  were 
opened  so  joyfully,  so  merrily,  yonder  in  the  land 
of  the  yellow  men,  while  the  Japanese  guns  were 
raging?  Gone  is  the  copious  drinking,  the 
libations,    and    the    ingenuous   gaiety." 

However,  the  suppression  of  alcohol  and  the 
sobriety  of  the  troops  were  not  enough  to  ensure 
the  victory  of  Russia  over  a  powerful  adversary. 
The  composition  of  the  higher  command  of  the 
Russian  Army  was  somewhat  defective,  as  the 
promotion  of  generals  and  lesser  officers  in 
Russia  depends  too  often,  not  on  their  military 
capacities  but  on  their  relations  and  their  political 
convictions.  For  instance,  during  the  first  inva- 
sion of  Prussia  by  the  Russian  Army  the  com- 
mand of  the  left  wing  of  that  army  was  confided 
to  General  Rennenkampf,  a  "  True  Russian  "  of 
German  origin,  who  was  famous,  not  for  his 
military  talents  but  for  the  cruelty  with  which  he 
suppressed  the  revolutionary  movement  of  1905 
in  Siberia,  where  he  shot  down  the  "  suspects  " 
by  dozens  without  trial,  took  "  hostages,"  and 
in  general  behaved  like  ...  a  German  officer 
in  a  conquered  country !  And  this  is  what 
a  Swiss  journal  (the  Geneva  Tribune)  has  to 
say  of  the  Russian  defeats  in  Eastern  Prussia  : — 

"  The  first  Russian  invasion  threw  two  armies 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  281 

on  to  Prussian  soil,  which  numbered  together 
650,000  men.  General  Hindenburg  defeated 
them  in  a  series  of  rapid  actions.  ...  Of  the 
two  splendid  armies  of  Generals  Samsonov  and 
Rennenkampf  nothing  was  left  but  shapeless  ruin . 
The  jealousy  of  Rennenkampf  in  respect  of  his 
colleague  assisted  the  strategy  of  Hindenburg  : 
General  Tiger,  as  the  Japanese  nicknamed 
Rennenkampf,  could  ill  support  the  intellectual 
superiority  of  Samsonov.  He  left  him  alone  at 
grips  with  the  Germans,  although  they  were  not 
far  apart  and  he  must  have  known  that 
Samsonov's  army  had  to  deal  with  a  powerful 
enemy.  Samsonov  died  a  glorious  death  at  the 
head  of  his  troops."  ' 

Another  prominent  Swiss  Journal,  La  Gazette 
de  Lausanne,  discussing  the  causes  of  the  second 
defeat  of  the  Russians  in  Eastern  Prussia,  made 
a  statement  to  which  I  would  direct  the  most 
serious  attention  of  my  readers  : — 

"  The  most  plausible  explanation  of  the  rela- 
tive weakness  revealed  by  the  stafif  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  is 
probably  to  be  found  in  the  intrigues  of  the 
German  party  in  Petrograd.  It  is  by  no  means 
impossible  that  the  German  General  Stafif  should 
be  secretly  informed  of  the  strength  and 
weakness  of  the  positions  of  the  enemy,  the  dis- 
tribution of  his  troops,  and  his  plans  of  action. 

'  La  Tribune,  Geneva,  20th  of  February  1915. 


282  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT    WAR 

"  To  those  who  feel  amazement  at  the  idea 
that  treason  could  exist  in  Russia,  where  no  war 
has  ever  been  more  popular,  let  us  recall  the 
fact  that  a  certain  number  of  high  officials  detest 
the  liberalism  of  the  Western  nations,  in  whose 
triumph  they  see  a  menace  to  their  privileges  ; 
that  Prussia  and  Prussian  '  order  '  is  their  ideal, 
and  that  they  dread  a  Prussian  defeat  as  a 
catastrophe. 

"  When  we  form  opinions  on  things  Russian 
we  must  never  lose  sight  of  the  abyss  which 
divides  the  great  Slav  nation  from  the  interests 
of  certain  of  those  who  govern  it."  ' 

II 

How  far  the  supposition  expressed  by  the 
Gazette  de  Lausanne  was  well  founded  we  may 
judge  by  the  following  official  statement,  issued 
by  the  General  Staff  of  the  Russian  Commander- 
in-Chief  on  the  3rd  of  April   1 9 1  5  :— 

"  As  a  result  of  information  respecting  the 
actions  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Miassoiedov^  inter- 
preter to  the  staff  of  the  loth  Army,  this  officer 
was  placed  under  observation. 

"  Directly  this  observation  had  confirmed  the 
suspicions  entertained  as  to  the  criminal  character 
of  the  actions  of  the  said  officer,  who  was  in 
touch  with  the  agents  of  a  hostile  Power, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Miassoiedov  was  arrested, 
'   Gazette  de  Laitsatmcy  1 6th  of  February  19 15. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  283 

and  at  the  same  time  other  persons  were  arrested, 
not  belonging  to  the  Army  but  suspected  of  the 
same  criminal  activities. 

"  The  preliminary  examination  established  the 
guilt  of  Lieutenant -Colonel  Miassoiedov  in  a 
most  positive  manner ;  he  was  therefore  sent 
before  a  court-martial  to  reply  to  an  accusation 
of  espionage.  The  court  found  him  guilty  and 
he  was  hanged. 

"  The  examination  in  respect  of  his  accom- 
plices is  proceeding,  and  as  the  guilt  of  each 
prisoner  is  established  he  will  be  sent  before 
the  competent  tribunal." 

To  complete  the  picture,  I  may  add  that 
Colonel  Miassoiedov  (of  the  gendarmerie)  was 
one  of  the  chief  officers  of  the  Russian  political 
police,  an  organizer  of  provocation,  one  of  the 
"  Russifiers  "  of  Finland,  and,  in  general,  one 
of  the  "  pillars  "  of  the  Russian  reaction.  As 
for  his  accomplices,  it  is  said  that  they  were 
mostly  agents  or  ex-agents  of  the  political 
pohce.  There  is  nothing  surprising'  in  this. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  very  natural  that  the 
unclean  trade  of  an  agent-provocateur ,  who 
betrays  and  sells  the  revolutionists  of  his  own 
country,  should  be  doubled  by  the  unclean 
trade  of  a  spy,  who  betrays  and  sells  his  own 
country. 

One  of  the  members  of  the  Duma,  M. 
Kerensky,    addressed    the    following    courageous 


284  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

declaration,  in  respect  of  the  Miassoiedov  affair, 
to  the  President  of  the  Duma  :— 

"  M.  LE  President,— 

"  By  order  of  the  miHtary  authorities  some 
officers  of  the  gendarmes  and  officials  of  the 
Department  of  the  Police  have  been  arrested.' 
They  are  accused  of  high  treason  and  of  relations 
with  the  enemy.  Treason  has  made  itself  a  nest  in 
the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  Russian  society  had 
already,  for  some  considerable  time,  uneasily  fol- 
lowed the  activities  of  this  department,  based 
as  it  is  on  a  system  of  provocation  which  is  in- 
evitably sapping  the  Governmental  organism  and 
corrupting  the  powers  of  the  State.  The  Duma 
also  had  more  than  once  drawn  attention  to  the 
serious  danger  which  arises  out  of  this  system, 
and  had  expressed  its  suspicion  of  the  Ministry 
of  the  Interior,  at  the  same  time  condemning  the 
entire  domestic  policy  of  the  Cabinet, 

"  Then  the  war  broke  out.  All  Russia,  in  a 
supreme  effort  of  its  popular  forces,  has  risen 
to  accomplish  one  common  aim— to  repulse  the 
aggression  of  the  enemy.  Only  the  Ministry 
of  the  Interior,  acting  in  agreement  with  the 
Ministry  of  Justice,  is  continuing  its  destructive 
activities  with  unusual  energy,  and  is  irritating 
and    loosening    the    bonds    of    society.      By    the 

"  The  Department  of  Police  is  occupied  principally  in  the 
persecution  of  revolutionaries,  and,  in  general,  persons  whose 
political  opinions  are  "suspect  "  or  "subversive." 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  285 

arrest  of  Bourtzev  the  Government  at  one  blow 
extinguished  the  enthusiasm  of  large  numbers 
of  persons,  and  also  betrayed  its  manner  of  in- 
terpreting its  own  declaration  concerning  '  the 
forgetting  of  internal  dissensions.'  And  it  was 
with  very  good  reason  that  the  members  of  the 
Duma,  during  the  session  of  the  Budgetary  Com- 
mittee of  that  body— recalling  the  arrest  of 
Bourtzev  and  of  the  Social-Democratic  Labour 
deputies,  the  campaign  against  the  Press,  and 
the  policy  of  the  Government  in  Poland,  Finland, 
and  Galicia — hinted  that  these  acts  of  the  Govern- 
mental authorities  visibly  revealed  the  character 
of  a  hostile  obstruction  which  was  calculated  to 
militate  against  a  happy  termination  of  the 
external  conflict.  The  most  startling  manifesta- 
tion of  the  destructive  action  of  the  Government 
was  the  publication  of  a  lying  official  declaration 
that  a  portion  of  the  members  of  the  Duma 
desired  the  defeat  of  the  Russian  armues.  Mean- 
while, in  the  very  heart  of  the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior,  calmly  and  confidently,  a  solid  organiza- 
tion of  the  real  traitors  is  at  work.  The 
suspicion  involuntarily  presents  itself  that  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior  is  consciously  endeavour- 
ing to  divert  the  attention  of  Russian  society  to 
a  false  trail.  Russian  society  is  well  aware  that 
the  directing  circles  of  the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior  and  the  Ministry  of  Justice  are  deeply 
involved  in  that  considerable  political  movement 


286  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

which  regards  it  as  imperiously  necessary  that 
a  close  union  with  the  Berlin  Government  should 
be  re-established  as  speedily  as  possible,  that 
Government  being  the  most  powerful  ally  of  our 
internal  reaction.  For  this  reason  Russian 
society  finds  it  hard  to  believe  that  these  adminis- 
trative departments  can  possibly  disclose  in  its 
full  extent  this  organization  of  traitors,  whose 
traces  were — by  chance— discovered  by  the  mili- 
tary authorities.  The  intervention  of  Russian 
society  itself  is  necessary,  and  it  alone  can  claim 
the  needful  authority.  The  State  Duma  must 
do  its  utmost  to  protect  the  nation  from  a  hideous 
stab  in  the  back.  In  the  name  of  my  electors 
I  beg  you,  M.  le  President,  as  the  official  repre- 
sentative of  the  Duma,  to  insist  on  the  immediate 
convocation  of  the  State  Duma  in  order  that  it 
may  address  to  the  Government  an  interpellation 
concerning  the  existence  of  high  treason  in  one 
of  the  central  administrations  of  the  Government, 
and  also  accomplish  its  duty,  which  is  to  exercise 
an  unrelaxing  control  over  the  actions  of  the 
Executive   at   a   moment   so   exceptional. 

"  A.  Kerensky, 
"  Member  of  the  Duma., 

"The  25th  of  February  (nth  of  March,  new  style)  1915." 

Unfortunately,    M.    Kerensky's    demands    were 
without  result. 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  287 

The  Miassoiedov  affair  reveals  a  few  more 
characteristic  details.  In  the  first  place,  Colonel 
Miassoiedov  was  once  before  accused  of  military 
espionage — two  years  earlier,  by  M.  Gutshkov, 
sometime  President  of  the  Duma.  But  the 
Government,  with  which  Miassoiedov  was  a 
persona  grata,  was  not  willing  to  risk  the  con- 
sequences of  the  charge  brought  by  M. 
Gutshkov,  who  was  even  challenged  to  a  duel 
by  Miassoiedov,  who  declared  his  honour  to  be 
attainted.  Investigation  established  the  fact  that 
Miassoiedov  enjoyed  intimate  and  personal  rela- 
tions with  W'ilhelm  II.  The  latter,  during  his 
visits  to  his  estate  of  Rominten,  in  Eastern 
Prussia,  used  to  invite  Colonel  Miassoiedov,  then 
the  chief  officer  of  the  Frontier  Guard  at  Wir- 
ballen,  a  few  miles  distant  from  Rominten,  to 
visit  him.  And  we  need  not  suppose  that  the 
German  Emperor  disdained  to  direct  the  activities 
of  the  traitor  who  sold  his  Government  and  his 
country.  We  have  here  yet  another  interesting 
fact  for  the  biographers  of  WilheJm  II. 


Ill 

As  for  the  troops,  they  have  shown  themselves 
in  this  war,  as  I  have  already  said,  equal  to  the 
greatness  of  their  task.  The  German  Social- 
Democratic  "  comrades  "  who  have  so  quickly 
forgotten  the  hymns  of  praise  which  they  sang 


288  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

in  1905-6  in  honour  of  the  "noble"  Russian 
people  who  were  ready  to  die  for  liberty,  and 
who  have  now  plunged  the  dagger  of  treason 
into  the  back  of  European  democracy  and  the 
Russian  revolution,  are  to-day  writing  that  the 
Russian  Army  is  merely  a  mob  of  "  stolid 
brutes  "  (the  expression  is  that  used  by 
Vorwdrts).  But  this  amiable  appreciation— 
especially  on  the  part  of  the  "  comrades  "— 
has  no  correspondence  with  the  reality.  It  is 
true  that  the  Russian  soldier  is  not  so  well 
educated  as  the  German  soldier,  who  "  carries 
in  his  knapsack  " — as  Herr  Gerhardt  Hauptmann 
informs  us — "  the  works  of  Goethe,  Nietzsche,  the 
Bible,  etc."  There  are  certainly  illiterates  in 
the  Russian  Army.  None  the  less  we  may  assert 
that  in  the  present  war  the  Russian  soldier 
appears  to  us,  not  as  a  beast  of  burden  but  as 
a  man  who  understands  for  what  cause  he  is 
fighting  and  dying,  and  who  believes  that  cause 
is  a  just  cause. 

And  here  I  must  say  a  few  words  of  a  very 
important  and  very  interesting  trait  observed  by 
many  witnesses  who  have  been  in  contact  with 
the  Russian  troops  during  the  war.  It  is  that 
the  "  idea  of  liberation  "  is  very  prevalent  among 
the  Russian  troops.  For  many  the  present  war 
is  not  only  a  just  war  and  a  defensive  war,  it 
is  also  a  war  of  "  liberation."  The  impression 
produced    by    the    brutal    aggression    of    great 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  289 

Austria  against  little  Serbia,  by  the  crushing  of 
neutral  Belgium  by  the  German  Army,  by  the 
cruelties  committed  by  German  officers  upon  the 
civil  populations  of  Belgium,  IvrancCj  and  Poland, 
by  the  treacherous  attack  of  Turkey,  which  is  re- 
garded in  Russia  as  the  hangman  among  nations 
—all  this  has  greatly  contributed  to  this  mental 
state  of  the  Russian  soldiers,  who  believe 
sincerely  that  they  are  dying  for  an  ideal  of 
liberation.  And  here  is  a  touching  story  which 
illustrates  this  simple  faith  : — 

In  one  of  the  hospitals  of  the  Caucasian 
Army  a  Russian  non-commissioned  officer  lay 
in  the  next  bed  to  some  Bagdad  Arabs,  prisoners. 
"  .  .  .  He  writes  verses.  I  will  not" — says  the 
military  correspondent  who  tells  the  story— 
"  speak  of  the  literary  quality  of  these  verses. 
They  are  very  defective  in  form  and  very  ordinary 
as  to  substance.  .  .  .  But  one  half -stanza  is 
notable  for  its  curious   simplicity  : — 

Here  is  Mount  Ararat.     It  has  a  brooding  look.  .  .  . 
One  would  think  it  was  waiting  to  be  set  free. 

"  What  do  you  think  of  that?  It  is  very 
delightful.  A  non-commissioned  officer,  coming 
from  the  Russian  plains,  feels  a  need  of  setting 
Mount  Ararat  free  !  Poor,  feeble  Ararat,  sixteen 
thousand  feet  in  height  !  .  .  .  When  I  explained 
to  the  hospital  doctor  the  poetical  dream  of  his 
sympathetic  patient,  the  doctor  remarked  :    '  Oh, 

19 


290  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

the  idea  of  a  liberation  is  widely  diffused  among 
our  soldiers.'  "  ' 

Another  soldier  of  the  Caucasian  Army  ex- 
plained the  necessity  of  abstaining  from  vodka 
and  the  suppression  of  the  drink  traffic  in  the 
following  manner  :  "  A  drunken  man  can't  set 
anybody  free  !  " 

While  stating  that  the  Russian  soldier  is 
fighting  in  the  present  war  far  better  than  he 
fought  ten  years  ago,  I  ought  at  the  same  time 
to  state  that  the  errors  of  the  domestic  policy 
of  Tsarism  are  shackling  his  heroic  impulse.  By 
not  proclaiming  a  political  amnesty  Tsarism  has 
retained  in  the  backgroimd  of  the  Army  which 
is  marching  against  the  enemy  the  prisons  and 
penal  settlements,  which  are  very  living  tombs, 
in  which  are  suffering  the  noblest  of  Russia's 
sons.  By  failing  to  suppress  the  racial  and 
religious  restrictions  the  Government  continues 
to  poison  the  moral  atmosphere  in  which  the 
country  is  living  during  the  war  and  which  the 
army  is  breathing  as  it  fights.  These  errors 
diminish  the  successes  of  the  Army  by  weakening 
the  moral  of  the  Army. 

We  have  seen  also  that  the  German  Socialists 
are  mistaken  in  regarding  the  Russian  soldier  as 
"  stolid."  On  the  contrary,  in  this  war  they 
are  animated  by  feelings  which  are  perhaps 
ingenuous,  but  which  are  generous  in  the 
'  See  the  Russkoic  Slovo,  January  191 5,  Moscow. 


IN  THE   BLOODY   FRAY  291 

extreme.  Are  they  indeed  "  brutes,"  as 
Vorwdrts  asserted?  I  have  searched  the  news- 
papers (Austrian  and  German  amongst  others) 
for  information  as  to  the  attitude  of  the  Russian 
soldier  in  the  presence  of  civil  populations.  I 
have,  I  do  not  deny,  found  a  few  cases— very 
few,  but  very  disgusting— of  violence  committed 
upon  civilians  by  the  Cossacks.  But  I  must 
add  that  such  actions  happily  are  few  and  ex- 
ceptional, as  is  proved  even  by  the  enemy's  press . 
Thus,  for  instance,  the  Danzers  Armeezeltung, 
a  paper  edited  entirely  by  Austrian  officers,  pro- 
tests, in  its  issue  of  the  15th  of  October  19 14, 
against  the  false  accusations  brought  against  the 
Russian  soldiers  by  the  Austrian  press,  and 
stated  :— 

"  The  '  Muscovite  hordes  '  are  in  reality  armies 
of  brave  and  valiant  soldiers.  ...  In  isolated 
cases  the  Red  Cross  has  not  beei:i  respected,  and 
we  sometimes  hear  of  pillage,  but  on  the  whole 
we  have  before  us  an  honest  and  chivalrous 
enemy." 

Alas  !  the  populations  of  Belgium,  France,  and 
Poland  cannot  say  of  the  Prussian  officers  and 
soldiers  what  this  Austrian  military  journal  finds 
itself  compelled  to  say  of  the  Russian  Army. 

The  declaration  of  the  Danzers  Armeezeitunor 
is  all  the  more  precious  in  that  it  may  be  re- 
garded as  confirming  the  testimony  of  a  well- 
informed   observer,    M.    R.,   a  Ukrainian   patriot 


292  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

and  writer.  M.  R.,  who  has  no  Russophile  ten- 
dencies and  does  not  conceal  his  dislike  of  the 
Russian  occupation  of  Bukovina  and  Eastern 
Galicia,  lived  in  Austria  during  the  first  five 
months  of  the  war.  •  , 

"  Generally  speaking,"  he  tells  us,  "  the 
Russian  troops  have  behaved  better,  in  Buko- 
vina and  Galicia,  than  the  Austrian  soldiery. 
The  Russians  did  not  drink  (with  very  rare 
exceptions),  and  paid  for  what  they  took  to 
supply  their  needs  from  the  local  population, 
while  the  Austrians  did  drink  and  did  not  pay." 

According  to  a  statement  published  in  the 
French  and  Swiss  press,  the  German  journals 
found  themselves  obliged  to  contradict  the 
rumours  relating  to  Russian  atrocities.  Notably, 
Vorwarts  on  the  23rd  of  March  declared 
that  the  official  inquiry  opened  in  Eastern 
Prussia  established  the  non-existence  of  the 
atrocities  of  which  the  Russians  were  accused. 
These  accusations  were  based  merely  on  the 
gossip  of  soldiers  published  in  a  Konigsberg 
newspaper. 

I  explain  this  relatively  correct  attitude  on  the 
part  of  our  soldiers  by  attributing  it  to  the  effects 
of  the  generous  and  humanitarian  propaganda 
which  the  democratic  parties  have  for  so  long 
conducted  among  the  Russian  peasants  and 
industrial  workers.  It  is  incontestable  that  the 
German   soldier  has  a  better  general  education, 


IN   THE   BLOODY   FRAY  293 

and  that  he  has  passed  through  the  Public 
Schools.  But  the  Russian  soldier  has  passed 
through  the  school  of  the  Revolution.  I  believe 
the  influence  of  the  latter  is  perhaps  more  pro- 
found. 


PART    III 
AFTER    THE    WAR 


-54 


CHAPTER    I 

I.  The  possible  results  of  the  war.  Territorial  changes  and  the 
problem  of  an  enlargement  of  the  Russian  frontiers. — II.  The 
possession  of  the  Dardanelles  and  Constantinople.  Are 
they  necessary  to  Russia? 


I  WRITE  these  words  "  after  the  war  "  at  a 
moment  when  the  war  is  not  only  not  finished, 
but  when  no  one  can  say  how  long  it  will  last. 

None  the  less,  I  will  try  to  reply  to  this  ques- 
tion :  What  shall  we  find  after  the  war  ?  What 
will  its  effects  and  results  be  on  the  life  of  the 
Russian  State  and  the  Russian  people,  or  rather 
the  Russian  peoples? 

Let  us  begin  by  considering  the  possible 
territorial   changes. 

Let  us  venture  on  a  very  likely  supposition— 
that  the  war  will  end  in  a  complete  victory  of 
the  Allied  troops  over  the  armies  of  Germany 
and  Austria  and  Turkey.  What  territorial  acqui- 
sitions will  in  that  case  be  possible  and  desirable 
for  Russia  ? 

To  reply  to  this  important  question  we  will 
refer  to  an  official   document  of  not  too  recent 

297 


298  RUSSIA   AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 

origin,  but  which  has  lost  none  of  its  actuaUty. 
This  is  the  report  of  General  Kuropatkin,  which 
was  presented  by  him  to  the  Tsar  in  1900,  and 
was  reproduced  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  on  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War.  There  we  find  an  interesting 
analysis  of  the  Russian  frontiers  from  the  strate- 
gical and  political  point  of  view,  and  a  review 
of  the  possible  modifications  of  these  frontiers. 

The  present  frontier  between  Russia  and 
Turkey  was  established  after  the  Russian 
victories  of  1877-8.  It  coincides  with  the 
natural  boundaries,  and  "  not  only  protects  our 
possessions  against  the  attempts  of  Turkey  but 
constitutes  an  advantageous  point  of  departure 
for  our  march  towards  the  principal  point  of 
Asia  Minor  and  the  only  fortress  of  serious  value 
on  the  whole  of  the  route  until  Scutari  is  reached 
—the  fortress  of  Erzeroum.  Thus  the  existing 
frontier  between  Russia  and  Turkey  may  be 
considered  as  being  fully  satisfactory  and 
demands  no  modifications."  ' 

The  political  frontier  between  Russia  and 
Austria  does  not  coincide  with  a  natural  frontier, 
and  from  a  strategical  point  of  view  it  would 
be  perhaps  desirable  for  Russia  to  push  it  back 
to  the  Carpathians,  towards  the  west,  incor- 
porating the  whole  of  Galicia  in  the  Russian 
Empire.  But  first  of  all  we  must  consider 
whether  such  an  addition  of  territory  and  of 
'  Memoirs,  Russian  edition,  p.  57. 


AFTER  THE  WAR  299 

population  is  necessary  for  Russia  ;  whether 
we  should  be  stronger  after  this  addition,  or 
whether  we  should  perhaps  create  for  ourselves  a 
source  of  weakness  and  anxiety  ?  To  this  question 
General   Kuropatkin  replies  in   the  negative. 

"  The  separation  of  Galicia  from  Austria  when 
Galicia  has  for  so  long  lived  her  own  life  isolated 
from  us  can  only  be  effected  by  violent  and 
therefore  unhealthy  means.  Not  only  the  Polish 
population  but  also  the  Russian  (the  Russiny 
or  Ruthenes)  is  without  any  desire  to  be  incor- 
porated in  the  Russian  State.  .  .  .  Despite  the 
painful  economic  situation  of  the  population  of 
Galicia,  despite  the  monopolization  of  land  by 
the  Jews,  despite  the  taxes,  which  are  heavier 
than  in  Russia,  despite  the  relative  inequality 
of  the  rights  of  Poles  and  Ruthenians,  the  popu- 
lation of  Galicia  is  justified  in  considering  the 
level  of  its  culture  as  higher  than  that  of  the 
neighbouring  populations  of  Russia.  The  Slav 
population  of  Galicia  believes  that  its  incorpora- 
tion in  the  Russian  State  would  be  a  retro- 
grade step,  not  a  step  in  advance.  ...  If  we 
allow  ourselves  to  be  tempted  by  the  idea 
of  enlarging  our  possessions  as  far  as  the  natural 
frontier  of  Galicia,  we  should  without  doubt 
create  an  unending  source  of  anxiety  for  our- 
selves. .  .  .  Galicia  occupied  by  us  might 
become   a   new  Alsace-Lorraine."  » 

'  Memoirs  Russian  edition,  pp.  54-5. 


300  RUSSIA   AND  THE   GREAT  WAR 

General  Kuropatkin  applies  these  considera- 
tions also  to  the  idea  of  the  conquest  of  Eastern 
Prussia.  "  Possessing  the  two  banks  and  the 
mouths  of  the  Vistula  and  the  mouth  of  the 
Niemen,  we  should  occupy  a  highly  threatening 
position  towards  Germany  and  should  consider- 
ably improve  our  frontier  from  a  military  point 
of  view.  But  these  advantages  would  be  far 
from  compensating  for  all  the  disadvantages  of 
such  an  enlargement  of  the  frontiers  of  Russia. 
We  should  be  confronted  by  a  new  Alsace- 
Lorraine  problem,  but  in  an  aggravated  form. 
.  .  .  The  population  of  Eastern  Prussia  will 
always  be  hostile  to  us  on  account  of  the 
superiority  of  its  culture  and  its  ties  with  the 
population  and  the  historical  past  of  Germany."  ' 

Moreover,  the  violent  occupation  of  Galicia 
and  Eastern  Prussia  by  Russia  would  involve  a 
perpetual  menace  of  a  fresh  conflict  with  Austria 
and  Germany,  who  would  never  reconcile  them- 
selves to  the  loss  of  these  provinces. 

All  these  considerations  led  General  Kuropat- 
kin absolutely  to  negative  the  idea  of  any 
augmentation  of  Russian  territory  at  the  expense 
of  Germany  and  Austria. 

I  can  but  agree  with  his  attitude,  adding  a 
few  more  reasons  for  so  doing. 

As  far  as  the  interests  of  the  great  masses  of 
the   Russian  people  are  concerned  the  enlarge- 
'  Memoirs,  Russian  edition,  p.  51- 


AFTER   THE   WAR  301 

merit  of  the  frontiers  would  represent  no  advan- 
tages. The  territories  of  Galicia,  Bukovina,  and 
Eastern  Prussia  cannot  constitute  a  "  basis  of 
colonization  "  for  the  peasants  of  Russia,  because 
these  provinces  are  more  thickly  populated  than 
Russia  itself.  Asia  Minor,  again,  would  not 
constitute  a  possible  colony,  firstly  because  it  has 
a  fairly  dense  population,  and  secondly  because 
its  soil  and  climate  are  not  such  as  are  familiar 
to  Russian  agriculturists.  The  Russian  people 
has  nothing  to  gain  from  these  countries,  and 
would  gain  nothing  save  the  hatred  of  the  natives, 
who  would  greatly  object  to  their  violent  sub- 
jection by  Russia.  The  annexation  of  Galicia 
and  Eastern  Prussia  might  even  create  diffi- 
culties for  the  Russian  agriculturists,  as  these 
two  countries  are  agricultural  par  excellence  and 
would  compete  against  the  rural  economy  of  the 
rest  of  the  Empire.  As  for  Russian  industry, 
it  has  no  need  of  Eastern  Prussia  or  Galicia  or 
Anatolia.  It  has  before  it  the  vast  home  market 
of  the  Empire,  which  is  by  no  means  supersatu- 
rated—it is  not  even  saturated— from  the  point  of 
view   of   consumption. 

What  the  masses  of  the  Russian  peoples  need 
is^  not  the  conquest  of  new  territories  but  a  pro- 
found transformation  of  the  internal  government 
of  the  life  of  the  people  and  of  the  political  and 
economic  conditions  of  its  existence. 


302  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

II 

But  there  is  one  special  factor  in  the  jprospect 
of  a  victory  of  the  Allies  which  is  of  great 
importance  to  Russia  and  to  all  the  other  Powers. 
This  is  the  question  of  the  possession  of  the 
Dardanelles   and   Constantinople. 

In  discussing  this  question  we  must  reject  all 
arguments  of  a  religious  and  historic  order,  which 
are  merely  the  verbal  and  metaphysical  em- 
broidery of  the  economic  and  political  aspirations 
of  the  Russian  Nationalists.  The  sacred  duty 
of  planting  the  Orthodox  Cross  on  the  dome  of 
St.  Sophia  at  Constantinople,  of  re-taking  from 
the  Turk  the  heritage  of  the  Byzantine  Emperors, 
etc.— all  this  is  merely  a  stringing  together  of 
words  that  have  no  concrete  meaning.  If  the 
Orthodox  Russian  Church  has  been  able  to  do 
without  St.  Sophia  for  so  many  centuries,  it  can 
do  without  it  in  the  future ;  and  the  Russian 
monarchy  can  very  well  do  without  Byzantium. 

If,  rejecting  all  these  empty  words,  we  address 
ourselves  to  the  analysis  of  the  true  interests  of 
Russia,  we  shall  see  that  the  possession  of  the 
Dardanelles  and  Constantinople  is  not  necessary 
to  her. 

Turkey  is  not  necessary  as  a  market  for  Russian 
produce,  which  is  exported  thither  in  far  smaller 
quantities  than  English,  Austrian,  German,  Greek 
and  Bulgarian  goods.     In  demanding  possession 


AFTER  THE   WAR  303 

of  Constantinople  Russia  cannot  base  her  claim 
on  the  possession  of  the  Turkish  market  by 
Russian  commerce,  which  occupies  one  of  the 
lowest  places  in  that  market.  But  the  problem 
of  the  Dardanelles  has  for  Russia  a  great  im- 
portance in  another  sense  :  the  Straits  form  the 
principal  outlet  for  Russian  cereals.  From  this 
point  of  view  Russia  is  bound  to  take  an  interest 
in  the  question  of  the  possession  of  the  Straits 
and  of  Constantinople.  But  we  must  not  forget 
that  there  are  many  other  Powers  and  States 
whose  economic  interests  are  as  closely  bound  up 
in  this  question  as  those  of  Russia.  In  1909-10, 
for  example,  of  the  total  tonnage  of  vessels  enter- 
ing the  port  of  Constantinople,  41' 7  flew  the 
British  flag,  177  the  Greek,  92  the  Austrian, 
and  only  7  per  cent,  the  Russian.  The  unde- 
niable fact  that  the  commercial  interests  of  many 
States  are  involved  is  a  sufficient  argument  to 
oppose  the  possession  of  the  Straits  and  of  Con- 
stantinople by  Russia  by  the  idea  of  neutraliza- 
tion, which  would  be  the  more  advantageous  as 
it  would  cause  the  minimum  prejudice  to  Turkey. 
Needless  to  say,  the  Balkan  States— Roumania, 
Bulgaria,  Greece,  and  Serbia— ought  to  share,  with 
the  Great  Powers,  in  the  administration  of  the 
neutralized   Straits  and  capital. 

Such  a  solution  would  possess  the  further  ad- 
vantage that  it  would  eliminate  one  of  the  objects 
of   disagreement   between   Russia   and   England, 


304  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

who  cannot  permit  that  Russia,  possessing  the 
Dardanelles,  should  threaten  the  Mediterranean, 
the  Balkan  States,  and  Asia.  The  neutralization 
of  the  Dardanelles  might  solve  the  difficult  and 
complicated  problem  without  disagreement  be- 
tween the  Allies  and  in  the  interests  of  all. 

Professor  Migulin,  one  of  the  leaders  of 
economic  Imperialism  in  Russia,  is  of  opinion 
that  "  the  territorial  acquisitions  in  the  West 
[Galicia  and  Prussia]  will  not  greatly  enrich 
Russia,"  as  these  regions  are  well  populated,  con- 
siderably in  debt,  and  so  far  developed,  from 
an  economic  point  of  view,  that  they  might  com- 
pete with  Russian  trade  and  production.  But 
the  same  writer  considers  that  Russia  should 
appropriate  "  the  German  heritage  in  Turkey," 
taking,  not  only  the  Dardanelles  and  Constanti- 
nople but  also  all  Asia  Minor. 

In  the  Duma,  in  January  191  5,  the  leader  of 
the  "  Cadets,"  M.  Milukov,  insisted  that  Russia 
must  gain  possession  of  the  Straits  and  Constanti- 
nople. He  repeated  his  words  during  a  public 
speech  made  at  Moscow  on  the  31st  of  January, 
in  which  he  declared  even  that  Russia  "  must 
make  haste  and  take  the  Dardanelles  as  soon  as 
possible,   so  as  not  to  be  behind-hand."  ' 

The  same  declaration  was  repeated  in  the  Duma 
by   the    representative    of   the    Nationalists,    who 

'  Quoted  from  the  Russkoie  Slovo  of  the  19th  of  January 
( I  St  of  February)  191 5. 


AFTER  THE   WAR  305 

declared:  "The  Straits  and  Tsargrad  [Con- 
stantinople] must  belong  to  us  and  to  us  only." 
M.  Milukov  supported  him,  saying  that  "  the 
acquisition  of  the  Straits  and  Constantinople 
should  be  assured  by  the  aid  of  both  diplomatic 
and   military  measures." 

In  this  case,  as  in  so  many  others,  the  leader  of 
the  Russian  Liberals  does  not  express  the  true 
feelings  and  aspirations  of  our  democracy  during 
the  present  war,  for  whom  the  present  war  is 
not  a  war  of  conquest  and  usurpation,  but  simply 
a  war  to  defend  Russia  and  Europe  against  the 
brutal  aggression  and  domination  of  Germany. 


20 


CHAPTER     II 

I.  The  political  and  economic  results  of  a  German  defeat  and 
the  destruction  of  Prussian  Imperialism. — II.  The  defeat  of 
Germany  is  to  the  advantage  of  the  German  revolutionaries 
and  the  Socialists  of  Germany  and  of  all  Europe. 

I 

In  denying  the  necessity  of  an  enlargement  of 
the  territory  of  Russia  at  the  expense  of  her 
enemies,  I  wish  to  lay  stress  on  the  advantages 
which  the  victory  of  the  Allies  over  Germany, 
Austria,  and  Turkey  would  signify  for  the 
economic  and  political  progress  of  all  Europe. 
But  if  Germany  were  victorious  Europe  would 
lie  prostrate  under  the  heavy  boot  of  Prussian 
Imperialism.  The  great  development  of  German 
industry  would  enable  Germany  to  complete  her 
military  victory  by  monopolizing  the  European 
market  and  a  great  part  of  the  world-market. 
German  capitalism  would  flourish  to  the  detriment 
of  the  industries  of  other  countries,  and  the 
German  people  would  grow  wealthy  at  the  ex- 
pense of  other  peoples.  The  economic  progress 
of  Europe,  crushed  under  the  boot  of  Prussia, 
would  be  arrested,  and  would  assume  unhealthy 
forms  under  the  pressure  of  the  monopolization 
and   parasitism   of   German    capital. 

306 


AFTER   THE   WAR  307 

To  save  the  economic  life  of  Europe  from  the 
disastrous  effect  of  this  monopolization  and  para- 
sitism is  the  first  task  of  the  Allies  now  fighting 
against  Germany. 

But  Russia  ?  Perhaps  some  Germanophile  or 
Russophobe  will  ask  me  whether  the  victory  of 
Russia  would  not  be  as  disastrous  to  the  economic 
progress  of  Europe.  By  no  means.  Russia  is 
a  semi-capitalist,  agricultural  country,  and  has 
not  the  technical  advantages  which  would  permit 
her  to  monopolize  the  European  market,  much 
less  the  world-market,  as  her  industry  and  her 
capital  are  still  too  undeveloped  and  too  weak 
for  such  a  task,  while  Germany  is  the  most  highly 
industrialized  country  of  Europe. 

Erom  the  social  and  political  point  of  view 
the  German  domination  of  Europe  would,  I  think, 
be  equally  perilous.  We  can  well  imagine  what 
results  this  domination  would  have  in  annexed 
Belgium  or  crushed  and  humiliated  France.  It 
would  be  the  triumph  of  Prussian  absolutism  over 
the  democratic  regimes  of  other  nations.  It  would 
also  involve  a  great  set-back  to  the  labour  move- 
ment in  the  conquered  States,  for  instead  of  find- 
ing occupation  in  the  conflict  of  classes,  and  the 
social,  professional,  and  political  aspects  of  that 
conflict,  the  intellectual  forces  of  the  proletariat 
of  the  three  capitalist  countries— England,  France, 
and  Belgium— would  be  absorbed  by  the  idea 
of  revenge,  of  national  defence,  and  of  libera- 
tion from   the   German   yoke.      Nationalism  and 


308  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

chauvinism  would  supplant  international  Social- 
ism in  the  labour  movement  of  a  great  part  of 
Europe. 

II 

The  defeat  of  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
necessary,  not  only  to  the  progress  and  democracy 
of  Europe,  but  to  Germany  herself.  It  would 
shatter  the  omnipotent  influence  of  the  Prussian 
Junkers,  and  the  HohenzoUern  monarchy,  which 
relies  on  their  support.  It  would  force  the 
German  people  to  understand  that  it  must  recon- 
struct its  political  system  and  free  itself  from 
the  absolutist  militarism  of  which  it  seems  at  the 
present  moment  to  be  the  timid  and  faithful  tool. 
Even  now  I  can  detect  symptoms  of  the  awaken- 
ing of  the  German  people.  While  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  the  most  popular  of  the  political  parties 
of  Germany,  the  Social -Democratic  Party,  was 
absolutely  obedient  to  the  Government,  after  six 
months  of  warfare  it  is  already  beginning  to  pro- 
test. The  Socialist  deputies  of  the  Prussian 
Landtag  proclaim  the  necessity  of  concluding 
peace  as  speedily  as  possible.  Karl  Liebknecht, 
deputy  to  the  Reichstag,  refuses  to  associate  him- 
self with  the  Prussian  Government,  and  openly 
declares  that  the  military  cliques  of  Austria  and 
Germany  are  responsible  for  the  outbreak  of  the 
war.  In  certain  important  Social-Democratic 
organizations  in  the  provinces  secession  has  oc- 
curred owing  to  the  attitude  of  the  central  official 


AFTER   THE   WAR  309 

centres.  The  labour  organization  of  Charlotten- 
burg,  the  great  suburb  of  Berlin,  voted  a  protest 
against  the  war,  and  declared  that  the  principal 
responsibility  for  the  war  rested  with  the  Govern- 
ments of  Austria  and  Germany.  This  popular 
discontent  will  increase  as  the  Germans  meet  with 
failure  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  German  people, 
whose  Government  promised  to  take  Paris  in  a 
month  and  conquer  Russia  before  Christmas  of 
19 1 4,  begins  to  see  tTiat  it  is  deceived.  And,  in 
spite  of  all  its  dislike  of  revolutionary  measures, 
the  German  people  will  rid  themselves  of  abso- 
lutism by  a  revolution  if  that  absolutism  is 
defeated  in  the  war. 

But  this  is  not  all.  I  should  wish  to  draw  the 
attention  of  all  European  Socialists  to  a  point  of 
special  interest  and  importance  to  the  Socialist 
movement. 

I  regard  Germany  as  the  country  which  objec- 
tively and  technically  is  the  most  highly  developed 
in  its  industrial  and  capitalist  organization  of  all 
the  countries  of  Europe.  We  may  even  say  that 
it  is  too  highly  developed,  that  it  suffers  from  a 
permanent  superproduction  and  is  suffocating 
itself  under  the  weight  of  this  superproduction. 
There  were  only  two  possible  issues  before  the 
economic  organism  of  Germany  :  suffering  from 
a  plethora  of  capitalism,  she  had  either  to  effect 
a  radical  reconstruction  of  her  whole  domestic 
fabric,  on  a  new  basis,  or  she  had  to  endeavour 
to  hack  her  way  toward  the  domination  of  the 


310  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

world  over  the  corpses  of  other  economic  and 
poHtical  organisms.  The  working-classes  of 
Germany  preferred  the  first  issue  before  the  war_, 
and  even  prudent  writers  like  Karl  Kautsky  pre- 
dicted the  not  very  remote  possibility  of  a  com- 
plete transformation  of  the  economic  life  of 
Germany,  the  abolition  of  the  capitalist  system, 
and  the  beginning  of  a  social  revolution.  The 
propertied  classes  and  the  Government  would 
doubtless  prefer  another  issue  :  instead  of  a 
change  of  the  economic  and  social  system  of  the 
country,  they  intended  to  combat  its  capitalist 
plethora  by  means  of  a  military  conquest  of  new 
outlets.  Instead  of  withdrawing  into  itself, 
capitalist  Germany  breaks  out  upon  Europe,  rifle 
in  hand. 

These,  I  think,  are  the  economic  and  socio- 
logical factors  which  induced  Germany  to  pro- 
voke the  present  war.  And  this  explanation 
permits  me  to  warn  all  European  Socialists  that 
they  ought  to  desire  the  defeat  of  Germany,  for 
that  defeat  is  in  the  interests  of  Socialism  in 
Germany  and  in  all  Europe.  German  capitalism, 
guided  by  the  military  caste  of  Prussia, 
endeavoured  to  avoid  the  prospect  of  a  labour 
revolution  and  a  Socialist  transformation  of 
society,  and  sought  an  issue  in  the  international 
war  and  the  German  domination  of  Europe. 
Socialists  everywhere  ought  to  make  every 
possible  effort  to  bar  the  way  to  Germany 
and   to   compel   her  to   return   home.      Then   the 


AFTER  THE   WAR  311 

problem  of  the  reconstruction  of  the  entire 
economic  structure  of  Germany,  of  a  renewal  of 
all  its  social  bases,  will  once  more  confront  the 
German  people,  and  the  German  Social- 
Democratic  working-men  will  be  forced  to 
repent  of  their  treachery  towards  their  inter- 
national comrades,  and  to  conduct  a  revolution 
at  home  instead  of  going  forth  to  kill  the  Erench, 
Russian,  English,  and  Belgian  workers.  But 
there  is  only  one  means  of  bringing  capitalist 
and  working-class  Germany  to  this  point  :  the 
Allied  armies  must  bar  the  way  before  German 
Imperialism  on  its  errand  of  stupendous  military 
brigandage.  And  this  is  why  I  believe  the 
Allied  armies  are  fulfilling  a  positive  and  pro- 
gressive role,  not  merely  from  the  standpoint 
of  national  defence,  but  also  from  the  standpoint 
of    international    Socialism. ' 

^  I  will  quote  an  observation  made  by  George  Plechanov  in 
his  pamphlet  on  the  war  :  "  Under  the  present  conditions  the 
defeat  of  German  Imperialism  will  contribute  considerably  to  the 
propagation  of  the  revolutionary  movement  in  the  interior  of 
Germany,  and  this  will  weaken  the  position  of  Russian  Tsarism. 
The  defeat  of  German  Imperialism  will  at  the  same  time  be  the 
defeat  of  the  Right  wing  of  the  German  Social-Democratic  Party. 
So  we  cannot  but  say  that  an  issue  of  the  war  which  shall  be 
unfavourable  to  Germany  is  extremely  desirable,  as  regards  the 
interest  of  revolutionary  Socialism  all  the  world  over."  I  only 
hope  this  defeat  of  opportunism  in  Social-Democratic  Germany 
may  prove  to  be  the  only  punishment  its  leaders  will  suffer  for 
the  abominable  treachery  with  which  it  thrust  the  poisoned 
dagger  of  betrayal  into  the  back  of  international  labour  and  the 
Russian  revolution. 


CHAPTER    III 

I.  Why  is  the  Anglo-Franco-Russian  alliance  preferable,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  Russian  liberty  and  democracy,  to 
the  alliance  of  Russia  with  the  German  and  Austrian 
monarchies  ? — II.  The  intrigues  of  the  Russian  reaction- 
aries during  the  war.  Their  propaganda  in  favour  of  a 
separate  peace  with  Germany.  The  necessity  of  an  alliance 
of  the  democratic  elements  of  the  Allied  countries  if  these 
intrigues  are  to  be  disarmed. 

I 

I  HAVE  already  said,  in  a  preceding  chapter,  that 
the  present  mihtary  and  pohtical  grouping  of 
the  European  Powers  is  far  more  advantageous 
to  Russia  than  the  aUiance  with  the  Hohen- 
zoUern  and  Hapsburg  monarchies  which  the 
reactionaries  in  Russia  so  desire.  Imagine  that 
in  place  of  the  alliance  of  Russia  with  republican 
France  and  democratic  England  we  were  to  have 
a  Holy  (  !  )  Alliance  of  the  three  Emperors- 
Russian,  German,  and  Austrian  !  What  damage 
they  could  do  to  the  liberty  and  democracy  of 
Europe  !  What  bonds  might  they  not  impose 
upon  them  !  And  how  the  Russian  reactionaries 
would  rejoice  the  friends  of  the  Prussian  reac- 

31'2 


AFTER   THE   WAR  313 

tion  !  r  In  1904,  at  the  time  of  the  Russo- 
German  "  friendship,"  the  Russian  bureaucracy 
sacrificed  to  Germany  the  interests  of  the  agri- 
cukural,  population  and  the  rural  economy  of  its 
own  country  by  accepting  the  conditions  of  the 
Customs  Treaty  imposed  by  Germany.  We  can- 
not doubt  that  the  same  story  would  be  repeated 
in  1 9 1 6  on  the  conclusion  of  the  new  Russo- 
German  treaty. 

As  far  as  the  economic  interests  of  Russia  are 

'  In  order  once  more  to  give  the  reader  some  conception  of 
the  hatred  of  the  Russian  reactionaries  for  republican  and  demo- 
cratic ideas,  I  quote  the  following  passage :  "  On  the  3rd  of 
December  1909  the  deputy  Markov,  a  member  of  the  Union  of 
the  Russian  People,  declared  in  the  Duma,  to  the  applause 
of  the  Right,  and  without  being  called  to  order  by  the  President, 
Prince  Volkonsky  :  "  The  French  Revolution  is  the  most  odious 
and  contemptible  act  of  modern  history.  .  .  .  The  Republic 
means  the  reign  of  public  men  and  public  women"  (see  La 
Verite  stir  La  Russie,  by  Rene  de  Chavagnes,  Paris,  19 10,  p.  10). 

And  of  the  amiability  of  the  Russian  reactionaries  to  their 
German  and  Austrian  friends,  the  reader  may  judge  from  the 
following  extract  from  M.  Milukov's  book,  "  The  Balkan  Crisis  and 
the  Policy  of  M.  Izvolsky,"  Petersburg,  1900.  In  speaking  of 
the  tactlessness  of  Russian  and  the  skill  of  Austrian  diplomacy, 
in  the  Balkan  affairs  of  1907-8,  M.  Milukov  says:  "Baron 
von  Aerenthal,  an  old  friend  of  the  late  P.  X.  Schwanebach,  who 
gave  him,  when  at  Petersburg,  the  most  precise  information  as 
to  the  internal  weakness  of  Russia,  had  calculated  very  exactly. 
Russia  could  not  at  that  period  occupy  herself  seriously  with 
Balkan  affairs.  And  Baron  von  Aerenthal  hastened  to  profit  by 
our  weakness."  M.  V.  Schwanebach,  a  State  Comptroller,  was 
one  of  the  highest  of  Russian  oiScials,  and  a  member  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers,  so  that  the  reader  will  understand  that 
this  is  a  very  grave  accusation. 


314  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

concerned,  the  victory  of  Germany  might  be  fol- 
lowed by  lamentable  results.  It  would  increase 
the  economic  dependence  of  Russia  upon 
Germany.  A  Marxist  writer  well  known  in 
Russia,  M.  P.  Maslov,  author  of  a  great  work 
on  "  The  Agrarian  Problem  in  Russia,"  ex- 
presses the  supposition  that  in  the  event  of  a 
German  victory  Russia  might  become  merely  the 
colony  of  Germany  and  lose  all  possibility  of 
independent  economic  development.  He  makes 
the  deduction  that  all  classes  of  the  Russian 
population — peasants  and  artisans  included— have 
much  to  fear  from  the  victory  of  Germany. 

Another  Marxist  writer,  Georges  Plechanov, 
whose  letter  to  Justice  I  have  already  quoted, 
wrote  an  interesting  pamphlet  on  the  war,  which 
was  published  in  Paris  :— 

"  We  have  reason  for  believing  that  the  defeat 
of  Russia  in  the  present  war  would  be  injurious 
to  the  future  economic  development  of  the 
country.  Wliy?  Simply  because  the  nature  of 
the  Imperialist  policy  involves  the  economic  ex- 
ploitation of  the  conquered  people  by  the  con- 
queror. As  a  result  of  such  exploitation  the 
economic  development  of  the  conquering  people 
is  accelerated  and  that  of  the  conquered  people 
is  hampered. 

"  And  as  the  principal  forces  of  the  liberative 
movement  in  Russia  are  born  of  its  economic 
progress,    which    has    destroyed    the    old    social 


AFTER   THE   WAR  315 

relation  and  has  created  new  classes— the 
working-class  in  particular— it  is  easy  to  under- 
stand that  the  defeat  of  Russia  would  retard  her 
economic  development  and  be  injurious  to  the 
work  of  popular  liberty  and  favourable  to  the 
ancien  regime— that  is,  to  the  very  Tsarism  whose 
abolition  we  desire.  All  that  hampers  our 
economic  development  and  upholds  Tsarism, 
which  is  merely  the  inevitable  political  con- 
sequence of  the  fact  that  the  Russian  State  is 
still  undeveloped  from  the  economic  point  of 
view."  I 

On  the  other  hand,  as  I  have  already  said,  the 
German  reaction  has  many  political  interests  and 
sentiments  in  common  with  the  Russian  reaction. 

"  Everybody  knows,"  writes  Plechanov,  "  that 
the  German  Emperor  was  the  faithful  defender 
of  our  ancien  regime.  He  knew  well  what  he 
was  doing  in  supporting  it.  He  understood  that 
the  existence  of  this  regime  was  profitable,  not 
to  the  Russian  people  but  to  the  German  Junkers 
and  Imperialists,  because  it  facilitated  the  victory 
of  Germany  over  Russia."  2 

The  crushing  of  Prussian  militarism  is  there- 
fore, for  Russian  democracy,  the  crushing  of  a 
friend  and  the  giving  of  support  to  the  autocracy 
and  reaction  of  Russia. 

'  Georges  Plechanov,  O  voim'e,  "  Concerning  the  War,"  Paris, 
1914,  pp.  25-7.  ^  Ibid.,  p.  30. 


316  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

II 

The  Russian  reactionaries  well  understand  the 
situation  created  by  the  present  war,  and  they 
endeavour  to  modify  it  in  the  direction  desirable 
to  them.  I  have  already  quoted  extracts  from 
articles  in  the  organ  of  the  Union  of  the  Russian 
People,  Russkoie  Znamia,  which,  even  during 
the  war  against  Germany,  is  conducting  a  propa- 
ganda in  favour  of  Germany  by  representing  her 
as  the  symbol  of  order  and  the  monarchical  prin- 
ciple and  by  expressing  the  hope  that  she  will 
crush  France,  and  there  restore  an  absolutist 
government.  The  Russkoie  Znamia,  in  its  sym- 
pathy for  Germany,  even  went  so  far  as  to  justify 
the  execution  of  Russian  students  in  Belgium 
(at  Liege)  by  the  Germans,  for  the  sole  reason 
that  these  students  were  of  the  Jewish  faith. 

"  These  Jews  had  themselves  fired  on  the 
Germans  and  provoked  the  latter  to  shoot  them 
down,"  wrote  this  cannibalistic  Russian  journalist 
of  the  innocent  death  of  a  few  youths  who  were 
Russian  subjects.  "Why  did  they  fire  on  the 
Germans  ?  Simply  to  provoke  the  Germans  to 
massacre  as  large  a  number  as  possible  of 
Belgian  Christians,  so  that  the  Zionists  might  the 
more  readily  replace  these  Christians  and  trans- 
form Belgium  into  a  Palestine  !  "  ' 

These  filthy  imbecilities  are  published  openly 

'  In  ikxt  Rzisskoii  y.naniia,  gth  of  December  19 14,  Petrograd. 


AFTER   THE   WAR  317 

in  Petrograd,  under  the  eye  of  the  benevolent 
Russian  censor,  the  very  censor  who  has  pitilessly 
suppressed  the  whole  of  the  "Left  "  press. 

But  the  intrigues  of  the  Russian  reactionaries 
go  farther  than  the  mere  verbal  expression  of 
sympathy  for  Germany.  They  have  undertaken 
a  whole  propaganda  in  favour  of  the  separation 
of  Russia  from  her  present  Allies  and  the  con- 
clusion of  a  separate  peace  with  Germany,  or,  to 
put  it  more  simply,  in  favour  of  international 
treason  and  perfidy. 

The  task  of  directing  this  treacherous  cam- 
paign was  assumed  by  Count  Witte,  creator  of 
the  monopoly  of  alcohol  which  so  long  poisoned 
the  Russian  people,  and  the  breaker  of  the  great 
political  strike  in  1905.  This  gentleman,  in 
December  19 14,  delivered  a  speech  before  the 
Assembly  of  the  representatives  of  Russian 
industries  convoked  to  deliberate  concerning  the 
war  tax.  In  this  speech  he  developed  the  idea 
that  Russia  is  far  less  interested  in  defeating 
Germany  than  is  England,  who  alone  will  be 
enriched  by  the  war.  The  ideas  expressed  in 
his  speech  were  reproduced  and  repeated  by 
several  organs  of  the  press.  The  supporters  of 
M.  Witte  accused  England  of  inciting  Russia, 
with  the  egotistical  object  of  imposing  the  heavier 
burden  of  military  effort  on  her  while  economizing 
her  own  resources. 

The  propaganda  against  England  and  against 


318  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

France,  conducted  by  the  Russian  Germano- 
philes,  coincided  (and  this  must  not  be  over- 
looked) with  an  analogous  and  "  parallel  "  propa- 
ganda conducted  in  Germany  by  certain  journals, 
which,  ceasing  their  call  to  the  conflict  with 
reactionary  Tsarism,  began  to  assure  their  readers 
that  the  principal  enemy  of  Germany  is  not 
Russia  but  England,  who  incited  both  Russia 
and  France  to  make  war. 

The  propaganda  of  treason  conducted  by  these 
Russian  Germanophiles  was  in  obvious  contra- 
diction to  the  public  declaration  of  the  three 
Allied  Governments,  whose  text,  signed  on  the 
4th  of  September  19 14,  states  that  "the  British, 
French,  and  Russian  Governments  mutually 
engage  themselves  not  to  conclude  a  separate 
peace  during  the  present  war,  and  agree  that 
when  there  shall  be  occasion  to  discuss  the  terms 
of  peace  no  one  of  the  Allied  Powers  can  propose 
conditions  of  peace  without  previous  agreement 
with  each  of  the  other  Allies."  So  the  French 
and  English  Governments  have  an  incontestable 
right  to  protest  against  the  intrigues  of  the 
Russian  Germanophiles  and  to  demand  explana- 
tions from  the  Tsar's  Government.  Early  in 
January  1 9 1  5  the  Petrograd  Coiirrier  published 
the   following   communication  : — 

"  We  are  informed,  from  an  authorized  and 
well-informed  source,  that  the  Ambassadors  of 
France  and  Great  Britain  have  lately  complained 


AFTER   THE   WAR  319 

to  M.  Sazonov,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of 
the  disagreeable  and  altogether  '  undesirable  ' 
tone  of  certain  organs  of  the  press — few  in 
number,  it  is  true— and  also  of  certain  isolated 
politicians,  men  well  known  in  Europe  and 
America,  who  have  declared  themselves  inimical 
to  England.  M.  Paleologue  and  Sir  George 
Buchanan  observed  to  M.  Sazonov,  amongst 
other  matters,  that  the  speech  of  Count  Witte 
before  the  Assembly  of  the  representatives  of 
Russian  industries  had  produced  the  most  painful 
impression  upon  British  statesmen  and  the  British 
press.  The  Ambassadors  declared  that  these 
criticisms,  which  have  no  foundation  in  fact  and 
are  expressed  only  because  it  is  not  possible  to 
publish  all  the  agreements  existing  between 
Russia,  France,  and  England  touching  the 
common  conduct  of  the  war,  are  utilized  by  our 
enemies,  and  allow  them  to  spread,  by  means 
of  their  agents  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  reports 
of  dissension  between  the  Allies,  whose  cause 
is  said  to  be  our  excessive  confidence  in  England. 
More,  these  criticisms  injure  our  common  cause. 
The  Ambassadors  begged  M.  Sazonov  to  take 
action  in  order  to  dissipate  these  regrettable  and 
absolutely  gratuitous  suspicions,  which  tend  to 
represent  England  as  preoccupied  exclu- 
sively with  herself.  On  his  side  Sir  George 
seized  the  occasion  to  declare,  in  the  name  of 
Great  Britain,  that  the  latter  is  prepared  to  fulfil 


320  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

to  the  end,  worthily  and  nobly,  her  obligations 
towards  her  Allies,  without  recoiling  from  any 
sacrifice  either  in  material  or  in  men. 

To  this  protest  the  British  Ambassador  added 
another  and  a  public  protest  in  his  speech  at  the 
English  Club  (on  New  Year's  Eve),  when  he 
spoke  scathingly  of  "  certain  notorious  Germano- 
philes  who  are  preaching  a  crusade  against 
England  and  a  little  band  of  their  supporters 
who  are  making  every  effort  to  sow  discord 
between  Russia  and  her  Allies." 

After  this  the  Russian  Government  published 
an  official  declaration  in  which  it  stated  that 
"  the  co-ordination  of  all  the  operations  of  the 
Allied  armies  had  been  perfect,"  and  that  "  each 
of  the  parties  was  free  from  all  reproach."  But 
as  this  declaration  contained  no  precise  reply  to 
the  propaganda  of  a  separate  peace  between 
Russia  and  Germany,  the  question  was  raised 
at  a  sitting  of  one  of  the  Commissions  of  the 
Duma,  whose  members  demanded  to  know,  of 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  whether  there 
was  any  foundation  to  the  rumours  concerning 
the  possibility  of  a  separate  peace.  M.  Sazonov 
on  this  occasion  replied  by  a  non-equivocal 
denial . 

From  all  this  strange  and  perhaps  not  yet  com- 
pleted story  we  may  make  this  deduction,  that 
France  and  England  should  not  repose  too  much 
confidence   in   the   ruling   classes   of  Russia,   for 


AFTER  THE   WAR  321 

they  contain  in  their  midst  many  enemies  of  the 
French  and  English  democracies  and  friends  of 
the  Prussian  reaction.     But  in  order  to  safeguard 
themselves   against   the  intrigues   of  these   reac- 
tionary Germanophiles,  the  democratic  elements 
of    France    and    England    and    Belgium    should 
count,  above  all,  on  the  sympathies  of  the  demo- 
cratic elements  in  Russia  and  should  hold  out  the 
hand  of  friendship  offered  them.    Such  an  alliance 
of  the  democracies  of  the  three  countries  would 
facilitate   a   solution   of   those    varied   and    com- 
plicated problems  which  confront  us  to-day,  and 
will  confront  us  even  more  urgently  at  the  close 
of  the  war,  in  a  truly  democratic  sense  and  in  the 
interests  of  the  people. 


21 


CHAPTER    IV 

I.  The  future  evolution  of  Russia.  Various  opinions  held  in 
Russian  society  concerning  this  evolution. — II.  The  national 
question  after  the  war. — III.  The  role  of  the  French  and 
English  democracies  in  the  Russian  people's  struggle  for 
liberty. —  IV.  What  has  Russia  to  give  to  the  world  ? 

I 

The  eminent  Russian  historian  M.  Nicolas 
Rojkov,  sometime  Professor  of  the  University 
of  Moscow/  contributed  to  the  Sovremenny  Mir 
for  October  19 14  an  article  dealing  with  the 
analogy  between  the  present  war  and  the 
campaign  of   1 8 1 2- 1 4 . 

"  Any  war,"  he  writes,  "  is  a  terrible  misfor- 
tune, more  especially  a  '  world-war.'  It  is  the 
duty  of  all  to  whom  the  interests  of  the  great 
popular  masses  are  dear  to  seek  to  prevent  war. 
.  .  .  But  when  we  are  already  confronted  by 
the  reality  of  war  we  should  endeavour  to  grasp 
its  entire  significance.     A  war  is  a  vast  shock, 

'  I  may  remark,  in  passing,  that  M.  Rojkov  is  at  present  in 
Siberia,  having  been  sentenced  to  "perpetual  deportation,  with 
deprivation  of  all  civil  and  personal  rights."  He  was  condemned 
to  this  punishment  in  1908  for  participation  in  the  revolutionary 
movement  of  the  Russian  people. 

332 


AFTER  THE   WAR  323 

a  huge  upheaval.  The  objective  action  of  the 
war  gives  a  final  impulse  to  those  forces  of  social 
development  which  are  ripening,  and  to  those 
which  have  already  arrived  at  maturity,  and 
accelerates  the  processes  which  were  developing 
in  the  bosom  of  society  before  the  war.  We 
know  that  before  the  war  a  fresh  and  encouraging 
wind,  a  breeze  of  springtide,  was  blowing  across 
Russia.  It  is  very  evident  that  after  the  war 
these  springtide  forces  will  not  disappear,  that, 
on  the  contrary,  they  will  develop  into  a  warm 
summer,  a  season  of  great  activity  of  independent 
social  forces.  A  defeat  of  the  ruling  classes 
of  Germany  .  .  .  holds  out  the  promise  to  our 
country  of  the  prospect  of  a  wide  economic, 
social,  and  political  development." 

But  the  various  elements  of  Russian  society 
are  not  agreed  as  to  what  constitute  the  most 
desirable  forms  of  such  development.  Take,  for 
example,  the  question  of  the  economic  emancipa- 
tion of  Russia  from  German  influence.  The  great 
capitalist-monopolists  and  their  theoreticians  are 
preaching  the  forced  and  artificial  elimination  of 
German  competition,  and  foreign  competition  in 
general,  from  the  Russian  market,  by  means  of 
an  even  stronger  Protectionism  than  that  which 
exists  in  Russia  to-day.  The  Russian  democracy, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  against  Protectionism,  and 
believes  that  its  abolition  would  be  beneficial 
to  the  economic  development  of  Russia,  because 


Jt 


324  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

it  would  impel   Russian  capitalism  toward  more 
energetic  and  more  enlightened  activities. 

We  find  the  same  disagreement  in  respect  of 
the  problem  of  foreign  markets.  The  great 
capitalists  wish  the  Government  to  seize  this  or 
that  market  by  aid  of  military  force,  so  that 
they  may  exploit  it  as  their  personal  property, 
guarded  by  bayonet  and  cannon.  The  demo- 
cratic elements  of  Russian  society  consider,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  Russian  capital  has  no  need 
of  an  external  market  conquered  by  force, 
because  it  is  confronted  with  many  possibilities 
of  development  in  the  interior  of  the  country, 
and  the  forcible  seizure  of  an  external  market 
into  which  Russian  manufacturers  could  pour 
products  of  bad  quality  and  very  high  price 
would  play  only  a  negative  part  in  the  permanent 
development  of  Russian  industry. 

One  of  the  causes  of  the  present  war,  and  one 
of  the  principal  points  of  the  Russo-German  con- 
flict, is  the  question  of  the  renewal  of  the  Customs 
Treaty.  And  this  is  how  the  Council  of  the 
Congress  of  Trade  and  Industry  (the  directive 
centre  of  all  the  unions  of  Russian  manu- 
facturers) wishes  to  solve  this  problem  :  "  Vic- 
torious Russia,"  it  says  in  its  official  declaration, 
"  must  dictate  her  economic  programme  to  van- 
quished Germany."  To  this  economic  canni- 
balism the  Russian  democracy  replies  that  even 
after  the  completest  victory  of  Russia  over  Ger- 


AFTER   THE   WAR  325 

many  there  can  be  no  question  of  the  dictation  of 
a  one-sided  economic  programme  by  the  victor 
at  the  bayonet's  point.  There  can  only  be  a 
reciprocal  arrangement  which  would  conciliate 
the  vital  interests  of  the  popular  masses  of  Russia 
and  Germany.  There  must  be  no  exploitation  of 
the  German  people  by  the  Russian  capitalists,  but 
an  economic  collaboration  of  the  two  countries. 

Here  is  a  case  in  point.  At  the  last  session 
of  the  Duma  the  peasant  deputies  put  forward 
a  proposal  as  to  the  necessity  of  introducing  as 
soon  as  possible  a  progressive  tax  upon  income. 
The  majority  of  the  Duma  rejected  the  proposi- 
tion, although  it  was  thoroughly  justified  by  the 
eeconomic  situation  of  the  population  and  even 
by  the  necessities  of  the  war.  "  We  are  paying 
a  tax  in  blood,"  say  the  poor  Russian  peasants 
to  the  rich  nobles  and  monopolists.  "  It  is  only 
fair  that  you  should  pay  a  tax  in  money."  But 
the  wealthy  nobles  and  capitalists  will  not  put 
aside  their  egoism  even  during  the  difficulties  of 
a  time  of  war,  when  a  powerful  enemy  is  invading 
the  country. 

II 

In  other  domains  of  Russian  life  we  find  many 
similar  contradictions  and  disagreements.  What, 
for  instance,  do  we  find  in  respect  of  the  racial 
or  nationalist  problem? 

Early  in  September    19 14  the  Commander-in- 


326  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

Chief  of  the  Russian  Army  addressed  the  popula- 
tion of  Austria-Hungary  in  a  proclamation 
wherein  he  solemnly  declared  "  in  the  name  of 
the  great  Russian  Tsar "  that  "  Russia,  which 
has  already  on  more  than  one  occasion  shed  her 
blood  for  the  liberation  of  the  peoples  from  a 
foreign  yoke,  seeks  nothing  but  the  re-establish- 
ment of  law  and  justice. 

"  To  you,  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  also, 
Russia  to-day  brings  liberty  and  the  fulfilment 
of  your  national  aspirations.  .  .  .  Russia  has 
but  one  object  :  that  each  of  you  may  develop 
and  live  in  prosperity,  preserving  the  precious 
heritage  of  his  fathers— his  language  and  his 
religion." 

Such  were  the  words  used ;  but  what  were 
the  facts?  I  will  quote  from  the  Journal  le 
Geneve,  a  moderate  and  Russophile  journal,  in 
which  we  find  a  description  of  the  policy  of 
"  Russification  "  pursued  by  the  Russian  bureau- 
cracy in  Bukovina  and  Galicia  after  the  Russian 
troops  had  entered  those  countries  : — 

"  Despite  the  criticisms  of  the  Liberal  Russian 
journals,  such  as  the  Retch,  the  Russkiya  Viedo- 
mostl,  etc.,  and  even  of  some  of  the  Conservative 
organs,  such  as  the  Golos  Moskvy  and  the 
Kolokol,  the  new  Russian  administration,  under 
the  influence  of  the  Nationalist  and  Clerical 
Party,  has  inaugurated  in  Galicia  an  extremely 
irritating  policy  of  Russification. 


AFTER  THE   WAR  327 

"  Eastern  Galicia,  inhabited  by  four  millions 
of  Ruthenians  and  a  million  and  a  half  of  Poles 
and  Jews,  has  become  the  field  of  action  of  the 
Nationalist  Party,  which  now  reigns  there  as  a 
master.    ... 

"  Despite  the  proclamation  of  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas,  who  promised  the  free  exercise  of  their 
language  and  their  religion  to  the  Slav  peoples 
of  Austria,  here  are  the  measures  which  the 
Governor-General,  Count  Bobrinsky,  has  taken 
in   Galicia  : 

"  All  the  Ruthenian  and  Ukrainian  journals  are 
suspended ;  all  the  bookshops  closed,  as  well 
as  the  co-operative  societies  and  intellectual 
associations,  among  others  Prosvlta,  which 
boasted  150,000  members,  3,000  libraries,  and 
1,000  savings-banks.  The  Ukrainian  National 
Museum  is  closed  and  its  collections  have  been 
transported  into  Russia. 

"  The  University  and  all  the  schools  are  closed, 
until  the  professors  and  school-teachers  have 
learned  Russian.  [This  news  is  official  and  was 
published  in  the  Voennole  Slovo  of  Lemberg, 
and  all  the  Russian  journals,  together  with  the 
following  ]  : — 

"  By  an  order  of  the  30th  September  1914 
all  the  Ruthenian  books  printed  in  Galicia,  and 
even  books  of  prayers,  must  be  taken  to  the 
police-stations,  there  to  be  destroyed,  under 
penalty  of  three  months'  imprisonment  or  a  fine 


328  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

of  3,000  roubles.     Correspondence,  even  private, 
in  the  Ruthenian  language  is  forbidden. 

"  Under  the  pretext  that  the  Ruthenians  are 
Russians  [but  if  they  are,  why  Russify  them?] 
and  were  Orthodox  three  centuries  ago,  an  ener- 
getic propaganda  has  been  organized,  at  the 
bayonet's  point,  in  favour  of  '  Holy  Orthodoxy.' 
The  Galician  peasants  are  forced  to  attend 
'  plebiscites  '  under  the  vigilant  eye  of  the 
Cossacks,  in  order  to  choose  between  the 
Orthodox  faith  and  that  which  has  been  theirs 
for  three  hundred  years. 

"In  September  .  .  .  the  '  Russo  -  Galician  ' 
Clerical  and  Nationalist  Society  at  Petrograd 
discussed  the  methods  to  be  employed  to  '  con- 
vert '  Galicia. 

"  It  decreed  the  necessity  of  removing  the 
Uniat  Metropolitan,  expelling  the  Basilian  monks, 
confiscating  their  property,  and  replacing  them 
by  Orthodox  popes. 

"...  While  assuring  the  correspondent  of 
the  journal  Kiev  that  it  is  false  that  violent 
means  have  been  employed,  the  Archbishop 
Euloge  has  already  transported  from  Lemberg 
to  Kharkov  more  than  300  children  in  order 
to  educate  them  in  his  religion.  .  .  .  The 
Ruthenian  metropolitan  of  Lemberg  was  arrested 
and  deported  to  Nijni-Novgorod,  then  to  Koursk, 
for  having  protested.  He  is  the  head  of  the 
Ruthenian  Uniat  Church,  which  numbers  2,325 


AFTER   THE   WAR  329 

priests  and  3,540,000  faithful  in  Galicia,  to  say 
nothing  of  Bukovina  and  America,  where  there 
are  nearly  a  million  Ruthenians. 

"  The  fate  of  the  Uniat  religion  seems  decided  : 
the  Governor-General,  Bobrinsky,  has  declared 
that  he  recognizes  only  three  religions — Orthodox, 
Catholic,  and  Jewish. 

"  Twenty  thousand  officials  employed  by  the 
posts,  railways,  etc.,  of  the  Austrian  administra- 
tion, all  Galicians,  are  to-day  without  employ- 
ment, plunged  into  the  deepest  poverty ;  they 
have  been  replaced  by  Russians,  who  do  not 
even  know  the  language.  The  Nationalist 
deputy,  Tshihatshov,  demands  the  colonization 
of  Galicia  by  Russian  peasants,  and  announces 
that  300,000  Muscovite  colonists  have  already 
been  dispatched. 

"  The  Russian  journals  of  the  Left  and  Right, 
and  even  some  Nationalist  journals,  criticize  these 
regrettable  measures."  ' 

Another  Swiss  journal,  the  Lausanne  Gazette," 
equally  moderate  and  sympathizing  equally  with 
the  Allies,  recalling  the  fact  that  Russia  was 
to  act  the  part  of  a  "  steam-roller  "  in  the  present 
war,  remarks,  a  propos  of  the  Russian  policy  in 
Galicia  :— 

"  There  was  generosity  and  grandeur  even  in 
the  pose  of  Russia  drawing  the  sword  in  favour 

'  See  thQ  Journal  de  Geneve  for  the  i6th  of  February  19 15. 
'  La  Gazette  de  Lausanne^  ist  of  March  19 15. 


330  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

of  threatened  Serbia  ;  but  is  Russia  then  only 
capable  of  generosity  towards  countries  which 
do  not  belong  to  her?"' 

In  replying  to  this  question  I  will  say  that 
we  must  first  of  all  decide  which  Russia  we 
are  discussing,  because  there  are  two  Russias— 
the  Russia  of  Tsarism,  Nationalism,  and  the  re- 
action, and  the  Russia  of  democracy,  toleration, 
and  progress .  The  latter  is  in  no  way  responsible 
for  the  deeds  of  the  former.  The  Russian 
democracy  deplores  the  brutal  actions  of  an 
arbitrary  Tsarism  and  extends  a  brotherly  hand 
toward  all  the  oppressed,  whose  fate  it  can  well 
comprehend,   being  itself  oppressed. 

The  present  war  proves  that  the  union  of  all 


^  The  present  work  was  already  written  when  the  Swiss  journal, 
the  Berner  Tagzvacht,  and  others,  published  information  as  to  the 
conduct  of  the  Germans  in  Russian  Poland.  Compared  with  their 
actions,  the  Russian  policy  in  Galicia  might  be  called  "  tolerant," 
for  while  the  Russian  authorities  practise  Russification,  the 
Germans  in  Poland  prefer  to  exterminate  the  population ;  while 
the  Russians  suppress  newspapers,  the  Germans  suppress  whole 
villages  and  towns.  Or,  as  a  Polish  publicist  has  remarked,  they 
destroy  with  far  more  "system  "  and  "organization." 

As  for  the  Austrians,  they  have  established  a  true  reign  of 
terror  in  the  Slav  provinces  of  their  State.  They  hang  and 
imprison  en  masse  those  Slavs  who  are  suspected  of  Russian 
sympathies,  leaving  the  bodies  hanging  for  weeks.  .  .  .  The 
population  of  Austrian  Bukovina  fled  into  Russia  to  escape  the 
"administrative  psychosis"  (the  expression  of  an  eye-witness 
from  whom  I  received  a  private  letter)  which  seized  the  Austrian 
authorities  in  the  Austrian  provinces  reoccupied  by  the  Austrian 
troops  after  the  temporary  retreat  of  Russia. 


AFTER   THE   WAR  331 

the  peoples  inhabiting  Russia  is  an  actual  fact ; 
and  it  is  extremely  regrettable  that  the  Govern- 
ment should  shatter  this  union  by  its  measures 
of  oppression  and  "  Russification."  And  there 
is  no  doubt  that  when  the  present  system  of 
government  has  been  done  away  with  the  peoples 
dwelling  on  Russian  soil  will  succeed  in  estab- 
lishing such  forms  of  political  cohabitation  and 
co-existence  as  will  assure  to  all  of  them  the 
widest  possibilities  of  national  development. 


Ill 

But  that  all  this  may  be  realized  more  readily 
the  effectual  assistance  of  the  democracies  of 
the  Allied  nations  would  not  only  be  of  great 
utility,  but  is  even  a  necessity.  My  readers  will 
recall  the  last  few  lines  of  the  letter  from  a 
Lettish  revolutionary  which  I  quoted  in  a  pre- 
ceding chapter.  The  writer  of  the  letter  fears 
the  triumph  of  Tsarism,  and  does  not  con- 
ceal the  fact.  But  he  relies  on  the  French  and 
English  democracies,  who  will  not — he  hopes- 
allow  Tsarism  to  oppress  the  lesser  peoples.  The 
same  hopes  are  expressed  by  the  press  of  other 
nationalities.  The  Armenian  publicist  M. 
Varandian,  when  the  Novoie  Vremla,  the  organ 
of  Russian  Nationalism,  pronounced  in  favour 
of  "  an  annexation  pure  and  simple  of  Turkish 
Armenia  '    and  its  incorporation  into  the  Russian 


332  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

State,  replied  that  "  England  and  France  will 
also  have  their  word  to  say  as  to  the  final  settle- 
ment," and  asked,  in  the  name  of  "  the  great 
majority  of  the  Armenian  people,"  that  Turkish 
Armenia  shall  be  constituted  as  "an  autonomous 
State  under  the  collective  protectorate  of  France, 
Russia,  and  England."  The  Polish  democrats, 
who  are  justified  in  distrusting  the  promises  of 
Tsarism,  also  appeal  to  the  democracies  of 
France  and  England. 

The  Lausanne  Cazette,  in  the  article  lately 
cited,  condemns  the  reactionary  policy  of  Tsarism 
as  regards  the  Poles  and  Ruthenians,  and  ex- 
presses the  conviction  that  "  if  the  last  word 
of  settlement  rests  with  the  Triple  Entente  its 
diplomatists  will  have  the  right  to  speak  plainly 
in  the  Congress  which  will  establish  peace.  It 
is  to  be  hoped  that  the  delegates  of  France  and 
England  will  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  their 
Muscovite  ally,  and  that  their  own  Liberalism 
will  to  some  extent  affect  their  Eastern  partner. 
It  would  be  reassuring  for  the  future  should 
the  present  war  draw  Russia  into  the  orbit  of 
the  great  civilizing  Powers  of  the  West ;  but 
for  the  moment,  we  must  admit,  Russian  policy 
continues  to  draw  its  inspiration  from  Prussian 
and  Austro- Hungarian  methods  far  more  than 
from   French  and  English   principles."  ^ 

Personally    I    do   not    put   my   trust   in   diplo- 
'  La  Gazette  de  Lausanne,  ist  of  March  191 5. 


AFTER  THE   WAR  333 

matists  or  members  of  Governments.  I  put  it 
rather  in  the  democratic  masses  of  the  AlHes 
of  Russia.  Before  the  war  the  union  of  Russia, 
France,  and  England  was  of  a  diplomatic, 
military,  and,  in  general,  governmental  character. 
The  French  and  English  Governments  were  con- 
cerned with  the  aspirations  and  interests  of  the 
Russian  Government  rather  than  with  those  of 
the  Russian  people.  Thus  we  have  witnessed 
things  as  strange  as  the  systematic  support  of 
the  Russian  reaction  by  means  of  the  money 
of  French  republicans  ;  or  as  the  arrest  of  a 
Russian  political  refugee  (M.  Adamovitsh)  by 
Anglo-Egyptian  authorities,  and  his  extradition 
by  the  Tsar's  Government.  France  was  giving 
asylum  to  Russian  political  refugees,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  Government  of  republican 
France  tolerated  the  existence  in  Paris  of  a 
bureau  of  the  Russian  secret  police,  who 
operated  unashamed  and  unhindered  in  the 
French   capital. 

All  these  obvious  contradictions  are  explained 
by  the  fact  that  France  and  England,  in  the 
persons  of  their  Governments,  regarded  their 
alliance  with  Russia  as  an  alliance  with  ofhcial 
and  governmental  Russia^  which  was  yet  at  war 
with  her  own  people. 

But  then  the  "  world-war "  came,  and  the 
union  of  the  three  Governments  became  a  union 
of  peoples,  sealed  by  the  red  seal  of  their  blood. 


334  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

shed  in  terrible  abundance  on  common  battle- 
fields. And  I  will  not,  I  cannot,  believe  that 
all  this  blood  will  be  shed  for  nothing,  that  after 
the  war  we  shall  return  to  the  bad  old  state  of 
things. 

The  Russian  people  did  not  accept  the  present 
war  for  egoistical  reasons.  It  had  no  need  of 
conquests,  of  new  territories,  of  the  subjection 
of  other  peoples,  of  brigandage  or  booty.  It 
accepted  the  war  as  a  war  for  the  defence  of 
its  own  country  and  the  defence  of  Europe 
against  a  brutal  oppressor  and  invader.  It 
accepted  it  because  it  sincerely  believes  that  it 
ought  to  save  Serbia,  France,  and  Belgium ; 
because  the  advanced  democracies  of  France  and 
England  are  fighting  by  its  side  against  the  same 
enemy.  But  it  hopes  and  desires  that  they  will 
be  beside  it,  not  only  on  the  battlefields  of  the 
war  against  Germany  but  also  on  the  battle- 
fields of  its  painful  campaign  against  the  Russian 
reaction,  the  fight  for  liberty. 

A  first  step  towards  this  true  union— a  Holy 
Alliance  of  the  popular  masses  of  the  Allied 
countries— was  taken  by  the  Socialist  Conference 
in  London,  at  which  were  present  Socialist 
members  of  the  French  and  Belgian  Govern- 
ments, who  passed  a  vote  of  protest  against  the 
reactionary  policy  of  Tsarism.  Some  of  the 
French  Conservative  journals  expressed  their 
intense   disapproval  of  this   step.      But  of  what 


AFTER   THE   WAR  335 

did  they  disapprove  ?  Do  they  not  understand 
that  the  attitude  assumed  by  the  London  Confer- 
ence is  consistent  with  the  interests  of  France  and 
England  ?  Do  they  not  understand  that  even  from 
a  purely  military  point  of  view  Russia,  their  ally, 
would  be  stronger  and  more  capable  of  resist- 
ance against  the  common  enemy  were  the  moral 
of  the  Russian  soldiers  not  depressed  by  the 
sad  and  terrible  news  reaching  the  trenches  from 
the  interior  of  the  country?  Can  a  soldier  fight 
well  when  he  knows  that  in  the  interior  of  the 
country  which  he  is  defending  the  people  is  in 
chains,  that  the  most  elementary  rights  of  man 
are  being  violated,  and  that  the  prisons  are  over- 
flowing with  his  brothers  ?  No,  I  assert  that 
even  from  the  most  strictly  Nationalist  and  Con- 
servative point  of  view,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  those  who  desire  nothing  from  this  war 
but  the  immediate  object  of  crushing  Germany, 
the  action  of  the  Socialist  Conference  was  useful 
and  beneficial. 

As  for  the  democratic  elements  of  France  and 
England,  they  should  understand  that  the  demo- 
cratization of  the  political  system  of  Russia  is 
in  their  own  interests.  If  the  Germanophile 
party  in  Russia  wish  to  bring  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  Russian  Government  in  order  to 
persuade  it  to  commit  an  act  of  treachery  against 
its  present  Allies,  who  could  save  Russia  from 
this  infamy,  or  France,  England,  Belgium,  and 


336  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

Serbia  from  this  perfidious  and  possibly  mortal 
blow?     Who  but  the  Russian  democracy? 

On  the  other  hand,  the  solution  of  the 
problems  involved  in  the  termination  of  the  war 
will  be  greatly  facilitated  by  the  triumph  of  a 
democratic  regime  in  Russia.  The  more 
thoughtful  portion  of  the  Russian  people  does 
not  desire  a  policy  of  conquest.  It  does  not 
desire  the  forcible  annexation  of  Galicia,  Prussia, 
Asia  Minor,  the  Dardanelles,  and  Constanti- 
nople. With  the  Conference  of  London,  it 
"  wishes  to  see  Belgium  liberated  and  indemni- 
fied. It  trusts  that  the  Polish  question  will  be 
solved  conformably  with  the  will  of  the  Polish 
people,  in  the  sense  of  autonomy  in  the  midst 
of  another  people,  or  complete  independence.  It 
wishes  all  annexed  populations,  from  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  the  Balkans,  to  recover  the  right 
to  dispose  of  themselves  in  freedom." 

If  the  present  war  does  not  realize  these 
desiderata,  it  will  not  be  merely  a  "  great  illu- 
sion," to  use  the  phrase  of  Mr.  Norman  Angell  ; 
it  will  be  a  vast  "  bluff,"  a  world-wide  fraud, 
an  abominable  outrage  and  insult  to  all  the 
millions  of  dead  who  will  have  given  their  lives 
for  a  cause  which  they  believed  to  be  just  and 
noble. 

But  if  the  realization  of  the  great  object  of 
the  war  is  to  be  possible  the  establishment  of 
a  democratic  government  in  Russia  is  a  necessity. 


AFTER  THE   WAR  337 

It  is  a  practical  necessity  because  the  Russian 
democracy,  if  it  finds  itself  possessed  of  power, 
will  be  able  to  form  an  agreement  with  the 
democracies  of  the  Allied  countries  in  respect 
of  all  the  problems  of  the  moment.  Between 
Tsarism  and  the  British  Government  a  conflict 
in  respect  of  the  possession  of  the  Dardanelles 
and  Constantinople  is  a  possibility  ;  but  it  would 
not  be  possible  between  the  Russian  democracy 
and  the  English  democracy,  as  the  Russian  people 
has  no  interest  in  demanding  the  military  posses- 
sion of  the  Dardanelles.  And  so  with  all  the 
dangerous  and  litigious  problems  of  international 
relations. 

IV 

The  more  thoughtful  elements  of  the  Russian 
people  agree  entirely  with  the  declaration  of  the 
Conference  of  London,  which  states  that  the 
labouring  classes  of  the  Allied  countries  "  do  not 
desire  the  political  and  economic  destruction  of 
Germany,"  that  they  are  making  war,  not  against 
the  German  people  but  against  its  Government. 
The  more  thoughtful  elements  of  the  Russian 
people  believe  sincerely  that  "  the  victory  of  the 
Allies  should  be  the  victory  of  national  liberty, 
of  the  unity,  independence,  and  autonomy  of  the 
nations  in  the  peaceful  federation  of  the  United 
States  of  Europe  and  the  World." 

I  regard  the  Russian  people— in  its  lower  social 

2ii 


338  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

strata — as  one  of  the  most  pacific  and  non-mili- 
tary— or  rather  anti-miUtarist— peoples  of  modern 
Europe.  I  explain  this,  not  by  this  or  that 
"  psychological  "  peculiarity  of  the  Russian 
people  but  by  the  economic  conditions  of  its 
life.  The  agricultural  peoples  are,  in  general, 
pacific,  because  they  have  already  passed  through 
the  disturbed  period  of  the  warlike  existence  of 
hunters  and  nomads,  and  have  not  yet  reached 
the  period  of  insatiable  and  capitalistic  Im- 
perialism, which  busies  itself  with  international 
brigandage.  The  only  motive  which  can  engender 
the  desire  of  conquest  and  expansion  in  the  case 
of  an  agricultural  people  is  "  land  hunger,"  the 
lack  of  soil.  But  this  motive  could  not  impel 
the  Russian  people  to  go  to  war.  In  the  first 
place,  they  know  that  it  is  already  too  late  to 
satisfy  this  hunger  at  the  expense  of  neighbouring 
States,  these  being  for  the  most  part  more  thickly 
peopled  than  Russia  ;  secondly,  they  know  that 
they  already  possess  in  Russia  great  territorial 
wealth  which  has  been  monopolized  by  a  small 
number  of  nobles  and  great  landlords,  and  that 
to  obtain  the  soil  which  is  necessary  to  them  they 
must  make  their  demands,  not  of  foreign  peoples 
and  Governments  but  of  their  own  masters.  In 
place  of  an  international  war  of  aggression  they 
must  fight  for  "  land  and  liberty  "  in  their  own 
country. 

This   is  why   the  greatest  of  Russian  writers, 


AFTER   THE   WAR  339 

Leo  Tolstoy,  who  tried  in  his  philosophy  to 
express  the  "  truth  of  the  moujiks,"  is  the  greatest 
pacifist  of  the  modern  world.  This  is  why  the 
only  remarkable  Russian  painter  of  battle-scenes, 
M.  Verestschagin,  represented  the  tragic  and 
mournful  aspect  of  war  in  his  pictures.  This  is 
why  in  the  works  of  the  best  Russian  writers  you 
will  never  find  hymns  of  praise  to  the  ferocious 
God  of  Battles,  but  a  unanimous  condemnation 
of  warfare.  This  is  why  the  idea  of  a  protest 
against  war  against  "  murder,"  and  the  propa- 
ganda in  favour  of  peace,  occupy  so  large  a  place 
in  the  religious  movements  of  the  rural  masses  of 
Great  Russia  and  her  sister— Ukraine. 

As  for  the  workers  of  the  towns,  their  pacificism 
is  so  great  that  their  parliamentary  representa- 
tives have  voted  against  the  war  credits  even  in 
time  of  war,  as  my  readers  will  remember. 

This  instinctive  aversion  to  war  and  aggression 
does  not,  it  is  true,  exclude  a  great  capacity  for 
defence.  But  I  believe  that  people  which  is  least 
aggressive  is  most  capable  of  defence.  We  know 
that  the  most  docile  animals  defend  themselves 
often  the  most  valiantly.  A  comparison  between 
the  attitude  of  the  Russian  people  in  the  war 
against  Japan  and  its  attitude  during  the  present 
war  is  the  best  proof  of  what  I  have  said  of 
the  mentality  of  the  popular  masses  of  Russia  : 
the  war  against  Japan  was  for  the  Russian  people 
a  war  of  "other  people,"  an  aggressive  and  use- 


340  RUSSIA   AND    THE   GREAT   WAR 

less  and  detestable  war.  The  present  war  is  a 
defensive  war — disagreeable  but  necessary.  It  is 
a  painful  but  salutary  task,  a  heavy  but  inevitable 
burden  ;  the  labour  of  sweeping  aside  a  large 
and  dangerous  obstacle  which  might  obstruct  the 
broad  highway  of  historic  evolution.  And  we 
may  be  sure  that  as  soon  as  this  task  is  finished, 
as  soon  as  the  Russian  people,  with  its  Allies, 
has  torn  the  bloodstained  sword  of  Prussian  mili- 
tarism from  the  hands  of  the  German  people,  the 
Russian  people  will  be  the  first  to  offer  its  sincere 
friendship  to  its  former  enemy.  We  may  be  sure 
that  after  the  end  of  the  present  war  the  Russian 
people  will  contribute  largely  to  the  establish- 
ment of  peace  in  Europe  and  the  realization  of 
all  those  measures  which  might  ensure  that 
peace. 

But  this  is  not  the  only  service  that  the  Russian 
democracy  may  render  to  the  world.  Russia  is 
a  revolutionary  country— that  must  not  be  for- 
gotten. Having  lit  the  great  torch  of  the  libera- 
tive  movement  in  its  own  country,  the  Russian 
people— or  rather  the  peoples  o'f  Russia— have 
hurled  it  beyond  their  frontiers.  The  Russian 
revolution  of  1905  was  a  signal,  an  impulse  to 
many  other  peoples.  In  Austria  the  working- 
classes  obtained  from  their  Government  a 
measure  of  universal  suffrage,  thanks  to  the 
impression  produced  on  that  Government  by  the 
revolutionary  movement  in  Russia.     "If  you  do 


AFTER   THE   WAR  341 

not  give  us  electoral  rights  we  shall  speak 
Russian."  Such  was  the  expression  employed 
by  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  labour  movement 
in  Austria  during  the  struggle  for  universal 
suffrage  in  that  country.  The  Russian  revolution 
awoke  from  their  secular  slumber  the  peoples 
of  the  East— Turkey,  Persia,  and  even  mysterious 
China.  The  Russian  people,  which  has  not  yet, 
alas  !  been  able  to  liberate  itself,  has  yet  rendered 
a  remarkable  service  to  the  liberation  of  other 
peoples. 

And  it  is  with  much  gratitude,  and  not  without 
pride,  that  I  have  recently  read  in  the  work  of 
Marcel  Sembat,  one  of  the  organizers  of  the 
national  defence  in  France,  and  one  of  the  scepti- 
cal minds  of  that  country,  the  following  lines 
concerning  Russia. 

"  Russia  does  not  appear  to  me  as  a  bogey," 
writes  Sembat.  "  On  the  contrary,  at  this  dis- 
tance from  Russia  the  Slav  appears  charming 
to  me.  .  .  .  What,  for  me,  is  Russia?  Russia, 
to  me,  is  a  revolutionary  comrade  ...  a  scien- 
tist, a  scholar,  with  nothing  of  the  barbarian 
about  him  !  Russia  is  a  whole  impassioned 
literature ;  it  means  the  heroes  of  Turgenev, 
Tolstoy,  Gorky.  I  count  on  Russia  enormously. 
I  tell  myself  that  there  are  in  Russia  the  Slav 
soul,  buried  treasures  of  fraternal  enthusiasm,  of 
generous  devotion,  a  great  need  of  and  a  great 
capacity    for   loving    pity.      I    count   secretly    on 


342  RUSSIA  AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

the  Russian  people  as  on  one  of  the  chief  peoples 
of  the  Socialist  Period."' 

Russia  is  a  country  of  great  revolutionary  and 
democratic  possibilities.  But  for  these  possibili- 
ties to  be  realized  the  European  democracies  who 
are  marching  side  by  side  with  the  Russian  people 
against  German  Imperialism,  to  fight  for  the 
liberty  of  the  world,  must  not  leave  the  masses 
of  Russia  alone  and  unsupported  when  they 
march  to  another  war— against  their  own  oppres- 
sors, to  win  the  liberty  of  their  own  country. 
May  the  sacred  union,  the  Holy  Alliance  of  the 
democratic  elements  and  the  popular  masses  of 
Russia  and  the  most  advanced  coimtries  of 
Europe  endure  after  the  war,  the  end  of  the 
present  war  !  May  it  endure  into  the  future  ! 
^  Marcel  Sembat,  Faites  un  Rot,  sino?i  faites  la  Paix,  pp.  80-82. 


CHAPTER    V 

I.  Russia  and  England.  Their  economic  relations.  The  neces- 
sity of  a  system  of  Free  Trade  in  these  relations. — II.  The 
intellectual  relations  between  Russia  and  England. — Con- 
cerning certain  "  deviations  "  of  English  sympathies. 

I 

Finally,  a  few  brief  words  as  to  the  relations 
between  England  and  Russia.' 

According  to  my  custom,  I  will  begin  with 
the  material  and  economic  side  of  these  rela- 
tions. 

The  beginnings  of  Anglo -Russian  commercial 
exchange  go  back  to  a  period  already  remote. 
In  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century  English 
merchants  came  to  Russia  for  purposes  of  trade. 
In  1566  the  Government  of  Ivan  Grozny— the 
Terrible — ^addressed  itself  to  the  Government  of 
Elizabeth  through  the  mediumship  of  the  English 

'  I  may  permit  myself  to  be  brief  in  this  chapter,  because  I 
am  at  present  preparing  a  large  work  on  "  Russia  and  Europe," 
which  will  be  published  in  English  by  Mr.  Fisher  Unwin,  to 
whom  I  am  profoundly  grateful  for  affording  me  the  opportunity 
to  inform  the  English  public  concerning  the  life  and  history  of 
my  country.  In  this  work  I  shall  speak  at  length  of  the  relations 
between  Russia  and  England. 

343 


344  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

Ambassador  in  Moscow,  Jenkinson,  begging  her 
to  send  from  England  good  artisans  and  crafts- 
men to  assist  in  the  development  of  trades  and 
industries.  In  1569  the  English  traders  re- 
ceived from  the  Russian  Government  a  "  privi- 
lege "  allowing  them  to  establish  a  metallurgical 
workshop  in  the  north  of  Russia  (at  Vytshegda, 
in  the  province  of  Vologda).  In  the  commercial 
town  of  Shuia  the  English  traders  had  at  this 
period   their  own  warehouses  and  offices. 

The  general  census  of  the  population  of  the 
Russian  Empire  in  1897  numbered  7,481  British 
subjects  residing  in  Russia  at  the  moment  of 
the  census — of  whom  3,602  were  men  and  3,879 
women  ;  80  per  cent,  of  these  British  immigrants 
were  living  in  the  cities  and  only  20  per  cent,  in 
the  rural  districts.  A  third  of  the  whole  were 
living  in  the  capital  (the  same  census  gave  2,527 
English  as  living  in  Petersburg).  The  remain- 
ing two -thirds  inhabited  principally  the  great 
maritime  ports.'  The  majority  of  English  subjects 
residing  in  Russia  are  employed  in  wholesale 
trade  and  industry. 

According  to  the  figures  given  by  M.  Isch- 
chanian,  the  Armenian  economist  (whose  work 
on  the  foreign  elements  in  the  economic  life  of 

^  The  same  census  numbered  158,103  German  subjects  in 
Russia,  121,599  Austrians,  and  only  9,421  French  subjects.  See 
M.  Ischchanian's  book,  Die  ausldndischen  Ekmente  in  der  russis- 
chen  Volkswirtscha/t,  BerUn,  191 3,  pp.  62-3. 


AFTER  THE   WAR  345 

Russia  was  published  in  German  in  19 13),  the 
total  amount  of  English  capital  in  the  industrial 
undertakings  and  various  securities  in  Russia  was, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  about 
£37,000,000.  Taking  into  consideration  that 
the  total  amount  of  British  capital  abroad  is 
£3,000,000,000,  we  perceive  that  only  12  per 
cent,   of  this  sum  was  placed  in  Russia. 

As  for  the  commercial  exchange  between 
Russia  and  Great  Britain,  it  is  expressed  by  the 
following  figures  : — 

In  1900  the  importation  of  Russian  products 
into  England  attained  the  value  of  146  million 
roubles,  and  the  exports  of  British  products  to 
Russia  attained  a  value  of  127  million  roubles. 
In  1909  the  Russian  imports  entering  England 
had  already  increased  to  289  million  roubles, 
while  the  British  exports  to  Russia  remained  at 
almost  the  same  level  as  in  1900,  being  valued 
at   128  million  roubles. 

So  the  balance-sheet  of  Anglo-Russian  trade 
is  active  for  Russia  and  passive  for  England, 
while  the  Russo -German  commercial  exchange 
presents  a  very  different  picture  and  is  balanced 
in  favour  of  Germany. 

From  this  point  of  view  the  greatest  possible 
development  of  trade  between  England  and 
Russia  is  very  desirable  for  the  former,  especi- 
ally after  the  war,  when  the  relations  between 
Russia  and  her  immediate  neighbours— Germany 


346  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

and  Austria — will  necessarily  be  diminished  for 
a  shorter  or  longer  period. 

But  we  may  invoke  a  more  general  reason  than 
this  to  demonstrate  the  utility  of  wider  economic 
relations  between  Russia  and  England.  Eng- 
land is  a  Free  Trade  country,  an  enemy  of  Pro- 
tectionism. Germany — after  Russia-  is  the  most 
Protectionist  country  in  Europe,  and  it  is  easily 
comprehensible  that  Russia  cannot  dispense  with 
Protectionism  in  her  commercial  relations  with 
Germany  until  the  latter  abolishes  her  Customs 
Tariff.  But  in  her  relations  with  England  Russia 
can  and  should  pursue  the  policy  of  Free  Trade, 
and  the  abolition  of  Customs  Tariffs.  In  this 
case  the  vast  Russian  market  will  be  open  to  the 
products  of  British  industry,  whose  competition 
will  stimulate  the  energy  and  initiative  of  the 
Russian  capitalists.  At  the  same  time,  the  pro- 
ducts of  Russian  agriculture — wheat,  sugar,  etc.— 
as  well  as  the  products  of  the  petroleum  industry, 
will  have  larger  access  to  the  British  market, 
above  all  after  the  neutralization  of  the 
Dardanelles  and  the  re-establishment  of  traffic 
on  the  Baltic. 

I  have  read  Lately  that  certain  English  pub- 
licists—Mr. Wells  among  others— are  undertak- 
ing a  campaign  in  favour  of  the  establishment 
of  a  Protectionist  system  in  England.  I  do  not 
believe  the  English  people  will  wish  to  repeat 
the  error  of  the  Russian  Government.      Our  ex- 


AFTER   THE   WAR  347 

perience  suffices  to  show  that  the  Protectionist 
system  is  harmful  to  the  economic  development 
of  modern  countries,  and  that  it  constitutes  a 
menace  to  international  peace.  The  abolition  of 
customs,  the  victory  of  Free  Trade  between  the 
nations  of  the  world— such  must  be  our  common 
programme  in  future. 

II 

The  intellectual  relations  between  Russia  and 
Great  Britain  are  far  more  highly  developed  than 
their  material  and  economic  relations.  But  I 
cannot  in  this  case  tell  you  on  which  side  the 
balance-sheet  is  active  !  In  the  domain  of  com- 
mercial exchange  we  can  measure  the  results 
attained  by  tons  of  merchandise  and  by  pounds 
sterling,  but  in  the  intellectual  domain  an  evalu- 
ation and  appreciation  of  the  balance-sheet  can 
only  be  relative. 

But  I  do  know  that  in  Russia  the  intellectual 
influence  of  England  is  already  considerable. 
Certain  currents  of  English  literature  have  pro- 
duced a  great  impression  on  Russian  letters. 
Shakespeare  is  no  less  known  and  loved  by 
Russian  readers  than  the  classical  writers  of  their 
own  country.  Children  and  young  people  are 
familiar  with  the  heroes  of  Walter  Scott,  smile 
at  the  adventures  of  Swift's  Gulliver,  and  weep 
over  the  pathetic  pages  of  Dickens.    "  Byronism  " 


348  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

played  an  enormous  part  in  the  evolution  of 
Russian  literature,  and  the  two  great  lights  of 
Russian  poetry,  Pushkin  and  Lermontov,  are  the 
intellectual   children  of  Byron. 

Modern  English  literature  is  equally  familiar 
and  equally  loved  in  Russia.  Nearly  all  the 
works  of  the  best  English  authors  are  published 
in  Russia— sometimes  going  through  many  edi- 
tions. The  names  of  Wells,  Kipling,  Jerome,  and 
many  others  are  very  familiar  to  Russian  readers. 

English  science  has  also  a  great  influence  in 
Russia.  Darwinism  is  the  predominating  ten- 
dency in  Russian  naturalism,  and  several  gene- 
rations, not  only  of  naturalists,  scientists,  and 
University  teachers,  but  the  bulk  of  the  intel- 
lectual youth  of  Russia,  have  shaped  their  mental 
equipment  by  the  aid  of  Darwinian  studies  and 
theories. 

As  for  the  political  system  of  Great  Britain, 
it  is  admired  above  all  by  the  Russian  Liberals. 
As  for  the  Radical  and  Democratic  elements  of 
Russian  society,  their  attention  is  drawn  and  their 
sympathies  captured  rather  by  the  republican 
regime  of  France  than  by  the  monarchical 
constitutionalism  of  England.  This  is  explained 
by  the  fact  that  in  Russia  one  cannot  count  on 
the  possibility  of  transforming  the  Tsarist  auto- 
cracy into  a  constitutional  monarchism  of  the 
English  type.  The  clash  between  the  reaction 
and  the  democracy  is  too  violent,  the  social  and 


AFTER  THE   WAR  349 

political  conflict  too  profound,  to  permit  one  to 
count   on   such  a  possibility. 

Among  the  thinking  members  of  the  working- 
classes— that  is,  the  Socialists— a  great  interest 
is  felt  in  the  English  Labour  movement.  The 
political  and  economic  theories  of  Robert  Owen 
and  of  Chartism  are  necessary  subjects  of  study 
in  the  classes  organized  by  the  Russian  workers. 
Many  books  and  pamphlets  published  by  the 
Socialist  bookshops  are  devoted  to  the  history 
of  the  Socialist  movement  in  England.  In 
Russian  Marxism,  which  forms  the  prevailing 
current  in  the  Socialism  of  our  country,  the  study 
of  the  economic  evolution  of  England  occupies 
a  great  place,  and  the  Russian  Marxists  are  fond 
of  saying  that  the  true  revolutionary  Marxism 
constitutes  a  synthesis  of  three  elements  :  the 
German  dialectical  philosophy,  French  revolu- 
tionary practice,  and  English  economic  evolution. 

The  Russian  press  follows  the  principal  events 
of  English  national  life  with  great  attention,  most 
of  the  larger  Russian  journals  having  their  special 
correspondents  in  England.  The  Labour  press 
in  Russia  always  has  reliable  information  as  to 
the  struggles  and  the  situation  of  the  proletarian 
class  in  England,  and  I  believe  an  English  artisan 
would  be  greatly  astonished  if  he  could  realize 
the  great  and  sincere  interest  with  which  his 
Russian  comrades  follow  all  that  affects  the  pro- 
letariat of  England. 


350  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT  WAR 

In  attempting  a  brief  analysis  of  Russian  influ- 
ence in  England^  I  may  begin  by  asserting  that 
the  literary  aspect  of  that  influence  is  by  no 
means  negligible.  Not  Tolstoy  alone,  who  has 
left  his  visible  imprint  on  the  English  thought 
of  our  time,  but  many  of  the  classics  of  Russian 
literature  are  known  and  appreciated  in  England, 
where  the  modern  Russian  writers  also  are  widely 
read — for  example,  Gorky  and  Tchekov. 

English  interest  in  Russia  has  increased  more 
particularly  during  the  last  ten  years,  since  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  and  the  revolution  of  1905. 
The  appearance  of  organs  of  the  English  press 
devoted  especially  to  Russian  affairs  proves  that 
this  interest  is  profound  and  serious.  It  is  true 
that  some  of  these  publications  give  a  somewhat 
partial  view  of  Russian  affairs  (this  criticism  is 
true,  for  example,  of  the  Russian  Supplement 
published  by  the  Times),  but  others  are  more 
objective  and  are  inspired,  not  by  the  views  of 
the  Russian  Government  but  by  the  aspirations 
of  the  Russian  masses.  Such  are  Free  Russia 
and  Darkest  Russia.  Finally  I  may  cite  the 
Russian  Review,  devoted  to  the  study  of  various 
problems  of  Russian  life,  two  weeklies,  and  a 
monthly  review  published  in  English  and  devoted 
particularly  to  Russia :  this  is  at  least  a  be- 
ginning. 

But  what  is  still  more  remarkable  than  the 
literary  and  informative  interest  felt  for  Russia 


AFTER   THE   WAR  351 

in  England,  is  the  active  and  practical  sympa- 
thy displayed  in  certain  English  circles  for  the 
Russian  people  and  its  revolutionary  struggles. 
The  existence  of  a  "  Union  of  the  Friends  of 
Russian  Liberty  "  in  England,  the  agitation  in 
respect  of  the  arrest  of  the  old  revolutionist 
Tchaikowsky,  who  was  literally  torn  from  the 
hands  of  his  jailers,  thanks  to  the  intervention 
of  British  public  opinion,  and  again,  the  inter- 
vention of  English  society  in  the  affair  of  Miss 
Malitzky,  the  propaganda  directed  against  the 
persecution  of  Jews  in  Russia,  the  protests  of 
the  British  Labour  Party  against  the  arrest  and 
extradition  of  M.  Adamovitsh  in  Egypt,  and  a 
long  series  of  similar  actions,  prove  that  the 
British  democracy  sympathises  with  the  sufferings 
of  the  masses  in  Russia,  and  in  their  great 
struggle  for  the  destruction  of  the  autocracy  and 
the  establishment  of  a  democratic  system  of 
government. 

I  may  here  recall  a  personal  impression.  In 
1907  I  was  among  the  delegates  sent  from  Russia 
to  the  Congress  of  the  Social -Democratic  Labour 
Party  of  Russia,  which  cannot  meet  in  Russia, 
being  an  "  illegal  "  Congress.  We  went  to  Den- 
mark, to  Copenhagen,  to  open  our  Congress. 
The  constitutional  Danish  Government  expelled 
us  as  though  we  had  been  dangerous  beasts.  We 
went  to  Stockholm  in  Sweden.  The  constitu- 
tional Swedish  Government  expelled  us  as  though 


352  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

we  had  been  dangerous  beasts.  We  then  sailed 
for  London,  where  no  one  disturbed  us  during 
the  four  or  five  weeks  of  our  labours.  And  when 
the  Congress  lacked  money  to  terminate  its 
labours  and  to  send  its  three  hundred  delegates 
back  to  Russia,  Englishmen  were  foimd  to  come 
to  the  aid  of  the  Russian  Social-Democratic  Party 
and  to  lend  it  the  necessary  and  very  considerable 
sum  of  money.  Expelled  from  two  European 
countries,  the  Russian  Socialists,  delegates  to  the 
Congress,  were  well  qualified  to  appreciate  the 
warm  welcome  which  they  found  in  the  capital 
of  Great  Britain. 

The  sympathies  of  the  advanced  and  demo- 
cratic elements  of  English  society  for  the 
cause  of  Russian  liberty  is  deep  and  sincere. 
We  can  only  express  the  hope  that  this 
sympathy  will  have  lost  none  of  its  strength 
after   the  war. 

I  must  here  warn  the  democratic  opinion  of 
England  against  a  change  in  the  attitude  observ- 
able of  the  English  democracy  toward  Russia. 
For  instance,  I  read,  in  a  Russian  journal,  an 
extract  from  an  article  which  had  appeared  in 
the  English  review  published  by  Mr.  and  Mrs. 
Sydney  Webb.  In  this  article  a  revision  was 
proposed  of  the  opinions  held  by  enlightened  and 
democratic  circles  in  England  concerning  the 
present  political  regime  in  Russia.  The  author 
of  the  article  endeavoured  to  convince  the  Eng- 


AFTER  THE   WAR  333 

lish  democrats  that  they  must  not  be  more  revo- 
lutionary than  the  Russian  revolutionists  them- 
selves ;  that  they  must  not  judge  Tsarism  as 
severely  as  of  old,  because — so  says  the  author  of 
the  article— the  oppressed  nations,  particularly  the 
Jews,  and  the  democratic  elements  in  Russia,  are 
reconciled  to  their  Government  on  account  of  the 
war.  This  argument  is  false  ;  no  "  reconcilia- 
tion "  has  taken  place  between  the  revolution  and 
the  reaction,  and  none  could  have  taken  place, 
for  the  simple  reason  that  Tsarism  is  continuing, 
even  during  the  war,  its  policy  of  oppression  and 
violence  in  the  interior  of  the  country.  Tsarism 
has  not  changed  during  the  war,  and  the  atti- 
tude of  the  English  democracy  ought  not  to 
change. 

Another  possible  modification  of  public  opinion 
may  have  its  source  in  a  too  great  respect  which 
some  of  its  representatives  entertain  for  the  so- 
called  "  historic  traditions  "  of  the  life  of  the  Rus- 
sian people.  An  example  of  this  kind  of  error  is 
to  be  found  in  the  interesting  pamphlet  by  Mr. 
G.  K.  Chesterton,  "The  Barbarism  of  Berlin." 
There  is  in  this  pamphlet  a  just  appreciation  of 
the  mentality  of  the  Russians  as  compared  with 
that  of  the  Prussians  : — 

"  The  Russian  institutions  are,  in  many  cases, 
left  in  the  rear  of  the  Russian  people,  and  many 
of  the  Russian  people  know  this.  But  the 
Prussian  institutions  are  supposed  to  be  in  ad- 

23 


354  RUSSIA   AND   THE   GREAT   WAR 

vance  of  the  Prussian  people,  and  most  Prussians 
believe  it."  ' 

But  the  same  author,  who  so  justly  appreciates 
the  institutions  of  Russia  as  outgrown  by  the 
Russian  people,  falls,  a  few  lines  farther  on,  into 
an  archaeological  sentimentalism,  and  sings  a 
hymn   of  praise  to   these   same  institutions  :-- 

"  If  the  Russian  institutions  are  old-fashioned, 
they  exhibit  honestly  the  good  as  well  as  the  bad 
that  can  be  found  in  old-fashioned  things.  In 
their  police  system  they  have  an  inequality  which 
is  against  our  ideas  of  law.  But  in  their  com- 
mune system  they  have  an  equality  that  is  older 
than  the  law  itself.  Even  when  they  flogged 
each  other  like  barbarians  they  called  upon  each 
other  by  their  Christian  names  like  children.  At 
their  worst  they  retained  all  the  best  of  a  rude 
society.  At  their  best,  they  are  simply  good,  like 
good  children,  or  good  nuns." 

Concerning  this  too  sentimental  and  sugary 
estimate,  I  will  confine  myself  to  the  remark  that 
it  would  be  far  better  if  the  Russians  described 
by  Mr.  Chesterton  were  to  call  upon  each  other 
by  their  Christian  names  like  children  without 
accompanying  this  infantile  amiability  by  blows 
of  the  whip.  I  am  ready  to  agree  with  Mr. 
Chesterton  when,  in  speaking  of  the  barbarian 
influence  experienced  by  the  Russians  during 
their  history,  he  wittily  remarks  :— 
'  G.K.Chesterton,  "The  Barbarism  of  Berlin,"  London,  1915. 


AFTER   THE   WAR  355 

"  Whether  Jonah  did  or  did  not  spend  three 
days  inside  a  fish,  that  did  not  turn  him  into  a 
merman."  ' 

I  am  of  the  same  opinion.  But  I  beheve  that 
if  Jonah  could  have  dispensed  with  a  somewhat 
disagreeable  detention  in  the  belly  of  the  whale 
he  would  gladly  have  done  so.  And  I  am  sure 
that  the  experience  was  neither  salutary  nor  use- 
ful from  a  hygienic  point  of  view,  and  that  on 
issuing  from  the  whale  Jonah  had,  probably,  any- 
thing but  the  look  of  a  well-groomed  and 
immaculate   gentleman  of  fashion. 

The  Russian  people  is  anxious  to  emerge  from 
the  belly  of  the  whale  of  Tsarism  and  reaction 
as  speedily  as  may  be.  May  the  English  demo- 
cracy aid  it  in  its  efforts  ! 

'  G.  K.  Chesterton,  "The  Barbarism  of  Berlin,"  London,  1915. 


■^ 


CONCLUSION 

I  HAVE  completed  my  work,  and  on  reading 
once  more  the  manuscript  of  this  hook,  I  myself 
am  struck  by  the  contradiction  of  sentiments 
which  fills  and  runs  through  it.  But  what  would 
you  have?  I  have  tried  to  be  sincere  in  what 
I  have  written.  And  the  contradictory  sentiments 
which  are  expressed  in  the  present  work  are  only 
a  reflection  of  the  real  contradictions  of  Russian 
life  and  its  situation  during  the  present  war. 

The  young  Russian  armies  are  defending  the 
cause  of  European  democracy  and  the  world's 
progress.  But  they  are  commanded  by  an  auto- 
cratic and  timeworn  power.  It  is  a  misfortune 
for  us,  the  democrats  of  Russia,  that  the  military 
forces  of  our  country  are  in  the  hands  of  auto- 
cratic Tsarism  !  But  for  the  European  demo- 
cracy, for  the  peoples  of  Belgium,  Serbia,  France, 
and  England,  it  is  none  the  less  a  lucky  chance 
that  the  millions  of  Russian  soldiers  are  obsti- 
nately and  to  the  death  resisting  the  aggression 
of  Germany  and  her  Allies. 

How  are  we  to  conciliate  our  own  misfortune 
with  the  "  lucky  chance  "  so  necessary  to  our 
Allies? 

356 


CONCLUSION  357 

I  find  a  good  and  simple  reply  to  this  question 
in  the  words  of  a  Russian  mother,  whose  letter 
to  her  son,  fallen  on  the  field  of  battle,  I  en- 
countered in  the  press  : — 

"  We  shall  not  live  for  ever  in  this  world.  What 
is  the  life  of  a  human  being?  A  drop  of  water 
in  the  life  of  glorious  Russia.  We  shall  not  live 
for  ever,  but  Russia  must  have  a  long  and  pros- 
perous life.  I  know  we  shall  be  forgotten  and 
our  happy  descendants  will  not  remember  those 
who  sleep  in  the  graves  of  soldiers  ;  but  what 
matter  !  " 

And  enlarging  this  generous  thought,  I  would 
say  :  The  interests  of  the  atom  must  be  sub- 
ordinated to  the  superior  interests  of  the  whole. 
In  the  first  place  the  interests  of  the  entire 
democracy  of  Europe,  the  progress  of  the  whole 
world  ;  then  the  individual  interests  of  Russia. 
First  the  interests  of  all  Russia,  then  the  interests 
of  this  or  that  group  !  It  is  the  one  rule,  the  one 
maxim,  possible  and  applicable  in  these  tragic 
hours  of  human  history. 

But  we  may  be  sure  that  in  yielding  the  first 
place  to  the  interests  of  the  whole  we  shall  also 
gain  our  own  portion.  The  triumph  of  the 
common  cause  of  European  democracy  will  at 
the  same  time  be  the  triumph  of  our  own  ! 


Ttbc  <3tc8bam  picas 

tTNWIN  BROTHERS,  LIMITED 
WOKINO  AND  LONDON 


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